The ancient constitution of Europe was not sufficiently destroyed in

this part of Germany to make Frederick believe that, in spite of the

contempt with which he regarded it, the time was yet come for sweeping

away its remains. He mostly confined himself to depriving the nobles

of the right of assembling and governing collectively, and left each

individual in possession of his privileges, only restricting and

regulating their application. Thus it happened that this code, drawn up

under the direction of a disciple of our philosophers, and put in force

after the French Revolution had broken out, is the most authentic and

the most recent legislative document that gives a legal basis to those

very feudal inequalities which the Revolution was about to abolish

throughout Europe.

In it the nobility was declared to be the principal body in the State;

the nobles were to be appointed by preference, it says, to all posts of

honour which they might be competent to fill. They alone might possess

noble estates, create entails, enjoy the privileges of sporting and

of the administration of justice inherent in noble estates, as well

as the rights of patronage over the Church; they alone might take the

name of the estates they possessed. The burghers who were authorised by

express exemption to own noble estates could only enjoy the rights and

honours attached to their ownership, within the precise limits of this

permission. A burgher possessed of a noble estate could not bequeath it

to an heir of his own class unless he was within the first degree of

consanguinity. If there was no such heir, or any heir of noble birth,

the estate was to be sold by public auction.

One of the most characteristic parts of Frederick’s code is the penal

law for political offences, which is appended to it.

The successor of the Great Frederick, Frederick William II., who, in

spite of the feudal and absolutist portion of the legislation, of which

I have given a sketch, thought he perceived a revolutionary tendency

in his uncle’s production, and accordingly delayed its publication

until 1794, was only reassured, it is said, by the excellent penal

regulations by means of which this code corrected the bad principles

which it contained. Never, indeed, has anything been contrived, even

since that time, more perfect in its kind; not only were revolts and

conspiracies to be punished with the greatest severity, but even

disrespectful criticisms of the acts of the Government were likewise

to be most severely repressed. The purchase and dissemination of

dangerous works was carefully prohibited; the printer, the publisher,

and the disseminator were made responsible for the sins of the author.

Ridottos, masquerades, and other amusements, were declared to be public

assemblages, and must be authorised by the police; the same thing held

good with respect to dinners in public places. The liberty of the press

and of speech was completely subjected to an arbitrary surveillance;

the carrying of fire-arms was also prohibited.

In the midst of this production, of which half was borrowed from the

Middle Ages, there appear regulations, which, by their extreme spirit

of centralisation, actually bordered on socialism. Thus, it is laid

down that it is incumbent on the State to provide food, work, and

wages for all who are unable to maintain themselves, and who are not

entitled to assistance either from the lord or from the parish: for

such as these work was to be provided, according to their strength and

capacity. The State was to form establishments for the relief of the

poverty of its citizens; the State, moreover, was authorised to destroy

foundations which tended to encourage idleness, and to distribute

amongst the poor the money under their control.

The novelty and boldness of the theories, and the timidity in practice

which characterises this work of the Great Frederick, may be found in

every part of it. On the one hand, it proclaimed the great principle of

modern society, that all ought to be alike subject to taxation; on the

other, it suffered the provincial laws, which contain exemptions from

this rule, to subsist. It ordained that all lawsuits between a subject

and the sovereign shall be judged according to the forms and precedents

laid down for all other litigation; but, in fact, this rule was never

obeyed when the interests or the passions of the King were opposed to

it. The Mill of Sans-Souci was ostentatiously exhibited, while on many

other occasions justice was quietly suppressed.

The best proof of how little real innovation was contained in this

apparently innovating code, and which, therefore, renders it a most

curious study for those who desire to know the true state of society

in that part of Germany at the end of the eighteenth century, is that

the Prussian nation scarcely seemed to be conscious of its publication.

The legists alone studied it, and at the present day a great number of

educated men have never read it.

Note (VII.)--Page 21, last line.

LANDS OF THE PEASANTS IN GERMANY.

Amongst the peasantry there were many families who were not only

freemen and owners of land, but whose estates formed a perpetual

entail. The estate they possessed could not be divided, and was

inherited by only one of the sons, usually the youngest, as is the case

in certain English customs. This son was only bound to pay a certain

portion to his brothers and sisters.

These _Erbgüter_ of the peasantry were more or less common throughout

Germany; for in no part of it was the whole of the soil swallowed up by

the feudal system. In Silesia, where the nobility still retain immense

domains, of which most of the villages formed a part, there were

nevertheless villages owned entirely by their inhabitants, and entirely

free. In certain parts of Germany, such as the Tyrol and Friesland, the

predominant state of things was that the peasants owned the soil as

_Erbgüter_.

But in the greater part of Germany this kind of possession was but a

more or less frequent exception. In the villages where it existed the

small proprietors of this kind formed a sort of aristocracy among the

peasantry.

Note (VIII.)--Page 22, line 3.

POSITION OF THE NOBILITY AND DIVISION OF LANDS ALONG THE BANKS OF THE

RHINE.

From information gathered on the spot, and from persons who lived

under the old state of things, I gather that in the Electorate of

Cologne, for instance, there was a great number of villages without

lords, governed by the agents of the Prince; that in those places

where the nobility existed, its administrative powers were much

restricted; that its position was rather brilliant than powerful (at

least individually); that they enjoyed many honours, and formed part

of the council of the Prince, but exercised no real and immediate

power over the people. I have ascertained from other sources that in

the same electorate property was much divided, and that a great number

of the peasants were landowners; this was mainly attributable to the

state of embarrassment and almost distress in which so many of the

noble families had long lived, and which compelled them constantly

to alienate small portions of their land which were bought by the

peasants, either for ready money or at a fixed rent-charge. I have read

a census of the population of the Bishopric of Cologne at the beginning

of the eighteenth century, which gives the state of landed property at

that time, and I find that even then one-third of the soil belonged

to the peasants. From this fact arose a combination of feelings and

ideas which brought the population of this part of Germany far nearer

to a state of revolution than that of other districts in which these

peculiarities had not yet shown themselves.

Note (IX.)--Page 22, line 27.

HOW THE USURY LAWS HAD ACCELERATED THE SUBDIVISION OF THE SOIL.

A law prohibiting usury at whatever rate of interest was still in

force at the end of the eighteenth century. We learn from Turgot that

even so late as 1769 it was still observed in many places. The law

subsists, says he, though it is often violated. The consular judges

allow interest stipulated without alienation of the capital, while the

ordinary tribunals condemn it. We may still see fraudulent debtors

bring criminal actions against their creditors for lending them money

without alienation of the capital.

Independently of the effects which this legislation could not fail to

produce upon commerce, and upon the industrial habits of the nation

generally, it likewise had a very marked influence on the division

and tenure of the land. It had multiplied, _ad infinitum_, perpetual

rent-charges, both on real and other property. It had led the ancient

owners of the soil instead of borrowing when they wanted money to sell

small portions of their estates for payments partly in capital and

partly in perpetual annuities; this had contributed greatly on the one

hand to the subdivision of the soil, and on the other to burdening the

small proprietors with a multitude of perpetual services.

Note (X.)--Page 25, line 9.

EXAMPLE OF THE PASSIONS EXCITED BY THE TITHES TEN YEARS BEFORE THE

REVOLUTION.

In 1779 an obscure lawyer of Lucé complained in very bitter language,

which already had a flavour of the revolution, that the curés and other

great titheholders sold to the farmers, at an exorbitant price, the

straw they had received in tithe, which was indispensable to the latter

for making manure.

Note (XI.)--Page 25, line 15.

EXAMPLE OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THE CLERGY ALIENATED THE PEOPLE BY THE

EXERCISE OF ITS PRIVILEGES.

In 1780 the prior and the canons of the priory of Laval complained

of an attempt to subject them to the payment of the tariff duties on

articles of consumption, and on the materials needed for the repairs

of their buildings. They pleaded that as the tariff duties represented

the _taille_, and as they were exempt from the _taille_, they therefore

owed nothing. The minister referred them to a decision at the election,

with the right of appeal to the _Cour des Aides_.

Note (XII.)--Page 25, line 23.

FEUDAL RIGHTS POSSESSED BY PRIESTS.--ONE EXAMPLE FROM AMONGST A

THOUSAND.

_Abbey of Cherbourg_ (1753).--This abbey possessed at this period the

seignorial rent-charges, payable in money or in kind in almost every

parish round Cherbourg; one single village owed it three hundred and

six bushels of wheat. It owned the barony of Ste. Geneviève, the

barony and the seignorial mill of Bas-du-Roule, and the barony of

Neuville-au-Plein, situated at a distance of at least ten leagues. It

received moreover the tithes of twelve parishes in the peninsula, of

which several were very distant from it.

Note (XIII.)--Page 27, line 21.

IRRITATION AMONG THE PEASANTS CAUSED BY FEUDAL RIGHTS, AND ESPECIALLY

BY THE FEUDAL RIGHTS OF THE PRIESTS.

The following letter was written shortly before the Revolution by a

farmer to the Intendant himself. It cannot be quoted as an authority

for the truth of the facts which it alleges, but it is a perfect

indication of the state of feeling among the class to which its writer

belonged.

