FOUR LONG MONTHS.
Four months would not ordinarily be considered a long period of time.
But when one is compelled to see the working of a vast amount of
mischief, powerless to prevent it, and knowing one's self to be the
chief victim of it all, the time is long. Such was the fate of Lincoln.
The election was not the end of a life of toil and struggle, it was the
beginning of a new career of sorrow. The period of four months between
the election and inauguration could not be devoted to rest or to the
pleasant plans for a prosperous term of service. There developed a plan
for the disruption of the government. The excuse was Lincoln's
election. But he was for four months only a private citizen. He had no
power. He could only watch the growing mischief and realize that he was
the ultimate victim. Buchanan, who was then President, had a genius for
doing the most unwise thing. He was a northern man with southern
principles, and this may have unfitted him to see things in their true
relations. He certainly was putty in the hands of those who wished to
destroy the Union, and his vacillation precisely accomplished what they
wished. Had he possessed the firmness and spirit of John A. Dix, who
ordered,--"If any man attempts to haul down the American flag, shoot
him on the spot;" had he had a modicum of the patriotism of Andrew
Jackson; had he had a tithe of the wisdom and manliness of Lincoln;
secession would have been nipped in the bud and vast treasures of money
and irreparable waste of human blood would have been spared. Whatever
the reason may have been,--incapacity, obliquity of moral and political
vision, or absolute championship of the cause of disruption,--certain
it is that the southern fire-eaters could not have found a tool more
perfectly suited to their purpose than James Buchanan. He was the
center of one of the most astonishing political cabals of all history.
Lincoln did not pass indiscriminate condemnation upon all men of
southern sympathies. At the time of which we are now writing, and
consistently up to the end of his life, he made a marked distinction
between the rank and file of the Confederates on the one hand, and
those leaders who, on the other hand, had, while in the service of the
United States government, sought to accomplish its destruction. The
first were revolutionists; they were so regarded generally in Europe,
and he believed they were sincere; he regarded them as having the
spirit of revolutionists. For the second, who held office under, drew
pay from, and were under solemn oath to support, the government, while
they were using the vantage of their official position to violate the
Constitution and disrupt that government, there is but one word, and
that a strong one,--traitors. This was Lincoln's judgment of the men.
Let us now briefly describe the situation. Jefferson Davis, though not
a member of Buchanan's cabinet, was probably the most influential of
the Southerners in Washington. He had been Secretary of War under
Pierce, and it was he who inaugurated the policy of stripping the North
for the purpose of strengthening the military defenses of the South.
This policy was vigorously pursued under his successor.
The only person to call a halt to the treasonable proceedings was
General Winfield Scott. He was residing in New York City, and on
October 29th addressed a letter to President Buchanan containing his
views upon the situation. A day or two later he added supplementary
considerations addressed to the Secretary of War. He set forth, with
much clearness and force, the necessity of garrisoning the southern
forts before they should be lost; His letter had its faults, but it
accomplished one thing: it showed that there was one high official who
was in earnest in the discharge of his duties, and with whom it was not
safe to trifle.
President Buchanan sent in his annual message to Congress December
3, 1860. In his discussion of the subject of slavery, he recommended
that it be extended to the territories,--the very thing that the people
had just voted should not be done. Concerning secession, he said for
substance that the government had the power to suppress revolt, but
that it could not use that power in reference to South Carolina, the
state then under consideration. The secessionists had apparently tied
the hands of the executive effectually.
Now observe what was going on in the cabinet. Lewis Cass had been
Secretary of State, but resigned in indignation over the inaction of
the President when he failed to succor the forts in Charleston Harbor.
He was succeeded by Jeremiah S. Black, who, as attorney-general, had
given to Buchanan an opinion that the Federal government had no power
to coerce a seceding state.
Howell Cobb, Secretary of the Treasury, having wasted the funds and
destroyed the credit of the government, resigned and left an empty
treasury.
John B. Floyd, Secretary of War, was not the least active. He carried
out fully the plan which Jefferson Davis had begun to operate several
years before. The northern arsenals were stripped of the arms and
ammunition which were sent South for storage or use. The number of
regular troops was small, but the few soldiers there were, he scattered
in distant places, so that they should be out of reach. They were not
to be available for the use of the government until the conspirators
should have time to complete their work. It was Floyd whom an emotional
Virginian later eulogized. With quite as much truth as poetry he
declared that the Secretary of War "thwarted, objected, resisted, and
forbade" the efforts of General Scott. This same admirer of Floyd
further declared that, if Scott's plans had been adopted and his
measures executed, the conspiracy would have been defeated and it would
have been impossible to form the Southern Confederacy.
Not worse, perhaps, but more flagrant, was the action of the Secretary
of the Interior, Thompson of Mississippi. With the advice and consent
of Buchanan, he left his post at Washington to visit North Carolina and
help on the work of secession, and then returned and resumed his
official prerogatives under the government he had sworn to sustain.
