LINCOLN HIS OWN PRESIDENT.
Had the question been asked early in 1861, Who will be the real force
of the republican administration? almost every unprejudiced observer
would have answered promptly, Seward. He was a man of unusual
intellectual powers, of the best education, and of the finest culture.
In regard to the moral aspects of politics, he was on the right side.
He had a career of brilliant success extending over thirty years of
practical experience. He had been governor of the Empire State, and one
of the leading members of the United States senate. He was the most
accomplished diplomatist of the day.
In marked contrast was the President-elect. He had, in his encounters
with Douglas, shown himself a master of debate. But his actual
experience of administration was practically _nil_. He had served
a few years in a frontier legislature and one term in the lower house
of congress. Only this and nothing more. His record as representative
may be summarized as follows:
1 comic speech on General Cass.
1 set of humorous resolutions, known as the spot resolutions.
1 bill in reference to slavery in the District of Columbia, which
bill failed to pass.
There was thus no comparison between the careers of the two men.
Seward's friends, and Seward himself, assumed as a self-evident truth,
that "where Seward sits is the head of the table." Lincoln did not
assent to this proposition.
He considered himself President and head of the cabinet. How the matter
came out will appear later in the chapter.
The selection of a cabinet was a difficult and delicate task. It must
be remembered that Lincoln confronted a solid South, backed by a
divided North. It has already been said that in fifteen states he
received not a single electoral vote, and in ten of these not a single
popular vote. That was the solid South.
The divided condition of the North may be inferred from the following
letter, written by ex-President Franklin Pierce to Jefferson Davis
under date of January 6, 1860:
"If, through the madness of Northern abolitionists, that dire calamity
[the disruption of the Union] must come, the fighting will not be along
Mason and Dixon's line merely. It will be _within our own borders, in
our own streets_, between the two classes of citizens to whom I have
referred. Those who defy law, and scout constitutional obligation,
will, if we ever reach the arbitrament of arms, find occupation enough
at home."
It is plain that unless Lincoln could, in a large measure, unite the
various classes of the North, his utter failure would be a foregone
conclusion. He saw this with perfect clearness. His first move was in
the selection of his cabinet. These selections were taken not only from
the various geographical divisions of the country, but also from the
divers political divisions of the party. It was not his purpose to have
the secretaries simply echoes of himself, but able and representative
men of various types of political opinion. At the outset this did not
meet the approval of his friends. Later, its wisdom was apparent. In
the more than a hundred years of cabinets in the history of the United
States there has never been an abler or a purer cabinet than this.
As guesses, more or less accurate, were made as to what the cabinet
would be, many "leading citizens" felt called on to labor with the
President and show him the error of his ways. As late as March 2d there
was an outbreak against Chase. A self-appointed committee, large in
numbers and respectable in position, called on Lincoln to protest
vigorously. He heard them with undivided attention. When they were
through he replied. In voice of sorrow and disappointment, he said, in
substance: "I had written out my choice and selection of members for
the cabinet after most careful and deliberate consideration; and now
you are here to tell me I must break the slate and begin the thing all
over again. I don't like your list as well as mine. I had hoped to have
Mr. Seward as Secretary of State and Mr. Chase as Secretary of the
Treasury. But of course I can't expect to have things just as I want
them.... This being the case, gentlemen, how would it do for us to
agree to a change like this? To appoint Mr. Chase Secretary of the
Treasury, and offer the State department to Mr. Dayton of New Jersey?
"Mr. Dayton is an old whig, like Mr. Seward and myself. Besides, he is
from New Jersey, which is next door to New York. Then Mr. Seward can go
to England, where his genius will find wonderful scope in keeping
Europe straight about our troubles."
The "committee" were astounded. They saw their mistake in meddling in
matters they did not understand. They were glad enough to back out of
the awkward situation. Mr. Lincoln "took _that_ trick."
The names sent on March 5th were: for Secretary of State, William H.
Seward, of New York; for Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase, of
Ohio; for Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania; for
Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, of Connecticut; for Secretary of
the Interior, Caleb B. Smith of Indiana; for Attorney-General, Edward
Bates, of Missouri; for Postmaster-General, Montgomery Blair, of
Maryland.
