WAR
War always changes the composition of a nation; but this change may be
either a loss or a gain. The modification of selection by war is far
more manifold than the literature on the biological effects of war would
lead the reader to suppose. All wars are partly eugenic and partly
dysgenic; some are mainly the one, some are mainly the other. The racial
effects of war occur in at least three periods:
1. The period of preparation.
2. The period of actual fighting.
3. The period of readjustment after the war.
The first division involves the effect of a standing army, which
withdraws men during a part of the reproductive period and keeps most of
them in a celibate career. The officers marry late if at all and show a
very low birth-rate. The prolonged celibacy has in many armies led to a
higher incidence of venereal diseases which prolongs the celibacy and
lowers the birthrate.[155] Without extended discussion, the following
considerations may be named as among those which should govern a policy
of military preparedness that will safeguard, as far as possible, the
eugenic interests:
1. If the army is a standing one, composed of men serving long terms of
enlistment, they should be of as advanced an age as is compatible with
military efficiency. If a man of 35 has not married, it is probable that
he will never marry, and therefore there is less loss to the race in
enrolling him for military service, than is the case with a man of
20-25.
2. The army (except in so far as composed of inferior men) should not
foster celibacy. Short enlistments are probably the most valuable means
of avoiding this evil.
3. Universal conscription is much better than voluntary service, since
the latter is highly selective, the former much less so. Those in
regular attendance in college should receive their military training in
their course as is now done.
4. Officers' families should be given an additional allowance for each
child. This would aid in increasing the birth-rate, which appears to be
very low among army and navy officers in the United States service, and
probably in that of all civilized countries.
5. Every citizen owes service to his nation, in time of need, but
fighting service should not be exacted if some one else could perform it
better than he where he is expert in some other needed field. The recent
action of England in sending to the front as subaltern officers, who
were speedily killed, many highly trained technicians and young
scientists and medical men who would have been much more valuable at
home in connection with war measures, is an example of this mistake.
Carrying the idea farther, one sees that in many nations there are
certain races which are more valuable on the firing line than in
industries at the rear; and it appears that they should play the part
for which they are best fitted. From this point of view, the Entente
allies were wholly justified in employing their Asiatic and African
subjects in war. In the United States are millions of negroes who are of
less value than white men in organized industry but almost as valuable
as the whites, when properly led, at the front. It would appear to be
sound statesmanship to enlist as many Negroes as possible in the active
forces, in case of war, thus releasing a corresponding number of more
skilled white workers for the industrial machine on whose efficiency
success in modern warfare largely rests.
The creation of the National Army in the United States, in 1917, while
in most ways admirably conducted, was open to criticism in several
respects, from the eugenic point of view:
(a) Too many college men and men in intellectual pursuits were taken as
officers, particularly in the aviation corps. There should have been
more men employed as officers who had demonstrated the necessary
qualifications, as foremen and others accustomed to boss gangs of men.
(b) The burden was thrown too heavily on the old white Americans, by the
exemption of aliens, who make up a large part of the population in some
states. There were communities in New England which actually could not
fill their quotas, even by taking every acceptable native-born resident,
so large is their alien population. The quota should have been adjusted
if aliens were to be exempt.
(c) The district boards were not as liberal as was desirable, in
exempting from the first quota men needed in skilled work at home. The
spirit of the _selective_ draft was widely violated, and necessitated a
complete change of method before the second quota was called by the much
improved questionnaire method.
It is difficult to get such mistakes as these corrected; nevertheless a
nation should never lose sight of the fact that war is inevitably
damaging, and that the most successful nation is the one which wins its
wars with the least possible eugenic loss.
Leaving the period of preparedness, we consider the period of open
warfare. The reader will remember that, in an earlier chapter, we
divided natural selection into (1) lethal, that which operates through
differential mortality; (2) sexual, that which operates through
differential mating; and (3) fecundal, that which operates through
differential fecundity. Again, selection operates both in an inter-group
competition and an intra-group competition. The influence of any agency
on natural selection must be examined under each of these six heads. In
the case of war, however, fecundal selection may be eliminated, as it is
little influenced. Still another division arises from the fact that the
action of selection is different during war upon the armed forces
themselves and upon the population at home; and after the war, upon the
nations with the various modifications that the war has left.
