trousers. Most of them wore coarse leather sandals. Each man had a grey
overcoat and hood. The infantry were all armed with Remington rifles.
The tactics of the Egyptians in the presence of the enemy were to form
battalion or double company squares. The troops were formed in three
ranks, to give them confidence. Each man was provided with four or five
crow’s feet (iron spikes with four points), which he was instructed to
throw in front of him on the approach of the enemy. The rebels usually
attacked in several masses.
[Sidenote: January.]
[Sidenote: Defeat of a detachment of troops near Jura Hadra.]
Early in January news was received of a disaster on the eastern bank
of the White Nile. A detachment of 190 men had been sent from the fort
of Jura Hadra in a northerly direction to repair the line of telegraph
to Kartoum. When a short distance from the fort, they were attacked
by some rebels under Fakir Owde.[300] The troops formed square as
usual, but after a short resistance commenced to give way, the square
was broken, and many were killed. Half the party, however, managed to
rally, and held out until a reinforcement came to their assistance from
Jura Hadra.
[Sidenote: 1883. 2nd January.]
On the 2nd January, Abdel Kader Pasha left Kartoum by steamer to
take personal command of the troops operating between the Blue and
White Niles. He did not reach Mesalamieh till the 7th, having stopped
frequently on the journey to interview the chiefs of the villages on
the banks of the river.
The town of Mesalamieh is six miles west of the river. On arrival,
the Pasha proceeded immediately to inspect the battalion encamped
there (2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment), and informed the officers that
he intended to march with as small a baggage train as possible. They
protested, and made all kinds of difficulties, but it was finally
decided that each company should be accompanied by four camels only.
[Sidenote: 8th January.]
[Sidenote: Advance on Abut.]
On the 8th January, the battalion, with some irregular troops under
Saliha Bey, and some Shukuriyeh horsemen, started for Abut. The
order of march was in company column with scouts on both flanks, and
advance and rear guards. The country traversed was a treeless but
well-cultivated open plain, with many villages and plenty of water. The
crops consisted chiefly of dhoora (maize) and cotton. There were also
many large herds of cattle, and flocks of sheep. The inhabitants were
very friendly, and freely supplied the troops with water, and even with
bread.
At 8 P.M., a halt was made at the Faulla (pond) of El-Sunga. The troops
bivouacked, protected by a bank which had, on a previous occasion, been
thrown up round the pond. Ten men per company were employed to patrol
during the night some 500 yards from the camp.
[Sidenote: 9th January.]
On the 9th, the column started at 7 A.M. The order of march was the
same as on the preceding day. Two miles from the bivouac, the village
of Effena was passed. This was the last inhabited village met with on
the road. Further on they were all deserted, the inhabitants having
gone off willingly, or unwillingly, to join the rebels, leaving their
crops standing, and ready for harvesting.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
At 1.30 P.M. the village of Abut was reached. It is a small military
station, and had a garrison of 350 men, who were encamped in a zeriba
with trench near the well. When attacked on the 31st December, only
150 of the garrison were present, 200 men under Osman Agha had arrived
since then. Two new zeribas were at once constructed, one for the
regular troops, and another for the irregulars. Reconnaissances were
pushed in all directions, but especially along the roads leading to
Kawa _viâ_ Waliya, and to Manasra, south of Sibel.
Finding then that the quelling of the insurrection in the province of
Sennaar would be a more difficult task than he had anticipated, the
Pasha determined to call up the battalion from Shawal,[301] and to send
for another from Kartoum.
[Sidenote: 10th January.]
The 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment, left Kartoum accordingly on the
afternoon of the 10th January, and proceeded up the Blue Nile in twelve
sailing boats.
[Sidenote: 11th January.]
On the 11th January, Abdel Kader was still at Abut. On that date his
attention was to await the arrival of the 3rd Battalion, and then march
on Sennaar. Reports had come in that that town was hard pressed by a
large body of rebels, that Karkoj was again in their hands, that the
tribe of Rufaa el Sherk,[302] under Sheikh Sherif el Hindi, was in full
revolt, and the last mentioned was doing his best to induce Aud el
Kerim Bey, the powerful Sheikh of the Shukuriyeh, to join the movement.
[Sidenote: 12th January.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
On the 12th, however, it was reported that the Sheikh Wad el Kerif, at
the head of a large force, was marching from Maatuk to attack Abdel
Kader, that he was forcing all the men of the districts through which
he passed to join him, and that Fakir Moosa, who was commanding the
rebels in the neighbourhood of Kawa, would co-operate with him.
This news compelled the Pasha to reconsider his decision, and, instead
of advancing on Sennaar, he resolved to await the approach of the Wad
el Kerif.
[Sidenote: 16th January.]
[Sidenote: Despatch of troops to Karasah.]
[Sidenote: Revolt of the Husseinyeh Arabs.]
On the White Nile, the Hassaniyeh nomads were again giving trouble.
To pacify this tribe, and the villages in the neighbourhood of
Karasah,[303] the 1st Battalion, 2nd Regiment, left Kartoum on the
16th January in two steamers, and proceeded up the White Nile. It was
accompanied by the Vakeel[304] of the Mudiriyeh and some Ulemas. These
officials were directed to enter into communication with the people,
and to try to induce them to submit quietly. The orders given to the
battalion were to disembark when still a little north of the village,
and then advance in close order.
[Sidenote: 18th January.]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the Egyptians at Karasah.]
On the 18th, the steamers reached the neighbourhood of the village.
Here one of the steamers ran aground in the middle of the river. The
other, on board of which was the Bimbashi[305] with five companies,
pushed up right abreast of the village. Three companies immediately
disembarked, lined a low sand dyke parallel to and about 500 yards from
the river, and opened fire on some rebels who were about 2000 yards
off. The latter advanced to the attack, but the severity of the fire
forced them to incline away to the right and left as they approached.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
Three or four horsemen of the right-hand party succeeded in penetrating
between the dyke and the river, and fell upon the two companies which
had disembarked last, and were not yet formed up. This was the signal
for a regular panic, and the flight of all the Egyptians to the river.
The rebels did not pursue. In the confusion the Bimbashi was killed,
some accounts say by his own men, others by the enemy.
The other steamer with the three remaining companies of the battalion
having by this time come up, a council of war was held, when it was
decided that the battalion was not strong enough to advance, and that
reinforcements of men and guns from Kartoum were absolutely necessary.
The rebel force did not in reality exceed 400 men.
[Sidenote: 26th January.]
During the next few days the battalion remained quietly on board the
steamers off Karasah. On the 26th January, the Bimbashi of the 2nd
battalion of the regiment arrived from Kartoum to replace the Bimbashi
who had been killed. The steamers were then lying about two and a half
hours’ march from the village. An advance was ordered for 3 A.M. on
the 27th so as to attack the village at daybreak, and take the rebels
by surprise. But, on the remonstrances of nearly all the officers,
who said that they would certainly be killed if they marched in the
dark through an unknown country, the order was cancelled, and that day
nothing was done except a short reconnaissance inland. The Bimbashi,
however, decided to attack on the 28th. After the orders were issued
five of the senior officers proceeded to report themselves sick.
[Sidenote: 28th January.]
At 3.30 A.M. on the 28th the battalion marched off. It was formed up in
a square, preceded by an advance guard and scouts, and at daybreak was
within about 800 yards of the village, from which it was separated by a
long, narrow strip of forest.
Two companies were ordered into the forest to reconnoitre the path
leading to the village, but the officers refused to advance, saying
that they and their men would certainly be killed.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
During the delay and discussion that followed, some soldiers,
disobeying orders, fired at some cattle that were grazing near by.
This gave the alarm to the rebels, and in a few minutes nine or ten
horsemen appeared at the edge of the wood. By galloping about and
waving their swords, these men engaged the attention of the troops, and
gave time for the removal of the women and cattle from the village.
When this was accomplished, the rebel foot advanced through the wood,
and the troops immediately began to fall back. The rebels, who did
not exceed 350, and had no firearms, followed them till within about
half an hour’s distance of the steamer, but generally keeping out of
rifle range. It is estimated that about thirty of them were killed or
wounded. A few hours after the return of the troops to the boats, the
2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment, as well as two guns and a rocket
trough, arrived from Kartoum with the Kaimakan[306] of the regiment.
These reinforcements had been sent on receipt of a direct order from
the Khedive.
The rebels appear to have been subsequently attacked and defeated, but
there does not appear to be any account of the engagement.
[Sidenote: 24th January.]
The 1st Battalion, 3rd Regiment, and 225 Bashi Bazouks, without horses,
arrived at Kartoum from Egypt on the 24th January. 650 camels for
transport purposes had already been collected at Kartoum, and 400 were
expected in a few days from Dongola. According to the lowest estimate,
300 camels per battalion would be required for the Kordofan expedition,
to be distributed as follows:—For rations, 115; water, 75; ammunition,
52; officers, 25; sick hospital, &c., 33.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
On the 23rd January, Hussein Pasha Serri, the senior military officer
at Kartoum, received a telegram from the Khedive ordering him to
suspend all operations and to concentrate all the troops at Kartoum,
pending the arrival of some English staff officers at Cairo. The fact
of the Khedive communicating direct with this officer instead of with
Giegler Pasha, the representative of Abdel Kader, caused a great deal
of unpleasantness. This order was communicated to Abdel Kader, then
at Abut, who replied that, if he withdrew the troops to Kartoum the
rebellion would unquestionably extend in the eastern provinces, and
that, if the expedition did not soon leave for Kordofan, that province
would be lost, and with it Darfur.
[Sidenote: 24th January.]
To return to the operations of Abdel Kader. About the 24th January a
party of rebels pillaged the village of Mangalla, which, together with
some others of the south and south-west of Abut, had submitted to the
Government of the Khedive.
Hearing of this, the Pasha, having been joined by the 3rd Battalion,
1st Regiment, determined to advance against a large body of rebels,
reported to be about eight hours’ march from his camp.
[Sidenote: 27th January.]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the rebels near Maatuk.]
Early on the 27th he moved towards the village of Maatuk. When about
three hours from it, the rebels were observed on a plain on the further
side of a small wood. The troops were at once halted in the open, about
500 yards from the wood, and formed into square.
The rebels, after a short halt for prayer, advanced through the wood,
but, contrary to expectation, halted again at the near edge, and Wad
Eyoub, a revolted Benluk Bashi of irregulars, with some negroes, opened
fire on the troops, killing one and wounding five. The square then
fired, and after some minutes the rebels commenced to retire, pursued
by the irregular cavalry. In this affair Faki Moosa was wounded. The
losses of the rebels are estimated at 600 killed and wounded.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
In the retreat the rebels broke up into two parties, one, under Sheikh
Wad-el-Kerif, went in a south-westerly direction towards Göz Abu
Djuma,[307] and the other, under Faki Moosa and Faki Mohammed Abu
Shneb, retired to the village of Baatuk on the road to Kawa.
[Sidenote: 28th January.]
Against the latter, the Pasha directed the whole of his available
cavalry and camel corps, altogether about 300 men. This force came
up with the rebels at 3 A.M. on the 28th, and totally defeated them,
killing Abu Shneb.
[Sidenote: 1st February.]
On the 1st February Abdel-Kader, with his two battalions, reached Kawa,
where he met the 1st Battalion, 1st Regiment, from Shawal. On the 3rd
February this force was increased by the arrival of the 1st and 2nd
battalions 2nd Regiment, which had marched along the river bank from
Karasah, performing, according to their own account, prodigies of
valour on the road.
[Sidenote: 3rd February.]
On the 3rd February Abdel-Kader left Kawa by steamer for Kartoum
leaving orders—
(1.) That the three battalions of the 1st Regiment were to march at
once to Wad el Medinet on the Blue Nile, where he would join them
about the 15th for an advance on Sennaar; and
(2.) That the two battalions of the 2nd Regiment, under the Kaimakan,
were to attack the rebels at Abu Djuma.
[Sidenote: Disaffection among the Kababish Arabs.]
Towards the end of January it was rumoured in Kartoum that the Kababish
Arabs had gone over to the Mahdi, or rather to the Faki Manne, who
commanded the rebels in Northern Kordofan. As the Kababish extend as
far north as Dongola, fears were entertained that the rebellion might
spread to that province, and early in February it was reported that
the natives about Debbeh[308] were becoming very restless. Some Bashi
Bazouks were sent there to maintain order.
[Sidenote: 10th February.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
About the 10th February the troops in the camp at Omdurman comprised:—
4 battalions of Egyptian infantry (3200 men).
420 Bashi Bazouks.
1,100 Negro recruits.
90 dismounted cavalry, and a few artillerymen.
Their health was very good.
[Sidenote: Surrender of Bara, 5th January.]
On the 11th February, a messenger arrived at Kartoum from the west
confirming the rumours that Bara had fallen on the 5th January. The
garrison were said to be fairly well treated by the Arabs, and only
the officers were kept in confinement. By this surrender 2000 troops,
besides a considerable quantity of arms and ammunition, fell into the
hands of the rebels.
[Sidenote: Siege of El Obeyed.]
Four days afterwards the news arrived that El Obeyed had capitulated on
the 17th January, and that the whole of Kordofan was in the hands of
the Mahdi.
After the repulse of the assaults on El Obeyed, in September, 1882,
various plans were proposed for attacking the Mahdi, but the Council
of War was always of opinion that the troops available were too few,
and the garrison relapsed into a state of inactivity, which continued,
so far as any operations of importance are concerned, till the end of
the siege. Small sorties of two or three hundred men were, however, of
frequent occurrence, generally resulting in the capture of some cattle
and grain.
The besiegers, on their side, established themselves comfortably around
the town, some availing themselves of the ruined houses, and others
building straw huts, and patiently awaited the inevitable surrender.
