THE WAR: THE ROYAL FLYING CORPS FROM MONS TO YPRES
The German war of the twentieth century, like the German wars of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was carefully planned and prepared
by the military rulers of Prussia. To elucidate its origins and causes
will be the work of many long years. Yet enough is known to make it
certain that this last and greatest war conforms to the old design. The
Prussians have always been proud of their doctrine of war, and have
explained it to the world with perfect frankness. War has always been
regarded by them as the great engine of national progress. By war they
united the peoples of Germany; by war they hoped to gain for the peoples
of Germany an acknowledged supremacy in the civilized world. These
peoples had received unity at the hands of Prussia, and though they did
not like Prussia, they believed enthusiastically in Prussian strength
and Prussian wisdom. If Prussia led them to war, they were encouraged to
think that the war would be unerringly designed to increase their power
and prosperity. Yet many of them would have shrunk from naked assault
and robbery; and Prussia, to conciliate these, invented the fable of the
war of defence. That a sudden attack on her neighbours, delivered by
Germany in time of peace, is a strictly defensive act has often been
explained by German military and political writers, never perhaps more
clearly than in a secret official report, drawn up at Berlin in the
spring of 1913, on the strengthening of the German army. A copy of this
report fell into the hands of the French.
'The people,' it says, 'must be accustomed to think that an offensive
war on our part is a necessity.... We must act with prudence in order to
arouse no suspicion.'
The fable of the war of defence was helped out with the fable of
encirclement. Germany, being situated in the midst of Europe, had many
neighbours, most of whom had more reason to fear her than to like her.
Any exhibition of goodwill between these neighbours was treated by
German statesmen, for years before the war, as a covert act of hostility
to Germany, amply justifying reprisals. The treaty between France and
Russia, wholly defensive in character, the expression of goodwill
between France and England, inspired in part by fears of the restless
ambitions of Germany, though both were intended to guarantee the
existing state of things, were odious to Berlin. The peace of Europe
hung by a thread.
On Sunday, the 28th of June 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir
to the throne of Austria, and his wife, the Duchess of Hohenberg, paid a
visit to Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia, and were there murdered by
Bosnian assassins. It has not been proved that Germany had any part in
the murder, but she was quite willing to take advantage of it. The Kiel
canal, joining the Baltic with the North Sea had just been widened to
admit the largest battleships, and the German army had just been raised
to an unexampled strength. The gun was loaded and pointed; if it was
allowed to be fired by accident the military rulers of Germany were much
to blame. They were not in the habit of trusting any part of their plans
to accident. But the excitement caused by the Archduke's murder was
allowed to die away, and an uneasy calm succeeded. On the 23rd of July
the Austrian Government, alleging that the Serajevo assassinations had
been planned in Belgrade, presented to Serbia, with the declared
approval of Germany, an ultimatum, containing demands of so extreme a
character that the acceptance of them would have meant the abandonment
by Serbia of her national independence. Serbia appealed to Russia, and,
acting on Russia's advice, accepted all the demands except two. These
two, which involved the appointment of Austro-Hungarian delegates to
assist in administering the internal affairs of Serbia, were not bluntly
rejected; Serbia asked that they should be referred to the Hague
Tribunal. Austria replied by withdrawing her minister, declaring war
upon Serbia, and bombarding Belgrade. This action was bound to involve
Russia, who could not stand by and see the Slavonic States of southern
Europe destroyed and annexed. But the Russian Government, along with the
Governments of France, Great Britain, and Italy, did their utmost to
preserve the peace. They suggested mediation and a conference of the
Powers. Germany alone refused. Alleging that Russia had already
mobilized her army, she decreed a state of war, and on Saturday, the 1st
of August, declared war upon Russia. France by her treaty with Russia
would shortly have become involved; but the German Government would not
wait for her. They judged it all-important to gain a military success at
the very start of the war, and to this everything had to give way. They
declared war on France, and massed armies along the frontier between
Liege and Luxembourg, with the intention of forcing a passage through
Belgium. England, who was one of the guarantors of the integrity of
Belgium, was thus involved. At 11.0 p.m. on the 4th of August, Great
Britain declared war on Germany, and the World War had begun.
The events of the twelve days from the 23rd of July to the 4th of
August, when they shall be set forth in detail, will furnish volumes of
history. Those who study them minutely are in some danger of failing to
see the wood for the trees. The attitude of the nations was made clear
enough during these days. When Austria issued her ultimatum, many people
in England thought of it as a portent of renewed distant trouble in the
Balkans, to be quickly begun and soon ended. It was not so regarded in
Germany. The people of Germany, though they were not in the confidence
of their Government, were sufficiently familiar with its mode of
operation to recognize the challenge to Serbia for what it was,
Germany's chosen occasion for her great war. The citizens not only of
Berlin, but of the Rhineland, and of little northern towns on the Kiel
canal, went mad with joy; there was shouting and song and public
festivity. Meantime in England, as the truth dawned, there were hushed
voices and an intense solemnity. The day had come, and no one doubted
the severity of the ordeal. Yet neither did any one, except an unhappy
few who had been nursed in folly and illusion, doubt the necessity of
taking up the challenge. The country was united. Not only was the safety
and existence of the British Commonwealth involved, but the great
principle of civilization, difficult to name, but perhaps best called by
the appealing name of decency, which bids man remember that he is frail
and that it behoves him to be considerate and pitiful and sincere, had
been flouted by the arrogant military rulers of Germany. Great Britain
had a navy; her army and her air force, for the purposes of a great
European war, were yet to make. The motive that was to supply her with
millions of volunteers was not only patriotism, though patriotism was
strong, but a sense that her cause, in this war, was the cause of
humanity. There are many who will gladly fight to raise their country
and people in power and prosperity above other countries and other
peoples. There are many also among English-speaking peoples who are
unwilling to fight for any such end. But they are fighters, and they
will fight to protect the weak and to assert the right. They are a
reserve worth enlisting in any army; it was by their help that the
opponents of Germany attained to a conquering strength. The systematic
cruelties of Germany, inflicted by order on the helpless populations of
Serbia and Belgium and northern France, are not matter of controversy;
they have been proved by many extant military documents and by the
testimony of many living witnesses. They were designed to reduce whole
peoples to a state of impotent terror, beneath the level of humanity.
The apology made for them, that by shortening resistance to the
inevitable they were in effect merciful, is a blasphemous apology, which
puts Germany in the place of the Almighty. The effect anticipated did
not follow. The system of terrorism hardened and prolonged resistance;
it launched against Germany the chivalry of the world; it created for
use against Germany the chivalry of the air; and it left Germany
unhonoured in her ultimate downfall.
