trial I.H.P. 23,685 = 22.84 knots, the _Black Prince_ 23,939 = 23.6
knots. In service, however, the former has generally proved the better
steamer. Another innovation in these ships was the re-appearance of
the stern torpedo tube, first introduced in the _Centurions_. As
re-introduced it was built submerged, a feature long desired, but which
had previously presented innumerable difficulties in design.
[Illustration:
SWIFTSURE.
WATTS ERA.
LORD NELSON.
BLACK PRINCE.
WARRIOR.
MINOTAUR.
PRE-DREADNOUGHTS OF THE WATTS ERA.]
For the Estimates of the following year (1903–04) four more ships of
the same type were provided--
===========+============+===========+=============
Name. | Laid down. | Builders. | Engines by.
-----------+------------+-----------+-------------
_Achilles_ | Feb. ’04 | Elswick | Hawthorn
_Cochrane_ | Mar. ’04 | Fairfield | Fairfield
_Warrior_ | Jan. ’04 | Vickers | Vickers
_Natal_ | Nov. ’03 | Pembroke | Wallsend Co.
===========+============+===========+=============
In these the defect of the low 6-in. battery of the _Black Princes_ was
anticipated, and instead of ten 6-inch guns, four 7.5 were mounted in
gun-houses on the upper deck amidships. Yarrow and cylindrical boilers
mixed were installed. Otherwise no change was made. On trial the
_Achilles_ reached a maximum of 23.27, the other three ships all made
their contracts or over.
These four, generally known as the _Warriors_, proved to be the finest
cruisers as sea-boats ever built for the British Navy. They have always
proved most remarkably steady gun platforms. Shooting from them is
invariably good--they have always been near the top of the list in
gunnery returns. For a single ship in a single commission good shooting
is attributable to causes other than the ship; but with four ships and
different crews at different times the effect of the design is obvious.
Apparently the extra weight on their upper decks is responsible; for
their dimensions are identical with those of the unsatisfactory _Black
Princes_.
In all these ships, as in the _Devonshires_ which preceded them, raking
masts and stumpy funnels were introduced. The latter proved most
inconvenient for navigating purposes, and in 1911 all the _Warriors_
had their funnels considerably heightened.
In these four latter the “dove-cot” platform fire-controls first
appeared; they were fitted also to the three latest ships of the _King
Edward_ class.
The main defect of all six is the trivial anti-torpedo armament. The
3-pounders are perfectly useless against destroyers. Incidentally it
may be noticed that the class signalled the scientific placing of such
guns for control purposes. In the _Warriors_ some guns were mounted on
turret tops also, this being with a view to their survival after an
action. It was contended that an actual hit was extremely improbable on
any anti-t.b. guns, but that shells bursting underneath might easily
disable them. Hence the search for an armoured base. This idea seems to
have originated in the German Navy, though the Germans never adopted
the turret-top position.
The Estimates (1904–05) provided for two battleships and three armoured
cruisers. The latter of these, the _Minotaur_ class, were “improved
_Warriors_”; but, as a matter of fact, except for a larger armament,
they proved somewhat inferior to their immediate predecessors:--
Details are:
Displacement--14,600 tons (as against 13,550).
Length (between perpendiculars)--490ft., (over all) 525ft.
Beam--74½ft. (but a foot more in _Shannon_).
Draught--(maximum) 28ft. (but a foot less in _Shannon_).
Armament--Four 9.2, 50 cal., ten 7.5, fourteen 12-pounders, five
18in. tubes (submerged).
Horse-power--27,000 = 23 knots.
Coal--(normal) 1,000 tons (950 only in _Shannon_); (maximum) 2,000,
also 400 tons oil.
[Illustration: SIR PHILIP WATTS.]
The 9.2 were placed in double turrets fore and aft. For those of the
_Minotaur_ electric manœuvring was substituted for the usual hydraulic.
The 7.5’s are disposed in ten single gun houses on the upper deck,
_Warrior_ fashion. The armour belt is of the same maximum thickness,
but only 3in. for 50ft. from the bow. Thereafter it thickens gradually
for the next 75ft. then reaches its maximum. Vertical armour above
the main deck was given up in order to allow for the increased weight
of armament and its protection--a total of 2,073 tons. The _Minotaur_
has Babcock, the other two Yarrow large-tube boilers. No cylindricals
were fitted; the opponents of the water-tube system having lost their
influence by 1905, when the ships were laid down.