Such was the attitude taken up by both sides till the 13th January,
by which date the supply of food was almost exhausted, and everything
eatable was being sold at fabulous prices.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
On the 14th, the Mahdi sent letters to Mahmoud Said, the Governor
of the Western Soudan, and all the principal officers, telling them
that they had held out long enough, and, if they would surrender, he
would guarantee the safety of their lives. On the 16th, a party of
rebels appeared outside the entrenchments to open negociations for a
capitulation. Mahmoud Said Pasha was not present at the interview which
followed, but the greater part of the garrison appear to have agreed to
the terms that were proposed.
[Sidenote: 17th January.]
[Sidenote: Surrender of El Obeyed.]
During the night many of the garrison deserted. At daybreak on the 17th
the insurgents advanced against the town in force. The Pasha ordered
what remained of the garrison to fire, but the infantry refused to
do so, and passed over to the enemy, while the artillery fired a few
salvoes in a direction that could do no harm to the assailing force.
The Pasha then understood that he was completely abandoned by his men,
and consented to surrender and make submission to the Mahdi, who was
then at an hour and a half’s distance from the town.
On entering the town, the Mahdi proceeded immediately to the principal
mosque.
Mahmoud Said Pasha, and Ali Sherif Bey, the Mudir of Kordofan, were
at first treated with consideration, but, on their refusal to give up
their money they were seized and imprisoned. 8000_l._ sterling in gold
was found concealed in the house of the former, and 7000_l._ in that of
the latter.
* * * * *
Altogether, although little or no money was found in the public
treasury, the Mahdi is said to have taken more than 100,000_l._ from
the officials and notables. He kept all the booty for himself, and
distributed none of it among his followers. This was a source of
great dissatisfaction, and subsequently caused many to waver in their
allegiance.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
The garrison at the time of the surrender numbered about 3500. They
were made to swear fidelity to the Mahdi, enlisted in his service, and
told off by companies to the various banners. About 6000 Remington
rifles, five guns, and one rocket trough passed into the hands of
the rebels. As regards provisions, only 200 ardebs[309] of dhoora
were found in the town. Towards the end of the siege famine had
prevailed, and the inhabitants had kept themselves alive by chewing raw
india-rubber, varied with a small ration of dhoora.
All the books and Government papers were destroyed and the town was
completely looted.
The Mahdi took up his residence in the Government House, and appointed
a Governor of the town, but did not make any attempt to form a regular
administration. The following is a translation of a proclamation issued
by him:—
[Sidenote: Proclamation issued by the Mahdi.]
“From the servant of his Lord Mohammed el Mahdi, son of Said Abdallah,
to all the fervent proselytes.
“We have appointed as your Prince our dear Sheik Mansour, son of Abd
el hakem. Execute his orders and commands, and follow him in the path
of battle.
“He who submits to him submits to us; he who disobeys him disobeys
us, and disobeys God Himself and His Prophet. Let all show penitence
before God, and abandon all bad and forbidden habits, such as the
degrading acts of the flesh, the use of wine and tobacco, lying,
bearing false witness, disobedience to parents, brigandage, the
non-restitution of goods to others, the clapping of hands, dancing,
improper signs with the eyes, tears and lamentations at the bed of the
dead, slanderous language, calumny, and the company of strange women.
Clothe your women in a decent way, and let them be careful not to
speak to unknown persons. All those who do not pay attention to these
principles disobey God and His Prophet, and they shall be punished in
accordance with the law.
“Say your prayers at the prescribed hours.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
“Give the tenth part of your goods, handing it to our Prince, Sheikh
Mansour, in order that he may forward it to the treasury of Islam.
“Adore God, and hate not each other, but assist each other to do good.”
At the bottom of this, the seal of the Mahdi was affixed.
* * * * *
[Sidenote: 13th February.]
[Sidenote: Advance of Abdel Kader towards Sennaar.]
On the 13th February, Abdel Kader Pasha left Kartoum to rejoin the
troops at Wad of Medinet, who had marched from Kawa. He proceeded
thence towards Sennaar, his force consisting of the three battalions of
the 1st Regiment, about 600 Bashi Bazouks, some Sakkeyer horsemen, and
a few guns and rocket troughs.[310]
On the 22nd February he reached Meshoa-el-Dakhin, about eight hours’
march from Sennaar. That evening, about 8 P.M., a large body of rebels
under the Makashef, who had raised the siege of Sennaar, approached the
camp. Some shots were exchanged, but the rebels, finding the soldiers
on the alert, retired. The following day, Friday, a halt was made, and
the neighbourhood was thoroughly reconnoitred. Abdel Kader received
a letter from the Makashef, in which, after testifying to the divine
mission and the invincibility of the Mahdi, he invited the Pasha to
submit, saying that he had a regard for him, and was anxious to spare
his life and spiritual hereafter.
[Sidenote: 24th February.]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the rebels at Meshra-el-Dai.]
Early on the 24th, the march was continued. On approaching
Meshra-el-Dai, the Makashef was discovered with 10,000 or 12,000
followers in some bushy ground close to the river. The guns and rockets
at once opened fire on them. After some time the rebels came out into
the open and attacked the troops.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
They advanced with great determination, but after a severe fight were
dispersed and pursued by the Cavalry; the engagement lasted from 10
A.M. till 1 P.M. Of the troops 27 were wounded. The rebel loss was
estimated at 2000 killed, including Sheikh Woad el Kerif, of Maatuk
notoriety. Many of the rebels fled into the river, where they were
cut down by the cavalry. The Makashef succeeded in escaping. Some of
the rebels used firearms, and Abdel Kader had a narrow escape, his
watch-chain being broken by a bullet.
[Sidenote: 25th February.]
Saturday night the troops remained halted, but on Sunday the 25th the
march was continued to Sennaar. The inhabitants of the villages along
the road came in, and tendered their submission.
The route between Sennaar and Kartoum, both by land and water,
was reported to be safe. A regular postal service was immediately
reestablished, and steps were taken for repairing the line of telegraph.
After the defeat at Meshra-el-Dai on the 24th, the insurgents appear
to have split themselves up into three bodies; one under Abdul Ghaffar
retired to Karkoj and joined Faki Sherif, another under the Makashef
took up a position at Jebel Sekhédy, about six hours west of Sennaar,
and a third came into Sennaar and gave themselves up.
[Sidenote: 4th March.]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the rebels at Sekhédy.]
Abdel Kader’s scouts having brought in intelligence of the Makashef’s
whereabouts, a force of 1200 irregulars, made up of Shukuriyeh
and Aburoff Arabs, under Saleh Agha, was directed against him. An
engagement took place on the 4th March at Sekhédy, which resulted in
the total defeat of the rebels, who lost 547 killed, among whom were
Sheikhs Omr and Amr, brothers of the Makashef, and Sadyk, his nephew.
The casualties among Saleh Agha’s force were only two men wounded.
Abdel Kader then proposed marching south up the Blue Nile, and
pacifying the country as far as Karkoj, after which he intended
to cross the river, and advance eastward against the revolted
Rufaa-el-Sherk and Kawakli tribes in the country between the rivers
Dinder and Rahad. But, as will be seen further on, he was superseded
before he had time to carry out these plans.
[Sidenote: 20th Feb.]
[Sidenote: Arrival of Pashas Al-el-din and Suleiman.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
[Sidenote: Nyasi at Kartoum.]
On the 20th February, the Pashas Al-ed-Din and Suleiman Nyasi reached
Kartoum. The latter was to take command of the troops, but the mission
of the former was kept secret, though it was rumoured that he was to
be appointed Governor-General of the Soudan.
[Sidenote: 4th March Arrival of Colonel Hicks at Kartoum.]
On the 4th March Colonel Hicks[311] reached Kartoum, and with him
the undermentioned English Officers, viz.:—Lieut.-Colonel Hon. J.
Colborne,[312] Lieut.-Colonel de Coetlogon,[313] Major Martin,[314]
Major Farquhar,[315] Captain Warner, Captain Massey,[316] Captain
Evans, Captain Walker,[317] and Surgeon-Major Rosenberg.
Colonel Hicks had been appointed Chief of the Staff of the Army of
the Soudan, with local rank of Major-General, but it was intended
that he should direct, and be responsible for, all preparations
and operations—in fact, that he should in reality be the
Commander-in-Chief, while nominally holding a subordinate post.
The Mahdi’s movement being, at any rate ostensibly, a religious one, it
was deemed inadvisable to place at the head of the Egyptian Army of the
Soudan a foreigner and a non-Mussulman, lest the insurgent leader might
make capital out of this to arouse still further the fanaticism of his
followers.
Suleiman Nyasi, whose military career dates back to the days of Mahomet
Ali and the Crimean War, was consequently named to the chief command,
but on the understanding that he was to pay strict attention to, and
carefully follow out General Hicks’s instructions and plans, but his
indolence, apathy, ignorance, and in many instances apparent malignity
and jealousy, caused him frequently to act in anything but the spirit
of the instructions given him at Cairo.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
[Sidenote: 8th March.]
[Sidenote: Departure of Lieut.-Col. Stewart for Egypt.]
On the 8th March, Lieut.-Colonel Stewart left Kartoum for Egypt,
travelling by way of Sennaar, Katarif, Kassala, and Massowah.
[Sidenote: 18th March.]
On the 18th March, Major Farquhar, who had been on a reconnaissance up
the White Nile, returned to Kartoum. He reported the inhabitants along
the western bank of the river to be hostile.
Four thousand five hundred rebels and 1800 Baggara Arab Cavalry were
assembled about Marabieh and Abu Djuma, and at Jebel Ain there was a
considerable body, which had lately been reinforced from Kordofan. The
Baggaras had quarrelled with the Mahdi regarding the booty taken at
El Obeyed, and had seized and carried off some of it. The troops at
the posts along the river were in rags, and from four to six months in
arrears of pay.
News from Kordofan stated that the Mahdi’s force was about one hundred
thousand strong, that it had dispersed for the moment, but could be
quickly reassembled. The chiefs met at El Obeyed every Friday for
orders, but the Sheiks of the Baggara did not attend.
Taking advantage of this discontent, General Hicks was trying to open
communications with the last-mentioned, and hoped to arrange a meeting
at Dem.
[Sidenote: 26th March.]
[Sidenote: Proclamation of Al-ed-Deen Pasha as Governor-General of the
Soudan.]
On the 26th March Al-ed-Deen Pasha was publicly proclaimed at Kartoum
as Governor-General of the Soudan, and, on the same day, Hussein Pasha
left for Sennaar to inform Abdel Kader Pasha of his removal from
office, and to relieve him of his military command.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
General Hicks and his Staff left Kartoum on the 3rd April by steamer,
and reached Kawa on the 6th. A force of about 5000 men had been
collected at the latter place, consisting of—
5½ battalions of regular infantry,[318]
½ battalion of negroes,
5 guns,
2 Nordenfeldts, and some Bashi-Bazouks.
[Sidenote: 10th April. Reconnaissance up the White Nile.]
On the 10th April General Hicks made a reconnaissance up the river.
He started at 6 A.M. on the steamer _Bordeen_, taking with him one
mountain gun, two Nordenfeldts, and 50 Bashi-Bazouks. After proceeding
for about an hour and a-half, the steamer was fired on from the western
bank. Higher up shots were fired from many places, especially opposite
the island of Abba, where the rebels had constructed trenches along
the banks. But a few shells, and some rounds from the Nordenfeldts
and rifles, soon drove them inland. Owing to the failure of fuel, the
reconnaissance could not be continued as far as the ford of Abu-Zed.
The steamer returned to Kawa at 5.30 P.M.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
On the 14th April, General Hicks telegraphed to Cairo that he was
anxious to get to Jebel-Ain (eight marches distant), where the rebels
were concentrating, as soon as possible, but that his supplies were
insufficient as he had only enough for from 15 to 20 days with him,
and nothing was obtainable in the country. The administration of the
army was most difficult, owing to the want of proper departments,
and the troops were several months in arrears of pay. The steamers
were out of repair, and too few in number to do all that was required
of them—viz., to bring up supplies of ammunition and food, take
possession of the ford at Abu-Zed, and patrol the river and stop
communication between the banks. There was no store of fuel, all had to
be cut as required.
[Sidenote: 23rd April.]
[Sidenote: Seizure of the ford of Abu-zed.]
It was not till the 23rd April that the main body, nearly 5000 strong,
set out from Kawa. Owing to the difficulty of obtaining reliable
information, General Hicks himself with a small force had proceeded up
the river on the 22nd to reconnoitre, and seize the ford of Abu-Zed. On
arrival at the ford, it was found to be in possession of a small body
of rebels, who were driven off without much difficulty. General Hicks
remained there on the 23rd, placing boats containing Bashi Bazouks
under the command of Jahier Bey, in échelon across the stream, in which
position they could command a very considerable length of the ford
(which extends about a mile), and support one another in case of any
attempt to force the passage.
He left on the morning of the 24th to continue the reconnaissance up
the river. The banks were found to be occupied by straggling groups of
Arabs, with whom shots were exchanged.
On the 25th, the Chief of the Shilluk village of Musran reported that
the rebels had left Jebel-Ain and were marching in force under the
Makashef to attack the “Turks” on the march from Kawa.
Having ascertained that this information was correct General Hicks
steamed back to the ford, warned Jahier Bey, and, during the night,
dropped down the river to join the army, which was then encamped
opposite the northern end of the island of Abba.
