SHOWING THAT ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRALISATION IS AN INSTITUTION ANTERIOR
IN FRANCE TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1789, AND NOT THE PRODUCT OF THE
REVOLUTION OR OF THE EMPIRE, AS IS COMMONLY SAID.
At a period when political assemblies still existed in France, I once
heard an orator, in speaking of administrative centralisation, call
it, ‘that admirable achievement of the Revolution which Europe envies
us.’ I will concede the fact that centralisation is an admirable
achievement; I will admit that Europe envies us its possession, but
I maintain that it is not an achievement of the Revolution. On the
contrary, it is a product of the former institutions of France, and, I
may add, the only portion of the political constitution of the monarchy
which survived the Revolution, inasmuch as it was the only one that
could be made to adapt itself to the new social condition brought about
by that Revolution. The reader who has the patience to read the present
chapter with attention will find that I have proved to demonstration
this proposition.
I must first beg to be allowed to put out of the question what were
called _les pays d’état_, that is to say, the provinces that managed
their own affairs, or rather had the appearance, in part, of managing
them. These provinces, placed at the extremities of the kingdom, did
not contain more than a quarter of the total population of France; and
there were only two among them in which provincial liberty possessed
any real vitality. I shall revert to them hereafter, and show to what
an extent the central power had subjected these very states to the
common mould.[19] But for the present I desire to give my principal
attention to what was called in the administrative language of the day,
_les pays d’élection_, although, in truth, there were fewer elections
in them than anywhere else. These districts encompassed Paris on every
side, they were contiguous, and formed the heart and the better part of
the territory of France.
To any one who may cast a glance over the ancient administration of
the kingdom, the first impression conveyed is that of a diversity
of regulations and authorities, and the entangled complication of
the different powers. France was covered with administrative bodies
and distinct officers, who had no connection with one another, but
who took part in the government in virtue of a right which they had
purchased, and which could not be taken from them; but their duties
were frequently so intermingled and so nearly contiguous as to press
and clash together within the range of the same transactions.
The courts of justice took an indirect part in the legislative
power, and possessed the right of framing administrative regulations
which became obligatory within the limits of their own jurisdiction.
Sometimes they maintained an opposition to the administration, properly
so called, loudly blamed its measures and proscribed its agents.
Police ordinances were promulgated by simple justices in the towns and
boroughs where they resided.
The towns had a great diversity of constitutions, and their magistrates
bore different designations--sometimes as mayors, sometimes as consuls,
or again as syndics, and derived their powers from different sources.
Some were chosen by the king, others by the lord of the soil or by the
prince holding the fief; some again were elected for a year by their
fellow-citizens, whilst others purchased the right of governing them
permanently.
These different powers were the last remains of the ancient system;
but something comparatively new or greatly modified had by degrees
established itself among them, and this I have yet to describe.
In the centre of the kingdom, and close to the throne, there had been
gradually formed an administrative body of extraordinary authority, in
the grasp of which every power was united after a new fashion: this
was the King’s Council. Its origin was ancient, but the greater part
of its functions were of recent date. It was at once a supreme court
of justice, inasmuch as it had the right to quash the judgments of all
the ordinary courts, and a superior administrative tribunal, inasmuch
as every special jurisdiction was dependent on it in the last resort.
It possessed, moreover, as a Council of State, subject to the pleasure
of the King, a legislative power, for it discussed and proposed the
greater part of the laws, and fixed and assessed the taxes. As the
superior administrative board, it had to frame the general regulations
which were to direct the agents of the Government. Within its walls all
important affairs were decided and all secondary powers controlled.
Everything finally came home to it; from that centre was derived the
movement which set everything in motion. Yet it possessed no inherent
jurisdiction of its own. The King alone decided, even when the Council
appeared to advise, and even when it seemed to administer justice, it
consisted of no more than simple ‘givers of advice’--an expression used
by the Parliament in one of its remonstrances.