We will consider lethal selection first. To measure the effect of the
inter-group selection of the armed forces, one must compare the
relative quality of the two races involved. The evidence for believing
in substantial differences between races is based (a) upon their
relative achievement when each is isolated, (b) upon the relative rank
when the two are competing in one society, and (c) upon the relative
number of original contributions to civilization each has made. Such
comparisons are fatal to the sentimental equalitarianism that denies
race differences. While there is, of course, a great deal of
overlapping, there are, nevertheless, real average differences. To think
otherwise is to discard evolution and revert to the older standpoint of
"special creation."
Comparison of the quality of the two sides is sometimes, of course, very
difficult. One may feel little hesitation in giving a decision in the
classical war of the Greeks and Persians, or the more modern case of the
English and Afghans, but when considering the Franco-Prussian war, or
the Russo-Japanese war, or the Boer war, or the American civil war, it
is largely a matter of mere opinion, and perhaps an advantage can hardly
be conceded to either side. Those who, misunderstanding the doctrine of
evolution, adhere to the so-called "philosophy of force," would answer
without hesitation that the side which won was, _ipso facto_, the better
side. But such a judgment is based on numerous fallacies, and can not be
indorsed in the sweeping way it is uttered. Take a concrete example:
"In 1806, Prussia was defeated at the battle of Jena. According to the
philosophy of force, this was because Prussia was 'inferior' and France
was 'superior.' Suppose we admit for the moment that this was the case.
The selection now represents the survival of the fittest, the selection
which perfects the human species. But what shall we say of the battle of
Leipsic? At Leipsic, in 1813, all the values were reversed; it is now
France which is the 'inferior' nation.... Furthermore, a large number of
the same generals and soldiers who took part in the battle of Jena also
took part in the battle of Leipsic. Napoleon belonged, therefore, to a
race which was superior to that of Blücher in 1806, but to an inferior
race in 1813, in spite of the fact that they were the same persons and
had not changed their nationality. As soon as we bring these assertions
to the touchstone of concrete reality we see at once how untenable and
even ridiculous are direct biological comparisons."[156]
Without going into further detail, it is readily seen that, on the world
at large, the eugenic effect of a war would be very different according
as the sides differ much or little. Yet this difference in quality,
however great, will have no significance, unless the superior or
inferior side is in general more likely to lose fewer men. Where the
difference has been considerable, as between a civilized and savage
nation, it has been seldom that the superior has not triumphed with
fewer losses. Victory, however, is influenced much less in these later
days by the relative military efficiency of two single nations than by
their success in making powerful alliances. But such alignments are by
no means always associated with better quality, because (a) there is a
natural tendency for the weak to unite against a strong nation, (b) to
side with a group which is apparently succeeding, and (c) the alliances
may be the work of one or a few individuals who happen to be in
positions of power at the critical time.
Modern European wars, especially the latest one, have been marked by the
high quality of the combatants on both sides relative to the rest of the
world. As these same races fight with pertinacity, there is a high
mortality rate, so that the dysgenic result of these wars is
particularly deplorable.
As for the selection taking place _within_ each of the struggling
nations, the combatants and the non-combatants of the same age and sex
must first be compared. The difference here depends largely on how the
army in question was raised. Where the army is a permanent, paid force,
it probably does not represent a quality above the average of the
nation, except physically. When it is conscripted, it is superior
physically and probably slightly in other respects. If it is a
volunteer army, its quality depends largely on whether the cause being
fought for is one that appeals merely to the spirit of adventure or one
that appeals to some moral principle. In the latter case, the quality
may be such that the loss of a large part of the army will be peculiarly
damaging to the progress of the race. This situation is more common than
might be supposed, for by skillful diplomacy and journalism a cause
which may be really questionable is presented to the public in a most
idealistic light. But here, again, one can not always apply sweeping
generalizations to individual cases. It might be supposed, for instance,
that in the Confederate army the best eugenic quality was represented by
the volunteers, the second best by those who stayed out until they were
conscripted, and the poorest by the deserters. Yet David Starr Jordan
and Harvey Ernest Jordan, who investigated the case with care, found
that this was hardly true and that, due to the peculiar circumstances,
the deserters were probably not as a class eugenically inferior to the
volunteers.[157] Again some wars, such as that between the United States
and Spain, probably develop a volunteer army made up largely of the
adventurous, the nomadic, and those who have fewer ties; it would be
difficult to demonstrate that they are superior to those who, having
settled positions at home, or family obligations, fail to volunteer. The
greatest damage appears to be done in such wars as those waged by great
European nations, where the whole able-bodied male population is called
out, and only those left at home who are physically or mentally unfit
for fighting--but not, it appears to be thought, unfit to perpetuate the
race.