[Sidenote: 29th April.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Marabieh and death of the Makashef.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
Being in a favourable position, it remained halted on the 26th and 27th
in expectation of an attack. On the former date some rebel cavalry
appeared, but were driven back with a few shells, and on the night of
the 27th there were several false alarms. The march was resumed on the
28th. On the following day tents were struck as usual, at daybreak,
and the order was given to march at seven A.M. About nine A.M.[319]
Colonel Farquhar, who had been reconnoitring in front, reported that
the enemy was about two miles off, and advancing at a rapid pace. About
a quarter of an hour afterwards they appeared in considerable numbers,
both cavalry and infantry, and spread out towards the flanks with a
view of attacking the angles of the square in which the Egyptian troops
were formed.[320]
They then advanced quickly, led by chieftains on horseback with banners
borne in front of them. There was considerable delay in getting the
guns into action,[321] but the rebel cavalry broke as soon as the
shells commenced falling among them, and moved off the field. The
infantry still came on boldly, and, although shot down in numbers,
succeeded in getting close enough to the square to throw some spears
into it. But few of the enemy were armed with rifles.
[Sidenote: 1883]
After half an hour’s fighting, during which the Egyptian troops behaved
steadily and well, though they appeared to have fired too high,[322]
the rebel force was completely broken up, and fled in confusion. Owing
to the absence of cavalry, the pursuit was not as vigorous as it would
otherwise have been. The strength of the rebels exceeded 5000 men.
Their losses in killed and wounded were about 500. The Makashef, his
son, and several chiefs were among the slain.
The Khedival troops lost two killed and five wounded.[323]
After the action General Hicks, anticipating that an immediate attempt
would be made by the rebels to cross to the western bank of the river
at some point above the ford of Abu-Zed, embarked on board the steamer
_Bordeen_ at Gozabonne-Gomme, and proceeded up the river, taking with
him two Nordenfeldt guns, a rifled howitzer, and 150 Bashi Bazouks. At
the ford of Abu-Zed he picked up the steamer _Fascher_, with Jahier Bey
and 90 Bashi Bazouks.
[Sidenote: 1st May.]
On the 1st of May, the rebels were found to be crossing in large
numbers at a regular place of passage, about 10 miles below Jebel
Ain. They were driven inland from both banks with some loss. Numbers
had already crossed, but a large body with camels and baggage still
remained on the eastern bank. In the hope of capturing these, General
Hicks sent to Sulieman Pasha asking him to hurry on as fast as
possible. But the Egyptians had no cavalry, and the infantry marched so
slowly that it took them more than two days to accomplish the twelve
miles between their camp and the place of passage.
[Sidenote: 1883]
General Hicks himself went towards Jebel Ain, landed, and sent a party
up the mountain. On their return they stated that not a sign of a
rebel was to be seen, and the Shilluks also reported that the district
had been evacuated.
[Sidenote: May 3rd.]
On the 3rd May General Hicks rejoined the main body, then encamped near
Jebel Ain. Suleiman Pasha was anxious to march through the district, as
he was of opinion that there were several tribes in the neighbourhood
to whom it was of importance to show the army. But it was finally
decided to return to Duem at once, and prepare for an attack on Schatt,
where the rebels were reported to be assembling in large numbers.
[Sidenote: Moral effect of the victory at Marabiyeh.]
The victory of the 29th had a very great moral effect and many of the
Baggara and other chiefs subsequently surrendered. General Hicks,
unaccompanied by any troops, received several of them on the western
bank of the river, and thus gave confidence. Negotiations with the
Kababish Arabs were also in progress.
[Sidenote: Withdrawal of the army to Kartoum.]
Towards the end of May the rebels, who had been threatening Duem,
dispersed, and it was reported that the western bank of the river was
free from hostile bands. The main body of the army was then withdrawn
to Kartoum, leaving garrisons at Kawa and Duem. On the Blue Nile,
Sennaar and Wod-Medinet were garrisoned.
The expedition to Kordofan could not be undertaken till after the
rains, when the wells in the desert would be full, and pools of water
would have been formed.
[Sidenote: Estimate of the expenses of the war.]
On the 15th May, the Governor-General of the Soudan telegraphed to
Cairo that he had only £40,000 in the treasury at Kartoum, and that
he thought it inadvisable to enforce the taxes for fear of producing
further disaffection among the natives.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
Arrears to the amount of £81,000 were still owing in the Mudiriyehs of
Kartoum and Sennaar for pay, food, and transport. He was anxious that
in future all salaries should be paid punctually both to the officials
and to the military, and that the Government should be able to meet its
other expenses at the proper time. He requested that large sums of
money might be forwarded to him, and estimated at £46,000 his monthly
expenditure for the troops at Kartoum, Sennaar, the military posts
on the White and Blue Niles, Fashoda, the Equatorial Provinces, and
Bahr-Gazelle, but exclusive of those at Dongola, Berber, and in the Red
Sea Provinces.
[Sidenote: Amount of money to be forwarded from Cairo to meet the
expenses entailed by the rebellion.]
In reply to the above Cherif Pasha telegraphed on the 11th June, that
the undermentioned amounts would be placed at the disposal of the
Governor-General during the current year, viz.:—
£
Seven months’ pay for the army actually
engaged in the war 13,000
Rations for seven months 32,000
Forage (_Fourrage_) 37,500
Purchase of camels 25,000
Arrears 80,000
—-—--
Total 187,500
But the amount actually in the
Treasury at Kartoum was to be
deducted from this 40,000
—-—--
£147,000
=======
leaving £147,000 to be sent from Cairo.
Reinforcements to the number of 3000 men were to be sent to the Soudan,
but all the expenses connected with them, which were estimated at
£40,000, would be defrayed by the Egyptian Government.
For the expenses of the Civil Administration and the pay of soldiers
not actually engaged in the war, the Governor-General was ordered to
do the best he could with the revenues of the Soudan, as the Egyptian
Government would not be able to furnish him with more than the sums
already specified.
[Sidenote: 13th May.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
[Sidenote: 2nd August.]
[Sidenote: Removal of Suleiman Pasha from the command of the army of
the Soudan.]
On the 13th May General Hicks telegraphed to Cairo requesting that he
might be put in indisputable command of the army, as otherwise he
could not be responsible for the success of the expedition to Kordofan.
It was subsequently rumoured on several occasions that he had requested
to be relieved of his post on account of the systematic obstructions he
met with from native officials. These reports were always officially
contradicted. However, on the 2nd August, Reuter’s agent at Alexandria
announced that the Governor-General of the Soudan had been appointed
to command the troops in that province, and that Suleiman Pasha had
been recalled, and appointed Governor of the Red Sea Provinces. By this
means it was expected that General Hicks would regain complete liberty
of action, though Al-ed-Deen Pasha was to accompany the expedition to
Kordofan.
During the absence of the latter, Hussein Bey, Lieutenant-colonel of
the 2nd Regiment, was to act as his deputy at Kartoum. Rashid Pasha,
who was then Governor of the Red Sea Provinces, was to be given the
command of one of the brigades of the Expeditionary Force.
[Sidenote: Position of The Mahdi.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
The Mahdi only remained master of Kordofan. All reports from there
tended to show that serious dissensions had broken out between him and
his chiefs, and that the number of his adherents was daily diminishing.
His position appeared to be getting critical. From the north he was
threatened by the Egyptian army, and to the east the White Nile, which
was constantly patrolled by Egyptian boats, would bar any attempt at
escape in that direction. On the south King Adam of Takallé had sworn
to kill the Mahdi if he attempted to pass through his country to Jebel
Gedir, whither he had sent his family and most of the booty captured
at El Obeyed. King Adam was also taking steps to arrange with Sheikh
Asaker, chief of the Baggara Gimeh Arabs, inhabiting the desert from
the island of Abba towards Takallé, a joint offensive movement against
southern Kordofan. In the middle of July it was stated that the Mahdi
had given up all hopes of resistance, and was only anxious about his
personal safety; and that it was his intention to try to reach the
copper mines in the south-west of Darfur, not far from Jebel Mara. In
order to do this, however, he would have to make a long detour to avoid
an encounter with the force under Slatin Bey, Governor of Darfur.
[Sidenote: Operations in Darfur.]
Very little news has been received of the real state of affairs in that
far-off province. It appears that, on receipt of orders from Cairo, a
messenger was despatched from Kartoum to El Fascher in April of the
present year with the following instructions for Slatin Bey—viz.,
to concentrate the garrisons of Darfur at El Fascher, attempt to
organise a national Government under a descendant of one of the former
kings, and then withdraw from the country, either to Dongola or Bahr
el Ghazel. Report states that Slatin Bey subsequently evacuated El
Fascher, defeated a tribe of hostile Hamr Arabs, and then intrenched
himself at Omchanga, in an important strategical position on the road
to El Obeyed, where he awaited the arrival of the garrison of Foga
before undertaking any further operations.
[Sidenote: Letter from Slatin Bey, Governor of Darfur.]
The above-mentioned orders do not appear to have reached Slatin Bey,
for on the 30th June he wrote as follows to the Governor-General of the
Soudan from Dara, 200 miles south of El-Fascher:—
“Up to this date I have fought 27 battles of more or less importance,
and have been twice wounded. I am besides suffering from Guinea worm,
and have consequently been obliged to retire on Dar Demittala, but
not before killing in battle the Khalifa of Mohammed Ahmet, Bishari
Wal-ud-Bakis.
“I have not only to fight external but internal enemies. Many of the
Arab officers intrigue against me, and seek to undermine my authority.
They spread rumours that Arabi has driven all the Europeans out of
Egypt, and that I myself have been deprived of my functions.”
* * * * *
[Sidenote: 1883.]
“After the commencement of the rainy season, fighting will begin again
with the Razagatt, Habanieh and Mali Arabs, and I am greatly in need
of help, for my best officers and men have fallen, and ammunition is
beginning to draw to an end.”
* * * * *
“I ask your Excellency to send me a letter not in cypher, setting forth
my absolute power, and I take upon myself, as long as I am alive, the
responsibility of keeping the Province of Darfur for the Government.”
* * * * *
The above letter reached Kartoum in August. It was in reply to one from
Giegler Pasha, dated 14th March, 1883, which, Slatin Bey stated, was
the first direct news he had received from Kartoum for more than a year.
[Sidenote: 20th August.]
[Sidenote: Appointment of General Hicks as Commander-in-Chief of the
Expedition to Kordofan. Plan of campaign.]
On the 20th August, General Hicks received a telegram from the Khedive
appointing him Commander-in-Chief of the expedition to Kordofan,
with the rank of General of Division. His original plan was to leave
Kartoum about the 8th of September, and march up the White Nile as far
Berair,[324] with 8600 infantry, 1400 cavalry and Bashi Bazouks, one
battery of Krupp field guns, two batteries of mounted guns, and one
battery of Nordenfeldts, and 5000 camels.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
Leaving the river at Berair, he proposed to march first on Bara,[325]
and then on El Obeyed, appearing before the last-mentioned place with
7000 men, which it was considered would be sufficient to overcome
the Mahdi. About 3000 were to be employed in keeping open the line
of communications. But the idea of establishing a line of fortified
posts between the Nile and Kordofan was subsequently abandoned, and
it was decided that the whole force should advance together, without
attempting to keep up any communication with the rear. The reason for
adopting this course was, that reports were brought in that large
numbers of hostile Arabs were likely to reappear on the line of march
after the passage of the army, and there would be great difficulty in
inducing small bodies of Egyptian troops to escort convoys of stores
between the posts.
The Egyptian officers attached to the force were inefficient, and, as a
rule, apathetic; they carried little or no respect, and had but slight
authority over their men. To bring the army into a state of efficiency,
feed it, provide transport, and procure intelligence, taxed the
energies of General Hicks and his small European Staff to the utmost.
His greatest anxiety was regarding the water supply during the march,
for Kordofan is the driest province in the whole Soudan. The wells
along the roads across the desert contain but little water, except
immediately after the rains, and it was feared that even then there
would be insufficient for a large force accompanied by horses, mules,
and several thousand camels.
On leaving the Nile, provisions for sixty days were to be carried with
the army.
Rashid Pasha, who was to have commanded a brigade, telegraphed from
Kassala that the Arabs in the neighbourhood were in a state of great
excitement, and he thought it would be best for him to remain there
till it had subsided.
[Sidenote: 9th September.]
[Sidenote: Departure of the army from Kartoum.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
On the 9th September the main body set out from Kartoum, and, passing
Berair, reached Duem[326] on the 20th. No hostility was shown along
the route, though many of the inhabitants fled on the approach of the
troops. The heat was intense, and there was considerable loss of life
among the camels during the march. The line of telegraph had been
destroyed.
On the 23rd September, an advanced force, consisting of three
battalions and six guns, seized the first water station, fifteen miles
from Duem, without encountering any resistance.
General Hicks did not leave Kartoum till the 28th September, when he
proceeded up the river by steamer to Duem, and then joined the main
body.[327]
[Sidenote: 30th September.]
On the 30th September the army encamped at a place 30 miles south-west
of Duem. The heat was still intense, and the camels were dying in
considerable numbers.
[Sidenote: Tactics of the Egyptian army.]
The square continued to be used as the fighting formation. Great
precautions were taken on the line of march. The army marched in three
columns prepared instantly to form square, with the camels and stores
in the centre, the guns in the front faces, and the Nordenfeldts at the
angles. Through constant practice, the men had become very perfect in
this manœuvre. When camping square was formed, two tents per company
were pitched behind piled arms. When possible a zeriba, or dense
abattis of thorny bushes was formed round the square. In case of sudden
attack on the march, each soldier carried four crows-feet, which he was
to throw to a distance in his front to check the rush of the assailing
forces.
[Sidenote: 7th October.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
On the 7th October the army appears to have reached Sangi Hamferid, 45
miles south-west of Duem, where it remained halted for several days,
owing to the uncertainty of the water supply in front. At the camp
there was no water except on the surface in depressions of the ground.