The German plan of campaign, it was rightly believed, was a swift
invasion and disablement of France, to be followed by more prolonged
operations against Russia. By this plan the German army was to reach
Paris on the fortieth day after mobilization. There was no promise that
Great Britain would help France, but the attitude of Germany had long
been so threatening that the General Staffs of the two countries had
taken counsel with each other concerning the best manner of employing
the British forces in the event of common resistance to German
aggression. It had been provisionally agreed that the British army
should be concentrated on the left flank of the French army, in the area
between Avesnes and Le Cateau, but this agreement was based on the
assumption that the two armies would be mobilized simultaneously. When
the principal British Ministers and the leading members of the naval and
military staffs assembled at Downing street on the 5th and 6th of
August, we were already behindhand, and the whole question of the
employment and disposition of the expeditionary force had to be
reopened. It was expected by some soldiers and some civilians that the
little British army would be landed at a point on the coast of France or
Belgium whence it could strike at the flank of the German invaders. The
strategic advantages of that idea had to yield to the enormous
importance of giving moral and material support to our Allies by
fighting at their side; moreover, there could be no assurance that the
coast of Belgium would not fall into the hands of the Germans at a very
early stage in the campaign. Accordingly, it was agreed to ship our army
to France, and to leave the manner of its employment to be settled in
concert with the French.
The original British Expeditionary Force, under the command of
Field-Marshal Sir John French, began to embark on the 9th of August; by
the 20th its concentration in a pear-shaped area between Maubeuge and Le
Cateau was complete. It consisted of the First Army Corps, under
Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig; the Second Army Corps, under
Lieutenant-General Sir James Grierson, who died soon after landing in
France and was succeeded by General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien; and the
Cavalry Division, under Major-General E. H. H. Allenby. The Germans made
no attempt to interfere with the transport of the expeditionary force
from England to France. They had many other things to think of, and
there is evidence to show that they viewed with satisfaction the placing
of that admirable little force in a situation where they hoped that they
could cut it off and annihilate it. That they were disappointed in this
hope was due not a little to the activity and efficiency of the newest
arm, numbering about a thousand, all told, the Royal Flying Corps.
The Royal Flying Corps took the field under the command of
Brigadier-General Sir David Henderson. It consisted of Headquarters,
Aeroplane Squadrons Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, and an Aircraft Park. Fairly
complete arrangements, thought out in detail, had been made some months
earlier for its mobilization. Each squadron was to mobilize at its peace
station, and was to be ready to move on the fourth day. On that day the
aeroplanes were to move, by air, first to Dover, and thence, on the
sixth day, to the field base in the theatre of war. The horses,
horse-vehicles, and motor-bicycles, together with a certain amount of
baggage and supplies, were to travel by rail, and the mechanical
transport and trailers by road, to the appointed port of embarkation,
there to be shipped for the overseas base. The Aircraft Park, numbering
twelve officers and a hundred and sixty-two other ranks, with four
motor-cycles and twenty-four aeroplanes in cases, were to leave
Farnborough for Avonmouth on the seventh day. Instructions were issued
naming the hour and place of departure of the various trains, with
detailed orders as to machines, personnel, transport, and petrol. On the
second day of mobilization a detachment from No. 6 Squadron was to
proceed to Dover, there to make ready a landing-ground for the other
squadrons, and to provide for replenishment of fuel and minor repairs to
aircraft. Squadron commanders were urged to work out all necessary
arrangements for the journey. How carefully they did this is shown by
some of the entries in the squadron diaries. In the diary of No. 2
Squadron (Major C. J. Burke's) a list is given of the articles that were
to be carried on each of the machines flying over to France. Besides
revolvers, glasses, a spare pair of goggles, and a roll of tools, pilots
were ordered to carry with them a water-bottle containing boiled water,
a small stove, and, in the haversack, biscuits, cold meat, a piece of
chocolate, and a packet of soup-making material.
The programme for mobilization was, in the main, successfully carried
out. The headquarters of the Royal Flying Corps left Farnborough for
Southampton on the night of the 11th of August, their motor transport
having gone before. They embarked at Southampton, with their horses, and
reached Amiens on the morning of the 13th. The movements of the Aircraft
Park, though it was the last unit to leave England, may be next
recorded, because it was in effect the travelling base of the squadrons.
The personnel and equipment were entrained at Farnborough during the
evening of Saturday, the 15th of August, and travelled to Avonmouth. Of
the twenty machines allotted to them only four, all Sopwith Tabloids,
were actually taken over in cases. Of the other sixteen (nine B.E. 2's,
one B.E. 2 c, three B.E. 8's, and three Henri Farmans) about half were
used to bring the squadrons up to establishment; the remainder were
flown over to Amiens by the personnel of the Aircraft Park, or by the
spare pilots who accompanied the squadrons. The Aircraft Park embarked
at Avonmouth very early on the morning of the 17th, arriving at Boulogne
on the night of the 18th. They disembarked, an unfamiliar apparition, on
the following morning. The landing officer had no precedent to guide him
in dealing with them. Wing Commander W. D. Beatty tells how a wire was
dispatched to General Headquarters: 'An unnumbered unit without
aeroplanes which calls itself an Aircraft Park has arrived. What are we
to do with it?' If the question was not promptly answered at Boulogne it
was answered later on. The original Aircraft Park was the nucleus of
that vast system of supply and repair which supported the squadrons
operating on the western front and kept them in fighting trim.
On the 21st of August the Aircraft Park moved up to Amiens, to make an
advanced base for the squadrons, which were already at Maubeuge. Three
days were spent at Amiens in unloading, unpacking, and setting up
workshops. Then, on the 25th, they received orders to retire to Le
Havre. The retreat from Mons had begun, and Boulogne was being evacuated
by the British troops. How far the wave of invasion would flow could not
be certainly known; on the 30th of August, at the request of the French
admiral who commanded at Le Havre, the machines belonging to the
Aircraft Park were employed to carry out reconnaissances along the coast
roads; on the following day German cavalry entered Amiens. There was a
real danger that stores and machines landed in northern France for the
use of the Royal Flying Corps might fall into the hands of the Germans;
accordingly a base was established, for the reception of stores from
England, at St.-Nazaire, on the Loire. The advanced base of the Aircraft
Park moved up, by successive stages, as the prospects of the Allies
improved, first from Le Havre to Le Mans, then, at the end of September,
to Juvisy, near Paris; lastly, in mid-October, the port base was moved
from St.-Nazaire to Rouen, and at the end of October the advanced base
left Juvisy for St.-Omer, which became its permanent station during the
earlier part of the war.
The squadrons flew to France. No. 2 Squadron, at Montrose, had the
hardest task. Its pilots started on their southward flight to
Farnborough as early as the 3rd of August; after some accidents they all
reached Dover. Their transport left Montrose by rail on the morning of
the 8th of August and arrived the same evening at Prince's Dock, Govan,
near Glasgow, where the lorries and stores were loaded on S.S. _Dogra_
for Boulogne. No. 3 Squadron was at Netheravon when war broke out; on
the 12th of August the machines flew to Dover and the transport moved
off by road to Southampton, where it was embarked for Boulogne. The
squadron suffered a loss at Netheravon. Second Lieutenant R. R. Skene, a
skilful pilot, with Air Mechanic R. K. Barlow as passenger, crashed his
machine soon after taking off; both pilot and passenger were killed. No.
4 Squadron on the 31st of July had been sent to Eastchurch, to assist
the navy in preparations for home defence and to be ready for
mobilization. From Eastchurch the machines flew to Dover and the
transport proceeded to Southampton. By the evening of the 12th of August
the machines of Nos. 2, 3, and 4 Squadrons were at Dover. At midnight
Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Sykes arrived, and orders were given for all
machines to be ready to fly over at 6.0 a.m. the following morning, the
13th of August.