This is so grave a matter that a passage from the diary of Mr. Clingman
is here inserted, quoted by Nicolay and Hay: "About the middle of
December (1860) I had occasion to see the Secretary of the Interior on
some official business. On my entering the room, Mr. Thompson said to
me, 'Clingman, I am glad you have called, for I intended presently to
go up to the senate to see you. I have been appointed a commissioner by
the state of Mississippi to go down to North Carolina to get your state
to secede.' ... I said to him, 'I did not know you had resigned.' He
answered, 'Oh, no! I have not resigned.' 'Then,' I replied, 'I suppose
you resign in the morning.' 'No,' he answered, 'I do not intend to
resign, for Mr. Buchanan wished us all to hold on, and go out with him
on the 4th of March.' 'But,' said I, 'does Mr. Buchanan know for what
purpose you are going to North Carolina?' 'Certainly,' he said, 'he
knows my object.'" In the meanwhile, Isaac Toucey, the Secretary of the
Navy, had been prevailed on to put the navy out of reach. The armed
vessels were sent to the ends of the earth. At the critical period,
only two were available to the government. What was going on in
congress? That body was very busy doing nothing. Both senate and house
raised committees for the purpose of devising means of compromise. But
every measure of concession was promptly voted down by the body that
had appointed the committees. In the senate the slave power was in full
control. In the house the slave power was not in majority, but they
enjoyed this advantage that they were able to work together, while the
constituency of the free states were usually divided among themselves.
And in joint session the extreme pro-slavery men were always able to
prevent anything from being accomplished. This was all they wished.
They had sufficient pledges from the President that nothing would be
done before the 4th of March, and it was their belief that by that time
the new power would have so good a start that it could treat with the
United States on equal terms. On January 7, 1861, Senator Yulee, of
Florida, wrote: "By remaining in our places until the 4th of March, it
is thought we can keep the hands of Mr. Buchanan tied, and disable the
republicans from effecting any legislation which will strengthen the
hands of the incoming administration."
On December 14, thirty of the southern senators and representatives had
issued a circular to their constituents. They said that the argument
was exhausted, that all hope of relief was extinguished, that the
republicans would grant nothing satisfactory, and that the honor,
safety, and independence of the Southern people required the
organization of a Southern Confederacy.
South Carolina was the first to act. Six days later that state passed
the ordinance of secession.
Upon this, one of the extreme traitors was forced out of the cabinet.
Floyd, the mischievous Secretary of War, was displaced by Holt, a loyal
man. Floyd, however, had done nearly, if not quite, all the mischief he
could have done. Stanton had already replaced Black as Attorney-General.
The conspirators then held a caucus. It is supposed that this caucus
was held in one of the rooms of the Capitol. At all events it was held
in the city of Washington. It was composed of the extreme southern
congressmen. It decided to recommend immediate secession, the formation
of the Southern Confederacy, and, not least, that the congressmen
should remain in their seats to keep the President's hands tied. The
committee to carry out these plans consisted of Jefferson Davis,
Slidell, and Mallory. By the first day of February, seven states had
passed ordinances of secession.
This is about what was going on during the four months Lincoln was
waiting for the appointed time when he should enter upon his duties. It
was not unlike looking upon a house he was shortly to occupy, and
seeing vandals applying the torch and ax of destruction, while he was
not permitted to go to the rescue, all the while knowing that he would
be held accountable for the preservation of the structure. So Lincoln
saw this work of destruction going on at Washington. It was plain that
the mischief ought to be, and could be, stopped. But Buchanan would not
stop it, and Lincoln was, until March 4th, a private citizen and could
do nothing. The bitterest part of it was that all the burden would fall
on him. As soon as he should become President it would be his duty to
save the government which these men were now openly destroying.
Miss Tarbell has recorded a conversation between Lincoln and his friend
Judge Gillespie, which took place in Springfield early in January, in
which the former expressed his feelings upon the situation.
"Gillespie," said he, "I would willingly take out of my life a period
in years equal to the two months which intervene between now and the
inauguration, to take the oath of office now."
"Why?"
"Because every hour adds to the difficulties I am called upon to meet
and the present administration does nothing to check the tendency
towards dissolution. I, who have been called to meet this awful
responsibility, am compelled to remain here, doing nothing to avert it
or lessen its force when it comes to me.... Every day adds to the
situation and makes the outlook more gloomy. Secession is being
fostered rather than repressed.... I have read, upon my knees, the
story of Gethsemane, where the Son of God prayed in vain that the cup
of bitterness might pass from him. I am in the garden of Gethsemane
now, and my cup of bitterness is full to overflowing" (Tarbell, "Life
of Lincoln," II., 406).
It was indeed hard to keep his patience and self-control. He was
importuned for expressions of his views, for messages conciliatory to
the South, for some kind of a proclamation which might quiet the public
feeling. But he saw clearly that anything he might say at that time, no
matter how wise or conciliatory, would surely be misused as fuel to add
to the flames. While therefore he talked and wrote freely to his
friends, he made no public announcement. He merely referred to his
record. His opinions had been fully expressed in the debates with
Douglas and in other speeches. There were four important points as to
his future policy. The Union should be preserved, the Constitution
should be upheld, and the fugitive slave law (being a law) should be
enforced, but slavery should not be extended. These fully covered all
the necessary points of the subject, and beyond these he would not go.
He who would control others must first control himself. It is hard to
imagine a more severe test than this imposed on Lincoln during this
period of waiting. He made his preparations in silence, and not an
injudicious word escaped him. He left his home for Washington the 11th
day of February, but though he made several speeches on the way, he did
not outline his policy until he read his inaugural address on the 4th
of March.