The camels were dropping, but the troops were in good health.
[Sidenote: 9th October.]
On the 9th October Colonel Farquhar made a reconnaissance 30 miles
forward, and ascertained that the pools were barely sufficient for a
rapid march to Sarakna, at which village there are a few wells.
The enemy was still retiring, and sweeping the country bare of cattle.
The uncut harvest supplied ample forage.
[Sidenote: Spread of the rebellion to the neighbourhood of Suakin.]
[Sidenote: August.]
In the beginning of August rumours reached Suakin that emissaries of
the Mahdi were inciting the Arabs in the neighbourhood of Sinkat[328]
and Erkowit[329] to revolt. On the 2nd Tewfik Bey, the Governor of
Suakin, left for Sinkat, to inquire into the true state of affairs. He
there learned that Osman Digma, a well-known slave-dealer, assisted
by his nephews, Ahmed and Fagi Digma, had raised the Erkowit, Sherah,
Mishab, Migadaff, and Bishirieh tribes in the name of the Mahdi. All
these are small tribes, living in the Erkowit district; but the more
important Langeb tribe, living in the neighbourhood of Toka, were said
to be preparing to rise.
[Sidenote: 5th August.]
[Sidenote: Defeat of the rebels at Sinkat.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
Tewfik Bey immediately summoned Digma to come to him at Sinkat.
He arrived on the 5th August, but accompanied by about 1500 armed
followers, and demanded, in the name of the Mahdi, the surrender of
Sinkat and Suakin, with all the arms and treasure they contain. These
demands being, of course, refused, Digma attacked the barracks and the
summer residences of the Suakis spread over the plain. The inhabitants
defended themselves, and, with the assistance of the troops, drove off
the rebels after an hour’s fight. Digma was severely wounded, and his
two nephews and sixty-three other rebels were killed. The number of
their wounded is unknown. On the Government side, seven soldiers and
Suakis were killed or died of their wounds.
The rebels retired to Erkowit, and it was reported that they were much
discouraged by their defeat.
By the 13th August the garrison of Sinkat, which on the 5th was only
100 strong, had been increased to 200. On that date there were 100
soldiers, forty of whom were artillerymen, and six Krupp 9-pounders at
Suakin. Some measures were being taken for the defence of the town.
[Sidenote: Uneasiness at Berber.]
Some uneasiness was also felt at Berber, and, in consequence, the Mudir
of that place detained there two battalions of infantry, which arrived
early in August, on their way to Kartoum.
It was reported that the last detachment of reinforcements for General
Hicks, consisting of 200 infantry and 300 Bashi-Bazouks, had been
abandoned by their camel-drivers and camels at a place called Kokreb,
about half-way between Suakin and Berber. What became of the troops
after the loss of their baggage and camels is not stated.
Although the attack on Sinkat had been repulsed with loss, the
appearance of the enemy in the rear of General Hicks, and more or less
commanding his line of communications, was sufficiently serious to
cause much uneasiness at Cairo.
[Sidenote: 24th August.]
[Sidenote: Despatch of reinforcements to Suakin.]
300 troops were despatched from Egypt to Suakin about the 24th August,
and they were to be followed by further large reinforcements.
The telegraph line between Suakin and Sinkat was cut on the 10th
August. On the 8th October it was reported that communication between
those places and Berber, which had been interrupted for some time, had
been reestablished.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
[Sidenote: Annihilation of a detachment of Egyptian troops between
Suakin and Sinkat.]
[Sidenote: 18th October.]
On the 18th October, however, two officers and 156 Egyptian soldiers
were killed by the Arabs in a mountain defile, about 20 miles from
Suakin. They were on their way to support Tewfik Bey, who was said to
be surrounded by rebels at Sinkat.
[Sidenote: 5th November.]
[Sidenote: Destruction of a detachment of Egyptians at Tokar, and death
of Commander Moncrieff, late R.N.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
On the 5th November, a body of Egyptian troops, variously estimated
at from 250 to 500 men, were attacked near Tokar[330] by a band of
insurgents, and completely routed. They are said to have thrown their
arms away and taken to flight, notwithstanding the efforts of their
commander to rally them. The reports are not very clear as to whether
the Egyptians were merely making a reconnaissance, or were attempting
to reach Kartoum by way of Kassala. Commander Moncrieff,[331] late
R.N., the British Consul at Suakin, who had accompanied them from that
place, was among the killed.
The latest accounts state that Tokar is still held for the Egyptian
Government by a small body of troops and some convicts. A panic had set
in at Suakin, and the inhabitants were leaving for Jeddah.
[Sidenote: 9th September.]
[Sidenote: Departure of General Hicks’s Army from Kartoum.]
On leaving the camp at Omdurman,[332] on the morning of the 9th
September, the order of march was as follows, viz.—Two guides, mounted
on camels, led the way. Behind them rode a detachment of men in armour,
followed by the general staff. Then came a battalion of infantry
in line, with several battalions in column in rear of each of its
flanks. The artillery marched between the columns of infantry. Another
battalion in line formed the fourth side of the infantry square.[333]
A detachment of cavalry completed the fighting force. Behind it came
a long train of pack animals, led and protected by Bashi-Bazouks. The
rear was brought up by irregular cavalry.
[Sidenote: Marching-out strength.]
The marching-out strength was 10,000 men, 4 Krupp field guns, 10
mountain guns, 6 Nordenfeldts, 500 horses, and 5500 camels.
Al-ed-Deen Pasha, the Governor-General of the Soudan, started at the
same time, proceeding as far as Duem by steamer. He took in his suite
several notables of great influence, who were to be considered as
hostages, and answerable with their lives for any disturbances that
might break out in Kartoum during their absence.
[Sidenote: Precautions on the march.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
On the march every precaution was taken to guard against surprise. The
troops were always under arms, and lined the “zerebas” an hour before
daybreak, the usual time for an Arab attack. The cavalry used to go out
at dawn, and not till then were the tents allowed to be struck and the
camels loaded. An hour later the whole force marched off. Owing to
the enormous number of camels, progress was slow. After twelve days’
marching, Duem, 110 miles from Omdurman, was reached, and the army
rested for four days. The heat was intense, and both men and camels
suffered considerably.
On quitting the Nile, General Hicks’s original intention had been to
retake Dara,[334] before marching on El Obeyed, but he altered his
plans at the request of King Adam of Takallé, who promised assistance
in the event of the army entering Kordofan from the south.
[Sidenote: 30th September.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
On the 30th September, General Hicks reached Zeraiga, about 30 miles
from Duem. The following despatch was probably written at Sangi
Hamferid,[335] some miles further on, though neither the date nor
the name of the place is stated. It was sent by hand to Kartoum, and
telegraphed thence to Cairo on the 17th October. It runs as follows,
viz.: “The army has arrived within 28 miles of Sarakhna. We have
depended upon pools of rain-water for supply, which we have fortunately
found. A reconnaissance made to-day ensures us water as far as
Sarakhna. Guide information is vague. I regret that I have to abandon
my intention of establishing military posts, and line of communication
with base at Duem. The Governor-General assures me that the Arabs
will close in on my route after the army has passed in sufficient
force to prevent posts forwarding supplies; besides, the pools of
rain-water—the only supply—will dry up. Water not to be obtained by
digging wells. I have no information regarding water between Sarakhna
and Nurabi, nor reliable information of the supply there. This causes
me great anxiety. I quite expected Sarakhna to be occupied by the
enemy, but the reconnaissance to-day found the place evacuated. The
Arabs had left this morning. The health of the troops is, on the whole,
good, which is fortunate, as we have no sick carriage. The heat is
intense.”
[Sidenote: 3rd October.]
[Sidenote: Camp near Sarakhna. Last despatch from General Hicks.]
The following is the last dispatch received from General Hicks. It is
dated “Camp, near Sarakhna, October 3rd, 1883”:—
[Sidenote: Reasons for advancing without securing line of
communications.]
“On leaving Duem, on the White Nile, to march by the Khor-el-Nil to
Melbeis and El Obeyed, I decided that my line of communication should
be secured by posts of 200 men each, left in strongly fortified
positions in the following places: Schatt, 16 miles distant; Zeraiga,
16 miles distant; Sarakhna, 32 miles distant; Nurabi, 16 miles distant;
Agaila, 24 miles distant; Johan, 32 miles distant; Abli, 28 miles
distant: Beliab, 22 miles distant; Um Sheikh, 12 miles distant; Rahad,
14 miles distant; Khashil (? Kazghil), 14 miles distant; Melbeis, 25
miles distant.[336]
“At all these places I was informed water would be found.
“Large quantities of biscuits were to arrive at Duem, and as we were
unable to leave a single camel at the base, 1000 were ordered to be
purchased and forwarded to Duem.
“His Excellency Al-ed-Deen Pasha had already at Kartoum 300, and gave
orders for the remaining 700 to be purchased and forwarded to Duem
without delay.
“The biscuits would then, with ammunition and other stores, be pushed
on to the front from post to post.
“Depôts would be formed at each post, and, in case of a reverse, a line
of retreat secured, the troops falling back upon these depôts, where we
should be certain of finding supplies of food, ammunition, and water.
[Sidenote: 1883.]
“We marched to Schatt, and formed the first post and depôt there; but,
before reaching Zeraiga, I was informed by the Governor-General of the
Soudan that it was useless for me to expect any supplies to be pushed
up from Duem, that the soldiers left at the posts would not guard the
convoys; in fact, that they would be afraid to do so; that, to insure
supplies being forwarded, an army would be required with each convoy;
that the Arabs, although now absent from our line of route, would
return after we had passed, and that they would be numerous, and the
garrisons of the posts would not consider themselves strong enough to
forward the supplies; that it would be dangerous; and I would find that
they would not run the risk.
“The Governor-General requested me to abandon the idea of having
this line of posts—to give up my line of communications and line of
retreat, and to advance with the army _en l’air_, with 50 days’ supply
of food only, the Arabs closing in on our rear.
“I am naturally very averse to this, but if, as his Excellency assures
me, it is a fact that the posts will not be supplied from the base at
Duem, and supplies will not be forwarded through them, I should, in
garrisoning these posts, be only weakening my fighting force without
gaining any advantage. I have therefore called a Council, have had
the matter explained, and requested the members to record their
opinions.”[337]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
No news of the Expeditionary Force having been heard for several weeks,
anxiety began to be felt as to its fate. Messengers were despatched
from Duem along the various routes to Kordofan, but, for a long while,
none of the few who returned brought any authentic information.
[Sidenote: 30th October. Rumoured defeat of the Mahdi.]
On the 30th October, rumours were spread in Kartoum that the Mahdi had
been defeated in several important engagements, and that General Hicks
was master of the whole of Kordofan. No official confirmation of the
reported victories was, however, received, and after a few days the
authenticity of the news began to be doubted.
[Sidenote: 5th November.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Kazghil. Annihilation of General Hicks’s army.]
[Sidenote: 1883.]
At length, on the 19th November, a messenger, who had failed to deliver
his despatches to Al-ed-Deen Pasha, returned to Duem, bringing news
of the total destruction of General Hicks’s army. These sad tidings
were soon confirmed by other persons arriving from Kordofan. Their
accounts differ in detail, but most of them agree that the greater
part, if not the whole, of the army was annihilated by the insurgent
forces on the 4th or 5th November. The events which culminated in this
terrible disaster are still shrouded in a certain amount of mystery.
Nothing has been heard from any of the Europeans who accompanied the
expedition, nor from any of the Egyptian Staff Officers, of a later
date than General Hicks’s despatch of the 3rd October. Probably
the most trustworthy account of the fighting is that given by a
camel-driver, who went as servant to a native officer. He states
that the army, on leaving Duem, soon met the rebels, and engaged in
skirmishes with them, the Mahdi’s men being beaten, and the Egyptians
losing a few Bashi-Bazouks and Shaggyehs. Thus the army arrived at
Rahad, where there is a lake. There it filled up with water, and then
marched towards Alouba. At the latter place there was an encounter with
the rebels, in which General Hicks was victorious. On the 2nd November
the army left Alouba, taking what water it could, and, while marching
through a forest, was surprised by a large force of rebels. The
Egyptians formed square, and, after fighting all day, finally defeated
them and drove them off. On Saturday, the 3rd November, the march was
resumed. Water was already becoming scarce. The rebels again appeared
in force, and surrounded the army. A serious engagement ensued, in
which heavy losses were suffered on both sides, but the rebels were
once more beaten. That night was passed on the field of battle, and
next day the army moved towards Kazghil. After proceeding for four
hours, it suddenly came under a heavy fusillade from large numbers of
the enemy. The troops were suffering great torments from thirst, but
nevertheless fought throughout the whole day. On the 5th, when they
were approaching the wells, which were only half an hour distant, the
rebels, who had been concealed in the forest, again suddenly attacked
the column on all sides. The Egyptians returned their fire, and a great
battle raged. Towards mid-day the entire force of the rebels made a
general charge with guns, swords, and spears, and General Hicks and
his whole army perished, except 200 Egyptian soldiers and a few negro
servants, most of whom were wounded.[338]
Of the whole of the expeditionary force, the only European supposed to
be now alive is Adolf Klootz, formerly a sergeant of Prussian Uhlans,
and recently servant to Major von Seckendorff. He is said to have
deserted three days before the final struggle, to have commanded the
insurgent artillery during the action, and to be at present an officer
in the service of the Mahdi.[339]
NOTE—The following is the Extract of a letter from the Mahdi’s Emir at
Berber to Zubair, by whom it was forwarded to Sir Henry Gordon.
Letter of the Emir Ali Mohammed Abou Saad Esshentrawi al Abadi (the
Mahdi’s Emir at Berber).