‘Although we have few nobles in this part of the country,’ says

he, ‘you must not suppose that the land is any the less burdened

with rent-charges; far from it, almost all the fiefs belong to the

cathedral, to the archbishopric, to the College of St. Martin, to the

Benedictines of Noirmoutiers, of Saint Julien, and other ecclesiastics,

who never suffer them to lapse from disuse, but perpetually hatch fresh

ones out of musty old parchments which are manufactured God only knows

how!

‘The whole country is infected with rent-charges. The greater part of

the land owes annually a seventh of wheat per half acre, others owe

wine; one has to send a quarter of his fruit to the seigneurie, another

the fifth, &c., the tithe being always previously deducted; this man a

twelfth, that a thirteenth. All these rights are so strange that I know

them of all amounts, from a fourth to a fortieth of the fruit.

‘What is to be said of the dues payable in all kinds of grain,

vegetables, money, poultry, labour, wood, fruit, candles?

‘I know strange dues in bread, wax, eggs, pigs without the head,

wreaths of roses, bunches of violets, gilt spurs, &c. There is also

a countless multitude of other seignorial rights. Why has not France

been released from all these absurd dues? At last men’s eyes are

beginning to be opened, and everything may be hoped from the wisdom of

the present Government: it will stretch forth a helping hand to the

poor victims of the exactions of the old fiscal laws called seignorial

rights, which ought never to be alienated or sold.

‘Again, what shall we think of the tyranny of fines (_lods et

ventes_)? A purchaser exhausts his means to buy some land, and is

then compelled to pay heavy expenses for adjudication and contract,

entering upon possession, _procès-verbaux_ (_contrôle_), verification

and registration (_insinuation_), hundredth _denier_, eight sous in

the livre, &c.: and besides all this, he has to submit his contract to

his seigneur, who makes him pay the fines (_lods et ventes_) on the

principal of his purchase; some exact a twelfth, others a tenth: some

demand a fifteenth, others a fifteenth and the fifth of that again.

In short they are to be found of all prices; and I even know some

who exact a third of the purchase money. No, the fiercest and most

barbarous nations in the universe never invented exactions so great and

so numerous as those of which our tyrants have heaped upon the heads of

our forefathers.’ (This philosophical and literary tirade is misspelt

throughout.)

‘How! can the late king have authorised the redemption of rent-charges

on property in towns and not have included those in the country? The

latter ought to have come first: why should the poor farmers not be

allowed to burst their fetters, to redeem and free themselves from the

multitude of seignorial rent-charges which cause so much injury to

the vassals and so little profit to their lords? There ought to be no

distinction as to the power of redemption between town and country and

between the lords and private persons.

‘The Intendants of the incumbents of ecclesiastical property pillage

and mulct all their farmers every time the property changes hands. We

have a recent example of this. The intendant of our new archbishop on

his arrival gave notice to quit to all the farmers of his predecessor

M. de Fleury, declared all the leases which they had taken under him

to be void, and turned out all who would not double their leases and

give over again heavy “pots de vin,” which they had already paid to

the intendant of M. de Fleury. They were thus deprived, in the most

notorious manner, of seven or eight years of their leases which had

still to run, and were forced to leave their homes suddenly just

before Christmas, the most critical time of the year on account of the

difficulty of procuring food for cattle, without knowing where to go

for shelter. The King of Prussia could have done no worse.’

It seems, indeed, that on ecclesiastical property the leases of the

preceding incumbent were not legally binding on his successor. The

author of the above letter is quite correct in his statement that

the feudal rent-charges were redeemable in the towns and not in

the country. It is a fresh proof of the neglect shown towards the

peasantry, and of the way in which all those placed above them found

means to forward their own interests.

Note (XIV.)--Page 27, line 27.

EFFECTS OF FEUDALISM.

Every institution that has long been dominant, after establishing

itself firmly in its proper sphere, penetrates beyond it, and ends by

exerting considerable influence even over that part of the legislation

which it does not govern; thus feudalism, although it belonged above

all to political law, had transformed the whole civil law as well,

and deeply modified the state of property and of persons in all the

relations of private life. It had affected the law of inheritance by

the inequality of partition, a principle which had even reached down to

the middle classes in certain provinces, for instance, Normandy. Its

influence had extended over all real property, for no landed estates

were entirely excluded from its action, or of which the owners did not

in some way feel its effects. It affected not only the property of

individuals but even that of the communes; it reacted on manufactures

by the duties which it levied upon them; it reacted on private incomes

by the inequality of public employments, and on pecuniary interests

generally in every man’s business; on landowners by dues, rent-charges,

and the corvée; on the tenant in a thousand different ways, amongst

others by the _banalités_ (the right of the seigneur to compel his

vassals to grind their corn at his mill, &c.), seignorial monopolies,

perpetual rent-charges, fines, &c.; on tradesmen, by the market dues;

on merchants by the transport dues, &c. By putting the final stroke

to the feudal system the Revolution made itself seen and felt, so to

speak, at all the most sensitive points of private interest.

Note (XV.)--Page 35, line 8.

PUBLIC CHARITY DISTRIBUTED BY THE STATE.--FAVOURITISM.

In 1748 the King granted 20,000 lbs. of rice (it was a year of great

want and scarcity, like so many in the eighteenth century). The

Archbishop of Tours asserted that this relief was obtained by him,

and ought therefore to be distributed by him alone and in his own

diocese. The Intendant declared that the succour was granted to the

whole _généralité_, and ought therefore to be distributed by him to

all the different parishes. After a protracted struggle, the King,

by way of conciliating both, doubled the quantity of rice intended

for the _généralité_, so that the Archbishop and the Intendant might

each distribute half. Both were agreed that the distribution should

be made by the curés. There was no question of entrusting it to the

seigneurs or to the syndics. We see, from the correspondence between

the Intendant and the Comptroller-General, that in the opinion of

the former the Archbishop wanted to give the rice entirely to his

own protégés, and especially to cause the greater part of it to be

distributed in the parishes belonging to the Duchess of Rochechouart.

On the other hand, we find among these papers letters from great

noblemen asking relief for their own parishes in particular, and

letters from the Comptroller-General recommending the parishes

belonging to particular persons.

Legal charity gives scope for abuses, whatever be the system pursued;

but it is perfectly impracticable when exercised from a distance and

without publicity by the Central Government.

Note (XVI.)--Page 35, line 8.

EXAMPLE OF THE MANNER IN WHICH THIS LEGAL CHARITY WAS ADMINISTERED.

We find in the report made to the provincial assembly of Upper Guienne

in 1780: ‘Out of the sum of 385,000 livres, the amount of the funds

granted by his Majesty to this _généralité_ from 1773, when the

_travaux de charité_ were first established, until 1779 inclusively,

the elective district of Montauban, which is the chef-lieu and

residence of the Intendant, has received for its own share above

240,000 livres, the greater part of which sum was actually paid to the

communauté of Montauban.

Note (XVII.)--Page 35, line 12.

POWERS OF THE INTENDANT FOR THE REGULATION OF TRADES AND MANUFACTURES.

The archives of the Intendancies are full of documents relating to this

regulation of trades and manufactures.

Not only was industry subjected to the restrictions placed upon it by

the _corps d’état_, _maîtrises_, &c., but it was abandoned to all the

caprices of the Government, usually represented by the King’s council,

as far as general regulations went, and by the intendants in their

special application. We find the latter constantly interfering as to

the length of which the pieces of cloth are to be woven, the pattern

to be chosen, the method to be followed, and the defects to be avoided

in the manufacture. They had under their orders, independently of

the sub-delegates, local inspectors of manufactures. In this respect

centralisation was pushed even further than at the present time; it

was more capricious and more arbitrary: it raised up swarms of public

functionaries, and created all manner of habits of submission and

dependence.

It must be remembered that these habits were engrafted above all upon

the manufacturing and commercial middle classes whose triumph was at

hand, far more than upon those which were doomed to defeat. Accordingly

the Revolution, instead of destroying these habits, could not fail to

make them spread and predominate.

All the preceding remarks have been suggested by the perusal of a

voluminous correspondence and other documents, entitled ‘Manufactures

and Fabrics, Drapery, Dry-goods,’ which are to be found among the

remaining papers belonging to the archives of the Intendancy of the

Isle of France. They likewise contain frequent and detailed reports

from the inspectors to the Intendant of the visits they have made to

the various manufactures, in order to ascertain whether the regulations

laid down for the methods of fabrication are observed. There are,

moreover, sundry orders in council, given by the advice of the

Intendant, prohibiting or permitting the manufacture, either in certain

places, of certain stuffs, or according to certain methods.

The predominant idea in the remarks of these inspectors, who treat

the manufacturers with great disdain, is that it is the duty and the

right of the State to compel them to do their very best, not only for

the sake of the public interest, but for their own. Accordingly they

thought themselves bound to force them to adopt the best methods, and

to enter carefully into every detail of their art, accompanying this

kind interest with countless prohibitions and enormous fines.

Note (XVIII.)--Page 36, last line.

SPIRIT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LOUIS XI.

