FURTHER MEMOIRS OF THE WHIG PARTY
1807-1821
[Illustration: _Henry Richard, 3rd Lord Holland_
_C. R. Leslie, Pinx._
_Emery Walker Ph. Sc._]
FURTHER MEMOIRS OF
THE WHIG PARTY 1807-1821
WITH SOME MISCELLANEOUS
REMINISCENCES
BY HENRY RICHARD VASSALL
THIRD LORD HOLLAND
EDITED BY LORD STAVORDALE
WITH PORTRAITS
LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET
1905
PRINTED BY
HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD
LONDON AND AYLESBURY.
PREFACE
_Hoc libro habes, ne sperne, quod restat mei._
With these words, written on the bottom of one of the boxes containing
the MSS., Lord Holland bequeaths to posterity this Memoir of his times.
Whatever may be the verdict of those who peruse these pages and that
portion of the work which has already been published, it is at least
desirable that this expression of Lord Holland’s political feelings and
actions should be placed in the hands of the public. The Memoirs were
written expressly for publication, and it is a pressing duty towards him
to rescue the result of his labours from the dusty shelves where they
have long lain unheeded and forgotten.
Fifty years have now elapsed since the appearance of the last published
volume of the work which these pages will complete. About ten years after
his father’s death, Henry Edward, fourth and last Lord Holland, took in
hand the publication of the Memoirs. The _Foreign Reminiscences_ appeared
in 1851, the first volume of the _Memoirs of the Whig Party_ in 1852, and
the second volume in 1854. It is impossible to explain why Lord Holland
paused before the completion of his task. Possibly at a future date some
document among the wealth of letters stored at Holland House may throw
light on what is at present shrouded in mystery. The point, however, is
of slight importance; and in all probability the state of Lord Holland’s
health during the last few years of his life (for he died in 1859) will
amply account for the postponement of the undertaking.
The four books or chapters under consideration deal with the period of
English history between 1807 and 1821—years fraught with interest for
the student and lover of history. Full details are given of the Prince
Regent’s negotiations with the Whigs in 1809 and 1812, and a rapid sketch
of the principal events and incidents of the last decade of George III.’s
reign. Lord Holland, however, distinctly states that the aim and object
of his labours were to record any incidents, anecdotes, or intrigues
which were not generally known at the time, and which were unlikely to be
found in the recognised histories, periodicals, or journals.
With these political notes we have incorporated a chapter called by the
author his “Miscellaneous Reminiscences,” a series of anecdotes and
recollections of the various literary celebrities and scientists of note
with whom he had chanced to become acquainted.
No one was better qualified than Lord Holland to relate the political
occurrences of these fifteen years. He was recognised as one of the
prominent leaders of the party after his uncle Charles James Fox’s death;
and by his intimate connection with him was brought in contact with many
persons of note, who were finishing their destined span of life when he
had barely entered the age of manhood.
Henry Richard, third Lord Holland, was born in 1773 at Winterslow, near
Salisbury. Before he was two months old, he narrowly escaped death in
the burning of the house, and was only snatched from the fire by the
heroism of his mother. His father, Stephen Fox, eldest son of Henry Fox,
the Paymaster, who was raised to the peerage in 1763 and died in 1774,
lived but six months after his accession to the title. His mother, who
was a daughter of John, first Earl of Upper Ossory, and Evelyn, daughter
of John, Earl Gower, survived her husband by four years. The boy was left
to the care of his uncles, Lord Upper Ossory and Charles James Fox, and
was educated at Eton and Christ Church, Oxford. On leaving the University
in 1792, he went abroad, and was absent from England, with the exception
of two or three fleeting visits, until 1796. Part of those years were
spent in Spain, and from this period dates his love of the literature
and art of that country of romance, and his interest in the political
condition of its people. Lord Holland passed the greater portion of the
remainder of those years in France and Italy. While travelling in the
latter country with his friend Lord Wycombe (afterwards second Lord
Lansdowne) in 1795, he met Elizabeth, Lady Webster, wife of Sir Godfrey
Webster, of Battle Abbey, in Sussex. The chance meeting was destined to
alter the whole course of their lives. They became deeply attached to one
another, and after many months spent in various parts of the Continent,
returned to England together in 1796. Sir Godfrey obtained a divorce in
July, 1797, and Lord Holland married her two days later. One son was
born before the marriage, afterwards known as General Charles Fox and
the husband of Lady Mary FitzClarence, daughter of William IV. and Mrs.
Jordan.
Lady Holland, who was a daughter of Richard Vassall and Mary, daughter of
Thomas Clark, of New York, who afterwards became Lady Affleck, succeeded
to large properties in Jamaica after the death of her father in 1795. The
greater portion of her income was made over to Sir Godfrey Webster at the
time of her divorce. On his death in 1800, Lady Holland regained her own,
and she and Lord Holland then took the additional name of Vassall.