“Compliments,—After the arrival of Hussein Pasha Khalifat in the
Soudan, it was found that all the inhabitants were aroused by the
appearance of the Imam. Since this every week a disturbance took
place among the Arabs and Jahleien and others. We tried to put down
the disturbances. While we were trying to do so, news came that the
influence of the Imam the Mahdi was established, and that all the
districts of Darfur and Bahr el Ghezel, and Kordofan, Sennaar, and
Jebel Khadir, and the Arabs, all of them, were under him. Why this was
so was that they saw and heard what he has done to the backsliders
at the battle of Jebel Khadir and in the slaughter of Yusuf Pasha
Shelali and his army of 8000 men, and in the destruction of Al-ed-Deen
Pasha and his army of 36,000 men, which was altogether destroyed in a
quarter of an hour. It was a fearful fight, in which you heard only the
slashing of swords into the bodies. At that time we received letters
from our lord the Imam strictly ordering us to fight the backsliders
and to block the way against all mischief-makers whatever, which
we prepared to do. Then came to us Mohammed El Kheir Ibu Abdullah,
Governor-General of the district of Berber, bringing with him standards
of victory prepared for the siege of Berber. When he arrived at
Metemma, he wrote letters to all the districts, calling for the aid of
all the tribes and Arabs. It was only a short time after that he came
to Berber with an army of 40,000 men, the youngest of whom were eager
to die in the field for the sake of God. This was on the 1st Rejeb,
1301. Correspondence took place between the Governor and the Pasha for
the space of eight days, and on Monday, the night of the 23rd Rejeb,
the battle was fought; and before break of day we had won the victory
and had killed all who opposed the Mahdi, and captured the Pasha.
Then all the inhabitants of Bertou, of Berkou, of Islih, of Balalah,
of Baskirmah, and of Salah came into the Imam, and then his reign was
established in all the Soudan, east and west. This is what happened in
these parts; and know, my friend, that the world is turned upside down,
and henceforward there will be nothing but preparation for the holy war
in the path of God, and spending of treasure and life in what pleases
Him and His Prophet. Be on your guard against the covetousness of the
world.
“As to your spy, Mohammed Abou Jibali, who was sent with your men,
after they came to Berber, and had seen the Governor, and had
permission to go to Kartoum, when they reached Shendy the Governor
thought it better that they should return to Berber—which they did on
the 1st Ramadan. They were imprisoned till the 20th. Then eight mounted
men came from among your relatives, and had a conference with the
Governor, who then released them, and they went to your friends living
near Kartoum. After they left, the spy, Mohammed Abou Jibali, was
detained, and imprisoned in Berber, as before, till the 3rd of Zu’l
Kādih. For your sake and friendship, &c., we have done all we could,
until we secretly released him and sent him away safely to you. I hope
he will arrive in safety, and will tell you how honestly we have acted
for you.
“Accept, &c.
“3rd Zu’l Kādih, 1301 [about 25th August, 1884].”
APPENDICES TO BOOK V.
APPENDIX Q.
From Saleh Bey, Governor at Galabat.
To his Excellency the Governor-General of all the Provinces of the
Soudan.
SIR,
The two envelopes enclosed were sent to your servant from his Majesty
the King of Kings of Abyssinia, with a special messenger from him, and
a request that we would receive and forward them to your Excellency
where-ever you may be found. Therefore we now send these messengers
with them. And we trust that after you have honoured them with your
attention that your Excellency will quickly send back the answer to
us, that we may send it to the King of Kings of Abyssinia by the two
messengers who have come from his Majesty, and who are at present date
with us at Kalabât (Galabat). Awaiting the said reply.
(Signed) SALEHH IBRAHIM,
District Inspector and Officer of Kalabât (Galabât).
_Postscript._—Sir, The name of the bearer is Ali Othman.
In order not to increase expense (this) is written on ruled paper.
(Signed) SALEHH IBRAHIM.
1 Zu’l Hejjeh, 1301.
Sept. 22, 1884.
From Saleh Bey, Governor of Galabat.
To his Excellency the Honourable the Governor-General of the Soudan.
SIR,
Your servant, who stands in the attitude of service (to you), prays God
with a sincere heart to grant his request and to extend His goodness
towards me, in strengthening and preserving your Excellency under His
shadow for the sake of the servants and subjects (of Government), and
to change the condition of affairs from what they are, and to grant me
the honour of seeing your Excellency, to kiss your bountiful hands, by
which we have been covered with good and with blessings;—(even you
who are) the destroyer of the enemies of the Government, the wicked
rebels who have lost their souls and their religion, and are deprived
of the benefits of the Government, from which they had obtained glory
and honour; and turned, in spite of (all) that, from truth to error.
May God preserve the glory of Government (so that) by presence of your
Excellency you may destroy and utterly ruin the wretched Mohammed
Ahhmed and his followers.
We have also to-day heard from the neighbourhood of Dukah of Abou
Sitti and of Abou Haraz about what the energy of your Excellency has
accomplished in beating the rebels and dispersing their people and
troops, assembled for purposes of sedition.
And I beseech God most High, to whom be praise, to stretch out the
sword of your Government more (and more)—(in order) to annihilate the
false pretences of Mohammed Ahhmed, and to disperse his wicked hordes.
If your thoughts be directed towards your servant and the humble
subject of the Government—(I have to say that) at present date I am
well, under your protection, and am still continuing in the attitude
of service to the Government. And oh! what a Government! (it is). How
much compassion and benefit and kindness have you bestowed on us in
goodness and bounty, which no man can deny? I pray in the name of God
and of His prophet that your servant may never depart from this path
of duty (fidelity—being) obedient to the Government openly, without
hindrance—under your protection.
With regard to the subjects of the Government under the care of your
servant—they do not cease to remain as they were in respect of
submission and obedience (loyalty), and will never follow the ways
of rebellion—by the mercy of God most High and as a result of the
advantage of being under your Government.
But, Excellency, we are surrounded by the enemy on all sides; from
the side of the Dukah, by the Shukryeh, by the Dhāniyeh, and by the
Ja’alibiyeh: as on the side of the river, by the Rahbar; also by the
Bukādi, and those rebels who follow them.
But by the influence of your Excellency no harm will come to us from
them. Nor do we take account of him (the Mahdi); our Lord will make
us victorious over him through the strength of the Government and the
reputation of its power and majesty, from which we derive glory and
honour, through your Excellency and the favour of the Khedive.
As to what we have enclosed about —--, we trust and pray for the
answer. Including this time we have now written to you four times.
The messenger takes them (the letters) from here, and when he gets to
Katarif, or Dukah, he finds liers in wait, and the rebels torment him
on meeting him in the road.
This prevented us from writing lately, but we are in constant
communication with the Mudiriyeh; and in that road we have lost two
persons by (hands of) the rebels of Dhāniyeh and of Bukkād, on the road
of Tumruk.
This for the information of your Excellency.
(Signed) SALEHH IBRAHIM,
Ma’amooor and Nāzir, of Kalabât (Galabât)
(District Inspector and Officer).
1 Zu’l Hejjeh, 1301.
Sept. 22, 1884.
From Saleh Bey, Governor of Salahah.
To His Excellency the Honourable the Governor-General of the Soudan.
SIR,
I have the honour to lay before your Excellency that at the beginning
of the month of Rajeb, from the time of the desertion and change of
conduct of the Shukriyeh and the Dhāniyeh, and the Jaalāni, and the
Bukkādi, in forsaking loyalty to Government and corrupting their ways
when they joined the wretch (the Mahdi) and his followers: as soon
as we received news of their having thrown off their allegiance we
communicated with the Mudiriyeh in the month aforesaid. And these
four tribes combined together against us and besieged us on the side
of Dukah, having with them one called Hussein Abd el Wāhhad, and they
wrote to us as to their intention that we should follow them into
error, or they would fight and hem us in. When we perceived this, and
that it was then the season of autumn and the time for sowing our
seed for necessary provisions—and that their wicked intention was to
prevent the inhabitants from sowing their grain, and that the soldiery
we had were very few; we tried by means of diplomacy and artifice with
their chief Hussein, to get them to leave us during the autumn (seed
time).
All that passed between us and them we have communicated in detail
to the Mudiriyeh from time to time—so that there should be no
misunderstanding from our silence—about what we wrote to them for
putting them off by diplomacy, as it seemed best to us for bringing
them to reason. And please God, after tranquillity is established,
we will hasten to make copies of all the communications which have
passed with them, as well as of what we wrote to the Mudiriyeh. On your
seeing them you will know the zeal of your servant in upholding his
office; and his exertions for honour of the Government, whose bounties
overwhelm him, will appear.
And, Sir, now that autumn is over and these four tribes above mentioned
are now in Katarif, and as there is great energy displayed in
assembling them for the certain purpose of besieging Kalabât (Galabât),
it became necessary to inform your Excellency, trusting and praying
for issue of your Excellency’s order, sanctioning all that we do for
the purpose of impeding and destroying those wretches before named.
And with the help of the most High God your servant will do nothing
but what will lead to victory, and will increase the supremacy of the
Government and the destruction of its enemies. It is not to be hidden
from your Excellency about Mohammed Bey Zain, that when the Mudiriyeh
sent orders to the Ma’amoor (district officer) of Katarif for payment
of 6000 dollars for payment of the salaries of the officials of
Galabât, an officer and thirty-five soldiers were appointed to receive
that amount from the officials of Katarif. And when they were coming
to Galabât, Mahmood Bey, the above-named, took the money from them and
left the officer to go his way. We wrote at the time to the Mudiriyeh
about it, telling what Mahmood had done, and also to his Excellency,
Mahmood Bey, and received his reply (denying) that the sum had been
given to him at all, and refusing to have any more communication on the
subject. And we made copy of what we received from him, and we wrote
about him to the Mudiriyeh, and his answer is preserved by us in case
of necessity.
(Signed) SALEHH IBRAHIM.
Nazir and Ma’amoor of Kalabat (District
Inspector and Officer).
Date, 1 of Zu’l Hejjeh, 1301.
Sept. 22, 1884.
_Postscript._—SIR, We learn from the Mudiriyeh of Saka (by letter)
of this date of what the energy of your Excellency has done there to
impede and repulse the rebels. They are joyful to-day at not being
besieged as hitherto, and the neighbourhood is pretty clear at present.
At this date there is perfect safety on account of the water from their
being surrounded. After this month the crossing of the rivers will
become possible, and (then) without doubt the rebels will be able to
get at them. Your servant is constantly writing to the General of his
troops to be always wide awake, and to look out for the preservation
and the safety of the honour of the Government.
Always, Sir, at your order,
SALEHH IBRAHIM.
From the Greek Consul at Adowa to General Gordon.
Adowa (Abyssinia), 5/17 August, 1884.
MY DEAR GENERAL,
I arrived in Abyssinia on the 12/24 May, sent by my Government to aid
the mission of Admiral Hewett at the Court of His Majesty the Emperor
John.
Thanks to the intelligence and the good feeling of His Majesty, aided
by my counsels, the mission of the Admiral has completely succeeded.
In Egypt and in England we have been for four months without news from
you, in spite of all the attempts which have been made to obtain news
from you.
In England they have prepared an expedition of 15,000 men for the Nile,
commanded by Lord Wolseley, besides which the Emperor John will put
himself in the field after the Haref with a great army. Take courage,
then. Give me news of you that I may send them to England.
The messenger is sent by the Emperor John, whom I have caused to
understand the urgent need of news from you. You must not detain the
messenger more than two days.
I wish you all honour and glory in your mission, and
I am your devoted friend,
MITZAKIS.
From Greek Consul Mitzakis, dated 24th August, to Greek Consul,
Kartoum, received 20th October, 1884.
Adowa (Abyssinia), 5/17 August, 1884.
SIR,
His Majesty’s Government is much affected at the misfortunes of the
Greeks in the Soudan, and has ordered me to come here, in order that by
my relations with His Majesty the Emperor John, I may help the Greeks
in the Soudan, and give them news.
His Majesty’s Government is much distressed about its subjects, because
there has been no news for four months of His Excellency Gordon Pasha,
in spite of all the efforts of the Governments of England and of Egypt.
The Most Christian Emperor John, to whom I have spoken of the great
interest of England and Greece in the Soudan, has promised me to send
this letter by Metemma[340] (Galabat) by a trusty messenger, who will
return, bringing your answer and a letter from His Excellency Gordon
Pasha, to whom I also write. Therefore I beg you to be so good as to
write to me all your news, that is to say, if the siege is very strict;
if the Mahdi himself is at the head of the besiegers; if you have
provisions and munitions, and for how many months; how many Greeks
and Europeans there are in Kartoum, together with their names; how
many soldiers have you, and what is the spirit of the soldiers and the
inhabitants of the town, and all other important news.
It must be thoroughly understood that you are to send back the
messenger at the earliest possible moment, and give him a letter, in
very small form, in order that he may conceal it in safety.
I am surprised that you have not sent any letter by Metemma or by
Walkeit.
If you can send me letters by Metemma, you must address them to the
Governour-General Gondar Axum-Gabroun; or by Walkeit, to the Governour
Degias-Tessema.
Hoping that your siege will soon be raised,
I am, &c.,
THE CONSUL.
[NOTICE.]
The English Admiral Hewett has come here, and has signed the Convention
of the Emperor John with the Egyptian Government, by which Abyssinia
takes Bogos,[341] Kassala, Katarif, and the right of importing and
exporting merchandize and arms by the port of Massowa.
Even while I am writing, the Egyptians are giving up Bogos to
Ras-Aloula (the Abyssinian Commander-in-Chief).
In England 15,000 soldiers are preparing to come to relieve Kartoum,
and I trust that an expedition of from 100,000 to 200,000 brave men
will start to save you.
If there is a messenger who can bring your letter to Metemma (or
Galabat) or to Walkeit you can promise him whatever you wish, and we
will pay him, because the English Government has a great interest in
General Gordon.
I am yours, &c.
APPENDIX R (249).
From Slatin Bey.
His Excellency Gordon Pasha, Governor-General of the Soudan.
YOUR EXCELLENCY,
I have sent two letters, one by George Calamatino and the other by
my servant, without having received an answer from your Excellency,
neither has Consul Hansall answered me.
Your Excellency, I have fought twenty-seven times for the Government
against the enemy, and they have beaten me twice, and I have done
nothing dishonourable, nothing which should hinder your Excellency from
writing me an answer, that I may know what to do.
They have taken the little steamer at Dar-Djumna, after it passed the
Sehelal of the Robatat, and they have brought the whole of the letters
from Kartoum for Cairo here. In order to assure you that they have
taken the steamer they have sent your Excellency some letters, and I
have done all that I could to send your Military Journal,[342] because
it may be, perhaps, of some value for your Excellency.
I hope that Consul Hansall has made a translation of my letter, in
which I place all my feeble services to your Excellency’s disposal, and
I have been obliged to write in German, because they have burnt my
French dictionary, believing that it was a prayer book.
His Excellency Stewart Pasha, with nine men, is dead. They have taken
the others to Berber.
When you have a letter for Dongola I beg you to send it me, and I will
find means of sending it on.
Your scribe has written a dispatch in cipher, half Arabic and half
cipher, so badly, that they have been able to decipher it, and so
they have found a key to your despatches, and have also deciphered
your Excellency’s despatch to his Excellency Towfik Pasha. If there
are letters from Europe for me at the post I beg you to send them
me, because it is almost three years since I have had any news of my
family. I entreat your Excellency to honour me with an answer.
Your devoted and obedient servant,
SLATIN.
I and Seid Gjoma, Mudir of Fascher, are seeking occasion to enter
Omdurman to remain with you. Pray, Excellency, do your best to give us
permission, because we are always in fear of spies. I pray God that He
may give you success in the siege.
P.S.—If your Excellency has perhaps understood that I have done
anything contrary to the honour of an officer, and if that hinders you
from writing to me, I pray you give me a chance of defending myself,
and judge according to truth.
APPENDIX T.
From the Mudir of Sennaar.
To the Governor-General of the Soudan and its dependencies, to His
Excellency the Honourable.
We stated to your Excellency that on Oct. 6, 1884, we had the honour to
receive the order of your Excellency, dated September 24, announcing
the arrival of nine regiments of the braves of the English army and
Moslems of India; artillery, cavalry, and infantry of the army,
experienced in passing mountains, plains, and rough places, with new
cannons and powerful horses. And our reading it to the public and
publishing it in the country produced great rejoicing and happiness
in all, and they augured all good and every benefit, and they are
all praying for victory and success for you and for the army. And
please God they are arrived at Berber and have taken possession
of it, and have arrived at Kartoum. Everybody at Sennaar and the
neighbourhood—Ulema, merchants, citizens, notables, officers, and
soldiers—kiss the hands of your Excellency, and we proclaim about your
Excellency, that by the power of God and His protection, and by the
help of our prophet—on whom and on his people be the best of blessings
and peace—the disturbances of the Soudan and the pretensions of the
Mahdi are stopped, and nothing remains thereof but little trifles in
some parts. And they will all submit to the sword of the Government.
To God belongs success, and help is in Him.
Mudir General of Sennaar,
(Signed) HASSAN SADIK.
Dated 18 Zu’l Hejje, 1301.
Oct. 9, 1884.
Postscript to his Excellency.—We beg your Excellency to give orders
for the quick despatch of a steamer with what we asked for in our
(letter) laid before you, No. 39/14.
APPENDIX U.
Letter from the Mahdi to General Gordon.
In the name of God the merciful and compassionate: praise be to God,
the bountiful Ruler, and blessing on our lord Mahomed with peace.
From the servant who trusts in God—Mahomed the son of Abdallah.
To Gordon Pasha of Kartoum: may God guide him into the path of virtue,
amen!
Know that your small steamer, named _Abbas_—which you sent with the
intention of forwarding your news to Cairo, by the way of Dongola,
the persons sent being your representative Stewart Pasha and the two
Consuls, French and English, with other persons, has been captured by
the will of God.
Those who believed in us as the Mahdi, and surrendered, have been
delivered; and those who did not were destroyed—as your representative
afore-named, with the Consuls and the rest—whose souls God has
condemned to the fire and to eternal misery.
That steamer and all that was in it have fallen a prey to the Moslems,
and we have taken knowledge of all the letters and telegrams which were
in it, in Arabic and in Frankish (languages), and of the maps, which
were opened to us (translated) by those on whom God has bestowed His
gifts, and has enlightened their hearts with faith, and the benefits of
willing submission. Also (we have found therein) the letters sent from
you to the Mudir of Dongola, with the (letters, &c.) accompanying, to
be forwarded to Egypt and to European countries. All has been seized,
and the contents are known. It should all have been returned to you,
not being wanted here; but as it was originally sent from you, and is
known unto you, we prefer to send you part of the contents and mention
the property therein, so that you may be certified; and in order that
the truth may make a lasting impression on thy mind—in the hope that
God may guide thee to the faith of Islam, and to surrender; that you
and your followers may surrender to Him and to us, that so you and they
may obtain everlasting good and happiness.
Now first (among the documents seized) is the cipher dated Sept. 22,
1884, sent to Mustafa Jāwer, Mudir of Dongola, in answer to his letter
dated 30th August, 1884, European reckoning, (saying) that you have
given him the rank of Liwa—on the back of which is your telegram to
the Khedive of Egypt, asking that he will confirm the said appointment.
We have also taken knowledge of (extract from) the Journal (daily
record) of the provision in the granary (as) seen by the Inspector
Moosa Othmān, namely 3374 ardebs of dhoora; 4 ardebs and ⅓ and ¼ of
wheat, &c. Also (extract from) the Journal[343] (daily register) of the
ammunition seized by the Inspector Mohamed, dated Aug. 18, 1884—the
number (? of cartridges) in store being 581,395.
Also of the telegram sent to the Khedive of Egypt, and Nubar Pasha,
and to the English Consul-General from nineteen persons who have put
their seals to it, and who are presidents of the Court of Appeal,
(namely) Hassan Abdul Munam, and the members and the merchants, who
pray (therein) that the Soudan Railway, which the Egyptian Government
find it difficult to make, (may be) exchanged for river steamers and
military stations, with telegraphic lines between the stations.[344]
Further, (there is) the letter (found) with the French Consul, written
by you to him on July 12, 1884, No. 512/38, in acknowledgment of the
100 francs distributed to the poor and needy.
(There is) also your letter dated August 28, 1884, No. 35/144, sent to
Nubar Pasha, and to the English Consul-General, and to the Chief of
the Egyptian Treasury, with information about the 50,000 guineas sent
from Egypt to Berber, and captured by the auxiliaries of the faith,
and mentioning the advances (made) by the merchants at interest of
one piastre per 100 piastres, with the hope of paying it back to the
principals or their agents in that part.
(There is) also your communication dated August 26, 1884, No. 34/144,
sent to the President of the Council, with a list of sixteen persons,
in which you ask for confirmation of the rank which you have bestowed
on them.
Also your letter, No. 1/141, dated August 14, 1884, to the Mohurdâr
(Keeper of the Seals) of the Khedive, as to disposal of the four
decorations you have given, and of which you enclose a specimen.
Also (as to) the ranks of the officers named by you, and the note
containing eleven names, like Nuehr Bey Mahomed, Commandant of the Army
of Sennaar, whom you made Liwa (General).
Also your telegram, dated Sept. 3, 1884, No. 23, to the afore-mentioned
Mohurdâr (Keeper of the Seals), to confirm the appointment of Ibrahim
Foozi, and Mohammed Nefii, and Moosa Shoki as Liwas (Generals).
Also your letters, (written) in European (language), all about the
siege of Kartoum, and all about the arranging of the steamers, with the
number of the troops in them, and their arms, and the cannon, and about
the movements of the troops, and the defeat of your people, and your
request for reinforcements, even if only a single regiment, and all
about how your agent Cuzzi turned Moslem.
Also many letters which had come to you from our lieutenants, and what
they contained of advice; also stating the number of Europeans at
Kartoum, 3 English, 2 Austrians, 1 Prussian, 1 Frenchman, 4 Italians,
40 Greeks.
Also the diary (registry) of the arms, ammunition, guns and soldiers
sealed by Faraj (Ferratch) ez Zainy, Commander of the Army, which
has 2 Krupp guns and 284 shells; 11 mountain field-pieces, and their
ammunition (? cartridges), numbering 2303; 2 matchlock guns and their
ammunition, 315; 5 mortars and their ammunition 565; and 1 field
piece, and 2 mitrailleuses without ammunition; and 8 howitzers (?) and
their ammunition, 599; and 7064 Remington rifles, and 1205 percussion
muskets; and 246 muskets (called) arshalik; and 127 rifles, old bore,
and 19 pistols; and the ammunition (cartridges) for the Remingtons
being 150,233 packets. And the number of the soldiers: 2 Liwas
(Generals), 2 Colonels, 5 Lieut.-Colonels, and so on for other grades,
and 2370 privates; the contingent of Bashi-Bazouk, and of the Shaggyeh
and Khotriyeh and others, the amount of their strength (being) 26
divisions, numbering 4797 men. Also giving the number of the servants
of the arsenal and on the steamers, ship by ship.
We have also taken knowledge of the two letters of Salehh, the Melek of
the Sanjak (district) of Sanik, which he gave up to us (the Mahdi).
One of them, dated April 30, 1884, in which he threatens (this); and
the second, dated May 1, in which he states that which he has already
stated, and in which he asks for his reward.
We have also noted the telegram of the officials and of the presidents
of courts, and of the Kadi and the Muftis and Ulema, numbering 34 sent
to the Mohurdâr of the Khedive in Egypt, dated August 28, 1884, in
which they ask for succour from the Egyptian Government; to which was
attached your note to the Mudir of Dongola on account of his drafts.
Also your cipher telegrams, one of which is dated August 8, 1884, to
the Mohurdâr of the Khedive, in which you explain that on your arrival
at Kartoum the impossibility had become clear to you of withdrawing the
troops and the employés, and sending them to Egypt; on account of the
disturbances (rebellions) in the country, and the cutting (closing) of
the roads; for which reason you ask for reinforcements, which did not
come until that happened which has happened to the Mudiriyeh of Berber.
Also about your coming to Kartoum with seven men after the annihilation
of Hicks’s army; and your requesting a telegram to be sent to you in
Arabic, in plain language about the Soudan, to show to the people
of Kartoum—as the telegrams in European cipher do not explain
enough, except only certain news (matters), and their meaning is not
intelligible, except only certain things (which are understood).
And also (you refer) to the useless waste of time, so much so, that
from your repeated promises to the people of Kartoum about arrival of
reinforcements, you have appeared to them as if you were a liar.
Also (about) your asking for Turkish troops and your promise to send
your representative, Stewart, and Mr. Power to Dongola, both of whom
the Most High God has destroyed.
And the second (telegram) with the same date and the same tenor, to the
President of the Council and the English Minister in Cairo.
And the third (telegram) dated August 28, 1884, to the Mohurdâr (of the
Khedive), in which you promise to send a detachment to attack Sheikh el
Obeyed; which you sent, and the Most High God has destroyed.
Also your letter to the Khedive of Egypt, without date, in which you
ask to have English soldiers sent, and appoint Zubair Pasha with
reinforcements for withdrawal of the Egyptian troops to Egypt, and
that you (will) give the Soudan to the Sultan on the arrival of the
reinforcements of 200,000 men. And (you state that) if this be not
done those in the Soudan will be killed, and their blood will be on
their conscience (i.e. those to whom he writes will be responsible for
their deaths). And the last you say in it (is) that Mahomed Ali Pasha
is the only and single one in the Soudan on whom you (could) rely to
take your place. But God has destroyed Mohamed Ali Pasha, on whom you
rely.
The fourth telegram is dated August 28, to the Khedive of Egypt, and
to Nubar Pasha and the English Consul in Egypt, in which you say that
you were expecting the reinforcements before asked for—by way of
Merowé—and also state the telegrams sent to the above-named at that
date; in which you speak about fighting my auxiliaries, and about your
having provisions for five months.
Also the telegram, dated August 25, 1884, to the above-mentioned, in
which you pretend (suppose) that Ibrahim el Obeyed has been killed. And
you say that you have the news of our arrival, which, however, was not
confirmed.
And your letter to the President of the Council and the English
Minister in Cairo, dated August 8, 1884, in which you speak of your
appointing three steamers to go and inquire as to the state of Sennaar,
and that you will send soldiers to Berber by the steamers to recapture
it, sending with them Stewart and the Consuls, whom the Most High God
has destroyed.
And the telegram, dated August 8, 1884, sent to the President of
the Council and the English Minister, in which you promise to send
2000 soldiers to Berber for recovering it, and (say) that unless
the reinforcements come to strengthen Berber, when the water of the
Nile gets lower the same thing will happen again to Berber which had
(already) happened.
Also your telegram to the Khedive of Egypt and Nubar Pasha, dated Sept.
8, 1884, in which you say it was your purpose to remove those (the
garrison, &c.) at Sennaar, but that you saw that it would not be done;
and (you mention) the sorrow of the inhabitants and of the employés at
Kartoum and Sennaar at the non-arrival of succour.
Also the telegram, dated Sept. 9, to the Khedive of Egypt and Nubar
Pasha and to the General, in which you speak of the sending of Stewart
and those with him by the small steamer, and (with) the two large
steamers escorting them for protection. And that you had so many times
already asked for succour, and had deep anxiety for the state of the
Soudan.
And (stating) that you had received no answer whatever, so that the
people had become disgusted.
Also your telegram, dated August 28, 1884, stating that (as to) the
Firmān emanating from the Khedive to all the nobles and notables and
people of the Soudan, announcing the withdrawal of the troops of the
Government from it, and their evacuation of the country, (and) leaving
it to the Soudanese to appoint rulers of the country from among the
natives,—you had not been able to communicate or to show it to anybody
on account of what had taken place.
Also (we have seen) the two seals engraved with our name to imitate our
seal.
We never miss any of your news, nor what is in your innermost thoughts,
and about the strength and support—not of God—on which you rely. We
have now understood it all.
Tricks in making ciphers, and using so many languages, are of no avail.
From the Most High God, to whom be praise, no secrets can be hidden.
As to your expecting reinforcements, reliance for succour on others
than God, that will bring you nothing but destruction, and (cause you
to) fall into utmost danger in this world and the next.
For God most High has dispersed sedition through our manifestation,
and has vanquished the wicked and obstinate people, and has guided
those who have understanding to the way of righteousness.
And there is no refuge but in God, and in obedience to His command, and
that of His Prophet and of His Mahdi.
No doubt you have heard what has happened to your brethren, from whom
you expected help, at Suakin and elsewhere, whom God has destroyed, and
dispersed and abandoned.
Notwithstanding all this, as we have now arrived at Mushra’ el Koweh’,
at a day’s journey from Omdurman, and are coming, please God, to your
place, if you return to the Most High God, and become a Moslem, and
surrender to His order and that of His Prophet, and believe in us as
the Mahdi, send us a message from thee, and from those with thee, after
laying down your arms and giving up the thought of fighting, so that I
may send you one with safe conduct, by which you will obtain (assurance
of) benefit of the blessing in this world and the next. Otherwise, and
if you do not act thus, you will have to encounter war from God and
His Prophet. And know that the Most High God is mighty (able) for thy
destruction, as He has destroyed (others) before thee, who were much
stronger than thou, and more numerous.
And you, and your children and your property, will be for a prey to the
Moslems, and you will repent when repentance will not avail. For, after
the beginning of the battle were you to surrender, it would be from
fear, and not willingly, and that will not be accepted.
And there is no succour or strength but in God, and peace be upon those
who have followed the Guidance.[345]
Dated (Wednesday) 7th day 2nd of Moharram, 1302.
Oct. 22, 1884.
_Postscript._—In one of your cipher telegrams sent to Bahhri and
seized, you mention that the troops present in Bahr Gazelle and the
Equator and elsewhere (number) 30,000 soldiers, whom you cannot leave
behind, even though you should die.
And know that Bahr Gazelle and the Equator are both of them under our
hand (power), and that both have followed us as Mahdi, and that they
and their chief and all their officers are now among the auxiliaries
of the Mahdi. And they have joined our lieutenant in that part, and
letters from them are constantly coming and going without hindrance, or
diminution of numbers.
And here inclosed are two letters of those which we have received from
our agents (lieutenants) there. On seeing them thou wilt understand and
know if Bahr Gazelle is (or not) in thy possession as thou thinkest, or
whether it forms part and parcel of the Mahdi’s dominions.
And for thy better information, and in our compassion for thee and
the worshippers of God (with thee), we have thought of adding this
postscript, and so that you should see clearly what to do, this
postscript was necessary.
(Seal.) There is no God but (God) ALLAH.
Mahomed is the prophet of (God) ALLAH.
Mahomed the Mahdi (son of) ABD-ALLAH.
(Year) 1292.
This Seal is square, and very large. It is roughly engraved, and the
inscription forms a triplet, each line ending with the name of God.
The letter is altogether written on one side of a very large sheet of
paper.
APPENDIX U _a._
(ENCLOSURE IN U.)
Letter from Mohammed Sheikh Mohammed Kerkasâwi to Achmet, son of
Suleiman.
In the name of God the Merciful and Compassionate. Praise be to God the
Supreme Ruler, and blessing and peace upon our lord Mahomed and his
successors with salutation.
From the Fakir of God, the humble and lowly, Mahomed Sheikh Mahomed
Kerkasâwi to our brother and beloved in God, to
Achmed, son of Suleiman, Receiver General of the Treasury of the
Moslems. May God preserve him. Amen!
After praying for the peace of God and His blessing and mercy upon
you; if you inquire after me (I can say that) I am by God’s help in
possession of all the conditions of good health.
As to the information which we have to give you (it) is that on
the arrival of the Emir Karm Illah Sheikh Mohammed in the parts of
Bahr Gazelle and the neighbourhood of Sirkua, your servant had been
appointed to the office of gathering in the crops; and we had not
received news of his arrival, excepting from the letter which reached
us from the Emir Abdullah,[346] surnamed Bilbitn, in which he asked
my presence at the seat of the Mudiriyeh. On my arrival at the seat
afore-named, I got to know positively about that, and after that I
tried, with the Emir Abdullah, to obtain the consent and surrender (of
the people there) without delay.
In the interval there came two dervishes from the Emir Karm Illah; in
their hands were several letters to us and to some of the brethren, and
to the Emir Abdullah.
After these letters had been carefully read by us, the Emir Abdullah
stopped the (carrying out of the) surrender to the Emir (Karm Illah),
because no letter had been sent to him to his (own) address by his
Highness.
So we and all the brethren used our utmost efforts with him, (urging)
the desirableness of (his) sending a letter from him to the Emir Karm
Illah, requesting him (the latter) to send (on) the letter of his
Highness that it might be considered, and as to settling the mode of
surrender. And this was done. When the letter was written, I received
it, and went with it in company of the two dervishes above-named, and
with us went the Sheikh Wakîa’ Allah Edrisi and Mahomed Sālim esh
Shareef; and Haj Omar, all of them of the inhabitants of this seat
(of the Mudiriyeh), they being appointed with me by order of the Emir
Abdullah for bringing quickly the Proclamation written by H. E. the
Mahdi.
On our arrival at (the place of) Karm Illah, and on his reading the
letter of the said Emir (Abdullah), he ordered copy to be made of
the Proclamation and gave it to me. Those appointed with me of the
inhabitants of the seat (of the Mudiriyeh) also wrote a message as they
remained with the Emir Karm Illah. On receiving the letter from the
afore-named, I came back with it to the Emir Abdullah, who on reading
it with intelligence, in the presence of the brethren, all of them
became delighted and filled with happiness and joy which could not be
exceeded.
Especially the Emir Abdullah obeyed and accepted (the terms of) the
proclamation of his Highness; and so everything was settled with the
help of God, the Lord to whom worship (is due).
All the brethren are longing to see his Highness, and so the letters
were written from the Emir Abdullah and the brethren in the form of
a deed (compact) of submission by them, and of obedience to the
Emir Karm Illah, appointed by his Highness the Mahdi, which I took,
and went to the town of Yānikah, the place where the afore-named
Emir was encamped; and I delivered it to him, and on his reading and
understanding it, his countenance expressed joy thereat. And he wrote
a letter to the Emir Abdullah, informing him of his being about to
leave the town of Yānikah, and to come to the seat of the Mudiriyeh
on Tuesday, the 25th of Jamād el Akhar, 1301, and he gave the safe
conduct for all—for themselves, their families, and their property.
And, praise be to God Most High, on the day named we and the Emir Karm
Illah, and the troops with him, arrived at an hour’s distance from the
seat (of the Mudiriyeh). And the Emir Abdullah and all the notables and
the brethren came to meet us outside of the wooden stockade surrounding
the seat (of the Mudiriyeh). The meeting was like the meeting of dear
friends with each other, and it was a memorable day for all that was
accomplished therein, and for the filling up of (our) joy.
On our entering the Mahhkameh (Court of Justice) of the Mudiriyeh, and
on the friends and the Emirs being seated, the Emir Abdullah rose, and,
standing upright, uttered the two declarations of testimony, saying,
“I testify that there is no God but God; and I testify that our Lord
Mohammed is the prophet of God, blessing be upon him, and that the
(Seyyed[347]) Lord Mohammed, son of the Lord Abdullah, he (is) the
Mahdi and Khalif of God and His prophet.” Likewise (after this) the two
Copts Gabriel B’abal and Sālehh Shanooda, became Moslems, and uttered
the two testimonies before the Emir Karm Illah (who received their
profession of faith).
After which all (the property) which was in the stores of the
Mudiriyeh, situated in the seat (thereof) and elsewhere, became the
property of the Treasury of Islām, as stated in the letters of the
Emir Karm Illah sent to his Highness.
And we pray God Most High, to whom be praise, that He may soon grant
us the favour of a journey (Hejira) to the honoured place, that we may
be blessed with sight of his Excellency the Mahdi, and that we may be
included in the number of the warriors on the way (for the truth) of
God.
I send from me to their Excellencies (the Hanifs) the nobles, and
Emirs, and friends, and acquaintances who fight for God, thousands of
salaams of God so long as I live.
(Signed) MOHAMMED SHAIKH MOHAMMED.
Written 17 Ramadan, 1301.
July 11, 1884.
APPENDIX U_b_.
(ENCLOSURE IN U.)
In the name of God, the merciful and compassionate, &c.
From the servant of his Lord, the Fakir, Karam Illah, Sheikh Mohammed
at Bahr el Gazelle to the relation of the Mahdi and Emir of the army
of the Mahdi, the Khalif Abdallah Ben of the Seyyed Mohammed. May his
glory be prolonged.
After paying our dutiful salutations and respectful compliments, if
you inquire about us (we can say) all praise to the Most High, all
is well, and I have the honour to announce to you we have captured a
large number of (female) slaves as booty; and that about 1360 head of
slaves have already been sent to Shakka,[348] including 200 slaves of
Kanâwi (of) Alyoo, which family passes to the Moslem Treasury (_i.e._
their value); and this (was done) in three divisions the first time
(under convoy of) the Fakir Ahhmed Mohammed, the Shakiyi; the second
(party) which is considered the most numerous, (under convoy of) our
brother Mohammed Sheikh Mohammed Karkasâwi, and the third under convoy
of the conductor Mohammed Salehh et Toom; (being) needed for buying
(barter for) horses for use of our auxiliaries, with the knowledge of
our brother Mohammed el Karkasâwi. And those which may be sent to your
honour to the noble camp (_i.e._ the Mahdi’s camp), will be also with
his knowledge, as he has already been appointed from here for that
purpose.
Also all the Fakirs, our auxiliaries, have been distributed in the
different zerebas in order to collect the booty. And, please God, all
that can be got will be sent to Shaka by degrees (as captured). And
Mahomed Sheikh Mohammed Karkasâwi is my brother (son) of my father and
mother—older than me, and he it is who helped us to take the town
of Bahr Ghazel—and in consideration of his good management we have
appointed him (to go) to Shaka to barter slaves for horses. And the
slaves which may be sent to your Honour will be with his knowledge and
by his instructions. And as the slaves taken as booty are exceedingly
numerous in this part, and are continually arriving at the camp of the
Mudir, we are much pressed in despatching them and in looking after
them.
If it is agreeable to your Honour (please) to write to Sheikh Manzal
Hamid, and the sons of Hamad Dodao, about their gratuitous assistance,
and their surrendering the booty to our brother, Sheikh Mohammed
Karkasâwi. We are at present awaiting the orders of your Excellency,
(whether) to remain here or to come to you, or to wait for the drying
up of the waters of the rain, out of compassion (in consideration for)
the believers (the slaves) who have little infants. And we pray the
most high God, to whom be praise, to bring us soon together with your
Excellency.
Salaam! (Signed) KARAM ILLAH MAHOMED.
Dated 22 Sha’abān, 1301.
June 17, 1884.
_Postscript._—My Lord, after what I have stated to you, your servant
awaits your orders; if your answer is that I should wait (here) or
otherwise.
This is (all) that is needful (to write). Salaam.
APPENDIX U_d_.
Copy of Telegram from his Excellency Gordon Pasha to his Excellency
Ferratch Ullah Bey, Commandant of Omdurmān.
Sheikh Mahomed Achmed has sent us a letter to inform us that Lupton
Bey, Mudir of Bahr Gazelle, has surrendered to him, and that the small
steamer in which was Stewart Pasha has been captured by him, together
with what was therein. And he demands that we should surrender to him.
But to me it is all one whether Lupton Bey has surrendered or has not
surrendered. And whether he has captured twenty thousand steamers like
the _Abbas_, or twenty thousand (officers) like Stewart Pasha (or not);
it is all one to me.
I am here, like iron, and hope to see the newly-arrived English; and if
Mahomed Achmed says that the English die, it is all the same to me. And
you must take a copy of this and give it to the messenger from Slātin,
and send him out early in the morning, that he may go to him. It is
impossible for me to have any more words with Mahomed Achmed, only
lead; and if Mahomed Achmed is willing to fight he had better, instead
of going to Omdurmān, go to the White Nile by the moat.
And after this the messengers whom he wants to send to us must not come
by the Omdurmān; they had better come by the moat afore-mentioned. And
send a literal copy of this, according to orders—when it has been
sealed by you—by the emissary of Slātin Bey to be delivered, and
explain to him that this is by our order.
At night.
3 of Moharram, 1302.
22nd October, 1884.
The forcible sentence: “I am here like iron, and I hope to see the
newly-arrived English,” runs as a rhymed couplet:—
“Wa ana mawjood hona zey el hhadeed
Wa ashoof el Ingleez el jadeed.”
This _may_ have been accidental on the part of the scribe, for the
letter is written in Arabic, but it is worth notice. The phraseology,
and even the words, are General Gordon’s own—as he wrote in a former
letter that he chose his own words by help of his dictionary, and did
not suffer his scribes to write only as they pleased.
* * * * *
Supposed Enclosure in Mahdi’s letter.
Intercepted communication from General Gordon to the Mudir of
Dongola.
Note (in Arabic) from General Gordon to the Mudir of
Dongola.
To His Excellency the Mudir of Dongola.
Wire the telegram enclosed herein to Cairo from the station at Dongola,
and charge the expense to account of the Mudiriyeh (Government account).
(Signed) C. G. GORDON (_across the seal_).
Dated 7 Zu’l Hejjeh.
Sept. 28, 1884.
Gordon Pasha.
Written on a small piece of thin paper 4 by 4½ inches.
Au Consulat Général d’Autriche-Hongrie à Caire.
Kartoum, 21 September, 1884.
To-day was a joyful Sunday! The inhabitants of the city were stirred
with joy when the salvoes of artillery announced from the fort the
approach of the English relieving army.
Three express messengers brought to General Gordon an autograph letter
from Lord Wolseley from Debbe. Rescue after all! Long live England!
Now at least the lives of (so many) these thousands will be saved, even
though goods and chattels be lost.
Yesterday the news had been already orally spread of an army
approaching from Dongola, but found no credence, any more than many
other false rumours. It was also said that the first messenger who left
on the 9th for Dongola had passed Berber without hindrance, and will
probably reach Cairo in safety.
Further, I was able, on the 13th, to speak outside the city lines with
Georgio Calamatino, the letter-carrier of the Mahdi. He was in dervish
dress. I sent the missionaries 100 dollars by him. The Mahdi was then
in Schatt, four hours from Duém, with all the European prisoners, and
among them Slatin, who were enrolled as dervishes in the armoury.
(_Secret_: the missionaries of both sexes have accepted [the religion
of] Islam. The six sisters are married to Greeks; only the superior,
Don Luigi Bonorn, remained steadfast, but he is condemned to martyrdom
unless he also apostasizes).
It is to be hoped that soon after the arrival of the English we may
or must remove (emigrate). No one knows whether they will permanently
occupy the country or only effect the complete evacuation.
With respect and devotion,
(Signed) M. L. HANSAL,
Consulate General of Austro-Hungary, Cairo.
Also written on a small piece of thin paper.
Note (in Arabic) from General Gordon to the Mudir of Dongola.
To His Excellency the Mudir of Dongola.
Take from bearer Mohammed Achmet, on his safe arrival, the telegrams
sent by him, and forward them to their destination, and give him fifty
dollars; and if you have any telegrams for us send them by him that he
may bring them here.
(Signed) GORDON.
C. G. GORDON (_written in pencil across the seal_).
Dated 15 Shawwāl, 1301.
Aug. 8, 1884.
Gordon Pasha in Kartoum.
Written on a small piece of thin paper 4 inches by 3.
APPENDIX V.
MANIFESTO OF THE MAHDI TO THE INHABITANTS OF KARTOUM.
In the year 1300.
In the name of God, the Merciful and Compassionate.
Praise be to God, the bountiful Ruler, and blessing on our Lord Mahomed
and his successors, with peace.
From the servant of his Lord, Mahomed the Mahdi, son of the Seyyed
Abdallah, to his beloved in God the believers in God, and in His Book
(the Koran).
The changes (disturbances) of the times are not hidden from you, nor
the forsaking of the Sunnas; and he who has the (true) faith and
understanding will not be pleased thereat, but will leave all he needs
and his native place (house and home) in defence of religion and the
Sunnas; and therefore jealousy for Islam will not delay to possess in
full strength (the heart of) the believer.
Now, O my beloved! as to what the Most High God, to whom be praise, has
willed in His Eternity and in His decrees to grant to His servant, the
humble and lowly, in (bestowing on him) the great Khalifate:—
The eminent Lord (Mahomed), on whom be blessing and peace, several
times informed me that I am the Mahdi, the Expected One, and
(appointed) me (as) successor[349] to himself, on whom be blessing and
peace, to sit on his throne, and (as successors) to their Excellencies
the four Khalifs and Princes[350] (of the Faith), and to El Khudr,[351]
on whom be peace: And God gave as my helpers, the angels (who are),
the Cherubim, and the saints from Adam to this our day, and also the
believing Jinns;[352] and in the hour of battle the eminent Lord, the
Bountiful One, on Whom be blessing and peace, will in person go with
them before my hosts, as also the four Khalifs and the Princes (of the
faith), and El Khudr, on whom be peace.
And He gave me the sword of victory of his Excellency (Mahomed), on
whom be blessing and peace; and it was made known to me that none of
either race, human or Jinn, can conquer him who has it.
Then said he, on whom be blessing and peace, “God has given to thee a
sign that thou art the Mahdi”; which (sign) is the mole on my right
cheek; and he likewise gave to me another sign (namely, that) there
should go forth before me in the hour of battle a banner of light,
borne by Azraïl,[353] on whom be peace, that by it God should convince
my friends, and terror should fall upon the hearts of my enemies, and
(that) God will destroy whoever should encounter me in hostility.
Then he, on whom be blessing and peace, said to me: “Thou art created
out of the effulgence of my innermost heart,” and he to whom happiness
(is granted) will believe I am the Mahdi, the Expected One. But God has
put hypocrisy (wickedness) into the heart of those who love vain pomp,
and they will not believe, being greedy of their vain pomps.
Then he, on whom be blessing and peace, said: Love of wealth and pomps
cause hypocrisy to spring up in the heart as water causes the herb to
spring up; and it is found in the Athar (traditional sayings about
Mahomed): If you see worldlings loving this world, charge them with it.
And it is found in some of the ancient books (saying): Do not ask of
me a world intoxicated with love of earthly things, for it will close
against thee the way of my love. And these (are they who like brigands)
stop the way of (true) service (of God).
And when there came to me, O my beloved, from God and His prophet the
decree of the great Khalifate, He ordered me (to take my) Hegira[354]
(flight) to Jebel Kadeer close by Masāt, and He commanded me to write
thence to all entrusted with public offices. I wrote thus to the
Emirs and Sheikhs of religion, and the wicked denied (my mission),
but the righteous believed; even those who do not mind any hardship
they may encounter for God, nor what they fail to attain of their
dearest wishes; but steadfastly regard the promises of the most High
God, to Whom be praise, in which He said that He will reserve that
other world for those who do not desire exaltation in this world, nor
(its) corruptions. Now since it is for God to decree, and since He has
willed to bestow the office of Mahdi upon His humble and insignificant
servant Mahomed the Mahdi, the son of the Seyyed Abdallah, it behoves
us to submit to the will of God; and, seeing that it is unanimously
agreed by the present and past generations to attribute supreme
knowledge to God, and as His knowledge, to Whom be praise, is not
limited by control of rules nor by the knowledge of the malevolent,
and since God will blot out (abrogate) or establish what He wills,
and since He is the source of the Book (the Koran), of which none can
understand anything save what He wills, and since with Him is the
key of the unknown (future),—none knows it but He, nor is He to be
questioned as to what He does,—He creates what He will,—He chooses
and bestows His mercy on whom He will. Sheikh Mohi ed Deen Ibn el Arabi
especially says in his commentary on the glorious Koran that knowledge
of the Mahdi is like knowledge of the hour (of resurrection), and that
hour none knoweth but God most High. And Sheikh Ahmed Ibn Edrees said,
Fourteen generations of the generations of the people of God have
denied the (coming of the) Mahdi. Then he said: He will come forth from
a place that they do not know and in a condition which they will disown.
It is not hidden from your knowledge that the writings about the
(coming of the) Mahdi are among others the Athar and the Keshef el
Ulema and others; and the conclusion of them all (is), and I understand
from them, that God will blot out (abrogate) what passages He will, and
some of these are the Hadiths (traditional sayings), and among them Ed
Dha’eef and El Maktooa’ and El Mansookh and El Mowdhooa’. The Hadith Ed
Dha’eef is superseded by the Hadith El Saheehh word for word. The Ayat
also are replaced by other Ayat.[355] And the truth as to this is not
known save to people of deep thought and insight.
Further, this is what the eminent Lord (Mahomed), on whom be blessing
and peace, said to me, “He who doubts that thou art the Mahdi has
blasphemed God and His prophet.” This he, blessing and peace be upon
him, declared to me thrice.
All that I have told you about my succession to the office of
Mahdi was told to me by the eminent Lord (Mohammed), on whom be
blessing and peace, when I was awake and in perfect health, free
from all transgressions of the law, not in sleep nor in (a state of)
hallucination, or drunkenness or madness, but accounted to be of sound
mind, following the traditions of the prophet, on whom be blessing and
peace, in ordering what he ordered and forbidding what he forbade.
And my Hegira (flight) to the aforesaid places was necessary, according
to the Book (the Koran) and to the Sunnas. The Most High God has said,
“Those who have had to flee (make a Hegira) for the sake of God after
having been persecuted; He will give them good things in this world,
and the reward in the next will be greater. And He, on whom is blessing
and peace, said, ‘One who has fled from land to land, even though it be
but a hand-breath of land, has deserved Paradise, and has become (in so
doing) a partaker with[356] Abraham, the friend of God and of Mahomed,
on whom be blessing and peace.’”
Thus also in other passages of the Hadiths.
And the duty of listening to God and His prophet is binding. The Most
High God has said, “Follow the way of those who are sincere to Me.”
If you have understood this, we order all the chosen ones to flee
(make their Hegira) unto us for the Jehād (holy war) in the cause of
God, to the nearest town, because God Most High has said, “Slay the
infidels who are nearest to you”; and he who holds back from this has
come within the threat uttered by the Most High. Say if your fathers,
your sons, your brethren, your wives, your tribes, the wealth you have
gained, the merchandise you are in fear of losing, or the dwellings
you delight in are dearer to you than God and His prophet and the
Jehād (holy war) in His cause, then wait till God shall come with His
sentence (against you). (So far) the Aya (verse).
The Most High has also said, “O you who have believed, why do you
cleave to the earth when called upon to fly (to the war) for God? Do
you love the life of this world better than that of the next? But the
possessions of this world will be less than nothing in the other world.”
The Most High has also said, “O you who have believed, why do you
cleave to the earth when called upon to fly (to the war) for God? Do
you love the life of this world better than that of the next? But
the possessions of this world will be less than nothing in the other
world.”[357]
He has also said, “Seek not to fly.” He will torment you with eternal
torments, and will accept others in your place.
Now, if you have understood the foregoing, hasten to us, and fear none
save God, for fear of the creature shows lack of trust and confidence
in God, from which may God preserve (us).
The Most High has said, “Fear ye not man, but fear ye Me;” and the Most
High has said, “Dread them not, but dread Me, if ye be believers.”
The Most High has said, “God is worthy to be feared”; and especially
because God has promised in His precious Book (the Koran) victory to
him who contends for the faith.
The Most High has said, “If you fight for God, He will fight for you
and establish your goings.”
And the Most High has said, “If you do not fight for him (the Mahdi)
God fighteth for him.” Because you have known this, if you do not
respond to him who calls (in the name) of God and hasten to fight for
the faith, you must receive punishment from God, inasmuch as you are
the light of creation, its strength, and its head.
Whoever among you is anxious about his faith and zealous for the
command of his Lord will answer the call, and will join with those that
fight for the religion of God.
Be it known unto you that I am of the family of the prophet of God, on
whom be blessing and peace. My father is a Hhusni on his father’s side;
and his mother, and my mother likewise, on the side of both father
and mother (are) Abbāssides, and God knows that I am of the blood of
Hussein, and these excellent indications will suffice for him who has
been touched by His grace and (by) the faith.
It will not be wonderful if some do see and do not believe it.
Fear God and join the righteous, and help one another in righteousness,
and in the fear of God and in the Jehād (holy war) in the cause of God,
and stand firm within the boundaries of God, for he who transgresses
those boundaries will injure himself.
Know that all things are in the hand of God. Leave all to Him and rely
on Him. He who makes God his support has been guided into the straight
way.
Peace (be with you).
In the year 1300.
In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate. Praise be to God,
the Bountiful Ruler, and blessing and blessing and peace on our Lord
Mahomed and his successors.
From the slave of his Lord, the Imām Mohamed the Mahdi, the son of
the Seyyed Abdallah, to all his beloved in God the believers, men and
women, in God and in His Book.
What I have to inform you is that the world is the abode of him who has
no (other) abode, and it is a prison to believers, and that the other
(world) is better, and (is) enduring, and that is the abode of those
who fear God.
Fear God and do....
This Manifesto is written on four sides of a two-leaved sheet of paper,
and breaks off abruptly, “and do” being written at bottom as catch-word
for the next page.
Specially to be noticed is the attempt made to forestall the objections
of those who would see that this man contradicts well known passages
in the writings which Moslems hold to be authoritative. Mahomed Achmet
boldly declares all such passages to be either abrogated or superseded,
or unintelligible save to those to whom deep thought and insight are
given!
APPENDIX X.
Letter from Major Kitchener to General Gordon.
DEBBEH, _14th October, 1884_.
MY DEAR GENERAL GORDON,
Please inform me by this present messenger, who is paid to return, who
were on board the steamer that came down from Kartoum. I am sorry to
say, whoever they were, they have fallen into the hands of Suleiman
Wady Goun, Sheikh of the Minassir, and have, I am afraid, been killed.
Lord Wolseley is now at Wady Halfa, and it is expected this expedition
will definitely start from Dongola on or about the 1st November.
Special boats are coming out from England for the passage up the Nile.
There are a considerable number of troops now at Dongola. I am
instructed by Sir Evelyn Baring to send you the following telegram from
the Austrian Consul-General:—