LINCOLN AND FREMONT.
In a community like that of the United States, where free press and
free, speech prevail, where every native-born boy is a possible
President, some undesirable results are inevitable. The successful men
become egotistic, and it is a common, well-nigh universal, practise for
all sorts and conditions of men to speak harshly of the authorities. In
the loafers on the street corners, in the illiterate that use the
country store as their club, in the very halls of congress, are heard
the most unsparing criticisms and denunciations of the administration.
These unwarranted comments fell thick and fast on Lincoln, because he
was at the post of responsibility in a critical period, a time of
general unrest. Self-appointed committees of business men, politicians,
clergymen, editors, and what not, were continually telling him what to
do and how to do it. Not a few of even the generals caught the
infection.
It is not possible nor desirable to tell of Lincoln's relations with
many of the eminent men with whom he dealt. But a few will be selected
--Fremont, McClellan, Greeley, and Grant--in order to explain some of
the difficulties which were continually rising up before him, and by
showing how he dealt with them to illustrate certain phases of his
character. This chapter will treat of Fremont.
At the outbreak of the war he was the most conspicuous military man in
the North. He had earned the gratitude of the country for distinguished
services in California, and he was deservedly popular among the
republicans for his leadership of the party in 1856. He was at the best
period of life, being forty-eight years of age. His abilities were
marked, and he possessed in an unusual degree the soldierly quality of
inspiring enthusiasm. If he could turn all his powers into the channel
of military efficiency, he would be the man of the age. He had the
public confidence, and he had such an opportunity as comes to few men.
At the opening of the war he was in Paris and was at once summoned
home. He arrived in this country about the first of July and was by the
President appointed Major-General in the regular army. On the 3d of
July he was assigned to the Western department with headquarters at St.
Louis. This department included the state of Illinois and extended as
far west as the Rocky Mountains.
At that time the condition of affairs in Missouri was distressful and
extremely threatening. The state of Missouri covers a very large
territory, 69,415 square miles, and it was imperfectly provided with
railroads and other means of communication. Private bands of marauders
and plunderers were numerous and did a great amount of damage among
law-abiding citizens. There were also several insurgent armies of no
mean dimensions threatening the state from the southwest. There were
good soldiers and officers there in defense of the Union, but they were
untried, insufficiently armed and accoutered, unprovided with means of
transportation, and, above all, they were in need of a commanding
general of sagacity, daring, and personal resources. Fremont seemed to
be just the man for the important post at that critical hour.
Generals Lyon, Hunter, and others, were sore pressed in Missouri. They
needed the presence of their commander and they needed him at once.
Fremont was ordered to proceed to his post immediately. This order he
did not obey. He could never brook authority, and he was not in the
habit of rendering good reasons for his acts of disobedience. Though he
was aware that the need of his presence was urgent, he dallied about
Washington a long time and then proceeded west with leisure, arriving
in St. Louis nearly three weeks later than he should have done. These
three weeks were under the circumstances time enough for an
incalculable amount of damage, enough to make all the difference
between success and failure. It was long enough to insure the death (on
August 10th) of that brave soldier, General Lyon, and long enough to
account for many other disasters.
One of the most annoying things with which the subordinate generals had
to contend, was that about this time the term of service of the men who
had enlisted for three months was beginning to expire. Many of these
reenlisted, and many did not. It was not possible to plan an expedition
of any sort when it was probable that a large portion of the command
would be out of service before it was completed. There was need of a
master hand at organizing and inspiring loyalty.
Though Fremont had so unaccountably delayed, yet when he came he was
received with confidence and enthusiasm. Lincoln gave to him, as he did
to all his generals, very nearly a _carte blanche_. His instructions
were general, and the commander was left to work out the details in
his own way. All that he required was that something should be done
successfully in the prosecution of the war. The country was not a
judge of military plans; it was a judge of military success and
failure. They expected, and they had a right to expect, that Fremont
should do something more than keep up a dress parade. Lincoln laid on
him this responsibility in perfect confidence.
The first thing Fremont accomplished in Missouri was to quarrel with
his best friends, the Blair family. This is important chiefly as a
thermometer,--it indicated his inability to hold the confidence of
intelligent and influential men after he had it. About this time
Lincoln wrote to General Hunter a personal letter which showed well how
things were likely to go:--
"My dear Sir: General Fremont needs assistance which it is difficult to
give him. He is losing the confidence of men near him, whose support
any man in his position must have to be successful. His cardinal
mistake is that he isolates himself and allows no one to see him; and
by which he does not know what is going on in the very matter he is
dealing with. He needs to have by his side a man of large experience.
Will you not, for me, take that place?"