Lord Holland’s political career commenced in 1798 with his speech in the
House of Lords on the Assessed Taxes Bill, on which occasion he showed
himself a worthy representative of his family. It was not long before
he was recognised as the authorised exponent of his uncle’s policy in
the House of Lords. He could not, however, at once shake off his love of
travel, which was shared by his wife. They were abroad for some months in
1800, and passed through France, although the two countries were still at
war. After the Peace of Amiens, the Hollands again visited Paris, where
they were joined by Mr. Fox. They were then received in audience by the
First Consul. Indeed, the only times Lord Holland ever saw the great man,
whose prowess and understanding he so revered, were during this stay in
Paris. From thence the Hollands went on to Spain, and did not return to
England till 1805.
Lord Holland received no office in Lord Grenville’s Administration
until after the death of his uncle. He then entered the Cabinet as Lord
Privy Seal; but his tenure of the post was of short duration, as the
Tory party returned to office early in 1807. For the next twenty-three
years he remained in Opposition, and took a leading part in the counsels
of the party during that period. In 1830 Lord Grey formed a Ministry,
in which Lord Holland accepted the post of Chancellor of the Duchy of
Lancaster, with a seat in the Cabinet. This he retained until his death
in 1840, with the exception of the short interval in 1834-35, when his
party were out of office. He was buried at Millbrook, in Bedfordshire,
near Ampthill, which had been bequeathed to him by Lord Upper Ossory on
his death in 1818. He left besides General Charles Fox, one son, Henry
Edward, who succeeded to the title, and one daughter, Mary, who married
Lord Lilford and died in 1891. Lady Holland survived him and died in 1845.
For some years before his death Lord Holland’s health was a source of
much anxiety to his friends. Constant attacks of gout had sapped his
strength, and he became, at times, little more than a cripple. These
afflictions, however, had no power to cloud his natural good-humour, or
subdue that buoyancy of spirits which made his society so sought after
by his acquaintances. His classical education, his fund of universal
knowledge, his retentive memory, and store of anecdotes, all combined to
increase the inimitable charm of his conversation. It would be impossible
in a few words to do justice to that noble character, beloved by all with
whom he came in contact. It would be easy to descant on his good nature
and benevolence, the simplicity and happiness of his domestic life, his
artistic and literary tastes, and his desire to alleviate the sufferings
of his fellow creatures. But it is rather to his political views and
surroundings that we must devote our short remaining space.
Lord Holland held an intermediate position between the Ultra-Whig or
Radical section of the party, and the more moderate portion—the followers
of Lord Grenville—whose sentiments differed but little from the avowed
policy of many individual members of the Tory Government. He was
unwilling to go the length desired by the extremists, whose ideal was the
French Revolution and the changes consequent on it. Possibly had he seen
a way to effect a sweeping alteration in the forms of British government
by a gradual and orderly process, he would have countenanced the change
from regal power to a constitution based on democratic principles.
Certainly the word Monarchy was no fetish in his eyes, and his dislike to
that recognised form of government was increased by the refusal of George
III. and his successor to deal with the Roman Catholic question. But any
form of excess was to him a thing unspeakable, and, as every important
revolutionary movement in his time was attended by an outbreak of popular
frenzy, his sentiments of humanity overcame the desire for fundamental
change.
In truth, the aim and object of Lord Holland’s political career was
universal toleration, combined with a recognition of the legitimate
rights of mankind. His unwavering support was consistently given to
every motion which tended to relieve the oppressed and assist the
persecuted. The Abolition of the Slave Trade, Improvements of the Penal
Code, Religious Toleration, and Catholic Emancipation were each one step
further towards the attainment of his ends.
His efforts in the House of Lords were seldom crowned with the success
they deserved. The Whig peers were but few in number, and their
divergent views on the great questions of the day rendered any combined
action difficult. Lord Holland held very strong views on the duties of
any public character, and was, in consequence, led to take action on
occasions when he knew that no effective result could be obtained. In
speeches and protests in the Journals of the House he strove to place
on record the principles of the party, and to impress on his friends
the necessity of further exertions at some future and more appropriate
moment. His speeches were replete with valuable information, and form
important evidence of the varied resources of his mind. His arguments
were clear and weighty; his reasoning relevant and sound. If his delivery
was halting, and his diction at times somewhat confused, it was from
wealth, not from poverty, of words and matter that he suffered. Lord
Brougham tells us that on occasions his speeches reached nearly to the
level of his uncle’s in excellence. Certainly, like Mr. Fox, he shone as
a debater; and this is not the less remarkable from the fact that he had
never received the assistance and training of the House of Commons to
develop his powers.
The Memoir was written to serve as a record of the internal history of
the Whig party, and as such Lord Holland stated his case from a Whig
point of view. Political feeling at the beginning of the nineteenth
century was far more virulent than in the present day. The line between
the opposing parties was much more strictly drawn: and it was but a few
years before that the relations between the leaders of each side were
limited to invectives hurled across the table of the House of Commons.