None of these ships came up to expectations on trial, though they
developed considerably more than the contract horse-power. The
_Minotaur_ just made her speed, the _Defence_ just failed to reach it,
the _Shannon_ failed by half-a-knot. This last ship had been varied
from the others with an idea that a new form of hull, would produce
better speed--an unfortunate surmise. Shortly after completion all had
15ft. added to their funnels. The increased draught added to their
power somewhat, but did not materially better their speeds.
Further details of these three ships are:--
============+============+===========+==================
Name. | Laid down. | Built at. | Engined by.
------------+------------+-----------+------------------
_Minotaur_ | Jan. ’05 | Devonport | Harland & Wolff
_Defence_ | Feb. ’05 | Pembroke | Scott S. & E. Co.
_Shannon_ | Jan. ’05 | Chatham | Humphrys
============+============+===========+==================
All were completed in 1908. Average cost, £1,400,000 per ship. In them
solid bulkheads first appear, their engine-rooms having no water-tight
doors.
The battleships of the same programme (1904–05) were the _Lord Nelson_
and _Agamemnon_.
Details are:--
Displacement--16,500 tons.
Length (between perpendiculars)--410 ft., (over all) 445ft.
Beam--79½ft.
Draught--(mean) 27ft.
Armament--Four 12-inch, 45 cal., ten 9.2, 50 cal. fifteen
12-pounders, sixteen 3-pounders, five submerged tubes (18in.).
Horse-power--16,750 = 18.5 knots.
Coal--(normal) 900 tons; (maximum) 2,000 tons; also 400 tons oil.
The _Lord Nelson_ was built and engined by Palmer, the _Agamemnon_
by Beardmore and engined by Hawthorn. The former was given Babcock,
the latter Yarrow boilers. Both on trial easily exceeded the contract
speed, and proved abnormally handy ships. They cost £1,500,000 or only
a little more than the _Minotaurs_.
The _Nelsons_ are often counted as “Dreadnoughts”; but their only
claim to the position is they do not happen to carry any 6-inch guns.
Actually they are nothing but improved _King Edwards_, bearing to those
ships very much the same relation as the _Warriors_ to the _Black
Princes_. Their comparatively slow speeds and their mixed armaments
entirely differentiate them from the swifter “all-big-gun” ship which
followed, and, for that matter, caught them up.[23]
The _Nelsons_ were never really successful ships outside the points
alluded to above. Eight of their ten 9.2’s were placed in twin
turrets, and in many circumstances two 9.2 so mounted proved very
little superior in efficiency to a similar single gun in an isolated
gun-house.[24]
In the matter of protection the _Nelsons_ far exceeded the _King
Edwards_. In place of a 9in. belt amidships they were given a 12in.
one, while the 8in. and 6in. strakes above of the earlier ships
became a uniform 8in. The bow belt forward was also augmented to 6in.
on the water-line, surmounted by 4in., instead of a belt uniformly
increasing from 2in. to 6in. further aft. But none of this made them
“Dreadnoughts,” and the absence of “Dreadnought” features relegated
them to the second line very soon after they were completed.
In these ships the tripod mast, the idea of which dates back to the
_Captain_ era, re-appeared. The _Nelsons_ were given as mainmasts the
first of those modern tripods which have characterised nearly every
British capital ship since built till the _Lion_ was altered.
The idea of the tripod mast is to avoid the many shrouds of an ordinary
mast; and so give greater training to the guns. Whether the idea be
of use is another matter. Generally speaking ideas abandoned by our
forefathers have failed to live long if resuscitated.
In the 1902–03 and 1903–04 Estimates provision was made for four
vessels each year of a new type, known as “Scouts.” These were the
_Adventure_ and _Attentive_ (Elswick), _Forward_ and _Foresight_
(Fairfield), _Pathfinder_ and _Patrol_ (Laird), _Sentinel_ and
_Skirmisher_ (Vickers-Maxim). One was awarded each year to each of the
firms mentioned, but all were actually laid down between June, 1903,
and January, 1904. The first four to be given out to contract were
originally named _Eddystone_, _Nore_, _Fastnet_, and _Inchkeith_.