Even within the army of one side, lethal selection is operative. Those
who are killed are by no means a haphazard sample of the whole army.
Among the victims there is a disproportionate representation of those
with (1) dauntless bravery, (2) recklessness, (3) stupidity. These
qualities merge into each other, yet in their extremes they are widely
different. However, as the nature of warfare changes with the increase
of artillery, mines, bombs, and gases, and decrease of personal combat,
those who fall are more and more chance victims.
In addition to the killed and mortally wounded, there are many deaths
from disease or from wounds which were not necessarily fatal. Probably
the most selective of any of these three agencies is the variable
resistance to disease and infection and the widely varying knowledge and
appreciation of the need for hygienic living shown by the individual,
as, for instance, by less reckless drinking of unsterilized water. But
here, too, in modern warfare, this item is becoming less selective, with
the advance in discipline and in organized sanitation.
The efficiency of selection will be affected by the percentage that each
side has sent to the front, if the combatants are either above or below
the average of the population. A nation that sends all its able-bodied
males forward will be affected differently from its enemy that has
needed to call upon only one-half of its able-bodied men in order to win
its cause.
Away from the fighting lines of the contending sides, conditions that
prevail are rendered more severe in many ways than in times of peace.
Poverty becomes rife, and sanitation and medical treatment are commonly
sacrificed under the strain. During a war, that mitigation of the action
of natural selection which is so common now among civilized nations, is
somewhat less effective than in times of peace. The scourge of typhus in
Serbia is a recent and graphic illustration.
After a war has been concluded, certain new agencies of inter-group
selection arise. The result depends largely on whether the vanquished
have had a superior culture brought to them, as in the case of the
Philippines, or whether, on the contrary, certain diseases have been
introduced, as to the natives of the New World by the Spanish conquerors
and explorers, or crushing tribute has been levied, or grievous
oppression such as has befallen Belgium.
Sometimes the conquerors themselves have suffered severely as the result
of excessive spoliation, which has produced vicious idleness and
luxurious indulgence, with the ultimate effect of diminishing the
birth-rate.
Within the nation there may be various results. Sometimes, by the
reduction of overcrowding, natural selection will be less severe. On the
other hand, the loss of that part of the population which is more
economically productive is a very serious loss, leading to excessive
poverty with increased severity in the action of natural selection, of
which some of the Southern States, during the Reconstruction period,
offer a good illustration.
Selection is also rendered more intense by the heavy burden of taxation,
and in the very common depreciation of currency as is now felt in
Russia.
Sexual selection as well as lethal is affected by war in manifold ways.
Considering the armed force, there is an inter-group selection, when the
enemy's women are assaulted by the soldiers. While this has been an
important factor in the past, it is somewhat less common now, with
better army discipline and higher social ideals.
Within the group, mating at the outset of a war is greatly increased by
many hurried marriages. There is also alleged to be sometimes an
increase of illegitimacy in the neighborhood of training camps. In each
of these instances, these matings do not represent as much maturity of
judgment as there would have been in times of peace, and hence give a
less desirable sexual selection.
In the belligerent nation at home, the number of marriageable males is
of course far less than at ordinary times. It becomes important, then,
to compare the quality of the non-combatants and those combatants who
survive and return home, since their absence during the war period of
course decreases their reproduction as compared with the non-combatants.
The marked excess of women over men, both during the war and after,
necessarily intensifies the selection of women and proportionately
reduces that of men, since relatively fewer men will remain unmated.