This Council was not composed of men of rank, but of personages of
middling or even low extraction, former Intendants or other men of that
class thoroughly versed in the management of business, all of whom were
liable to dismissal by the Crown. It generally proceeded in its course
quietly and discreetly, displaying less pretension than real power;
and thus it had but little lustre of its own, or, rather, it was lost
in the splendour of the throne to which it stood so near; at once so
powerful that everything came within its scope, and so obscure that it
has scarcely been remarked by history.
As the whole administration of the country was directed by a single
body, so nearly the entire management of home affairs was entrusted to
the care of one single agent--the Comptroller-General. On opening an
almanack of France before the Revolution, it will be found that each
province had its special minister; but on studying the administration
itself in the legal records of the time, it will soon be seen that the
minister of the province had but few occasions of any importance for
exercising his authority. The common course of business was directed
by the Comptroller-General, who gradually took upon himself all the
affairs that had anything to do with money, that is to say, almost the
whole public administration; and who thus performed successively the
duties of minister of finance, minister of the interior, minister of
public works, and minister of trade.
As, in truth, the central administration had but one agent in Paris,
so it had likewise but a single agent in each province. Nobles were
still to be found in the eighteenth century bearing the titles of
governors of provinces; they were the ancient and often the hereditary
representatives of feudal royalty. Honours were still bestowed upon
them, but they no longer had any power. The Intendant was in possession
of the whole reality of government.
This Intendant was a man of humble extraction, always a stranger to
the province, and a young man who had his fortune to make. He never
exercised his functions by any right of election, birth, or purchase
of office; he was chosen by the government among the inferior members
of the Council of State, and was always subject to dismissal. He
represented the body from which he was thus severed, and, for that
reason, was called, in the administrative language of the time,
a Detached Commissioner. All the powers which the Council itself
possessed were accumulated in his hands, and he exercised them all in
the first instance. Like the Council, he was at once administrator and
judge. He corresponded with all the ministers, and in the province was
the sole agent of all the measures of the government.
In each canton was placed below him an officer nominated by himself,
and removable at will, called the Sub-delegate. The Intendant was very
commonly a newly-created noble; the Sub-delegate was always a plebeian.
He nevertheless represented the entire Government in the small,
circumscribed space assigned to him as much as the Intendant did in the
whole; and he was amenable to the Intendant as the Intendant was to the
minister.
The Marquis d’Argenson relates in his ‘Memoirs,’ that one day Law
said to him, ‘“I never could have believed what I saw, when I was
Comptroller of Finance. Do you know that this kingdom of France
is governed by thirty _Intendants_? You have neither parliament,
nor estates, nor governors. It is upon thirty Masters of Requests,
despatched into the provinces, that their evil or their good, their
fertility or their sterility, entirely depends.”’
These powerful officers of the Government were, however, completely
eclipsed by the remnants of the ancient aristocracy, and lost in the
brilliancy which that body still shed around it. So that, even in their
own time, they were scarcely seen, although their finger was already on
everything. In society the nobles had over such men the advantages of
rank, wealth, and the consideration always attached to what is ancient.
In the Government the nobility were immediately about the person
of the Prince, and formed his Court, commanded the fleets, led the
armies, and, in short, did all that most attracts the observation of
contemporaries, and too often absorbs the attention of posterity. A man
of high rank would have been insulted by the proposal to appoint him
an Intendant. The poorest man of family would generally have disdained
the offer. In his eyes the Intendants were the representatives of an
upstart power, new men appointed to govern the middle classes and the
peasantry, and, as for the rest, very sorry company. Yet, as Law said,
and as we shall see, these were the men who governed France.
To commence with the right of taxation, which includes, as it were, all
other rights. It is well known a part of the taxes were farmed. In
these cases the King’s Council negotiated with the financial companies,
fixed the terms of the contract, and regulated the mode of collection.
All the other taxes, such as the _taille_, the capitation-tax, and
the _vingtièmes_ were fixed and levied by the agents of the central
administration or under their all-powerful control.