These vessels came to be built owing to an appreciation of the fact
that destroyers had altogether lost their original rôle and had become
torpedo-boats, pure and simple. The “Scouts,” though from three to four
times the size, were the old “catchers” re-introduced.
They compared with these as follows:--
=========+===============+==========+====================
| Average | Average |
| Displacement. | Designed | Armament.
| | Speed. |
---------+---------------+----------+--------------------
“Scouts” | 2850 | 25 | 12 to 14--12pdr.,
| | | 2--14in. tubes[25]
Halcyons | 1070 | 18.5 | 2--4.7, 4--6pdr.,
| | | 5--18in. tubes
=========+===============+==========+====================
A 1½ deck on slopes amidships was provided for the “Scouts,” which
incidentally were designed for ten 12-pounders only. By the year
1912 it became abundantly clear that, like their predecessors the
“catchers,” they were doomed to pass quickly into the “little use”
category on account of their weak armaments and small sea-keeping
capacity.
_TORPEDO CRAFT._
It has already been mentioned that Sir William White’s period of
office saw the coming of the destroyer. The origin of this craft is
to be found in a public agitation, which arose out of the tremendous
attention paid to torpedo boats by the French, who were then our most
likely enemy, and who had an overwhelming superiority in torpedo craft.
Some years before a type of craft, the torpedo gunboats already
referred to, which were first known as “torpedo boat catchers” and
subsequently as “catchers” had been introduced. It soon, however,
became very clear that they were little likely to achieve this end, and
the doctrine that “the torpedo boat is the answer to the torpedo boat”
was being steadily preached. At that time (1892) the then insignificant
navy of Germany was in possession of eight very large torpedo boats,
which were known as “division boats.” Austria also had one or two fast
craft, capable of dealing with torpedo boats. Upon these existing lines
a new type of craft was developed for the British Navy. The first two
to be built were the _Havock_ and _Hornet_, which were launched in
1893. In substance they were very large torpedo boats of about 250
tons displacement, designed by Messrs. Yarrow. Their speed of 27 knots
was well in excess of that of any existing torpedo boat, and it was
confidently expected that they would easily run down and destroy any
such. In addition to what was then the very considerable armament of
one 12-pounder and three 6-pounders, they were also fitted with torpedo
tubes.[26] The original idea of this was that when hostile torpedo
boats had been annihilated by them, the destroyers could be used as
torpedo boats in case of need.
In 1894 the _Havock_ and _Hornet_ were used in manœuvres and tested by
being made to lie by for twenty-four hours in the Bay of Biscay. They
underwent the test very well, and to this is probably attributed the
realisation of the fact that in them a more or less really effective
sea-going torpedo boat had been evolved. A large number of duplicates
were ordered; at first of 27 knots. Later this was increased to 30, and
in a few boats to a little more.
The whole of these boats were nothing but enlarged editions of existing
torpedo boats, and some of them proved rather weak for the service
demanded of them. In the year 1902 and onwards, therefore, a type of
better sea-going qualities was demanded, and the River class, which
totalled about 35 boats, began to be built. A feature of the River
class was that they were a blend of the early torpedo gunboats of the
Rattlesnake type, with the later and heavier torpedo gunboats. There
was a reduction of speed to 25½ knots, with a view to securing better
sea-going qualities. On account of their slow speed the River class are
verging on the obsolete to-day, but the high forecastle first embodied
in them has never been departed from, and the very latest types of
destroyers are nothing but swifter and larger editions of them.
It is interesting to note that here again to some extent the Germans
led the way. German destroyers had the North Sea to consider, whereas
all early British destroyers were built with a view to being used only
in the Channel. Consequently and naturally enough the Germans were the
first to perceive the necessity for a high forecastle.
The submarine also appeared in the pre-Dreadnought era, but the boats
of that time were of such a primitive type that they need hardly be
specially mentioned. They will be found alluded to in a later chapter.
_END OF THE PRE-DREADNOUGHT ERA._
So ended the pre-Dreadnought era. It was characterised by a
multiplicity of types which had included:--
First class battleships.
Second class battleships.
Fast intermediate battleships.
First rate armoured cruisers.
Second rate armoured cruisers.
First class protected cruisers.
Second class protected cruisers.