The first machine of No. 2 Squadron to start left at 6.25 a.m., and the
first to arrive landed at Amiens at 8.20 a.m. This machine was flown by
Lieutenant H. D. Harvey-Kelly, one of the lightest hearted and highest
spirited of the young pilots who gave their lives in the war. The
machines of No. 3 Squadron arrived safely at Amiens, with the exception
of one piloted by Second Lieutenant E. N. Fuller, who with his mechanic
did not rejoin his squadron until five days later at Maubeuge. One
flight of No. 4 Squadron remained at Dover to carry out patrol duties,
but a wireless flight, consisting of three officers who had made a study
of wireless telegraphy, was attached to the squadron, and was taken
overseas with it. Some of the aeroplanes of No. 4 Squadron were damaged
on the way over by following their leader, Captain F. J. L. Cogan, who
was forced by engine failure to land in a ploughed field in France.
No. 5 Squadron moved a little later than the other three. It was delayed
by a shortage of shipping and a series of accidents to the machines.
When the Concentration Camp broke up, this squadron had gone to occupy
its new station at Gosport. On the 14th, when starting out for Dover,
Captain G. I. Carmichael wrecked his machine at Gosport; on the same day
Lieutenant R. O. Abercromby and Lieutenant H. F. Glanville damaged their
machines at Shoreham, and Lieutenant H. le M. Brock damaged his at
Salmer. The squadron flew from Dover to France on the 15th of August;
Captain Carmichael, having obtained a new machine, flew over on that
same day; Lieutenant Brock rejoined the squadron at Maubeuge on the
20th; Lieutenants Abercromby and Glanville on the 22nd. Lieutenant R. M.
Vaughan, who had flown over with the squadron, also rejoined it on the
22nd; he had made a forced landing near Boulogne, had been arrested by
the French, and was imprisoned for nearly a week.
The transport of the squadrons, which proceeded by way of Southampton,
was largely made up from the motor-cars and commercial vans collected at
Regent's Park in London during the first few days of the war. The
ammunition and bomb lorry of No. 5 Squadron had belonged to the
proprietors of a famous sauce: it was a brilliant scarlet, with the
legend painted in gold letters on its side--_The World's Appetiser_. It
could be seen from some height in the air, and it helped the pilots of
the squadron, during the retreat from Mons, to identify their own
transport.
The names of the officers of the Royal Flying Corps who went to France,
the great majority of them by air, deserve record. They were the first
organized national force to fly to a war overseas. The following is
believed to be a complete list up to the eve of Mons, but it is not
infallible. Officers and men were changed up to the last minute, so that
the headquarters file, having been prepared in advance, is not
authoritative. The squadron war diaries are sometimes sketchy. Even when
surviving pilots set down what they remember, the whole war lies between
them and those early days, and their memory is often fragmentary. The
following list is compiled, as correctly as may be, from the diary of
Lieutenant B. H. Barrington-Kennett (a careful and accurate document),
the war diaries of Squadrons Nos. 2, 3, 4, and 5, which were kept in
some detail, the headquarters' records, and the reminiscences of some of
the officers who flew across or who travelled with the transport.
HEADQUARTERS
Brigadier-General Sir David Henderson, K.C.B., D.S.O.; Commander,
Royal Flying Corps.
Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Sykes, 15th Hussars; General Staff Officer,
1st Grade.
Major H. R. M. Brooke-Popham, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light
Infantry; Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.
Captain W. G. H. Salmond, Royal Artillery; General Staff Officer, 2nd
Grade.
Lieutenant B. H. Barrington-Kennett, Grenadier Guards; Deputy
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.
_Attached._
Captain R. H. L. Cordner, Royal Army Medical Corps.
Captain C. G. Buchanan, Indian Army.
Lieutenant the Hon. M. Baring, Intelligence Corps.
2nd Lieutenant O. G. W. G. Lywood, Norfolk Regiment (Special Reserve);
for Wireless duties.
NO. 2 SQUADRON
_Squadron Commander._
Major C. J. Burke, Royal Irish Regiment.
_Flight Commanders._
Captain G. W. P. Dawes, Royal Berkshire Regiment.
Captain F. F. Waldron, 19th Hussars.
Captain G. E. Todd, Welch Regiment.
_Flying Officers._
Lieutenant R. B. Martyn, Wiltshire Regiment.
Lieutenant L. Dawes, Middlesex Regiment.
Lieutenant R. M. Rodwell, West Yorkshire Regiment.
Lieutenant M. W. Noel, Liverpool Regiment.
Lieutenant E. R. L. Corballis, Royal Dublin Fusiliers.
Lieutenant H. D. Harvey-Kelly, Royal Irish Regiment.
Lieutenant W. R. Freeman, Manchester Regiment.
Lieutenant W. H. C. Mansfield, Shropshire Light Infantry.
Lieutenant C. B. Spence, Royal Artillery.
Captain A. B. Burdett, York and Lancaster Regiment.
Captain A. Ross-Hume, Scottish Rifles.
Lieutenant D. S. K. Crosbie, Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders.
Lieutenant C. A. G. L. H. Farie, Highland Light Infantry.
Lieutenant T. L. S. Holbrow, Royal Engineers.
2nd Lieutenant G. J. Malcolm, Royal Artillery.
_Supernumerary._
Major C. A. H. Longcroft, Welch Regiment; Squadron
Commander.
Captain U. J. D. Bourke, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire
Light Infantry; Flight Commander.
Captain W. Lawrence, 7th Battalion, Essex Regiment (Territorial
Force); Flight Commander.
_Attached._
Lieutenant K. R. Van der Spuy, South African Defence Forces.
NO. 3 SQUADRON
_Squadron Commander._
Major J. M. Salmond, Royal Lancaster Regiment.
_Flight Commanders._
Captain P. L. W. Herbert, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire Regiment.
Captain L. E. O. Charlton, D.S.O., Lancashire Fusiliers.
Captain P. B. Joubert de la Ferte, Royal Artillery.
_Flying Officers._
2nd Lieutenant V. H. N. Wadham, Hampshire Regiment.
Lieutenant D. L. Allen, Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Lieutenant A. M. Read, Northamptonshire Regiment.
Lieutenant E. L. Conran, 2nd County of London Yeomanry.
Lieutenant A. Christie, Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant A. R. Shekleton, Royal Munster Fusiliers.
2nd Lieutenant E. N. Fuller, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
Lieutenant W. C. K. Birch, Yorkshire Regiment.
Lieutenant G. F. Pretyman, Somerset Light Infantry.
Lieutenant W. R. Read, 1st Dragoon Guards.
2nd Lieutenant A. Hartree, Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant V. S. E. Lindop, Leinster Regiment.
Lieutenant G. L. Cruikshank, Gordon Highlanders (Special Reserve).
Lieutenant W. F. MacNeece, Royal West Kent Regiment.
2nd Lieutenant L. A. Bryan, South Irish Horse.
Major L. B. Boyd-Moss, South Staffordshire Regiment.
2nd Lieutenant E. W. C. Perry, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
NO. 4 SQUADRON
_Squadron Commander._
Major G. H. Raleigh, Essex Regiment.
_Flight Commanders._
Captain G. S. Shephard, Royal Fusiliers.
Captain A. H. L. Soames, 3rd Hussars.
Captain F. J. L. Cogan, Royal Artillery.