Lord Holland tells us that this state of things was undergoing a gradual
alteration in his time, and mentions “the difference which a change in
the habits of society has insensibly wrought in political parties.” As a
politician he viewed this change with no very favourable eye, for he goes
on to say: “The comparative disuse of men dinners, improving no doubt the
intercourse of private life, has nevertheless very sensibly impaired the
strength and union of party zeal and connection.”
The narrative compares very closely with other memoirs and histories
of the time. More especially is the resemblance noticeable in the
recently published _Creevey Papers_, for both are written from the same
standpoint. The history of the negotiations of 1809 and 1812, and the
dissensions which later arose in the Whig Party, are but two instances
of particulars which correspond almost exactly in each account. In a
few unimportant cases the author’s memory has played him false, and
these errors we have attempted to point out in our footnotes. But in
all essential facts the relation is strictly in agreement with the
established and recognised authorities on the period. Though written
some years after the transactions referred to, most of the substance is
collated from extensive notes, and if the authority is obscure or ground
of reference uncertain, that doubt is definitely stated. Lord Holland,
in a note to the earlier volumes of the work, lays great stress on the
mention of the exact date at which each special passage was written,
as tending to assist the elucidation of historical truths, and we have
therefore been careful to retain these at the commencement of each
chapter.
In dealing with the characters of individual statesmen and celebrities
of the day, Lord Holland has in a few cases been led by his personal
feelings to depart from his customary sense of justice. The chief
sufferer in this respect is the Duke of Wellington, whose policy and
actions are held up to opprobrium, often on scanty and insufficient
grounds. His worst offence in Lord Holland’s eyes seems to have been his
conduct in Paris, and his failure to save Ney from execution; and from
that time the favourable opinion of him formed in the Peninsular War
makes way for a deepening mistrust of his ulterior motives. Similarly his
conception of George III.’s disposition and mental qualities is deeply
coloured with the Whig prejudice; while the Regent obtains scant mercy at
his hands, after his repudiation of his obligations to the party. In most
instances, however, Lord Holland attempts to provide for his readers a
fair and unbiassed estimate of the characters he delineates. In dealing
with several of his political connections he finds himself obliged to
pass censure on their aims and on incidents connected with their careers;
but he does so with obvious reluctance, and tells us in Sheridan’s case
that he has done so, “from an apprehension that the false glitter thrown
over the darker shades of his portrait might injure the truth of the more
general picture of public men.”
The Memoir has been published as it stands, with the exception of two or
three short passages and notes, which were considered unnecessary. Two
long letters dealing with the negotiations of 1812 have been omitted,
as they are already published in the _Annual Register_ for that year.
An interesting conversation dealing with the _Junius_ controversy has
been added to the Appendix; for though no reference is made to the
subject in the text, the paper was placed among the other manuscripts.
Lord Holland’s intentions were to extend his narrative over the period
of the Whig return to power in 1830; but death cut short his labours
and even prevented a revision of portions of the Memoir. The text is,
therefore, occasionally somewhat confused, and words that have been
inserted to supply the sense will be found in square [] brackets. These
have also been used for the editorial notes to distinguish them from
Lord Holland’s, which are signed with the initial letters of his usual
signature, _Vassall Holland_.
At the commencement of each chapter has been placed a short sketch of
the history of the period in question. These are intended solely for the
use of readers who desire to be reminded of the outlines of events in
England and on the Continent during those years. To understand certain
portions of the narrative a clear and accurate knowledge of the times is
needed, for it was written and intended for many whose own memories would
carry them back to the days in which the events took place. Lapse of time
has altered these conditions, and has rendered notes and explanatory
paragraphs desirable, which were unnecessary when the earlier portions of
the work were published.
STAVORDALE.
_May, 1905._
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION TO BOOK THE FIRST 1
BOOK THE FIRST (1807-1810) 8
INTRODUCTION TO BOOK THE SECOND 67
BOOK THE SECOND (1810 TO JUNE, 1812) 71
INTRODUCTION TO BOOK THE THIRD 151
BOOK THE THIRD (1812-1815) 157
INTRODUCTION TO BOOK THE FOURTH 203
BOOK THE FOURTH (1815-1821) 210
MISCELLANEOUS RECOLLECTIONS (A SUPPLEMENTARY
CHAPTER BEGUN IN 1826) 307
APPENDIX A: LORD STRANGFORD’S DISPATCH 393
APPENDIX B: THE PRINCE REGENT’S VIEWS ON THE
ROMAN CATHOLIC QUESTION 396
APPENDIX C: LORD HOLLAND TO LORD GREY 400
APPENDIX D: JUNIUS LETTERS 404
INDEX 407
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
HENRY RICHARD, THIRD LORD HOLLAND _Frontispiece_
By _Leslie_, Holland House.
PAGE
FRANCIS HORNER 46
By _Sir Henry Raeburn_, National Portrait
Gallery.
PETER, SEVENTH LORD KING 104
By _Hoppner_, Holland House.
CHARLES, SECOND EARL GREY, 1811 138
By _T. Phillips_, Holland House.