Third class protected cruisers.
Scouts.
Torpedo gunboats.
Sloops.
Gunboats.
Destroyers.
Torpedo boats.
Submarines.
Although the whole of these types were not all building or provided
for at any one and the same time, yet towards the end of the period
there was a general feeling that too many types of ships were in use.
Reductions in this direction were announced, at first indicating that
in future programmes provision would be made only for:--
“Armoured ships.”
Destroyers.
Submarines.
Contemporaneously with this came Admiral Fisher’s famous “scrap-heap
policy,” whereby some eighty vessels of one kind and another were
struck off the effective list, and either sold or relegated to
subsidiary service.
The ships removed included all battleships and armoured cruisers of
earlier date than the _Trafalgar_, several ships of the _Apollo_ class,
all earlier protected cruisers, some of the “P” class, and the bulk of
the small fry in the way of sloops and gunboats.
This action aroused a certain amount of criticism on the grounds that
the clearance was excessive. As some of the ships were subsequently
restored to the active list, something is undoubtedly to be said for
that point of view; especially as no steps were taken to replace the
scrapped cruisers. On the other hand, most of the ships removed were
of trivial fighting value; though here again the zeal of the reformer
somewhat overlooked the fact that the police duties rendered by the
small fry had been valuable.
In connection with this policy some of the outlying naval bases were
done away with, and there commenced a “reorganisation” of the Fleet
which has continued intermittently from that day to this! Certain other
considerable changes affecting the _personnel_ will be found dealt with
in a later chapter.
IV.
THE DREADNOUGHT ERA--(WATTS).
A new era in battleship design, not only for the British Navy, but
for the navies of the entire world, was opened with the advent of the
_Dreadnought_. As has been seen, it was in a way led up to by previous
designs, notably the _Lord Nelson_ class. The essential point of
difference, however, lies in the fact that whereas the _Lord Nelson_
carries heavy guns of two calibres, in the _Dreadnought_ the main
armament is confined to one calibre only. The advantages of this on
paper are not particularly great, but for practical purposes, such
as fire control and so forth, the superiority to be obtained by a
uniformity of big gun armament is tremendous.
As the historical portion of this book indicates, the “Dreadnought
idea” has been a fairly regular feature of British Naval Policy, but
in this particular case the inception would seem to have been due to
accident and circumstance rather than to any settled policy.
Immature and abortive attempts to realise something of the “Dreadnought
ideal” had taken place in the past. The earliest ship claimed to
represent the Dreadnought ideal was the U.S. _Roanoake_, built at
the time of the Civil War. This was a high freeboard ship, fitted
with three turrets in the centre line. A few years later something
of the same sort found expression in the four-turreted British
_Royal Sovereign_ and _Prince Albert_, though these were merely coast
defence ships. Still later in the _Tchesma_ class, Russian, and in the
_Brandenburg_ class of the German Navy, six big guns were installed
as the primary armament. Both these two ideas were laughed out of
existence; and it became a settled fashion to carry four big guns, two
forward and two aft.
[Illustration: GENERAL CUNIBERTI.]
Matters were at this stage when the late “Colonel” Cuniberti,
Constructor to the Italian Navy, conceived the idea of a ship carrying
a considerable number of big guns, and embodying in herself the
power of two or three normal battleships. This design was considered
altogether too ambitious for the Italian Navy; but permission was
given him to publish the general idea, subject to official revision.
It first saw the light in “_Fighting Ships_,” in 1903, and is now so
historically interesting that I here reproduce the article in full, the
original being long since out of print:--
“Admiral Sir John Hopkins, late Controller of the British Navy, in his
admirable article, ‘Intermediates for the British Fleet,’ published in
the last edition (1902) of this Annual, asks what results it would be
possible to obtain in the British Navy by extending the ideas of the
two Italian Ministers of Marine, Admiral Morin and Admiral Bettolo,
which were translated into fact in the _Vittorio Emanuele III_ (12,625
tons), so as to arrive at the much greater tonnage of recent British
battleships, in the same manner as the ideas that found concrete form
in the projected vessels of the _Amalfi_ class were amplified and
realised in the Italian battleships alluded to and regarding which,
even now, so many doubts are expressed as to such realisation being
practicable.