This excess of women is found in all classes. Among superiors there are,
in addition, some women who never marry because the war has so reduced
the number of suitors thought eligible.
The five years' war of Paraguay with Brazil, Uruguay and Argentina
(1864-1869) is perhaps the most glaring case on record[158] in recent
years of the destruction of the male population of a country. Whole
regiments were made up of boys of 16 or less. At the beginning of the
war the population of Paraguay had been given as 1,337,437. It fell to
221,709 (28,746 men, 106,254 women, 86,079 children); it is even now
probably not more than half of the estimate made at the beginning of the
war. "Here in a small area has occurred a drastic case of racial ravage
without parallel since the time of the Thirty Years' War." Macedonia,
however, furnishes a fairly close parallel--D. S. Jordan found whole
villages there in 1913 in which not a single man remained: only women
and children. Conditions were not so very much better in parts of the
South at the close of the Civil War, particularly in Virginia and North
Carolina, where probably 40% of the young men of reproductive age died
without issue. And in a few of the Northern states, such as Vermont,
Connecticut and Massachusetts, the loss was proportionately almost as
great. These were probably as good men as any country has produced, and
their loss, with that of their potential offspring, undoubtedly is
causing more far-reaching effects in the subsequent history of the
United States than has ever been realized.
In the past and still among many savage peoples, inter-group selection
has been affected by the stealing of women from the vanquished. The
effect of this has been very different, depending on whether these women
would otherwise have been killed or spared, and also depending on the
relative quality of their nation to that of their conquerors.
To sum up, there are so many features of natural selection, each of
which must be separately weighed and the whole then balanced, that it is
a matter of extensive inquiry to determine whether a certain war has a
preponderance of eugenic or dysgenic results.
When the quality of the combatants is so high, compared with the rest
of the world, as during the Great War, no conceivable eugenic gains from
the war can offset the losses. It is probably well within the facts to
assume that the period of this war represents a decline in inherent
human quality, greater than in any similar length of time in the
previous history of the world.
Unfortunately, it does not appear that war is becoming much less common
if we consider number of combatants rather than number of wars as times
goes on,[159] and it steadily tends to be more destructive. War, then,
offers one of the greatest problems which the eugenist must face, for a
few months of war may undo all that eugenic reforms can gain in a
generation.
The total abolition of war would, of course, be the ideal, but there is
no possibility of this in the near future. The fighting instinct, it
must be remembered, is one of the most primitive and powerful that the
human mechanism contains. It was evolved in great intensity, to give man
supremacy over his environment--for the great "struggle for existence"
is with the environment, not with members of one's own species. Man long
ago conquered the environment so successfully that he has never since
had to exert himself in physical combat in this direction; but the
fighting instinct remained and could not be baulked without causing
uneasiness. Spurred on by a complex set of psychological and economic
stimuli, man took to fighting his own kind, to a degree that no other
species shows.
Now contrary to what the militarist philosophers affirm, this particular
sort of "struggle for existence" is not a necessity to the further
progressive evolution of the race. On the contrary it more frequently
reverses evolution and makes the race go backward, rather than forward.
The struggle for existence which makes the race progress is principally
that of the species with its environment, not that of some members of
the species with others. If the latter struggle could be supplanted by
the former then racial evolution would go ahead steadily without the
continuous reversals that warfare now gives.
William James saw, we believe, the true solution of the problem of
militarism, when he wrote his famous essay on _The Moral Equivalent of
War_. Here is man, full of fighting instinct which will not be baulked.
What is he to do? Professor James suggested that the youth of the nation
be conscripted to fight the environment, thus getting the fight "out of
its system" and rendering a real service to the race by constructive
reclamation work, instead of slaying each other and thus turning the
hands of the evolutionary clock backward.
When education has given everyone the evolutionary and eugenic view of
man as a species adapted to his environment, it may be possible to work
out some such solution as this of James. The only immediate course of
action open seems to be to seek, if possible, to diminish the frequency
of war by subduing nations which start wars and, by the organization of
a League to Enforce Peace; to avoid war-provoking conquests; to diminish
as much as possible the disastrous effects of war when it does come, and
to work for the progress of science and the diffusion of knowledge which
will eventually make possible the greater step, effective international
organization.