PRINCESS CHARLOTTE OF WALES 200
By _Sir T. Lawrence_, Abbotsbury Castle.
Given by the Prince Regent to Maria,
Countess Ilchester.
CHARLES, THIRD LORD STANHOPE 246
By _Opie_, Holland House.
SIR SAMUEL ROMILLY 262
By _Hoppner_, Holland House.
JOHN HOOKHAM FRERE 316
By _Sir M. Archer Shee_, Holland House.
LORD HOLLAND’S MEMOIRS OF THE WHIG PARTY
INTRODUCTION TO BOOK THE FIRST
The second volume of Lord Holland’s Memoirs, published in 1854, brings
his account of the fortunes of the Whig party down to the autumn of
1807. That year had witnessed the resignation of the Ministry “of all
the talents,” after barely a year in office. George III.’s hostility to
his Ministers throughout the period was patent to all observers; and he
was nothing loth to accelerate their downfall on the question of Roman
Catholic relief—a rock which had caused the wreck of other combinations
in past years. Lord Holland, who took the office of Lord Privy Seal after
Mr. Fox’s death, fully relates the circumstances of their dismissal and
the consequent General Election. The Tory party was re-established in
office under the leadership of the Duke of Portland; but his colleagues
were for the most part men of moderate and slender abilities, and their
views on many of the burning questions of the day showed a lack of
unanimity which foreboded ill for the success of the Administration.
Yet such is the uncertainty of political forecasts that the chief
figures in this Cabinet were able to hold their own for the next twenty
years, notwithstanding the strenuous and repeated efforts of the Whigs
to supersede them. Lord Holland goes on to mention the election of Mr.
George Ponsonby to the leadership of the Opposition in the House of
Commons, and gives a short account of the chief incidents of the ensuing
Session of Parliament.
On the Continent Napoleon was rapidly rising to the zenith of his power.
The campaign of 1806 had crushed the Prussian armies, and that country
lay at the mercy of the conqueror. The Berlin Decree had struck what he
hoped was a death-blow to the commerce of England. Austria was neutral;
and the French victories at Eylau and Friedland had indisposed Russia to
continue the struggle single-handed. It is true that the King of Prussia
and the Czar had only that year concluded a treaty pledging themselves
to carry on the war, but the latter was secretly wavering, and was,
besides, greatly incensed at the attitude of the English Government.
On the accession of the Whigs to power, the recognised Tory policy of
subsidies to the Allied Powers and the loan of troops was discontinued,
and a system of small expeditions, such as those to the Dardanelles and
Buenos Ayres, resorted to. Alexander, unable to comprehend the change of
front occasioned by the system of party politics in England, looked on
this reversal of pledges given to him as a personal slight, and was not
to be reconciled by renewed promises of assistance in 1807. A meeting
was arranged between him and Napoleon at Tilsit, which resulted in the
conclusion of a treaty of peace between France, Russia, and Prussia, and
the formation of a secret alliance against Great Britain.
Early intelligence of the secret clauses of the treaty and the storm
which was likely to break over Great Britain reached Canning, the Foreign
Secretary, and drastic measures were at once resolved upon to meet the
crisis. Napoleon had excluded English commerce from every Continental
port, and it seemed probable that he would also make use of every vessel
of war in them to further his schemes. Under these circumstances the
English Cabinet resolved to obtain possession of any foreign fleets which
it was possible to lay hands on, and thus diminish the number of ships
which might be added to the fleets of France. In accordance with this
policy an expedition was despatched against Copenhagen; the town was
bombarded, the Danish fleet taken into English custody, and the Russian
fleet denied access to the open sea by an English force stationed at the
mouth of the Baltic. The same considerations gave rise to the expedition
to Cadiz, where lay the remains of the Spanish and French fleet defeated
at Trafalgar; and that to Lisbon. Portugal had nominally declared war
against Great Britain in 1807 at the bidding of Napoleon; but the latter
soon threw off the mask of friendship, and ordered Junot to invade and
subjugate the country. The House of Braganza thereupon decided to embark
in their fleet for Brazil, and carried out this determination, leaving
Lisbon in the hands of the French.
The covetous eye of the Emperor had been cast on Spain, and that country,
not Portugal, was the real object of his machinations. By a trick he
obtained possession of the persons of Charles IV. and Ferdinand his son,
who had become King by the abdication of his father in March, 1808.
They were forced to resign their right to the throne of Spain, and in
June of the same year Joseph Bonaparte was proclaimed King. In the
meanwhile the Spanish people rose in arms against the French, and the
whole country was in a seething state of uproar. Delegates were sent
from the various provinces to England, asking for assistance against the
invader. This request was granted, and an expedition was despatched to
the coast of Portugal. Junot was forced to evacuate that country by the
terms of the Convention of Cintra; but the British operations in Spain
were not attended with the same success. Sir John Moore, misled by false
information, attempted to advance on Madrid, but found himself confronted
by Napoleon himself, who had recently met and defeated the Spanish armies
in detail. Immediate retreat became a necessity, and the campaign closed
with Moore’s death at Coruña and the successful re-embarkation of his
troops.