“To proceed from 8,000 to 12,000, and from 12,000 to 17,000 tons of
displacement, constitutes not only a problem of naval architecture, but
also involves high considerations of quite another nature, such as the
special functions of the Fleet, so as to harmonise with the political
objects of any given maritime Power, the geographical position of that
Power, the state of its finances, etc., etc. So that not only does the
answer to such a question entail a certain amount of difficulty from
the constructive point of view, but before the answer can be seriously
considered it is absolutely necessary to determine exactly what end
this ideal British battleship is to serve; for it is not to be imagined
that we are going merely to enlarge the _Vittorio Emanuele_ until we
arrive at a displacement equal to that of the _King Edward VII._ For
example, putting an extra 4,000 tons on board will produce a vessel
that will perhaps be a little steadier in heavy weather than the
original ship.
* * * * *
“In Britain are to be found naval experts of the highest possible
order, and they will have their own ideas as to what type of vessels
best fulfil the needs and ideals of the British Fleet, so that it
would almost appear a presumption on my part to offer suggestions for
any Navy other than the Italian. But in deference to the courteous
interrogation of Admiral Hopkins I may be permitted to point out that
from the purely human point of view there are two leading methods by
which one can strike to the ground one’s opponent, either by gradually
developing the attack and disposing of him little by little, or, on
the other hand, killing him at one blow without causing him prolonged
suffering. In like manner there are two distinct modes of sending an
enemy’s ship to the bottom.
“Let us take, for example, a human combat. The first--the most commonly
used, and the most practical in the majority of cases--has as its basis
the progressive dismemberment of the enemy.
“Two mortal foes place themselves on guard at a distance; they begin
with exceptional strokes, with feints, with opportune advances and
retreats, never coming to close quarters for a deadly blow until the
capabilities of the enemy, both offensive and defensive, are well
tested, and until some fortunate stroke, even although not actually
deadly, has considerably weakened the foe, has rendered his defence
less able, and has somewhat demoralised him. Covered with blood,
stunned, mutilated, and hardly capable of remaining on his feet, then
comes the moment when his adversary closes in upon him and delivers
the final and mortal blow. And we may almost imagine we hear the
beaten one, with thick and choking voice, repeat the terrible words of
Francesco Ferruccio at the battle of Gavinana: ‘Maramaldo, thou but
killest a man already dead!’
“Similarly, two opposing ships, with but slight differences in their
powers, will commence their combat at a great distance, utilising their
evolutionary abilities and their speed in prudent manœuvres, seeking
to gain as much advantage as possible from their offensive powers,
and attempting to place every obstacle in the way of the antagonist
utilising powers in either direction. The discharge of projectiles will
commence in earnest, greatly assisted by the rapid loading of which
the guns of medium and small calibre are now capable. What results
can reasonably be expected from the discharge of the smaller guns at
such great distances is hard to say; nor can the slender expectation
of, let us say, chancing to hit the captain of the opposing ship in
the eye with a lucky shot, at all justify such a waste of ammunition.
Gradually nearing one another, the ships manœuvring less freely, hits
will become more dangerous; the boats that were not set adrift before
the action began will be alight and burning fiercely; the cowls of the
wind trunks, the funnels, and the masts will be in fragments.
“The crew, wounded and reduced in numbers, will have lost their calm,
and consequently the firing will have become wilder; finally, one of
the two antagonists will get in a lucky shot that will disable the
other. She will speedily become unmanageable, and her enemy will as
speedily close into within the thousand metres which will permit of a
torpedo being launched with every chance of success, or the battle may
be concluded by a final rush and the point of the ram.
“As the wounded hull sinks slowly beneath the waves, the flag which had
put such heart into the crew, and the sight of which had spurred them
to fight to the last, may well seem as it disappears to repeat to the
enemy these sad words, ‘Thou but slayest one already dead.’
“Four ships in place of two, eight in place of four, will repeat in a
perhaps more complex action the same phases of attack, and the same
foolish waste of ammunition, which in these days causes the greatest
preoccupation of those who, having to design warships, must decide on
the quantity of ammunition and projectiles provided for each different
calibre of the armament.
* * * * *
“There is, however, another method of fighting and sending your enemy
to the bottom; but it is one that is capable of adoption only by a
Navy at the same time most potent and very rich.