_Flying Officers._
Lieutenant P. H. L. Playfair, Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant K. P. Atkinson, Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant R. P. Mills, Royal Fusiliers (Special Reserve).
Lieutenant T. W. Mulcahy-Morgan, Royal Irish Fusiliers.
Lieutenant R. G. D. Small, Leinster Regiment.
Lieutenant W. G. S. Mitchell, Highland Light Infantry.
Lieutenant G. W. Mapplebeck, Liverpool Regiment (Special Reserve).
Lieutenant C. G. Hosking, Royal Artillery.
Lieutenant H. J. A. Roche, Royal Munster Fusiliers.
Lieutenant I. M. Bonham-Carter, Northumberland Fusiliers.
2nd Lieutenant A. L. Russell, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
_Wireless Flight._
Lieutenant D. S. Lewis, Royal Engineers.
Lieutenant B. T. James, Royal Engineers.
Lieutenant S. C. W. Smith, East Surrey Regiment (Special Reserve).
_Attached._
Captain D. Le G. Pitcher, Indian Army.
Captain H. L. Reilly, Indian Army.
NO. 5 SQUADRON
_Squadron Commander._
Major J. F. A. Higgins, D.S.O., Royal Artillery.
_Flight Commanders._
Captain D. G. Conner, Royal Artillery.
Captain G. I. Carmichael, Royal Artillery.
Captain R. Grey, Warwickshire Royal Horse Artillery (Territorial Force).
_Flying Officers._
Lieutenant H. F. Glanville, West India Regiment.
Lieutenant F. G. Small, Connaught Rangers.
Lieutenant R. O. Abercromby, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
2nd Lieutenant C. W. Wilson, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
Lieutenant H. le M. Brock, Royal Warwickshire Regiment.
Lieutenant R. M. Vaughan, Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers.
Lieutenant L. da C. Penn-Gaskell, Norfolk Regiment (Special Reserve).
Lieutenant A. E. Borton, Royal Highlanders.
Lieutenant Lord G. Wellesley, Grenadier Guards.
Lieutenant C. G. G. Bayly, Royal Engineers.
Lieutenant C. E. C. Rabagliati, Yorkshire Light Infantry.
2nd Lieutenant A. A. B. Thomson, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
2nd Lieutenant L. A. Strange, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
2nd Lieutenant R. R. Smith-Barry, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
2nd Lieutenant D. C. Ware, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
2nd Lieutenant V. Waterfall, East Yorkshire Regiment (Special Reserve).
Captain R. A. Boger, Royal Engineers.
Captain B. C. Fairfax, Reserve of Officers.
_Attached._
Lieutenant G. S. Creed, South African Defence Forces.
AIRCRAFT PARK
_Squadron Commander._
Major A. D. Carden, Royal Engineers.
_Flight Commanders._
Major Hon. C. M. P. Brabazon, Irish Guards.
Captain W. D. Beatty, Royal Engineers.
Captain R. Cholmondeley, Rifle Brigade.
Lieutenant G. B. Hynes, Royal Artillery.
_Flying Officers._
Lieutenant G. T. Porter, Royal Artillery.
2nd Lieutenant C. G. Bell, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
2nd Lieutenant N. C. Spratt, Royal Flying Corps, Special Reserve.
Lieutenant R. H. Verney, Army Service Corps.
Something must be said of the machines which flew to France. Experience
at manoeuvres had favoured the factory B.E. 2 biplane; of the other
types most in use the Henri Farman had been found fatiguing to fly, and
the Maurice Farman was too slow. Accordingly, in the winter of 1913-14
Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Sykes had urged the gradual substitution of
B.E. machines for the Farmans. Major W. S. Brancker, writing for the
Director-General of Military Aeronautics, objected to this proposal on
the ground that until a satisfactory type of fighting aeroplane should
be evolved, the Henri Farman was the only machine that could mount
weapons effectively; and further, that a slow machine had some
advantages for observation. The first of these objections was not fully
met until firing through the airscrew was introduced; the second was for
a long time an accepted idea. The war was to prove that a slow machine,
exposed to armed attack, cannot live in the air. The battle of the
machines ended, for the time, in compromise. It was judged important
that the Flying Corps should have four squadrons ready for war by the
spring of 1914, and large changes would have caused delay. In the event,
at the date of mobilization, No. 2 Squadron and No. 4 Squadron were
furnished throughout with B.E. 2 machines; No. 3 Squadron made use of
Bleriots and Henri Farmans, and No. 5 of Henri Farmans, Avros, and B.E.
8's. A single type of machine for a single squadron is a thing to be
desired; the squadron is easier for the pilots and the mechanics to
handle; but in the early days of the war there was no formation flying;
each machine did its work alone, so that uniformity was of less
importance.
When the Flying Corps arrived in France they were received by the French
with enthusiasm, and had their full share of the hospitality of those
days. The officers were treated as honoured guests; the men with the
transport were greeted by crowds of villagers, who at all their
stopping-places pressed on them bottles of wine, bunches of flowers,
fruit, and eggs. At Amiens the transport and machines were parked
outside the town, without cover, and the officers were billeted at the
'Hotel du Rhin' and elsewhere. The hardships of the war were yet to
come. Lieutenant B. H. Barrington-Kennett, with his mind always set on
the task before them, remarks: 'There seemed to be a general
misunderstanding amongst the troops as to the length of time during
which rations have to last. They were apt to eat what they wanted at one
meal and then throw the remainder away. R.F.C. peace training does not
encourage economy with food, as the men are financially well off, and
can always buy food and drink in the villages.'
On Sunday, the 16th of August, the headquarters of the Flying Corps, the
aeroplanes of Nos. 2, 3, and 4 Squadrons, and the transport of Nos. 3
and 4 Squadrons moved from Amiens to Maubeuge. Second Lieutenant E. W.
C. Perry and his mechanic, H. E. Parfitt, of No. 3 Squadron, who were
flying a B.E. 8 machine (familiarly known as a 'bloater'), crashed over
the aerodrome at Amiens; the machine caught fire, and both were killed.
There was another accident on the 18th, when the aeroplanes and
transport of No. 5 Squadron followed. Second Lieutenant R. R.
Smith-Barry and Corporal F. Geard, also flying a B.E. 8 machine, crashed
at Peronne; the officer broke several bones, and the corporal was
killed. Three of these machines in all were flown over at the beginning;
they had been allotted to the Aircraft Park, and were taken on charge of
the squadrons in the field to fill vacancies caused by mishaps. The
third of them was the machine flown over by Captain G. I. Carmichael.
At Maubeuge the French authorities gave all the help they could,
providing blankets and straw for the troops. The Flying Corps were now
in the war zone, but for the first two or three days the conditions were
those of peace. They saw nothing of the British army till one evening
British troops marched through Maubeuge on their way to Mons. 'We were
rather sorry they had come,' says Wing Commander P. B. Joubert de la
Ferte, 'because up till that moment we had only been fired on by the
French whenever we flew. Now we were fired on by French _and_
English.... To this day I can remember the roar of musketry that
greeted two of our machines as they left the aerodrome and crossed the
main Maubeuge-Mons road, along which a British column was proceeding.'