The Emperor was unable to remain in Spain long enough to see the result
of his handiwork; rumours of hostile preparations on the part of Austria
caused him to return hurriedly to Paris. The truth was, that the checks
experienced by the French at the hands of the Spanish troops had inspired
fresh courage in the breasts of Austrian and Prussian statesmen, who
began to perceive that the development of a national and patriotic spirit
might be used with more success against the dreaded legions of France
than intrigues and coalitions of Cabinets. Prussia made an abortive
attempt to assert her independence, but it was rudely repressed, and
Austria was left alone in her fight for freedom. War broke out in April,
1809; but though the Archduke Charles managed to defeat the French at
Aspern, his immense losses minimised the result of his victory, and the
hard-fought battle of Wagram two months later left the Austrian armies
incapable of continuing the struggle. Reluctantly the Court of Vienna
consented to a treaty of peace, which deprived the country of fifty
thousand square miles of territory.
Two expeditions were despatched from England in 1809: one to Sicily
under Sir John Stewart, which met with no permanent success; the other
to Walcheren and the mouth of the Scheldt. The ulterior object of the
latter enterprise was the destruction of the French fleet then building
at Antwerp, and the conception that of Lord Castlereagh, the War
Minister. Had the Cabinet sanctioned its despatch early in the year, when
Napoleon’s fortunes were for the moment at a low ebb, it is probable
that all would have been well. As it was, a bold and expeditious line of
action would probably have accomplished all that was desired; but, on the
contrary, sloth and inaction prevailed and doomed to complete failure the
largest and most costly expedition which had ever, up to that period,
left the shores of Great Britain.
The unpopularity of Lord Castlereagh with the public was increased by the
ill-success of his scheme; and he discovered about the same time that
his dismissal from office had been for some time determined on by his
colleagues in the Cabinet headed by Canning. Believing that the latter
was prompted by a desire for self-advancement, Castlereagh challenged
him to a duel, and shot him through the thigh. Both Ministers resigned,
and in the subsequent readjustment of places, Mr. Perceval became Prime
Minister, with Lord Wellesley as Foreign Secretary and Lord Liverpool as
Secretary for War.
Public opinion had been greatly excited early in the year by the
accusations brought against the Duke of York of selling commissions in
the Army through the instrumentality of his mistress, Mrs. Clarke. An
investigation of the charge took place in the House of Commons, and it
was proved that the Duke had no guilty knowledge of the proceedings. He
thought right, however, to resign his office of Commander-in-Chief, which
was given to Sir David Dundas.
Sir Arthur Wellesley, who had been appointed to the supreme command in
Portugal, invaded Spain in June, and advanced on Madrid. He received no
information of Soult’s presence on his flank; and though he signally
defeated Marshal Victor at Talavera, was unable to maintain his position,
and was forced to retreat on Portugal. During the winter he employed his
time in forming the ring of fortifications round Lisbon known as the
Lines of Torres Vedras, with the intention of retiring thither in case
of necessity, after devastating the country and denying to the enemy
any possibility of obtaining local supplies. Complete success attended
his designs; and when Massena, who had arrived in Spain covered with
glory won at the battles of Aspern and Wagram, followed the British
into Portugal, he found it impossible to maintain his troops there, and
retired from the country.
Napoleon found time after the Treaty of Vienna to turn his attention to
more personal matters than the subjugation of nations. He divorced his
wife, Josephine, and with the assistance of Metternich, the new Austrian
Minister, prevailed on the Emperor Francis to give him his daughter,
Marie Louise, in marriage. Austria was thus for some years bound to his
cause; but Alexander, on the other hand, fell away and dissolved his
connection with the Continental System. The Emperor continued his policy
of the aggrandisement of France during 1810 by the annexation of the
Papal States and Holland, and his dominion then reached its widest bounds.
BOOK THE FIRST
1807-1810
N.B.—Copied in 1824. Written between December, 1817, and December, 1818.
In the latter end of the Session of 1808 the public attention was
diverted from domestic occurrences, and indeed from Parliament itself, to
events on the Peninsula of Spain. They changed the aspect of affairs both
at home and abroad, and led ultimately to those extraordinary revolutions
by which the next seven years were distinguished. These notes are devoted
to English politics, and however some documents and recollections within
my reach might illustrate the history of Spain during that period, it
is my intention to confine myself _here_ to such occurrences as have
immediate reference to our domestic parties. Some account, however, of
the campaigns on the Peninsula is necessary, to explain the state of
parties in England and the character and circumstances of those who took
a part in them.
I have not hitherto adverted to the emigration of the Court of Lisbon
to the Brazils, though it took place in November, 1807, and was much
connected with English politics.[1] It was in truth so interwoven with
the state in which our armies found that part of the Peninsula, that in
relating the ensuing campaign I must have fallen into some repetition.