No document better enables us to estimate the true spirit of the

government of Louis XI. than the numerous constitutions granted by him

to the towns. I have had occasion to study very carefully those which

he conferred on most of the towns of Anjou, of Maine, and of Touraine.

All these constitutions are formed on the same model, and the same

designs are manifest in them all. The figure of Louis XI., which they

reveal to us, is rather different from the one which we are familiar

with. We are accustomed to consider him as the enemy of the nobility,

but at the same time as the sincere though somewhat stern friend of the

people. Here, however, he shows the same hatred towards the political

rights of the people and of the nobility. He makes use of the middle

classes to pull down those above them, and to keep down those below:

he is equally anti-aristocratic and anti-democratic; he is essentially

the citizen-king. He heaps privileges upon the principal persons of

the towns, whose importance he desires to increase; he profusely

confers nobility on them, thus lowering its value, and at the same

time he destroys the whole popular and democratic character of the

administration of the towns, and restricts the government of them to

a small number of families attached to his reforms, and bound to his

authority by immense advantages.

Note (XIX.)--Page 37, line 30.

ADMINISTRATION OF A TOWN IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

I extract from the inquiry made in 1764 into the administration of

towns, the document relating to Angers; in it we shall find the

constitution of the town analysed, attacked, and defended by turns by

the Présidial, the Corporation, the Sub-delegate, and the Intendant. As

the same facts were repeated in a great number of other places, this

must not be looked upon merely as an individual picture.

‘_Report of the Présidial on the actual state of the Municipal

Corporation of Angers, and on the Reforms to be made in it._’

‘The corporation of Angers,’ says the Présidial, ‘never consults the

inhabitants generally, even on the most important subjects, except in

cases in which it is obliged by special orders to do so. This system of

administration is, therefore, unknown to all those who do not belong to

the corporation, even to the échevins amovibles, who have but a very

superficial idea of it.’

(The tendency of all these small civic oligarchies was, indeed, to

consult what are here called the inhabitants generally as little as

possible.)

The corporation was composed, according to an arrêt de règlement of

29th March, 1681, of twenty-one officers:--

A mayor, who becomes noble, and whose functions continue for four years.

Four échevins amovibles, who remain in office two years.

Twelve échevins conseillers, who, when once elected, remain for life.

Two procureurs de ville.

One procureur in reversion.

One greffier.

They possessed various privileges, amongst others the following: their

capitation tax was fixed and moderate; they were exempt from having

soldiers billeted upon them and from providing ustensiles, fournitures,

and contributions; from the franchise des droits, the cloison double

and triple, the old and new octroi and accessoire on all articles of

consumption, even from the don gratuit, from which, says the Présidial,

they chose to exempt themselves on their own private authority; they

receive moreover allowances for wax-lights, and some of them salaries

and apartments.

We see by these details that it was a very pleasant thing to be

perpetual échevins of Angers in those days. Always and everywhere we

find the system which makes the exemption from taxation fall on the

richest classes. In a subsequent part of the same report we read:

‘These places are sought by the richest inhabitants, who aspire to

them in order to obtain a considerable reduction of capitation, the

surcharge of which falls on the others. There are at present several

municipal officers, whose fixed capitation is 30 livres, whereas they

ought to be taxed 250 or 300 livres; there is one especially among

them, who, considering his fortune, might pay, at least, 1000 livres

of capitation tax.’ We find in another part of the same report, that

‘amongst the richest inhabitants there are upwards of forty officers,

or widows of officers (men holding office), whose places confer on them

the privilege of not contributing to the heavy capitation levied on the

town; the burden of this capitation accordingly falls on a vast number

of poor artisans, who think themselves overtaxed, and constantly appeal

against the excessive charges upon them, though almost always unjustly,

inasmuch as there is no inequality in the distribution of the amount,

which remains to be paid by the town.’

* * * * *

The General Assembly consisted of seventy-six persons:--

The Mayor;

Two deputies from the Chapter;

One Syndic of the clerks;

Two deputies from the Présidial;

One deputy from the University;

One Lieutenant-general of Police;

Four Échevins;

Twelve Conseillers-échevins;

One Procureur du Roi au Présidial;

One Procureur de Ville;

Two deputies from the Eaux et Forêts;

Two from the Élection (elective district?);

Two from the Grenier à sel;

Two from the Traites;

Two from the Mint;

Two from the body of Avocats and Procureurs;

Two from the Juges Consuls;

Two from the Notaries;

Two from the body of Merchants; and, lastly,

Two sent by each of the sixteen parishes.

These last were supposed to represent the people, properly so called,

especially the industrial corporations. We see that care had been taken

to keep them in a constant minority.

When the places in the town corporation fell vacant, the general

assembly selected three persons to fill each vacancy.

Most of the offices belonging to the Hôtel de Ville were not

exclusively given to members of corporations, as was the case in

several municipal constitutions, that is to say, the electors were not

obliged to choose from among them their magistrates, advocates, &c.

This was highly disapproved by the members of the Présidial.

According to this Présidial, which appears to have been filled with

the most violent jealousy against the corporation of the town,

and which I strongly suspect objected to nothing so much in the

municipal constitution as that it did not enjoy as many privileges

in it as it desired, ‘the General Assembly, which is too numerous,

and consists, in part, of persons of very little intelligence, ought

only to be consulted in cases of sale of the communal domains, loans,

establishment of octrois, and elections of municipal officers. All

other business matters might be discussed in a smaller assembly,

composed only of the _notables_. This assembly should consist only of

the Lieutenant-General of the Sénéchaussée, the Procureur du Roi, and

twelve other notables, chosen from amongst the six bodies of clergy,

magistracy, nobility, university, trade, and bourgeois, and others not

belonging to the above-named bodies. The choice of the notables should

at first be confined to the General Assembly, and subsequently to the

Assembly of _Notables_, or to the body from which each _notable_ is to

be selected.’

All these functionaries of the State, who thus entered in virtue of

their office or as _notables_ into the municipal corporations of the

ancien régime, frequently resembled those of the present day as to

the name of the office which they held, and sometimes even as to the

nature of that office; but they differed from them completely as to the

position which they held, which must be carefully borne in mind, unless

we wish to arrive at false conclusions. Almost all these functionaries

were _notables_ of the town previous to being invested with public

functions, or they had striven to obtain public functions in order to

become notables; they had no thought of leaving their own town and no

hope of any higher promotion, which alone is sufficient to distinguish

them completely from anything with which we are acquainted at the

present day.

_Report of the Municipal Officers._--We see by this that the

corporation of the town was created in 1474, by Louis XI., on the ruins

of the ancient democratic constitution of the town, on the system which

we have already described of restricting political rights to the middle

classes only, of setting aside or weakening the popular influence, of

creating a great number of municipal officers in order to interest

a greater number of persons in his reform, of a prodigal grant of

hereditary nobility, and of all sorts of privileges, to that part of

the middle classes in whose hands the administration was placed.

We find in the same report letters patent from the successors of Louis

XI. which acknowledge this new constitution, while they still further

restrict the power of the people. We learn that in 1485 the letters

patent issued to this effect by Charles VIII. were attacked before the

parliament by the inhabitants of Angers, just as in England a lawsuit,

arising out of the charter of a town, would have been brought before a

court of justice. In 1601 a decision of the parliament determined the

political rights created by the Royal Charter. From that time forward

nothing appears but the _conseil du Roi_.

We gather from the same report that, not only for the office of mayor,

but for all other offices belonging to the corporation of the town,

the General Assembly proposed three candidates, from amongst whom the

King selects one, in virtue of a decree of the council of 22nd June,

1708. It appears, moreover, that in virtue of decisions of the council

of 1733 and 1741, the merchants had the right of claiming one place of

_échevin_ or _conseiller_ (the perpetual échevins). Lastly, we find

that at that period the corporation of the town was entrusted with the

distribution of the sums levied for the capitation, the _ustensile_,

the barracks, the support of the poor, the soldiery, coast-guard, and

foundlings.

There follows a long enumeration of the labours to be undergone by

the municipal officers, which fully justified, in their opinion,

the privileges and the perpetual tenure of office, which they were

evidently greatly afraid of losing. Many of the reasons which

they assign for their exertions are curious; amongst others, the

following: ‘Their most important avocations,’ they say, ‘consist in

the examination of financial affairs, which continually increased,

owing to the constant extension of the _droits d’aides_, the _gabelle_,

the _contrôle_, the _insinuation des actes_, _perception illicite des

droits d’enrégistrement et de francs fiefs_. The opposition which

was incessantly offered by the financial companies to these various

taxes compelled them to defend actions in behalf of the town before

the various jurisdictions, either the parliament or the _conseil du

Roi_, in order to resist the oppression under which they suffered.

The experience and practice of thirty years had taught them that

the term of a man’s life scarcely suffices to guard against all the

snares and pitfalls which the clerks of all the departments of the

_fermes_ continually set for the citizens in order to keep their own

commissions.’

The most curious circumstance is, that all this is addressed to the

Comptroller-General himself, in order to dispose him favourably towards

the privileges of those who make the statement, so inveterate had the

habit become of looking upon the companies charged with the collection

of the taxes as an enemy who might be attacked on every side without

blame or opposition. This habit grew stronger and more universal every

day, until all taxation came to be looked upon as an unfair and hateful

tyranny; not as the agent of all men, but as the common enemy.

‘The union of all the offices,’ the report goes on to say, ‘was

effected for the first time by an order in council of the 4th

September, 1694, for a sum of 22,000 livres;’ that is to say, that the

offices were redeemed in that year for the above-named sum. By an order

of 26th April, 1723, the municipal offices created by the edict of 24th

May, 1722, were united to the corporation of the town, or, in other

words, the town was authorised to purchase them. By another order of

24th May, 1723, the town was permitted to borrow 120,000 livres for the

purchase of the said offices. Another order of 26th July, 1728, allowed

it to borrow 50,000 livres for the purchase of the office of _greffier_

secretary of the Hôtel de Ville. ‘The town,’ says the report, ‘has

paid these moneys in order to maintain the freedom of its elections,

and to secure to the officers elected--some for two years and others

for life--the various prerogatives belonging to their offices.’ A part

of the municipal offices having been re-established by the edict of

November, 1733, an order in council intervened, dated 11th January,

1751, at the request of the mayor and échevins, fixing the rate of

redemption at 170,000 livres, for the payment of which a prorogation of

the octrois was granted for fifteen years.

This is a good specimen of the administration of the monarchy, as far

as the towns were concerned. They were forced to contract debts, and

then authorised to impose extraordinary and temporary taxes in order to

pay them. Moreover, I find that these temporary taxes were frequently

rendered perpetual after some time, and then the Government took its

share of them.

The report continues thus: ‘The municipal officers were only deprived

of the important judicial powers with which Louis XI. had invested

them by the establishment of royal jurisdictions. Until 1669 they took

cognisance of all disputes between masters and workmen. The accounts

of the octrois are rendered to the Intendant, as directed in all the

decrees for the creation or prorogation of the said octrois.’

We likewise find in this report that the deputies of the sixteen

parishes, who were mentioned above, and who appeared at the General

Assembly, were chosen by the companies, corporations, or _communautés_,

and that they were strictly the envoys of the small bodies by which

they were deputed. They were bound by exact instructions on every point

of business.

Lastly, this report proves that at Angers, as everywhere else, every

kind of expenditure was to be authorised by the Intendant and the

Council; and, it must be admitted, that when the administration of

a town is given over completely into the hands of a certain number

of men, to whom, instead of fixed salaries, are conceded privileges

which place them personally beyond the reach of the consequences

which their administration may produce upon the private fortunes of

their fellow-citizens, this administrative superintendence may appear

necessary.

The whole of the report, which is very ill drawn up, betrays

extraordinary dread, on the part of the official men, of any change in

the existing order of things. All manner of arguments, good and bad,

are brought forward by them in favour of maintaining the status quo.

_Report of the Sub-delegate._--The Intendant having received these

two reports of opposite tendency, desires to have the opinion of his

Sub-delegate, who gives it as follows:--

‘The report of the municipal councillors,’ says he, ‘does not deserve

a moment’s attention; it is merely intended to defend the privileges

of those officers. That of the _présidial_ may be consulted with

advantage; but there is no reason for granting all the prerogatives

claimed by those magistrates.’

According to the Sub-delegate, the constitution of the Hôtel de Ville

has long stood in need of reform. Besides the immunities already

mentioned, which were enjoyed by the municipal officers of Angers, he

informs us that the Mayor, during his tenure of office, had a dwelling

which was worth, at least, 600 francs rent, a salary of 50 francs, and

100 francs for _frais de poste_, besides the jetons. The _procureur

syndic_ was also lodged, and the _greffier_ as well. In order to

procure their own exemption from the _droits d’aides_ and the _octroi_,

the municipal officers had fixed an assumed standard of consumption for

each of them. Each of them had the right of importing into the town,

free of duty, so many barrels of wine yearly, and the same with all

other provisions.

The Sub-delegate does not propose to deprive the municipal councillors

of their immunities from taxation, but he desires that their

capitation, instead of being fixed and very inadequate, should be

taxed every year by the Intendant. He desires that they should also

be subject, like every one else, to the _don gratuit_, which they had

dispensed themselves from paying, on what precedent no one can tell.

The municipal officers, the report says further, are charged with

the duty of drawing up the _rôles de capitation_ for all the

inhabitants--a duty which they perform in a negligent and arbitrary

manner; accordingly a vast number of complaints and memorials are

sent in to the Intendant every year. It is much to be desired that

henceforth the division should be made in the interest of each company

or _communauté_ by its own members, according to stated and general

rules; the municipal officers would have to make out only the _rôles de

capitation_, for the burghers and others who belong to no corporation,

such as some of the artisans and the servants of all privileged persons.

The report of the Sub-delegate confirms what has already been said of

the municipal officers--that the municipal offices had been redeemed by

the town in 1735 for the sum of 170,000 livres.

_Letter the Intendant to the Comptroller-General._--Supported by

all these documents, the Intendant writes to the Minister: ‘It is

important, for the sake of the inhabitants and of the public good,

to reduce the corporation of the town, the members of which are too

numerous and extremely burdensome to the public, on account of the

privileges they enjoy.’ ‘I am struck,’ continues the Intendant,

‘with the enormous sums which have been paid at all periods for the

redemption of the municipal offices at Angers. The amount of these

sums, if employed on useful purposes, would have been profitable to

the town, which, on the contrary, has gained nothing but an increased

burden in the authority and privileges enjoyed by these officers.’

‘The interior abuses of this administration deserve the whole attention

of the council,’ says the Intendant further. ‘Independently of the

_jetons_ and the wax-lights, which consume an annual sum of 2127 livres

(the amount fixed for expenses of this kind by the normal budget,

which from time to time was prescribed for the towns by the King),

the public moneys are squandered and misapplied at the will of these

officers to clandestine purposes, and the _procureur du Roi_, who has

been in possession of his place for thirty or forty years, has made

himself so completely master of the administration, with the secret

springs of which he alone is acquainted, that the inhabitants have at

all times found it impossible to obtain the smallest information as

to the employment of the communal revenues.’ The result of all this

is, that the Intendant requests the Minister to reduce the corporation

of the town to a mayor appointed for four years, a _procureur du Roi_

appointed for eight, and a _greffier_ and _receveur_ appointed for life.

Altogether the constitution which he proposes for this corporation is

exactly the same as that which he elsewhere suggested for towns. In his

opinion it would be desirable--

1st. To maintain the General Assembly, but only as an electoral body

for the election of municipal officers.

2nd. To create an extraordinary _Conseil de Notables_, which should

perform all the functions which the edict of 1764 had apparently

entrusted to the General Assembly; the said council to consist of

twelve members, whose tenure of office should be for six years, and

who should be elected, not by the General Assembly but by the twelve

corporations considered as _notable_ (each corporation-electing its

own). He enumerates the _corps notables_ as follows:--

The Présidial.

The University.

The Election.

The Officers of Woods and Forests.

The Grenier à sel.

The Traites.

The Mint.

The Avocats and Procureurs.

The Juges Consuls.

The Notaires.

The Tradesmen.

The Burghers.

It appears that nearly all these _notables_ were public functionaries,

and nearly all the public functionaries were notables; hence we may

conclude, as from a thousand other passages in these documents, that

the middle classes were as greedy of place and as little inclined to

seek a sphere of activity removed from Government employment. The only

difference, as I have said in the text, was that formerly men purchased

the trifling importance which office gave them, and that now the

claimants beg and entreat some one to be so charitable as to get it for

them gratis.

We see that, according to the project we have described, the whole

municipal power was to rest with the extraordinary council, which would

completely restrict the administration to a very small middle-class

coterie, while the only assembly in which the people still made their

appearance at all was to have no privilege beyond that of electing

the municipal officers, without any right to advise or control them.

It must also be observed that the Intendant was more in favour of

restriction and more opposed to popular influence than the King,

whose edict seemed intended to place most of the power in the hands

of the General Assembly, and that the Intendant again is far more

liberal and democratic than the middle classes, judging at least by

the report I have quoted in the text, by which it appears that the

_notables_ of another town were desirous of excluding the people even

from the election of municipal officers, a right which the King and the

Intendant had left to them.

My readers will have observed that the Intendant uses the words

burghers and tradesmen to designate two distinct categories of

notables. It will not be amiss to give an exact definition of these

words, in order to show into how many small fractions the middle

classes were divided, and by how many petty vanities they were agitated.

The word _burgher_ had a general and a restricted sense; it was used to

designate those belonging to the middle class, and also to specify a

certain number of persons included within that class. ‘The burghers are

those whose birth and fortune enable them to live decently, without the

exercise of any gainful pursuit,’ says one of the reports produced on

occasion of the inquiry in 1764. We see by the rest of the report that

the word burgher was not to be used to designate those who belonged

either to the companies or the industrial corporations; but it is more

difficult to define exactly to whom it should be applied. ‘For,’ the

report goes on to say, ‘amongst those who arrogate to themselves the

title of burgher, there are many persons who have no other claim to

it but their idleness, who have no fortune, and lead an obscure and

uncultivated life. The burghers ought properly to be distinguished by

fortune, birth, talent, morality, and a handsome way of living. The

artisans, who compose the _communautés_, have never been admitted to

the rank of _notables_.’

After the burghers, the mercantile men formed a second class, which

belong to no company or corporation; but the limits of this small class

were hard to define. ‘Are,’ says the report, ‘the petty tradesmen of

low birth to be confounded with the great wholesale dealers?’ In order

to resolve these difficulties, the report proposes to have a list of

the _notable_ tradesmen drawn up by the _échevins_, and given to their

head or syndic, in order that he may summon to the deliberations at

the Hôtel de Ville none but those set down in it. In this list none

were to be inscribed who had been servants, porters, drivers, or who

had filled any other mean offices.

Note (XX.)--Page 39, line 33.

One of the most salient characteristics of the eighteenth century, as

regards the administration of the towns, was not so much the abolition

of all representation and intervention of the public in their affairs

as the extreme variation of the rules by which the administration was

guided, rights were incessantly granted, recalled, restored, increased,

diminished, and modified in a thousand different ways. Nothing more

fully shows into what contempt these local liberties had fallen as this

continual change in their laws, which seemed to excite no attention.

This variation alone would have been sufficient to destroy beforehand

all peculiar ideas, all love of old recollections, all local patriotism

in those very institutions which afford the greatest scope for them.

This it was which prepared the way for the great destruction of the

past, which the Revolution was about to effect.

Note (XXI.)--Page 41, line 6.

ADMINISTRATION OF A VILLAGE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. FROM THE PAPERS

OF THE INTENDANCY OF THE ÎLE-DE-FRANCE.

I have selected the transaction which I am about to describe from

amongst a number of others, in order to give an example of some of the

forms followed by the parochial administration, to show how dilatory

they were, and to give a picture of the General Assembly of a parish

during the eighteenth century.

The matter in hand was the repairs to be done to the parsonage and

steeple of a rural parish, that of Ivry, in the Île-de-France. The

question was, to whom to apply to get these repairs done, how to

determine on whom the expense should fall, and how to procure the sum

which was needed.

1. Memorial from the curé to the Intendant, setting forth that the

steeple and the parsonage are in urgent need of repairs; that his

predecessor had added useless buildings to the parsonage, and thus

entirely altered and spoiled it; that the inhabitants, having allowed

this to be done, were bound to bear the expense of restoring it to a

proper condition, and, if they chose, to claim the money from the heirs

of the last curé.

2. Ordonnance of the Intendant (29th August, 1747), directing that the

syndic shall make it his business to convoke a meeting to deliberate on

the necessity of the operations demanded.

3. Memorial from the inhabitants, setting forth that they consent to

the repairs of the parsonage but oppose those of the steeple, seeing

that the steeple is built over the chancel, and that the curé, who is

the great-tithe-owner, is liable for the repairs of the chancel. [By a

decree in council of the end of the preceding century (April, 1695) the

person in receipt of the great tithes was bound to repair the chancel,

the parishioners being charged only with keeping up the nave.]

4. Fresh ordonnance of the Intendant, who, in consequence of the

contradictory statements he has received, sends an architect, the Sieur

Cordier, to inspect and report upon the parsonage and the steeple, to

draw up a statement of the works and to make an inquiry.

5. _Procès-verbal_ of all these operations, by which it appears that

at the inquiry a certain number of landowners of Ivry appeared before

the commissioner sent by the Intendant, which persons appeared to

be nobles, burghers, and peasants of the place, and inscribed their

declarations for or against the claim set up by the curé.

7. Fresh ordonnance of the Intendant, to the effect that the statements

drawn up by the architect whom he had sent shall be communicated to the

landowners and inhabitants of the parish at a fresh general meeting to

be convoked by the syndic.

8. Fresh Parochial Assembly in consequence of this ordonnance, at which

the inhabitants declare that they persist in their declarations.

9. Ordonnance of the Intendant, who directs, 1st, That the adjudication

of the works set forth in the architect’s statement shall be proceeded

with before his Sub-delegate at Corbeil, in the dwelling of the latter;

and that the said adjudication shall be made in the presence of the

curé, the syndic, and the chief inhabitants of the parish. 2nd, That

inasmuch as delay would be dangerous, the whole sum shall be raised by

a rate on all the inhabitants, leaving those who persist in thinking

that the steeple forms part of the choir, and ought therefore to be

repaired by the large titheowners, to appeal to the ordinary courts of

justice.

10. Summons issued to all the parties concerned to appear at the

house of the Sub-delegate at Corbeil, where the proclamations and

adjudication are to be made.

11. Memorial from the curé and several of the inhabitants, requesting

that the expenses of the administrative proceeding should not be

charged, as was usually the case, to the adjudicator, seeing that

the said expenses were very heavy, and would prevent any one from

undertaking the office of adjudicator.

12. Ordonnance of the Intendant, to the effect that the expenses

incurred in the matter of the adjudication shall be fixed by the

Sub-delegate, and that their amount shall form a portion of the said

adjudication and rate.

13. Powers given by certain _notable_ inhabitants to the Sieur X. to be

present at the said adjudication, and to assent to it, according to the

statement of the architect.

14. Certificate of the syndic, to the effect that the usual notices and

advertisements have been published.

15. _Procès-verbal_ of the adjudication--

_liv._ _s._ _d._

Estimate of repairs 487 0 0

Expenses of adjudication 237 18 6

---------------

724 18 6

16. Lastly, an order in council (23rd July, 1748) authorising the

imposition of a rate to raise the above sum.

We see that in this procedure the convocation of the Parochial Assembly

was alluded to several times.

The following _procès-verbal_ of the meeting of one of these assemblies

will show the reader how business was conducted on such occasions:--

_Acte notarié._--‘This day, after the parochial mass at the usual and

accustomed place, when the bell had been rung, there appeared at the

Assembly held before the undersigned X., notary at Corbeil, and the

witnesses hereafter named, the Sieur Michaud, vine-dresser, syndic

of the said parish, who presented the ordonnance of the Intendant

permitting the Assembly to be held, caused it to be read, and demanded

that note should be taken of his diligence.

‘Immediately an inhabitant of the said parish appeared, who stated that

the steeple was above the chancel, and that consequently the repairs

belonged to the curé; there also appeared [here follow the names of

some other persons, who, on the other hand, were willing to admit the

claim of the curé].... Next appeared fifteen peasants, labourers,

masons, and vine-dressers, who declared their adhesion to what the

preceding persons had said. There likewise appeared the Sieur Raimbaud,

vine-grower, who said that he is ready to agree to whatever Monseigneur

the Intendant may decide. There also appeared the Sieur X., doctor of

the Sorbonne, the curé, who persists in the declarations and purposes

of the memorial. Those who appeared demanded that all the above should

be taken down in the Act. Done at the said place of Ivry, in front of

the churchyard of the said parish, in the presence of the undersigned;

and the drawing up of the present report occupied from 11 o’clock in

the morning until 2 o’clock.’

We see that this Parochial Assembly was a mere administrative inquiry,

with the forms and the cost of judicial inquiries; that it never

ended in a vote, and consequently in the manifestation of the will of

the parish; that it contained only individual opinions, and had no

influence on the determination of the Government. Indeed we learn from

a number of other documents that the Parochial Assemblies were intended

to assist the decision of the Intendant, and not to hinder it even

where nothing but the interests of the parish were concerned.

We also find in the same documents that this affair gave rise to three

inquiries: one before the notary, a second before the architect, and

lastly a third, before two notaries, in order to ascertain whether the

parishioners persisted in their previous declarations.

The rate of 524 liv. 10s., imposed by the decree of the 13th July,

1748, fell upon all the landowners, privileged or otherwise, as was

almost always the case with respect to expenses of this kind; but

the principle on which the shares were apportioned to the various

persons was different. The _taillables_ were taxed in proportion to

their _taille_, and the privileged persons according to their supposed

fortunes, which gave a great advantage to the latter over the former.

Lastly, we find that on this same occasion the division of the sum of

523 liv. 10s. was made by two collectors, who were inhabitants of the

village; these were not elected, nor did they fill the post by turns,

as was commonly the case, but they were chosen and appointed officially

by the Sub-delegate of the Intendant.

Note (XXII.)--Page 46, line 21.

The pretext taken by Louis XIV. to destroy the municipal liberties of

the towns was the bad administration of their finances. Nevertheless

the same evil, as Turgot truly says, continued and increased since the

reform introduced by that sovereign. Most of the towns, he adds, are

greatly in debt at the present time, partly owing to the sums which

they have lent to the Government, and partly owing to the expenses and

decorations which the municipal officers, who have the disposal of

other people’s money and have no account to render to the inhabitants,

or instructions to receive from them, multiply with a view of

distinguishing and sometimes of enriching themselves.

Note (XXIII.)--Page 46, line 32.

THE STATE WAS THE GUARDIAN OF THE CONVENTS AS WELL AS OF THE

COMMUNES.--EXAMPLE OF THIS GUARDIANSHIP.

The Comptroller-General, on authorising the Intendant to pay 15,000

livres to the convent of Carmelites, to which indemnities were owing,

desires the Intendant to assure himself that this money, which

represents a capital, is advantageously re-invested. Analogous facts

were constantly recurring.

Note (XXIV.)--Page 50, line 22.

SHOWING THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRALISATION OF THE OLD MONARCHY

COULD BE BEST JUDGED OF IN CANADA.

The physiognomy of the metropolitan government can be most fully

appreciated in the colonies, because at that distance all its

characteristic features are exaggerated and become more visible. When

we wish to judge of the spirit of the Administration of Louis XIV.

and its vices, it is to Canada we must look. There we shall see the

deformity of the object of our investigation, as through a microscope.

In Canada a host of obstacles, which anterior circumstances or the

ancient state of society opposed either in secret or openly to the

spirit of the Government, did not exist. The nobility was scarcely seen

there, or, at all events, it had no root in the soil; the Church had

lost its dominant position; feudal traditions were lost or obscured;

judicial authority was no longer rooted in ancient institutions and

manners. There was nothing to hinder the central power from following

its natural bent and from fashioning all the laws according to its own

spirit. In Canada accordingly we find not a trace of any municipal or

provincial institutions; no authorised collective force; no individual

initiative allowed. The Intendant occupied a position infinitely more

preponderant than that of his fellows in France; the Administration

interfered in many more matters than in the metropolis, and chose to

direct everything from Paris, spite of the eighteen hundred leagues by

which they were divided. It adopted none of the great principles by

which a colony is rendered populous and prosperous, but, on the other

hand, it had recourse to all kinds of trifling artificial processes

and petty tyrannical regulations in order to increase and extend the

population; compulsory cultivation, all lawsuits arising out of the

grants of land withdrawn from the tribunals and referred to the sole

decision of the Administration, obligation to pursue particular methods

of cultivation, to settle in certain places rather than others, &c.

All these regulations were in force under Louis XIV., and the edicts

are countersigned by Colbert. One might imagine oneself in the very

thick of modern centralisation and in Algeria. Indeed Canada presents

an exact counterpart of all we have seen in Algeria. In both we find

ourselves face to face with an administration almost as numerous as

the population, preponderant, interfering, regulating, restricting,

insisting upon foreseeing everything, controlling everything, and

understanding the interests of those under its control better than they

do themselves; in short, in a constant state of barren activity.

In the United States, on the other hand, the decentralisation of the

English is exaggerated; the townships have become nearly independent

municipalities, small democratic republics. The republican element,

which forms the basis of the English constitution and manners, shows

itself in the United States without disguise or hindrance, and becomes

still further developed. The Government, properly so called, does but

little in England, and private persons do a great deal; in America,

the Government really takes no part in affairs, and individuals unite

to do everything. The absence of any higher class, which rendered the

inhabitants of Canada more submissive to the Government than even those

of France at the same period, makes the population of the English

provinces more and more independent of authority.

Both colonies resulted in the formation of a completely democratic

state of society; but in one, so long at least as Canada still belonged

to France, equality was united with absolutism; in the other it was

combined with liberty. As far as the material consequences of the two

colonial systems were concerned, we know that in 1763, the period of

the Conquest, the population of Canada consisted of 60,000 souls, and

that of the English provinces of 3,000,000.

Note (XXV.)--Page 52, line 10.

ONE EXAMPLE, AMONG MANY, OF THE GENERAL REGULATIONS CONTINUALLY MADE

BY THE COUNCIL OF STATE, WHICH HAD THE FORCE OF LAWS THROUGHOUT

FRANCE, AND CREATED SPECIAL OFFENCES, OF WHICH THE ADMINISTRATIVE

TRIBUNALS WERE THE SOLE JUDGES.

I take the first which comes to hand: an order in council of the 29th

April, 1779, which directs that throughout the kingdom the breeders and

sellers of sheep shall mark their flocks in a particular manner, under

a penalty of 300 livres. His Majesty, it declares, enjoins upon the

Intendants the duty of enforcing the execution of the present order,

which infers that the Intendant is to pronounce the penalty on its

infraction. Another example: an order in council, 21st December, 1778,

prohibiting the carriers and drivers to warehouse the goods entrusted

to them, under a penalty of 300 livres. His Majesty enjoins upon the

Lieutenant-General of Police and the Intendants to enforce this order.

Note (XXVI.)--Page 60, line 39.

RURAL POLICE.

The provincial assembly of Upper Guienne urgently demanded the creation

of fresh brigades of the maréchaussée, just as now-a-days the general

council of Aveyron or Lot doubtless requests the formation of fresh

brigades of gendarmerie. The same idea always prevails--the gendarmerie

is the symbol of order, and order can only be sent by Government

through the gendarme. The report continues: ‘Complaints are made

every day that there is no police in the rural districts’ (how should

there be? the nobles took no part in affairs, the burghers were all

in the towns, and the townships, represented by a vulgar peasant,

had no power), ‘and it must be admitted that with the exception of a

few cantons in which just and benevolent seigneurs make use of the

influence which their position gives them over their vassals in order

to prevent those acts of violence to which the country people are

naturally inclined, by the coarseness of their manners and the asperity

of their character, there nowhere exists any means of restraining these

ignorant, rude, and violent men.’

Such were the terms in which the nobles of the Provincial Assembly

allowed themselves to be spoken of, and in which the members of the

_Tiers-Etat_, who made up half the assembly, spoke of the people in

public documents!

Note (XXVII.)--Page 61, line 24.

Licences for the sale of tobacco were as much sought for under the old

monarchy as they are now. The greatest people begged for them for their

creatures. I find that some were given on the recommendation of great

ladies, and one at the request of some archbishops.

Note (XXVIII.)--Page 62, line 22.

The extinction of all local public life surpassed all power of belief.

One of the roads from Maine into Normandy was impracticable. Who do

our readers imagine requested to have it repaired? the _généralité_

of Touraine, which it traversed? the provinces of Normandy or Maine,

so deeply interested in the cattle trade which followed this road?

or even some particular canton especially inconvenienced by its

impassable condition? The _généralité_, the provinces, and the cantons

had no voice in the matter. The dealers who travelled on this road

and stuck fast in the ruts were obliged to call the attention of

the Central Government to its state, and to write to Paris to the

Comptroller-General for assistance.

Note (XXIX.)--Page 69, line 8.

MORE OR LESS IMPORTANCE OF THE SEIGNORIAL DUES OR RENT-CHARGES,

ACCORDING TO THE PROVINCE.

Turgot says in his works, ‘I ought to point out the fact that these

dues are far more important in most of the rich provinces, such as

Normandy, Picardy, and the environs of Paris. In the last named the

chief wealth consists in the actual produce of the land, which is held

in large farms, from which the owners derive heavy rents. The payments

in respect of the lord’s rights, in the case even of the largest

estates, form but an inconsiderable part of the income arising from

these properties, and such payments are little more than nominal.

In the poorer provinces, where cultivation is managed on different

principles, the lords and nobles have scarcely any land in their own

hands; properties, which are extremely divided, are charged with heavy

corn-rents, for payment of which all the co-tenants are jointly and

severally liable. These rents, in many instances, absorb the bulk of

the produce, and the lord’s income is almost entirely derived from them.

Note (XXX.)--Page 74, line 34.

INFLUENCE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT UNFAVOURABLE TO CASTE.

The unimportant labours of the agricultural societies of the eighteenth

century show the adverse influence which the common discussion

of general interests exercised on _caste_. Though the meetings

of these societies date from thirty years before the Revolution,

when the _ancien régime_ was still in full force, and though they

dealt with theories only--by the very fact of their discussions

turning on questions in which the different classes of society felt

themselves interested, and, therefore, took common part in--we may

at once perceive how they brought men together, and how by means of

them--limited as they were to conversations on agriculture--ideas of

reasonable reform spread alike among the privileged and unprivileged

classes.

I am convinced that no Government could have kept up the absurd and mad

inequality which existed in France at the moment of the Revolution, but

one which, like the Government of the old monarchy, aimed at finding

all its strength in its own ranks, continually recruited by remarkable

men. The slightest contact with _self-government_ would have materially

modified such inequality, and soon transformed or destroyed it.

Note (XXXI.)--Page 75, line 3.

Provincial liberties may exist for a while without national liberty,

when they are ancient, entwined with habits, manners, and early

recollections, and while despotism, on the contrary, is recent. But it

is against reason to suppose that local liberties may be created at

will, or even long maintained, when general liberty is crushed.

Note (XXXII.)--Page 75, line 19.

Turgot, in a report to the King, sums up in the following terms, which

appear to me singularly exact, the real privileges of the noble class

in regard to taxation:--

‘1. Persons of the privileged class have a claim to exemption from all

taxation in money to the extent of a four-plough farm, equivalent in

the neighbourhood of Paris to an assessment of 2,000 francs.

‘2. The same persons are entirely exempt from taxation in respect

of woods, meadows, vineyards, fish-ponds, and for enclosed lands

appurtenant to their castles, whatever their extent. In some cantons

the principal culture is of meadows or vineyards: in these the noble

proprietor escapes from all taxation whatever, the whole weight of

which falls on the tax-paying class; another immense advantage for the

privileged.’

Note (XXXIII.)--Page 76, line 7.

INDIRECT PRIVILEGES IN RESPECT OF TAXATION: DIFFERENCE IN ASSESSMENT

EVEN WHEN THE TAX IS GENERAL.

Turgot has given a description of this also, which, judging by the

documents, I have reason to believe exact.

‘The indirect advantages of the privileged classes in regard to

the poll-tax are very great. The poll-tax is in its very nature

an arbitrary impost; it cannot be distributed among the community

otherwise than at random. It has been found most convenient to assess

it on the tax-collector’s books, which are ready prepared. It is true

that a separate list has been made out for those whose names do not

appear in these books but as they resist payment, while the tax-paying

classes have no organ, the poll-tax paid by the former in the provinces

has gradually dwindled to an insignificant amount, while the poll-tax

on the latter is almost equal in amount to the whole tax-paying

capital.’

Note (XXXIV.)--Page 76, line 14.

ANOTHER INSTANCE OF INEQUALITY OF ASSESSMENT IN THE CASE OF A GENERAL

TAX.

It is well known that local rates were general: ‘which sums,’ say the

orders in council authorising the levy of such rates, ‘shall be levied

on all liable, exempt or non-exempt, privileged or non-privileged,

without any exception, together with the poll-tax, or in the

proportion of a mark to every franc payable as poll-tax.’

Observe that, as the tax-payer’s poll-tax, assessed according to the

assessment for other taxes, was always higher in comparison than the

poll-tax of the privileged class, inequality re-appeared even under the

form which seemed most to exclude it.

Note (XXXV.)--Page 76, line 14.

ON THE SAME SUBJECT.

I find in a draft edict of 1764, the aim of which is to equalise

taxation, all sorts of provisions, the object of which is to preserve

exceptional advantages to the privileged classes, in the mode of levy:

among these I find that all steps for the purpose of determining, in

their case, the value of the assessable property, must be taken in

their presence or that of their proxies.

Note (XXXVI.)--Page 76, line 27.

ADMISSION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ADVANTAGES ENJOYED BY THE PRIVILEGED

CLASSES IN THE ASSESSMENT EVEN OF GENERAL TAXES.

‘I see,’ writes the Minister, in 1766, ‘that the portion of the taxes

most difficult to levy is always that due from the noble and privileged

classes, from the consideration the tax-collectors feel themselves

bound to show such persons; in consequence of which long-standing

arrears of far too great an amount will be found due on their poll-tax

and their “twentieths”’ (the tax which they paid in common with the

rest of the community).

Note (XXXVII.)--Page 85, line 7.

In Arthur Young’s Travels, in 1789, is a little picture in which the

contrast of the systems of the two countries is so well painted, and so

happily introduced, that I cannot resist the temptation of citing it.

Young, travelling through France during the first excitement caused

by the taking of the Bastille, is arrested in a certain village by a

crowd, who, seeing him without a cockade, wish to put him in prison.

Young contrives to extricate himself by this speech:--

‘It has been announced, gentlemen, that the taxes are to be paid as

they have been hitherto. Certainly, the taxes ought to be paid, but

_not_ as they have been hitherto. They ought to be paid as they are

in England. We have many taxes there which you are free from; but the

_Tiers-Etat_--the people--does not pay them: they fall entirely on the

rich. Thus, in England, every window is taxed; but the man with only

six windows to his house does not pay anything for them. A nobleman

pays his twentieths[140] and his King’s-taxes, but the poor proprietor

pays nothing on his little garden. The rich man pays for his horses,

carriages and servants--he pays even for a licence to shoot his own

partridges; the poor man is free from all these burdens. Nay, more, in

England we have a tax paid by the rich to help the poor! So that, I

say, if taxes are still to be paid, they should be paid differently.

The English plan is far the better one.’

‘As my bad French,’ adds Young, ‘was much on a par with their patois,

they understood me perfectly.’

Note (XXXVIII.)--Page 86, line 24.

The church at X., in the electoral district of Chollet, was going to

ruin: it was to be repaired in the manner provided by the order of 1684

(16th December), viz., by a rate levied on all the inhabitants. When

the collectors came to levy this rate, the Marquis de X., seigneur of

the parish, refused to pay his proportion of the rate, as he meant to

take on himself the entire repair of the chancel; the other inhabitants

reply, very reasonably, that as lord of the manor and holder of the

great tithes, he is _bound_ to repair the chancel, and cannot, on the

plea of this obligation, claim to escape his proportion of the common

rate. This produces an order of the Intendant declaring the Marquis’s

liability, and authorising the collector’s proceedings. Among the

papers on the subject are more than ten letters from the Marquis, one

more urgent than the other, begging hard that the rest of the parish

may pay instead of himself, and, to obtain his prayer, stooping to

address the Intendant as ‘Monseigneur,’ and even ‘_le supplier_.’

Note (XXXIX.)--Page 87, line 35.

AN INSTANCE OF THE WAY IN WHICH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE OLD MONARCHY

RESPECTED VESTED RIGHTS, FORMAL CONTRACTS, AND THE FRANCHISES OF

TOWNS OR CORPORATIONS.

A royal declaration ‘suspending in time of war repayment of all loans

contracted by towns, villages, colleges, communities, hospitals,

charitable houses, trade-corporations,[141] and others, repayable out

of town dues by us conceded, though the instrument securing the said

loans stipulates for the payment of interest in the case of non-payment

at the stipulated terms.’

Thus not only is the obligation to repayment at the stipulated terms

suspended, but the security itself is impaired. Such proceedings, which

abounded under the old monarchy, would have been impracticable under

a Government acting under the check of publicity or representative

assemblies. Compare the above with the respect always shown for such

rights in England, and even in America. The contempt of right in this

instance is as flagrant as that of local franchises.

Note (XL.)--Page 89, line 21.

The case cited in the text is far from a solitary instance of an

admission by the privileged class that the feudal burdens which weighed

down the peasant reached even to themselves. The following is the

language of an agricultural society, exclusively composed of this

class, thirty years before the Revolution:--

‘Perpetual rent-charges, whether due to the State or to the lord, if

at all considerable in amount, become so burdensome to the tenant that

they cause first his ruin, and then that of the land liable to them;

the tenant is forced to neglect it, being neither able to borrow on

the security of an estate already too heavily burdened, nor to find

purchasers if he wish to sell. If then payments were commutable, the

tenant would readily be able to raise the means of commuting them by

borrowing, or to find purchasers at a price that would cover the value

both of the land and the payments with which it might be charged. A

man always feels pleasure in keeping up and improving a property of

which he believes himself to be in peaceable possession. It would

be rendering a great service to agriculture to discover means of

commutation for this class of payments. Many lords of manors, convinced

of this, would readily give their aid to such arrangements. It would,

therefore, be very interesting to discover and point out practicable

means for thus ridding land from permanent burdens.’

Note (XLI.)--Page 90, line 38.

All public functionaries, even the agents of farmers of the revenue,

were paid by exemptions from taxes--a privilege granted by the order of

1681. A letter from an Intendant to the minister in 1782 states, ‘Among

the privileged orders the most numerous class is that of clerks in the

Excise of salt, the public domain, the post-office, and other royal

monopolies of all kinds. There are few parishes which do not include

one; in many, two or three may be found.’

The object of this letter is to dissuade the minister from proposing

an extension of exemption from taxation to the clerks and servants

of these privileged agents; which extension, says the Intendant, is

unceasingly backed by the Farmers-General, that they may thus get rid

of the necessity of paying salaries.

Note (XLII.)--Page 91, line 1.

The sale of public employments, which were called _offices_, was

not quite unknown elsewhere. In Germany some of the petty princes

had introduced the practice to a small extent and in insignificant

departments of administration. Nowhere but in France was the system

followed out on a grand scale.

Note (XLIII.)--Page 95, line 17.

We must not be surprised, strange as it may appear and is, to find,

under the old monarchy, public functionaries--many of them belonging to

the public service, properly so called--pleading before the Parliaments

to ascertain the limits of their own powers. The explanation of this

is to be found in the fact that all these questions were questions of

private property as well as of public administration. What is here

viewed as an encroachment of the judicial power was a mere consequence

of the error which the Government had committed in attaching public

functions to certain offices. These offices being bought and sold, and

their holders’ income being regulated by the work done and paid for, it

was impossible to change the functions of an office without impairing

some right for which money had been paid to a predecessor in the office.

To quote an instance out of a thousand:--At Mans the Lieutenant-General

of Police carries on a prolonged suit with the _Bureau de Finance_

of the town, to prove, that being charged with the duty of

street-watching, he has a right to execute all legal instruments

relative to the paving of the streets, and to the fees for such

instruments.

The _Bureau_ replies, that the paving is a duty thrown upon him by the

nature of his office.

The question in this case is not decided by the king in council; the

parliament gives judgment, as the principal matter in dispute is the

interest of the capital devoted to the purchase of the office. The

administrative question becomes a civil action.

Note (XLIV.)--Page 96, line 23.

ANALYSIS OF THE INSTRUCTIONS OF THE ORDER OF NOBILITY IN 1789.

The French Revolution is, I believe, the only one, at the beginning

of which the different classes were able separately to bear authentic

witness to the ideas they had conceived, and to display the sentiments

by which they were moved before the Revolution had altered and defaced

these ideas and feelings. This authentic testimony was recorded, as

we all know, in the _cahiers_ drawn up by the three Orders in 1789.

These _cahiers_, or Instructions, were drawn up under circumstances of

complete freedom and publicity, by each of the Orders concerned; they

underwent a long discussion from those interested, and were carefully

considered by their authors; for the Government of that period did not,

whenever it addressed the nation, undertake both to put the question

and to give the answer. At the time when the Instructions were drawn

up, the most important parts of them were collected in three printed

volumes, which are to be found in every library. The originals are

deposited in the national archives, and with them the _procès-verbaux_

of the assemblies by which they were drawn up, together with a part of

the correspondence which passed between M. Necker and his agents on the

subject of these assemblies. This collection forms a long series of

folio volumes. It is the most precious document that remains to us from

ancient France, and one which should be constantly consulted by those

who wish to know the state of feeling amongst our forefathers at the

time when the Revolution broke out.

I at first imagined that the abridgment printed in three volumes, which

I mentioned above, might perhaps be the work of one party, and not a

true representation of the character of this immense inquiry; but on

comparing one with the other, I found the strongest resemblance between

the large original picture and the reduced copy.

The extract from the _cahiers_ of the nobility, which I am about to

give, contains a true picture of the sentiments of the great majority

of that Order. It clearly shows how many of their ancient privileges

they were obstinately determined to maintain, how many they were not

disinclined to give up, and how many they offered to renounce of their

own accord. Above all, we see in full the spirit which animated them

with regard to political liberty. The picture is a strange and sad one!

_Individual Rights._--The nobles demand, first of all, that an explicit

declaration should be made of the rights which belong to all men, and

that this declaration should confirm their liberties and secure their

safety.

_Liberty of the Person._--They desire that the servitude to the glebe

should be abolished wherever it still exists, and that means should be

formed to destroy the slave trade and to emancipate the negroes; that

every man should be free to travel or to reside wherever he may please,

whether within or without the limits of the kingdom, without being

liable to arbitrary arrest; that the abuses of police regulations shall

be reformed, and that henceforth the police shall be under the control

of the judges, even in cases of revolt; that no one shall be liable to

be arrested or tried except by his natural judges; that, consequently,

the state prisons and other illegal places of detention shall be

suppressed. Some of them require the demolition of the Bastille. The

nobility of Paris is especially urgent upon this point.

_Are ‘Lettres Closes,’ or ‘Lettres de Cachet,’ to be prohibited?_--If

any danger of the State renders the arrest of a citizen necessary,

without his being immediately brought before the ordinary courts of

justice, measures should be taken to prevent any abuses, either by

giving notice of the imprisonment to the _Conseil d’État_, or by some

other proceeding.

The nobility demands the abolition of all special commissions, all

courts of attribution or exemption, all privileges of _committimus_,

all dilatory judgments, &c., &c., and requires that the severest

punishment should be awarded to all those who should issue or execute

an arbitrary order; that in common jurisdiction (the only one that

ought to be maintained) the necessary measures should be taken for

securing individual liberty, especially as regards the criminal;

that justice should be dispensed gratuitously; and that useless

jurisdictions should be suppressed. ‘The magistrates are instituted

for the people, and not the people for the magistrates,’ says one of

the memorials. A demand is even made that a council and gratuitous

advocates for the poor should be established in each bailiwick;

that the proceedings should be public, and permission granted to

the litigants to plead for themselves; that in criminal matters the

prisoner should be provided with counsel, and that in all stages of

the proceedings the judge should have adjoined to him a certain number

of citizens, of the same position in life as the person accused, who

are to give their opinion relative to the fact of the crime or offence

with which he is charged (referring on this point to the English

constitution); that all punishments should be proportionate to the

offence, and alike for all; that the punishment of death should be

made more uncommon, and all corporal pains and tortures, &c., should

be suppressed; that, in fine, the condition of the prisoner, and more

especially of the simply accused, should be ameliorated.

According to these memorials, measures should be taken to protect

individual liberty in the enlistment of troops for land or sea

service; permission should be given to convert the obligation of

military service into pecuniary contributions. The drawing of lots

should only take place in the presence of a deputation of the three

Orders together; in fact, that the duties of military discipline and

subordination should be made to tally with the rights of the citizen

and freemen, blows with the back of the sabre being altogether done

away with.

_Freedom and Inviolability of Property._--It is required that property

should be inviolable, and placed beyond all attack, except for some

reason of indispensable public utility; in which case the Government

ought to give a considerable and immediate indemnity: that confiscation

should be abolished.

_Freedom of Trade, Handicraft and Industrial Occupation._--The freedom

of trade and industry ought to be secured; and, in consequence,

freedoms and other privileges of certain companies should be

suppressed, and the custom-house lines all put back to the frontiers of

the country.

_Freedom of Religion._--The Catholic religion is to be the only

dominant religion in France; but liberty of conscience is to be left

to everybody: and the non-Catholics are to be restored to their civil

rights and their property.

_Freedom of the Press.--Inviolability of the Secrecy of the Post._--The

freedom of the press is to be secured, and a law is to establish

beforehand all the restrictions which may be considered necessary in

the general interest. Ecclesiastical censorship to exist only for books

relative to the dogmas of the Church; and in all other cases it is

considered sufficient to take the necessary precautions of knowing the

authors and printers. Many of the memorials demand that offences of the

press should only be tried by juries.

The memorials unanimously demand above all that the secrecy of letters

entrusted to the post should be inviolably respected, so that (as they

say) letters may never be made to serve as means of accusation or

testimony against a man. They denounce the opening of letters, crudely

enough, as the most odious espionage, inasmuch as it institutes a

violation of public faith.

_Instruction, Education._--The memorials of the nobility on this point

require no more than that active measures should be taken to foster

education, that it should be diffused throughout the country, and that

it should be directed upon principles conformable to the presumed

destination of the children; and, above all, that a national education

should be given to the children, by teaching them their duties and

their rights of citizenship. They urge the compilation of a political

catechism, in which the principal points of the constitution should be

made clear to them. They do not, however, point out the means to be

employed for the diffusion of instruction: they do no more than demand

educational establishments for the children of the indigent nobility.

_Care to be taken of the People._--A great number of the memorials lay

much stress upon greater regard being shown to the people. Several

denounce, as a violation of the natural liberty of man, the excesses

committed in the name of the police, by which, as they say, quantities

of artisans and useful citizens are arbitrarily, and without any

regular examination, dragged to prison, to houses of detention, &c.,

frequently for slight offences, or even upon simple suspicion. All

the memorials demand the definitive abolition of statute labour. The

greater portion of the bailiwicks desire the permission to buy off the

vassalage and toll-dues; and several require that the receipt of many

of the feudal dues should be rendered less onerous, and that those

paid upon _franc-fief_ should be abolished. ‘It is to the advantage

of the Government,’ says one of the memorials, ‘to facilitate the

purchase and sale of estates.’ This reason was precisely the one given

afterwards for the abolition at one blow of all the seignorial rights,

and for the sale of property in the condition of _mainmorte_. Many of

the memorials desire that the _droit de colombier_ (exclusive right of

keeping pigeons) should be rendered less prejudicial to agriculture.

Demands are made for the immediate abolition of the establishments used

as royal game-preserves, and known by the name of ‘_capitaineries_,’ as

a violation of the rights of property. The substitution of taxes less

onerous to the people in the mode of levying for those then existing is

also desired.

The nobility demand that efforts should be made to increase the

prosperity and comfort of the country districts; that establishments

for spinning and weaving coarse stuffs should be provided for the

occupation of the country people during the dead season of the year;

that public granaries should be established in each bailiwick, under

the inspection of the provincial authorities, in order to provide

against times of famine, and to maintain the price of corn at a certain

rate; that means should be studied to improve the agriculture of the

country, and ameliorate the condition of the country people; that an

augmentation should be given to the public works; and that particular

attention should be paid to the draining of marsh lands, the prevention

of inundations, &c.; and finally, that the prizes of encouragement to

commerce and agriculture should be distributed in all the provinces.

The memorials express the desire that the hospitals should be broken

up into smaller establishments, erected in each district; that the

asylums for beggars (_dépôts de mendicité_) should be suppressed, and

replaced by charitable workhouses (_ateliers de charité_); that funds

for the aid of the sick and needy should be established under the

management of the Provincial States, and that surgeons, physicians,

and midwives should be distributed among the _arrondissements_ at the

expense of the provinces, to give their gratuitous services to the

poor; that the courts of justice should likewise be gratuitous to the

people; finally, that care should be taken for the establishment of

institutions for the blind, the deaf and dumb, foundling children, &c.

Generally speaking, in all these matters the order of nobles does no

more than express its desire for reform, without entering into any

minor details of execution. It may be easily seen that it mixed much

less with the inferior classes than the lower order of clergy; and

thus, having come less in contact with their wretchedness, had thought

less of the means for mitigating it.