To guard against incidents like this the Flying Corps, while stationed
at Maubeuge, turned to, and by working all night painted a Union Jack in
the form of a shield on the under-side of the lower planes of all the
machines.
While the Flying Corps remained at Maubeuge and began to carry out
reconnaissances over Belgium, the little British army had moved up north
to Mons, where it first met the enemy. By the 22nd of August it was in
position, on a front of some twenty-five miles, the First Army Corps
holding a line from Harmignies to Peissant on the east, the Second Army
Corps holding Mons and the canal that runs from Mons to Conde on the
west. On the right of the British the Fifth French Army, under General
Lanrezac, was coming up to the line of the river Sambre.
The original German plan was broad and simple. The main striking force
was to march through Belgium and Luxembourg into France. Its advance was
to be a wheel pivoting on Thionville. Count von Schlieffen, who had
vacated the appointment of Chief of the General Staff in 1906, had
prepared this plan. He maintained that if the advance of a strong right
wing, marching on Paris through Belgium, were firmly persisted in, it
would draw the bulk of the French forces away from their eastern
fortress positions to the neighbourhood of Paris, and that there the
decisive battle would be fought. His successor, von Moltke, believed
that the French, on the outbreak of war, would at once deliver a strong
offensive in Lorraine and so would themselves come into the open, away
from the bastion of the eastern fortresses. He must be prepared, he
thought, to fight the decisive battle either on his left wing in
Lorraine, or on his right wing near Paris, or, in short, at any point
that the initial operations of the French should determine. This was not
the conception of Count von Schlieffen, who had intended to impose his
will on the campaign and to make the enemy conform to his movements.
When he was on his death-bed in 1913, his thoughts were fixed on the
war. 'It must come to a fight,' were the last words he was heard to
mutter, 'only give me a strong right wing.' Von Moltke, though he did
not absolutely weaken the right wing, weakened it relatively, by using
most of the newly formed divisions of the German army for strengthening
the left wing.
The French, when the war came, delivered their offensive in Alsace and
Lorraine as had been expected, but not in the strength that had been
expected. They were held up, and retired, not without loss, to strong
defensive positions covering Epinal and Nancy. Meantime, the advance of
the German armies through Belgium was met by a French offensive in the
Ardennes, which also failed, whereupon General Joffre ordered a retreat
on the whole front, and began to move some of his forces westward, to
prepare for the battle in front of Paris.
The successes won by the German left wing and centre against a yielding
and retreating enemy were mistaken by the German high command for
decisive actions, which they were not. The French armies which had been
driven back on the Lorraine front rapidly recovered, and on the 25th of
August delivered a brilliant counter-offensive, inflicting heavy losses
on the Germans, and in effect upsetting all the German plans. The
indecision which marked the movements of the German right wing through
northern France had its origin in von Moltke's modifications of von
Schlieffen's plans and in the readiness of the Germans to believe that
the war was virtually won.[4]
[Footnote 4: This brief summary is based on two admirable articles
in _The Army Quarterly_ for April and July 1921, compiled by the
Historical Section (Military Branch) of the Committee of Imperial
Defence.]
The heroic stand made by the Belgians at Liege purchased invaluable time
for the preparations of the Allies. When, on the 17th of August, the
last fort of Liege fell, the great wheel of the German northern armies
began to revolve. Its pace was to be regulated by the pace of the armies
nearest to its circumference; that is to say, the First Army, under von
Kluck, and the Second Army, under von Buelow. Three divisions of cavalry
were to advance against the line Antwerp-Brussels-Charleroi, moving
westward across Belgium in order to discover whether a Belgian army was
still in being, whether the British had landed any troops, and whether
French forces were moving up into northern Belgium. The Belgian army
retired within the defensive lines of Antwerp, and by the 20th of August
Brussels was in the hands of the enemy. By the 22nd, von Buelow's army
had entered Charleroi and was crossing the Sambre. The repulse of the
French centre in the Ardennes left the British army and the French Fifth
Army completely isolated on the front Mons-Charleroi. The French Fifth
Army began to retreat. On Sunday morning, the 23rd of August, von
Kluck's army came into action against the British position at Mons.
The British army had taken up its position in high hopes. It was not a
British defeat which began the retreat from Mons, and the troops were
not well pleased when they were ordered to retire. But the retreat was
inevitable, and the most that the British could do was by rearguard
actions to put a brake upon the speed of the advancing enemy until such
time as they should be able to form up again in the Allied line and
assail him. Much depended on their power to gain information concerning
the movements of the enemy, so that they might know their own dangers
and opportunities. Von Kluck had at first no definite news of the
whereabouts of the British army. As late as the 20th of August the
German Supreme Command had issued a communication to the German armies
stating that 'a disembarkation of British Forces at Boulogne and their
employment from the direction of Lille must be taken into account. It is
the opinion here, however, that a landing on a big scale has not yet
taken place.' General von Zwehl, Commander of the Seventh Reserve Corps,
writing in September 1919, tells how the Germans had no reliable
information concerning the British expeditionary force. 'It was only on
the 22nd of August,' he says, 'that an English cavalry squadron was
heard of at Casteau, six miles north-east of Mons, and an aeroplane of
the English fifth flying squadron was shot down that had gone up from
Maubeuge. The presence of the English in front was thus established,
although nothing as regards their strength.' The first news that reached
General von Kluck of the presence of the British forces came to him from
a British, not from a German, aeroplane.
[Illustration: Map Illustrating Aerial Reconnaissance Area. 19th to 24th
Aug. 1914]
The first aerial reconnaissances by the Royal Flying Corps were carried
out on Wednesday, the 19th of August, by Captain P. B. Joubert de la
Ferte of No. 3 Squadron, in a Bleriot, and Lieutenant G. W. Mapplebeck
of No. 4 Squadron, in a B.E. They started at 9.30 a.m., and flew without
observers. Captain Joubert de la Ferte was to reconnoitre
Nivelles-Genappe in order to report what Belgian forces were in that
neighbourhood; Lieutenant Mapplebeck was to find out whether enemy
cavalry were still in force in the neighbourhood of Gembloux. The
machines were to fly together as far as Nivelles, 'so that if one was
obliged to descend the other could report its whereabouts'. The machines
lost their way and lost each other. Lieutenant Mapplebeck eventually
found himself over a large town which he failed to recognize as
Brussels. Later he picked up his position at Ottignies, and soon found
Gembloux, where he could see only a small body of cavalry moving in a
south-easterly direction. After leaving Gembloux he was enveloped in
cloud for some miles, came down to 300 feet over Namur, followed the
Sambre, missed Maubeuge, and landed near Le Cateau, whence he flew back
to the aerodrome at Maubeuge. He had been away from 9.30 a.m. to 12.0
midday. Captain Joubert de la Ferte, whose machine was slower than
Lieutenant Mapplebeck's, attempted to steer by compass through the banks
of cloud, and after two hours of wandering landed at Tournai. He made
inquiries concerning the Belgian army, but nothing was known of them. He
left Tournai at 12.15 p.m., lost his way again, and at 2.0 p.m. landed
at Courtrai. Here he was told by the gendarmerie that the headquarters
of the Belgian flying corps was at Louvain. He left Courtrai at 3.0 p.m.
and passed over Ath, Hal, Braine l'Alleud, Nivelles, returning to
Maubeuge at 5.30 p.m. He reported occasional trains in the main stations
and pickets on the roads to Brussels.