The Portuguese Minister, the Chevalier d’Aranjo (who was all along
suspected of promoting the designs of the French, and was certainly in
secret correspondence with them, though possibly, and indeed probably,
with the somewhat less criminal design of deceiving them), always assured
me that the Prince Regent of Portugal would, as he was in policy bound
to do, submit to almost anything to avoid a French invasion; but that
whenever he despaired of averting that calamity, he would throw himself
into the arms of the English, and emigrate to Rio Janeiro with all his
family and Court, rather than hold a nominal and precarious authority
under a French garrison in his own dominions. This previous view of the
subject, not Lord Strangford’s[2] negotiations, induced him to resort to
that measure; and he was on board the ship before that Minister landed,
and under weigh, if he had not actually crossed the bar, before he had
any interview with the person who in a public dispatch strongly implies
that his previous representations and promises, if not an audience on
November 28 in Lisbon, had prevailed on him to embark.[3]
Lord Strangford arrived in London with the news of the safe departure
of the Court from the Tagus, before the official intelligence which he
had sent by another ship reached the office. He had leisure during his
voyage to improve the story he had invented, and he made the whole so
dramatic that Mr. Canning, in the first fervour of gratitude, gave him a
riband; promised him the appointment to Rio Janeiro; offered him an Irish
earldom, which, as Mr. Canning expressed it, he had the _modesty_ to
refuse; and above all pressed him most earnestly to write a full account
of the animating tale he had related in the shape of a dispatch, and to
date it, “_Off the Tagus_.” He accordingly complied; and in observance of
the rules of fiction which both as a poet and a politician he had studied
and practised so successfully
Servetur ad imum
Qualis ab incepto processerit,
he composed an epistle in Reddish’s Hotel, St. James’s Street, as
true, or rather as false, as the date of it. It was published, while
the ink of the original was yet wet, in the official Gazette of the
country![4] Mr. Canning must have been thunderstruck when he received
the original dispatch, and discovered many variations in the second
edition. He was, however, either too vain to acknowledge himself a dupe
or too good-natured to expose the impostor. So far, therefore, from
disavowing Lord Strangford, he appointed him Minister to Rio Janeiro,
where, notwithstanding his detected falsehoods and other misconduct, he
was continued for many years against the better judgment of his various
employers, through the contrivances of the Portuguese Ambassador,
Souza[5] (Count Funchal), and the interest of his relation and protector,
the Duke of Northumberland. Mr. Brougham, who saw him frequently, did
not spare him in the _Morning Chronicle_; indeed, he dwelt so much on
the subject that I intimated to him and to Mr. Perry, the proprietor,
that it was growing tiresome. Whether by the contrivance of Mr. Brougham
to avenge himself of this criticism, or by pure accident, I know not,
but certain it is that Lord Strangford has always imputed those just
but severe strictures on his conduct to me, and with exquisite judgment
complained to Mr. Brougham, the real author, of the malignity and
inveteracy with which they were penned.
To return, however, to my narrative. Some regiments, detached from Sicily
to co-operate with a squadron for compelling the Portuguese and Russian
fleets on the Tagus to surrender in case the Prince of Brazil had not
determined to sail for America, were on the coast; an expedition, which I
have already adverted to as prepared during our Ministry, was at Cork[6];
and a small army, sent to the King of Sweden under the command of Sir
John Moore, was released from that service by the dis-agreements which
occurred between that King and the English general. All these forces were
ready to act when the intelligence of the revolution in Spain reached
England.[7]
It was brought thither at the end of May, or beginning of June, 1808,
from the Asturias by Matarosa and Don Andres de la Vega: the first, a
young nobleman afterwards better known by the name of Count Torreno;
the latter, a provincial lawyer, who united to considerable sagacity
and unblemished integrity great sobriety of judgment and a character
capable of inspiring and of feeling confidence. He afterwards laboured to
counteract the effects of that suspicion which both in and out of Cortes
was estranging the Spaniards from their allies; but he died of the yellow
fever at Cadiz before he acquired all the fame he deserved, and before
the healing qualities of his temper could be applied to the prevention
of those calamities which the return of King Ferdinand so unexpectedly
produced. His modest character and inferior rank, the extreme youth of
Matarosa, and the comparative insignificance of the province of the
Asturias, made our Government hesitate till the arrival of the Galician
and Andalusian deputies, men not equal in capacity, but of higher rank by
birth or station. Admiral Apodaca, though, in truth, selected to screen
him from the resentment of the multitude for having signed a proclamation
favourable to the French and not for any proof of zeal against them,
had a very prepossessing appearance, and a manner which announced
more knowledge of the world and talents of business than he really
possessed. These circumstances, and a confirmation of the simultaneous
rising throughout Spain on St. Ferdinand’s Day (May 25), determined our
Government to afford all possible aid to the first popular resistance
which the aggressions of Napoleon had encountered. Mr. Whitbread and
some other Whigs, but especially that genuine though sober lover of
freedom “wherever pleaded,” Mr. Horner,[8] caught the flame which such a
contest was likely to kindle in every generous breast. Lord Grey, while
his first impressions were yet warm, wrote me word that had he been in
office I should have been despatched to the insurgents without loss of
time. Some of the Ministers were less sanguine than the public; and Lord
Westmorland,[9] in a phrase characteristic of his feelings and taste,
said, “The Spaniards had got into a d——d scrape, and if we did not look
sharp they would drag us into it too.”