The Council, every year, by a secret decision, fixed the amount of the
_taille_ and its numerous accessories, and likewise its distribution
among the provinces. The _taille_ had thus increased from year to year,
though public attention was never called to the fact, no noise being
made about it.
As the _taille_ was an ancient tax, its assessment and collection had
been formerly confided to local agents, who were all, more or less,
independent of the Government by right of birth or election, or by
purchase of office; they were the lords of the soil, the parochial
collectors, the treasurers of France, or officers termed the _élus_.
These authorities still existed in the eighteenth century, but some had
altogether ceased to busy themselves about the _taille_, whilst others
only did so in a very secondary and entirely subordinate manner. Even
here the entire power was in the hands of the Intendant and his agents;
he alone, in truth, assessed the _taille_ in the different parishes,
directed and controlled the collectors, and granted delays of payments
or exemptions.
As the other taxes, such as the capitation tax, were of recent date,
the Government was no longer embarrassed in respect to them by the
remnants of former powers, but dealt with them without any intervention
of the parties governed. The Comptroller-General, the Intendant, and
the Council fixed the amount of each quota.
Let us leave the question of money for that of men.
It is sometimes a matter of astonishment how the French can have so
patiently borne the yoke of the military conscription at the time of
the Revolution and ever since; but it must be borne in mind that they
had been already broken in to bear it for a long period of time. The
conscription had been preceded by the militia, which was a heavier
burden, although the amount of men required was less. From time to time
the young men in the country were made to draw lots, and from among
them were taken a certain number of soldiers, who were formed into
militia regiments, in which they served for six years.
As the militia was a comparatively modern institution, none of
the ancient feudal powers meddled with it; the whole business was
intrusted to the agents of the Central Government alone. The Council
fixed the general amount of men and the share of each province. The
Intendant regulated the number of men to be raised in each parish;
his Sub-delegate superintended the drawing of the lots, decided all
cases of exemption, designated those militia-men who were allowed to
remain with their families and those who were to join the regiment, and
finally delivered over the latter to the military authorities. There
was no appeal except to the Intendant or the Council.
It may be said with equal accuracy that, except in the _pays d’état_,
all the public works, even those that had a very special destination,
were decided upon and managed by the agents of the central power alone.
There certainly existed local and independent authorities, who, like
the seigneur, the boards of finance, and the _grands voyers_ (surveyors
of public roads), had the power of taking a part in such matters of
public administration. But all these ancient authorities, as may be
seen by the slightest examination of the administrative documents of
the time, bestirred themselves but little, or bestirred themselves no
longer. All the great roads, and even the cross-roads leading from
one town to another, were made and kept up at the cost of the public
revenue. The Council decided the plan and contracted for its execution.
The Intendant directed the engineering works, and the Sub-delegate got
together the compulsory labourers who were to execute them. The care
of the by-roads was alone left to the old local authorities, and they
became impassable.
As in our days, the body of the _Ponts et Chaussées_ was the great
agent of the Central Government in relation to public works, and, in
spite of the difference of the times, a very remarkable resemblance is
to be found in their constitution now and then. The administration of
the _Ponts et Chaussées_ had a council and a school, inspectors who
annually travelled over the whole of France, and engineers who resided
on the spot and who were appointed to direct the works under the orders
of the Intendant. A far greater number of the institutions of the old
monarchy than is commonly supposed have been handed down to the modern
state of French society, but in their transmission they have generally
lost their names, even though they still preserve the same forms. As a
rare exception, the _Ponts et Chaussées_ have preserved both one and
the other.
The Central Government alone undertook, with the help of its agents, to
maintain public order in the provinces. The _maréchaussée_, or mounted
police, was dispersed in small detachments over the whole surface
of the kingdom, and was everywhere placed under the control of the
Intendants. It was by the help of these soldiers, and, if necessary,
of regular troops, that the Intendant warded off any sudden danger,
arrested vagabonds, repressed mendicity, and put down the riots, which
were continually arising from the price of corn. It never happened, as
had been formerly the case, that the subjects of the Crown were called
upon to aid the Government in this task, except indeed in the towns,
where there was generally a town-guard, the soldiers of which were
chosen and the officers appointed by the Intendant.
The judicial bodies had preserved the right of making police
regulations, and frequently exercised it; but these regulations were
only applicable to a part of the territory, and, more generally, to one
spot only. The Council had the power of annulling them, and frequently
did annul them in cases of subordinate jurisdiction. But the Council
was perpetually making general regulations applicable to all parts of
the kingdom, either relative to subjects different from those which the
tribunals had already settled, or applicable to those which they had
settled in another manner. The number of these regulations, or _arrêts
du Conseil_, as they were then called, was immense; and they seem to
have constantly increased the nearer we approach the Revolution. There
is scarcely a single matter of social economy or political organisation
that was not reorganised by these _arrêts du Conseil_ during the forty
years preceding that event.
Under the ancient feudal state of society, the lord of the soil, if
he possessed important rights, had, at the same time, very heavy
obligations. It was his duty to succour the indigent in the interior
of his domains. The last trace of this old European legislation is to
be found in the Prussian Code of 1795, which says, ‘The lord of the
soil must see that the indigent peasants receive an education. It is
his duty to provide means of subsistence to those of his vassals who
possess no land, as far as he is able. If any of them fall into want,
he must come to their assistance.’
But no law of the kind had existed in France for a long time. The
lord, when deprived of his former power, considered himself liberated
from his former obligations; and no local authority, no council, no
provincial or parochial association, had taken his place. No single
being was any longer compelled by law to take care of the poor in the
rural districts, and the Central Government had boldly undertaken to
provide for their wants by its own resources.
Every year the Council assigned to each province certain funds derived
from the general produce of the taxes, which the Intendant distributed
for the relief of the poor in the different parishes. It was to him
that the indigent labourer had to apply, and, in times of scarcity,
it was he who caused corn or rice to be distributed among the people.
The Council annually issued ordinances for the establishment of
charitable workshops (_ateliers de charité_) where the poorer among
the peasantry were enabled to find work at low wages, and the Council
took upon itself to determine the places where these were necessary. It
may be easily supposed, that alms thus bestowed from a distance were
indiscriminate, capricious, and always very inadequate.[20]
The Central Government, moreover, did not confine itself to relieving
the peasantry in time of distress; it also undertook to teach them the
art of enriching themselves, encouraged them in this task, and forced
them to it, if necessary.[21] For this purpose, from time to time, it
caused distributions of small pamphlets upon the science of agriculture
to be made by its Intendants and their Sub-delegates, founded schools
of agriculture, offered prizes, and kept up, at a great expense,
nursery-grounds, of which it distributed the produce. It would seem
to have been more wise to have lightened the weight and modified the
inequality of the burdens which then oppressed the agriculture of the
country, but such an idea never seems to have occurred.
Sometimes the Council insisted upon compelling individuals to prosper,
whether they would or no. The ordinances constraining artisans to use
certain methods and manufacture certain articles are innumerable; and
as the Intendants had not time to superintend the application of all
these regulations, there were inspectors-general of manufactures, who
visited in the provinces to insist on their fulfilment. Some of the
_arrêts du Conseil_ even prohibited the cultivation of certain crops
which the Council did not consider proper for the purpose; whilst
others ordered the destruction of such vines as had been, according
to its opinion, planted in an unfavourable soil. So completely had
the Government already changed its duty as a sovereign into that of a
guardian.
FOOTNOTES:
[19] See the last chapter of this Book (xxi.) for a fuller account of
the local government of Languedoc.
[20] See Note XV., Public Relief, and Note XVI.
[21] See Note XVII., Powers of the Intendant for the Regulation of
Trade.