On the 20th Major C. A. H. Longcroft, with Captain U. J. D. Bourke as
observer, reconnoitred as far as Louvain and reported a force of all
arms moving south-west through Tervueren, and another force moving into
Wavre. They also saw an aerodrome just east of Louvain with seven
machines on the ground. Lieutenant E. R. L. Corballis, who, with Captain
G. E. Todd, flew over the area Nivelles-Hal-Enghien, reported that there
was no sign of troops and that all bridges in the area appeared to be
intact. The German flood was spreading but was still some distance away.
On the following day (an important day of enemy movements) the weather
in the morning was too foggy for observation, and in the afternoon was
rainy and misty. Three reconnaissances which were made in the afternoon
showed that the country immediately in front of the British was very
quiet, but in the wood one mile south of Nivelles Lieutenant Corballis
reported a large body of cavalry with some guns and infantry (this was
later identified as the German 9th Cavalry Division), and another body
of infantry moving south on Charleroi. At Pont-a-Celles on the Charleroi
canal, south of Nivelles, three villages were seen to be burning.
On the 22nd there were twelve reconnaissances which revealed the
presence of large bodies of troops moving in the direction of the
British front, and did much to dissipate the fog of war. The first
machine to return came in soon after eleven. This was piloted by Captain
G. S. Shephard, with Lieutenant I. M. Bonham-Carter as observer. They
had landed at Beaumont (about twelve miles east of Maubeuge) for petrol.
Here they were informed that French cavalry had encountered German
infantry north of the Sambre canal on the previous afternoon, and had
had to fall back. The next machine to return came in at 11.50 a.m. with
a wounded observer, Sergeant-Major D. S. Jillings of No. 2 Squadron. He
was the first British soldier to be wounded in an aeroplane, and this
casualty seemed to bring the German armies nearer than a dozen
unmolested reconnaissances could have done. The machine, piloted by
Lieutenant M. W. Noel, had come under heavy rifle fire first of all at
Ollignies, south-east of Lessines, and then, after passing over a
cavalry regiment just south-west of Ghislenghien, had been met with
rifle and machine-gun fire. Frequent rifle fire was encountered all the
way back to Ath, and just south-east of Ath, over Maffle, Sergeant-Major
Jillings had been wounded in the leg by a rifle bullet. Confirmation of
the presence of large bodies of enemy in this area came from Captain L.
E. O. Charlton flying as observer with Second Lieutenant V. H. N.
Wadham. They started at 10.0 a.m. and passed over Charleroi, Gembloux,
and Brussels without seeing any large movements, but reported that the
northern part of Charleroi and many other towns and villages in that
area were burning. From Brussels they went on towards Grammont, and
landed at Moerbeke, two miles south-east of Grammont, to make inquiries.
Here they received information which hastened their departure. They
learnt that a force of 5,000 Germans was in Grammont, that cavalry and
cyclists were in Lessines, and that cavalry were expected from Enghien
to arrive in Ath that evening. When passing over Bassilly, about
half-way between Ath and Enghien, they were fired on by enemy troops
which they estimated at the strength of an infantry brigade, and they
drew further fire from patrols in Ath. They came in with their
information at 1.10 p.m.; Lieutenant W. H. C. Mansfield just before this
had reported large bodies moving into Enghien and Soignies. Afternoon
reconnaissances added little that was new except that there were cavalry
and infantry in the area north of the Mons-Conde canal, and cavalry as
far west as Peruwelz.
[Illustration: Reconnaissance Report of Lieutenant C. G. G. Bayly.
_To face page 303._]
The most important reconnaissance of the day is unfortunately not
recorded in the war diary. The value of the report when it came in was
recognized at once, and Brigadier-General Sir David Henderson took it
personally to General Headquarters. It stated that a long column, whose
strength was estimated to be that of an army corps, was moving westward
on the Brussels-Ninove road. At Ninove the column continued south-west
towards Grammont. This was von Kluck's Second Corps, and the report
seemed to show an attempt at an enveloping movement. The same report
confirmed what had already been seen, the presence of enemy troops
moving along the great Chaussee on Soignies. This column was taking
advantage of the trees on either side of the road to shield its
movements. This was the first day on which a machine failed to return
from over enemy territory. Lieutenants V. Waterfall and C. G. G. Bayly,
of No. 5 Squadron, started on a reconnaissance in an Avro at 10.16 a.m.
and next day were reported missing. It was the bringing down of this
machine, no doubt, which gave the Germans their first assurance of the
presence of the British forces. The observer's report, so far as he had
written it, was picked up near the wreckage of the machine by some
Belgian peasants, and eventually found its way to the War Office in
London.
Sir John French on the evening of the 22nd held a conference at Le
Cateau, whereat the position of the Germans, so far as it was then
known, was explained and discussed. At the close of the conference Sir
John stated that owing to the retreat of the French Fifth Army, the
British offensive would not take place. A request from General Lanrezac
arrived at 11.0 p.m., asking for offensive action against the German
right flank, which was pressing him back from the Sambre. This could not
be undertaken, but Sir John French promised to remain in his position
for twenty-four hours.
In his book, _A Staff Officer's Scrap Book_, Sir Ian Hamilton, who was
attached to the Japanese army during the Russo-Japanese War, has the
following entry: 'The Russians are sending up balloons to our front, and
in front of the Twelfth Division. Judging by manoeuvres and South
African experiences, they should now obtain a lot of misleading
intelligence.' Observation from the air, when the war broke out, had
still to prove its worth. The Royal Flying Corps, though confident of
its own ability, was a new and untried arm. In the early reports there
are occasional inaccuracies. Some of the early observers, among those
who were hastily enrolled to bring newly formed squadrons up to
strength, had not much military knowledge, and were not practised in
reading the appearances of things seen from the air. At the time of the
battles of Ypres, 1914, observers of No. 6 Squadron, which had prepared
itself in hot haste for foreign service, mistook long patches of tar on
macadamized roads for troops on the move, and the shadows cast by the
gravestones in a churchyard for a military bivouac. Mistakes like these,
though they were not very many, naturally made commanding officers shy
of trusting implicitly to reports from the air. Yet the early reports of
the first four squadrons did show without any possibility of mistake how
formidable the German movements were.
Sir John French remained at Mons and was led into fighting a battle in a
perilous position against much superior forces. The air reports of the
22nd had given some hints of the success of von Buelow's army in crossing
the Sambre, had indicated a possible enveloping movement from the
direction of Grammont, and had revealed something of the strength of the
enemy troops on the British front. On the following day the attack began
on the position at Mons, and pilots and observers were flying over and
behind the battle-field looking for enemy movements, and locating enemy
batteries.
On the 24th the retreat was in progress. As early as the morning of the
23rd the Royal Flying Corps had begun to shift its quarters from
Maubeuge to Le Cateau. The transport and machines of No. 3 Squadron
moved southward on that day, and on the 24th headquarters and other
squadrons also moved to Le Cateau. 'We slept,' says Major Maurice
Baring, 'and when I say we I mean dozens of pilots, fully dressed in a
barn, on the top of, and underneath, an enormous load of straw....