Count Florida Blanca[10] and my amiable, philosophical friend, Don
Gaspar Melchior de Jovellanos,[11] on acceding to the cause of the
insurgents, wrote to me to convey the intelligence to our Government. I
forwarded their respective letters, with a translation, to the Secretary
of State’s office, and a copy of my answers, in which I pointedly
disclaimed all connection or influence with any Ministry, but expressed
my private conviction that every Englishman in or out of our Councils
would be forward in assisting Spain in so arduous and so honourable a
struggle. I observed that Mr. Canning took very slight notice of these
communications, which, considering the character and station of the
writers, were not unimportant. I have since ascertained that he took
umbrage at my writing to the Under-Secretary of State and not to himself,
which I did from an unwillingness to give my correspondence too great an
air of importance or an appearance of obtruding either inquiry or opinion
of mine on the Government.
On my applying soon afterwards for a passport to travel in Spain, he
wrote me a letter of misplaced admonition; which I answered in a way to
show him that I should regulate myself by my own notions of propriety
without considering his, and that I did not conceive a Secretary of
State, in granting a passport to an English gentleman, had any authority
or occasion to read him a lecture as to his intercourse with foreigners.
This little incident and other traits which occurred at the same time
were indications of that personal vanity and flippancy which have
often obstructed his ambitious designs by raising him enemies most
unnecessarily, and which are the real defects of his character rather
than weaknesses of a baser nature at that time very generally, but at
all times very falsely, imputed to him. In our party Lord Grenville,
swayed by Mr. Wickham,[12] who deemed French armies invincible, and Mr.
Brougham, who had written himself into a persuasion that everything
which postponed peace must terminate in disaster, took in the course of
the summer a very despondent view of the contest on the Peninsula; but
the Duke of Norfolk was the only man who in 1808 publicly deprecated the
policy of assisting the Spaniards. The Convention of Cintra, the retreat
of Sir John Moore, the defeat and the dispersion of the Spanish armies,
and the arguments in the _Edinburgh Review_, converted many to the same
opinion in the course of a few months. Even Mr. Windham, with all his
ardour for war and hatred of the French, was at moments startled at the
apparition of liberty which the patriots occasionally summoned to their
aid, and at a subsequent period was scared at the notion of resisting
Napoleon himself by anything approaching to democratical principles.
The troops I have described above[13] were employed in the first instance
and in the absence of Sir John Moore, who was personally detained some
time in Sweden, to rescue Portugal from the French. They were placed
for that purpose under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley. The King
disapproved of entrusting so important an expedition to a General so
low in the list. He insisted on some older officer superseding him if
the force were augmented. These objections of His Majesty led to the
appointments of Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard, which occasioned
no little confusion. The brilliant battle of Vimiero and the Convention
of Cintra,[14] which, though it sacrificed some advantages, at least
liberated the west coast of the Peninsula from all French armies, are
all matters of history.
The circumstances relating to them were well sifted at the time, and I
know of no private or unpublished fact which would further illustrate
them. The success in Portugal, however incomplete, was considered by all
as necessarily the forerunner of some more extensive undertaking, but the
Generals there employed were for different reasons incapacitated from
the command of any immediate and greater expedition. The appointment of
a commander became the subject of much public speculation and anxiety,
and no doubt of as much secret deliberation and private intrigue. The
popular writers affected to apprehend that the Duke of York was destined
by Court favour to that important service. It is indeed probable that
his father countenanced such pretensions; and till the subsequent
career of Sir Arthur Wellesley enabled him without self-disparagement
to acquiesce in any appointment founded on a series of triumphs, it is
natural to suppose that a Prince of the Blood at the head of the army
was somewhat unwilling to admit his failures to be disqualifications for
a command to which no rival could aspire on the plea of any splendid or
popular success. The public, and the Ministry perhaps, thought otherwise.
Cobbett and other writers employed their memory and their wit to expose
his incapacity in the field; and a pamphlet, written in a mysterious
tone of insinuation and menace, prepared a way for the charges which
were afterwards preferred against him. It proceeded from a cabal, with
which some persons in the Duke of Kent’s family were reported to have a
connection. Ministers possibly were not displeased at having it in their
power to plead the existence of popular clamour and prejudice against
an appointment, which for many stronger but less courtly reasons they
wished to avoid. But Sir John Moore, the only person whom they could
venture to recommend to so extensive and important a command, never
enjoyed their confidence either before or after his appointment.[15]
His support at home in case of misfortune must have appeared to him
precarious, and he assumed the command in a temper of distrust very
natural, and in some views laudable, but not very propitious to the
success of a cause depending more upon passion than calculation, nor
encouraging to a people whose main resource consisted in an inward and
rooted persuasion that they were invincible.