It was Louis XV. who exclaimed, "_L'etat? C'est moi!_" "The state?
_I'm_ the state!" The next move of Fremont can be compared only with
that spirit of the French emperor. It was no less than a proclamation
of emancipation. This was a civic act, while Fremont was an officer of
military, not civil, authority. The act was unauthorized, the President
was not even consulted. Even had it been a wise move, Fremont would
have been without justification because it was entirely outside of his
prerogatives. Even had he been the wisest man, he was not an autocrat
and could not have thus transcended his powers.
But this act was calculated to do much mischief. The duty of the hour
was to save the Union. Fremont's part in that duty was to drive the
rebels out of Missouri. Missouri was a slave state. It had not seceded,
and it was important that it should not do so. The same was true of
Kentucky and Maryland. It is easy to see, upon reading Fremont's
proclamation, that it is the work not of a soldier, but of a
politician, and a bungling politician at that.
When this came to the knowledge of the President he took prompt
measures to counteract it in a way that would accomplish the greatest
good with the least harm. He wrote to the general:
"Allow me, therefore, to ask that you will, as of your own motion,
modify that paragraph so as to conform to the first and fourth sections
of the act of congress entitled, 'An act to confiscate property used
for insurrectionary purposes,' approved August 6, 1861, and a copy of
which act I herewith send you. This letter is written in a spirit of
caution, and not of censure."
But Fremont was willing to override both President and congress, and
declined to make the necessary modifications. This placed him, with
such influence as he had, in direct antagonism to the administration.
That which ought to have been done by Fremont had to be done by
Lincoln, upon whom was thrown the onus of whatever was objectionable in
the matter. It did give him trouble. It alienated many of the extreme
abolitionists, including even his old neighbor and friend, Oscar H.
Browning. They seemed to think that Lincoln was now championing
slavery. His enemies needed no alienation, but they made adroit use of
this to stir up and increase discontent.
So matters grew no better with Fremont, but much worse for three
months. The words of Nicolay and Hay are none too strong: "He had
frittered away his opportunity for usefulness and fame; such an
opportunity, indeed, as rarely comes."
On October 21st, the President sent by special messenger the following
letter to General Curtis at St. Louis:
"DEAR SIR: On receipt of this, with the accompanying enclosures, you
will take safe, certain, and suitable measures to have the inclosure
addressed to Major-General Fremont delivered to him with all reasonable
despatch, subject to these conditions only, that if, when General
Fremont shall be reached by the messenger,--yourself or any one sent by
you,--he shall then have, in personal command, fought and won a battle,
or shall then be in the immediate presence of the enemy in expectation
of a battle, it is not to be delivered but held for further orders."
The inclosure mentioned was an order relieving General Fremont and
placing Hunter temporarily in command. It is plain that the President
expected that there would be difficulties, in the way of delivering the
order,--that Fremont himself might prevent its delivery. General
Curtis, who undertook its delivery, evidently expected the same thing,
for he employed three different messengers who took three separate
methods of trying to reach Fremont. The one who succeeded in delivering
the order did so only because of his successful disguise, and when it
was accomplished Fremont's words and manner showed that he had expected
to head off any such order. This incident reveals the peril which would
have fallen to American institutions had he been more successful in his
aspirations to the presidency.
Fremont had one more chance. He was placed in command of a corps in
Virginia. There he disobeyed orders in a most atrocious manner, and by
so doing permitted Jackson and his army to escape. He was superseded by
Pope, but declining to serve under a junior officer, resigned. And that
was the end of Fremont as a public man. The fact that he had ceased to
be a force in American life was emphasized in 1864. The extreme
abolitionists nominated him as candidate for the presidency in
opposition to Lincoln. But his following was so slight that he withdrew
from the race and retired permanently to private life.
Yet he was a man of splendid abilities of a certain sort. Had he
practised guerilla warfare, had he had absolute and irresponsible
command of a small body of picked men with freedom to raid or do
anything else he pleased, he would have been indeed formidable. The
terror which the rebel guerilla General, Morgan, spread over wide
territory would easily have been surpassed by Fremont. But guerilla
warfare was not permissible on the side of the government. The aim of
the Confederates was destruction; the aim of the administration was
construction. It is always easier and more spectacular to destroy than
to construct.
One trouble with Fremont was his narrowness of view. He could not work
with others. If he wanted a thing in his particular department, it did
not concern him that it might injure the cause as a whole. Another
trouble was his conceit. He wanted to be "the whole thing," President,
congress, general, and judiciary. Had Lincoln not possessed the
patience of Job, he could not have borne with him even so long. The
kindness of the President's letter, above quoted, is eloquent testimony
to his magnanimity.