Everybody was quite cheerful, especially the pilots.' On the afternoon
of the 25th they moved again to St.-Quentin. The rapidity of the retreat
put a heavy strain upon the headquarters of the Royal Flying Corps,
which had to travel before the retreating army, to select an old
aerodrome or to make a new one almost every day, and in the brief hours
between arrival and departure to carry on all the complicated and
delicate business of ministering to the needs of the squadrons. The
places occupied by headquarters during the retreat were as follows:
Sunday, 16th August Maubeuge.
Monday, 24th August Le Cateau.
Tuesday, 25th August St.-Quentin.
Wednesday, 26th August La Fere.
Friday, 28th August Compiegne.
Sunday, 30th August Senlis.
Monday, 31st August Juilly.
Wednesday, 2nd September Serris.
Thursday, 3rd September Touquin.
Friday, 4th September Melun.
[Illustration: Movements of the Royal Flying Corps from Aug. 16th to
Oct. 12th 1914.]
In some of these places regular aerodromes were available, in others a
landing-ground had to be improvised. Sometimes officers of headquarters
would be sent on a long way ahead in motor-cars to select a
landing-ground, while another officer in a motor-car was detailed to
guide the transport. This he did by taking with him a small number of
men and dropping them one by one at the partings of the ways. When the
route was very complicated, these guides became so many that they had to
be carried in a transport lorry. The transport drivers were not as yet
skilled in the art of map-reading, and to lose the transport would have
left the Flying Corps helpless. Sometimes the officers who selected
the landing-ground moved with the transport, and made their choice when
the transport reached its destination. The only recognized French
aerodromes which were used by the Royal Flying Corps during the retreat
were those at Compiegne, Senlis, and Melun.
Whilst the aerodromes were changing almost daily, the officers carried
on reconnaissance, sometimes starting out not knowing whether their
aerodrome would be in British or enemy hands by the time they should
return. On the 24th, whilst the squadrons were moving from Maubeuge to
Le Cateau, the enemy advance as seen from the air looked menacing
enough. Captain G. S. Shephard and Lieutenant I. M. Bonham-Carter were
watching von Kluck's right wing soon after 4.0 a.m. They returned at six
o'clock with news of extensive movement about Ath and Leuze. They
reported a broken column nearly ten miles long with its head pointing at
Peruwelz. The column branched off the main Ath-Tournai road at Leuze.
This was part of von Kluck's Second Corps, and its line of march would
take it to the west of the extreme western flank of the British army.
The news was not reassuring. Captain H. C. Jackson as observer with
Lieutenant E. L. Conran went up at 8.30 a.m. and came back at 12.30 p.m.
with information of long enemy columns moving from Grammont through
Lessines into La Hamaide and further troops on the Ath-Leuze road. They
had flown as far as Ninove and Alost, but found the country there clear.
On returning over Lessines at 11.30 a.m. they saw three German
aeroplanes on the ground; they dropped a bomb overboard, but missed.
In the evening of the 24th, the first day of the retreat, the position
was on the whole not unsatisfactory. The British Fifth Division had not
only defended six miles of front, but with the aid of the cavalry and
the 19th Infantry Brigade had met and beaten off von Kluck's enveloping
attack. But that attack was soon renewed. On the following morning a
heavy movement of German troops southward from Marchiennes, with
cavalry, guns, and transport, was reported at six o'clock. Marchiennes
is almost midway between Valenciennes and Douai, to the west of the
British line of retreat. This moving line of troops continued southward
through Somain for a distance of about five miles, and then bent in a
south-easterly direction, pointing straight at Le Cateau, until it
reached Bouchain, where there were mounted and dismounted troops
extending over three miles. But Le Cateau was not the objective of these
troops. General von Kluck believed that the next stand of the British
army, after Mons, would be made on a position running east and west
through Bavai, and resting its right on the fortress of Maubeuge. The
troops seen at Bouchain were intended to envelop it and take it in the
rear. Meantime the British army, having escaped the lure of Maubeuge,
was continuing its painful march southward on both sides of the Forest
of Mormal; and the claw that was extended to catch it closed upon air.
[Illustration: Map Illustrating Aerial Reconnaissance Area.
25th & 26th August 1914.]
These movements of von Kluck's army on the 25th were influenced by
his own air reports, which appear to have misled him. The army order
issued by him from Soignies at 8.30 p.m. on the night of the 24th
assumed that the British army would accept battle on the line
Maubeuge-Bavai-Valenciennes. Von Kluck was very hopeful. 'The
outflanking of the left of the British Army,' he says, 'on the
assumption that it remained in position, appeared to be guaranteed.'
An important air report which reached him at 1.0 a.m. on the 25th
led him to suspect that the British were withdrawing on Maubeuge.
Speaking of this report, he says: 'Enemy columns of all arms were in
retreat on the roads Bellignies-Bavai, La Flamengrie-Bavai, and
Gommegnies-Bavai. The direction in which the movement was being made
beyond Bavai had not yet been determined; nevertheless, the army
commander began to suspect that the British were withdrawing on
Maubeuge.' He sent out orders in great haste by motor-car for the
army to advance in a more southerly direction. At 9.0 a.m. however,
a new air report came as a surprise. Long British columns of all
arms were moving from Bavai along the Roman road to Le Cateau, and
numerous small columns, single companies, batteries, squadrons, and
cars were crossing the Selle, north and south of Solesmes. 'The
enemy was marching in an almost opposite direction to what was
supposed earlier in the morning.' A fresh order was at once sent out
to attack the British and bring them to a standstill. Von Kluck does
not quote these air reports. But he says enough to show that he was
misled chiefly by his own preconceptions. Hope told a flattering
tale, and he seems to have been possessed by the idea that the
British army would be tempted into the fortress of Maubeuge.
The whole body of information which on any one day was obtained from the
reconnaissances of the Royal Flying Corps could be set out in detail
only by quoting all the reports in full. That would be too cumbrous a
method of writing history. The reports contain much that is
comparatively insignificant. But the reader of this book may desire to
know exactly what an air report is like, and his curiosity shall be
gratified. Here is the report, of no special tactical significance, but
full of incident, of a long air reconnaissance made by Lieutenant G. F.
Pretyman and Major L. B. Boyd-Moss in a machine of No. 3 Squadron, on
the day of the battle of Le Cateau:
_No. of Reconnaissance_: 57. _Hour Started_: 11.10 a.m.
_Date_: 26.8.1914. _Hour Ended_: 1.40 p.m.
_Aeroplane No._: 387. _Pilot_: Lieutenant G. F. Pretyman.
_Observer_: Major L. B. Boyd-Moss.
_Time._ _Place._ _Observation._
11.50 Honnechy. Gun-fire and shells bursting all along
the line from Honnechy towards
Cambrai. Caudry partly in flames.
11.52 Le Cateau. Burning. Howitzers open fire on us.
Artillery moving through village
of Ors. Several motor-cars moving
south through Croix.
11.55 Foret de Big column of troops moving along
Mormal. the road running along western
edge of the forest. Head at Englefontaine--Rear
at point where the
branch road leads off to Gommegnies.
Artillery moving through
centre of forest towards Landrecies.
12.0 Le Quesnoy. Full of troops.
12.5 Bavai. Scattered parties of troops and
wagons on all roads leading N.
No big columns.