With great and very unusual qualities of understanding and disposition,
Sir John Moore was perhaps less adapted to the command to which he was
appointed than to any other to which his destiny could have called him.
He was, indeed, the most accomplished soldier in our army. He united
firmness, knowledge, and sagacity, to great military skill and zeal for
his profession and his country. He had shown decision of character in
the field of action, and never betrayed any want of it in such commands
as he had been entrusted with. Nor was this all. The attachment of
numerous, and among them the most sensible, officers in the army, and the
veneration in which his memory was held by them even after his disaster
and death, cannot be accounted for by the active praise of his relations
and countrymen,[16] but prove that he really possessed those virtues
which confer on a commander an authority over the opinions and wishes
as well as the actions of his followers. But as he could not feel, so
neither could he inspire, confidence in any but a regular force. His
affections were limited to British officers, and he was either unwilling
or unable to court the goodwill or humour the weaknesses of any other.
His high spirit would not stoop to countenance either absurdity or
exaggeration; he disdained, perhaps he undervalued, the advantages which,
in a moment of national ferment, some extravagance of hopes and even of
expressions may produce.[17] He knew the superiority of English troops
over the undisciplined and ill-officered bands of their allies; and if
not childishly complacent in displaying, he was at least at no pains to
conceal, his sentiments on that subject.
He could not rely on the statements or depend on the skill of the
Spaniards with whom he came in contact, and he soon let them know that he
had made that discovery. Anxious not to forfeit his military reputation,
he probably expressed less ardour in the cause than he evinced
apprehension of reproach should he risk the safety of so large a British
force; and the tone of circumspection and diffidence at headquarters
spread through the army, and tended, no doubt, to produce in some
degree that backwardness to co-operate with them in the natives, which
he quotes so often in his notes and correspondence as a proof of their
want of enthusiasm. In the last and most important epoch of his life he
put himself in the right in all his differences with others; but it is
observable that, though in the right, he did always differ with those
whose co-operation and concert were most necessary to his success.
Before he took the command of the army, Ministers should have sent him
to the Spanish Governments then forming, or should have selected at
his recommendation some military man with whom he was in the habits of
confidence. The choice, however, fell on my friend, Mr. Frere,[18] a man
of a warm and generous disposition, of singular and original wit, and of
great literary accomplishments, who was zealous in the cause of Spain. He
had, it is true, contributed to our rupture with that country in 1804 and
to the scandalous capture of the frigates; but his personal quarrel with
the Prince of the Peace[19] might well be expected to atone for all such
offences, in the eyes of a nation irritated even to madness against that
favourite. His anti-Gallican spirit, too, somewhat extravagant elsewhere,
was congenial with the feelings of Spaniards, and not unlikely to inspire
them with confidence in him.
These considerations and his intimacy with Mr. Canning were his
recommendations. He had no other: with all his ardour, reading, talents,
and humour, he was a bad man of business. His manners, repulsive at all
times to new acquaintance, became yet more so when the importance of
the affairs in which he was engaged rendered him absent and pompous.
Thus distant to some and suspicious of all, he was often the dupe of
low and designing men, and yet oftener of his own imagination. He had
no knowledge of men’s characters, and even when he adopted their ideas
and approved of their conduct, was neither communicative nor cordial
in his official intercourse with them. His habitual absence assumed,
when he was in a public capacity, the appearance of haughty demeanour
and self-sufficiency; and though entirely exempt from such vices, he
preferred incurring the imputation of them to the acknowledgment of the
more venial infirmities of inattention, indolence, or forgetfulness. In
his correspondence with Sir John Moore he showed great want of judgment
in collecting intelligence, was unaccountably remiss in conveying such as
he did collect, and culpably presumptuous and offensive in the tone and
substance of his advice and remonstrances.
The General, from the commencement, was disposed to remain on or near the
frontiers of Portugal, and averse to any forward movement, especially
after the discomfiture of Blake in Biscay and Castanos in Arragon. He
wavered, however, either from want of accurate intelligence or from the
earnest representations of Mr. Frere. By that irresolution some time was
lost in forming his junction with Sir David Baird,[20] who had landed at
Coruña; and between the project of retreating by Portugal or Galicia the
necessary preparations were completed in neither. When it was determined
to retreat through Galicia, Admiral de Courcy, who commanded at Coruña,
was directed to prepare the transports at that port _or_ at Vigo,
according to his judgment as to which port was most favourable for the
embarkation of troops in the face of an enemy. On that subject no seaman
could doubt. Ships can anchor in Vigo Bay beyond the reach of cannon,
and, even if driven from thence, the islands at the mouth of the harbour
afford water for an army and a road with tolerable anchorage for a fleet,
where they could lie for a favourable wind in safety from any attack but
such as supposes a superiority at sea in the enemy.