All these names were confirmed by the senate the next day, March 6th.
Of the variety of the selection he said, "I need them all. They enjoy
the confidence of their several states and sections, and they will
strengthen the administration. The times are too grave and perilous for
ambitious schemes and rivalries." To all who were associated with him
in the government, he said, "Let us forget ourselves and join hands,
like brothers, to save the republic. If we succeed, there will be glory
enough for all." He playfully spoke of this cabinet as his happy
family.
The only one who withdrew early from this number, was Cameron. He was
accused of various forms of corruption, especially of giving fat
government contracts to his friends. Whether these charges were true or
not, we cannot say. But in the following January he resigned and was
succeeded by Edwin M. Stanton, a lifelong democrat, one who had
accepted office under Buchanan. Probably no person was more amazed at
this choice than Stanton himself. But he patriotically accepted the
call of duty. With unspeakable loyalty and devotion he served his chief
and his country to the end.
As has already been indicated, Seward cheerfully assumed that he was
the government, while Lincoln's duties were to consist largely in
signing such papers as he instructed him to sign. As difficulties grew
fast and thick, he wrote home, "These cares fall chiefly on me." Mr.
Welles wrote that confidence and mutual frankness existed among all the
members of the cabinet, "with the exception of Mr. Seward, who had, or
affected, a mysterious knowledge which he was not prepared to impart."
He went so far as to meddle with the affairs of his associates. He did
not entirely approve of the cabinet meetings and served notice that he
would attend only upon special summons of the President.
This condition reached its climax on the first day of April, an
appropriate date. Seward addressed on that day a document entitled,
"Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration, April 1, 1861."
Henry Watterson said that Seward could not have spoken more explicitly
and hardly more offensively if he had simply said: "Mr. Lincoln, you
are a failure as President, but turn over the direction of affairs
exclusively to me, and all shall be well and all be forgiven." This
statement gives a fair and truthful idea of Seward's letter. It is not
likely that its amazing assurance has ever been equaled in any nation
by "thoughts" addressed by an inferior officer to his chief. The paper
itself is here omitted from lack of space, but its tenor can be guessed
from the character of the reply, which is given in full:
EXECUTIVE MANSION, April 1, 1881.
"HON. W. H. SEWARD,
"MY DEAR SIR: Since parting with you I have been considering your paper
dated this day, and entitled 'Some Thoughts for the President's
Consideration.' The first proposition in it is, 'First, We are at the
end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy either
domestic or foreign.'"
"At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said, 'The power
confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property
and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and
imposts.' This had your distinct approval at the time; and, taken in
connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, directing
him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and hold the
forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the
single exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter."
"Again, I do not perceive how the reinforcement of Fort Sumter would be
done on a slavery or party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be
on a more national and patriotic one."
"The news received yesterday in regard to St. Domingo certainly brings
a new item within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that time
we have been preparing circulars and instructions to ministers and the
like, all in perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that we had no
foreign policy."
"Upon your closing propositions that 'whatever policy we adopt, there
must be an energetic prosecution of it,"
"'For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct
it incessantly,"
"'Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active
in it, or"
"'Devolve it on some member of his cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it
must end, and all agree and abide.'"
"I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line
of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being
changed without good reason or continuing to be a subject of
unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish,
and suppose, I am entitled to have the advice of all the cabinet."
"Your ob't serv't,
A. LINCOLN."
The courtesy, the convincing logic, the spirit of forbearance shown in
this letter, were characteristic of the man at the helm. It need hardly
be said that Seward never again tried the experiment of patronizing his
chief. He saw a great light. He suddenly realized that these cares did
not fall chiefly on him.
So far as is known, neither gentleman ever made any reference to this
correspondence. The result was worth while. It bound Seward to his
President with hoops of steel. For four long, weary, trying years he
served his chief with a loyal devotion which did credit to both men.
Thus the hallucination that he was premier was forever dispelled. The
"Public Man" wrote: "There can be no doubt of it any longer. This man
from Illinois is not in the hands of Mr. Seward."
There was surely no doubt of it. Lincoln was President. In the
councils, the place where Lincoln sat was the head of the table. Seward
was his secretary. And a good secretary he was, as well as a true man.