12.15 Blaugies. Blocked with transport. Dropped
bomb into transport parked 1/2 mile
S. of village. Transport stretching
along the road from Dour
to Houdain (not closed up--big
intervals).
12.40 Wargnies. Can make very little progress against
wind.
12.50 Saultain. Transport from Saultain to Preseau
moving south.
12.59 Valenciennes. All roads leading E.-N.E. and S.E.
clear.
1.5 Valenciennes. No troops _visible_ in town.
1.6 Landing-cross and two aeroplanes
close to Valenciennes-Cambrai
road 1-1/2 miles from Valenciennes.
Aircraft gun fires on us from landing-place.
Mechanical transport halted on road. Squadron
of cavalry in bivouac.
1.15 In clouds--making very little progress.
1.30 N. of Cambrai. Descend to 3,000 out of clouds. Troops marching
S.W. down main road.
1.35 Cambrai in flames and occupied by Germans.
1.40 W. of Cambrai. Under heavy infantry fire. Engine put out of
action by bullet. Glide two miles farther W.
clear of enemy, and land. Burn machine and join
French Cavalry retreating towards Arras.
Commandeer two bicycles and go to Gouzeaucourt
where we get car and report to H.Q. 12th
Brigade near Le Catelet.
Get back to St. Quentin about 11.30 p.m. and
report to General Smith-Dorrien.
(_Signed_) L. B. BOYD-MOSS, Major.
The machine, it will be seen, dropped a bomb on a park of transport
vehicles, was fired at by howitzers, and was brought down by heavy
infantry fire. A more dreaded enemy here makes an early appearance--the
prevailing westerly wind. This wind was the heaviest trial for pilots
during years on the western front; it made it easy to get at the enemy
and difficult to get away from him; the road to safety always, while the
west wind was blowing, lay uphill.
On this same day--the day of the battle of Le Cateau--the First Army
Corps under Sir Douglas Haig was delayed, and failed to reach its
appointed position in touch with the Second Army Corps. Lieutenant A. E.
Borton and Lieutenant F. G. Small were dispatched from headquarters in a
machine of No. 5 Squadron to 'find Sir Douglas Haig'. With them went
Lieutenant D. S. Lewis in a B.E. machine fitted with wireless apparatus.
He was to report by wireless when Sir Douglas Haig was found.
Lieutenants Borton and Small in their Henri Farman, being unable to find
a suitable landing-ground in the rear of the First Army Corps, landed
between the firing lines in a field protected by a rise in the ground
from the direct fire of the enemy. With the aid of a cavalry patrol they
succeeded in delivering their message to Sir Douglas Haig, after which
they returned to their machine, started up the engine, and flew away in
the presence of two Uhlans, who had just ridden into the field.
Meantime, Lieutenant Lewis, to whom they were unable to signal, lost
touch with them; he circled in the air for an hour under fire, and
returned with one shell splinter and four bullet-holes in his machine,
and with one of his hands grazed by a bullet. Captain L. E. O. Charlton
was also sent at 11.30 a.m. to report to General Smith-Dorrien at
Bertry. 'I found him', he says, 'in considerable anxiety as to his left
about Haucourt and Selvigny. Having been on that flank at 9.30 a.m., I
was able to reassure him as to its safety, and made another ascent to
confirm my previous reconnaissance. During the reconnaissance I was able
to report that the enemy had made no progress, though their shell-fire
had increased. I was sent up again to examine the right about Le Cateau,
and on reporting at 2.45 p.m. the General told me that the Fifth
Division had been unable to withstand a most determined artillery
attack, and had come back. He added that he had no doubt he would
succeed in getting them back somehow, and requested me to inform Sir
Archibald Murray. I left at 3.0 p.m. and reported to General
Headquarters as ordered.'
General Smith-Dorrien did succeed in getting them back. The stand made
at Le Cateau was a great fight against odds; and the part played in the
battle by the Royal Flying Corps seems a little thing when it is
compared with the gallant resistance of the infantry. But British
machines were flying over the enemy, under fire, within full view of the
British army, and some British officers who took part in the battle have
described how the sight of our aeroplanes above them raised the spirits
of the troops and gave them a feeling of security.
Copies of the original reports made out by observers before and during
the retreat from Mons are preserved in the war diary of headquarters,
Royal Flying Corps. It is not possible to say when each of these reports
reached General Headquarters; they were sent in as soon as possible
after the machines landed--some of them at once by telephone. When the
reports are systematically mapped out, day by day, they give a fairly
accurate picture of the German advance and throw light on the German
plans. General von Kluck speaks more than once of driving the British
army before him, but the complete map of the German movements, as they
were reported day by day from the air, shows that his predominant idea
was to envelop them. Always the crab-like claw is seen extended to the
west and beginning to close in on the line of the British retreat;
always the British army is already at a point farther south on the line,
out of the reach of the claw. When with swollen and blistered feet and
half asleep on the march, the patient British soldier carried on, he was
doing more to defeat the Germans than he could have done if his dearest
wish had been granted and he had been allowed to make a desperate stand.
It is a wonderful army that can suffer the long depression and fatigue
of such a retreat and yet keep its fighting quality unimpaired.
Von Kluck's advance after the battle of Le Cateau was directed to the
south-west. Speaking of the situation on the 28th. of August, he says,
'The occupation of the Somme area marked the conclusion of the fighting
with the British Army for the time being. In spite of the great efforts
of the First Army the British had escaped the repeated attempts to
envelop them. They continued their retreat southwards.' On the same day
the headquarters of the German army propounded a new task. 'The left
wing of the main French forces', they wrote, 'is retreating in a
southerly and south-westerly direction in front of the victorious Second
and Third Armies. It appears to be of decisive importance to find the
flank of this force, whether retreating or in position, force it away
from Paris, and outflank it. Compared with this new objective the
attempt to force the British Army away from the coast is of minor
importance.'
The German Supreme Command were giving most of their attention to the
operations on their left wing, where the Fifth and Sixth German Armies
were converging for the attack on Nancy, which town, when it fell, was
to witness the triumphal entry of the German Emperor. Meantime, the
French, trusting to the strength of their eastern fortifications, were
rapidly taking troops away from their eastern armies to form a new
French army, the Sixth, which was to operate to the north of Paris and
was to take part in the counter-offensive against the German First and
Second Armies. This was unknown to the German Command, who thought that
victory lay within the grasp of their eastern armies.
On the evening of the 30th of August General von Kluck received wireless
messages from the headquarters of the Second Army reporting a decisive
victory, and asking the First Army to wheel inwards towards the line La
Fere-Laon in order to gain the full advantages of the victory. General
von Kluck replied that the First Army had wheeled round towards the
Oise and would advance on the 31st by Compiegne and Noyon to exploit the
success of the Second Army. This was the much-discussed wheeling
movement, or swerve, which was discovered by the British from the air.
Von Kluck had been ordered by the German Supreme Command on the 28th to
continue his march towards the Lower Seine. Now, in response to von
Buelow's request, he wheeled his army south-eastwards towards the Oise.
The German Supreme Command was informed of this, and replied, 'The
movement begun by the First Army is in accordance with the wishes of the
Supreme Command'. The Royal Flying Corps reports of the 31st of August
gave to the British Command the first intimation of what was happening.
Here is one of them: