CHAPTER VII

THE ATOMISTS (_continued_)

_Empedocles at Etna--Brief life and scanty vision--The four

elements--The philosophy of contradiction--Philosophy a form of

poesy--The philosopher a prophet--Sensation through kinship--The whole

creation groaneth_

[129]

II. EMPEDOCLES.--Empedocles was a native of Agrigentum, a Greek colony

in Sicily. At the time when he flourished in his native city (circa

440 B.C.) it was one of the wealthiest and most powerful communities in

that wealthy and powerful island. It had, however, been infested, like

its neighbours, by the designs of tyrants and the dissensions of rival

factions. Empedocles was a man of high family, and he exercised the

influence which his position and his abilities secured him in promoting

and maintaining the liberty of his fellow-countrymen. Partly on this

account, partly from a reputation which with or without his own will he

acquired for an almost miraculous skill in healing and necromantic

arts, Empedocles attained to a position of singular personal power over

his contemporaries, and was indeed regarded as semi-divine. His death

was hedged about with mystery. According to one story he gave a great

feast to his friends and offered a {59} sacrifice; then when his

friends went to rest he disappeared, and was no more seen. According

to a story less dignified and better known--

Deus immortalis haberi

Dum cupit Empedocles, ardentem frigidus Aetnam

Insiluit. HOR. _Ad Pisones_, 464 _sqq_.

"Eager to be deemed a god, Empedocles coldly threw himself in burning

Etna." The fraud, it was said, was detected by one of his shoes being

cast up from the crater. Whatever the manner of his end, the Etna

story may probably be taken as an ill-natured joke of some sceptic wit;

and it is certain that no such story was believed by his

fellow-citizens, who rendered in after years divine honours to his name.

Like Xenophanes, Parmenides, and other Graeco-Italian philosophers, he

expounded his views in verse; but he reached a poetic excellence

unattained by any predecessor. Aristotle characterises his gift as

Homeric, and himself as a master of style, employing freely metaphors

and other poetic forms. Lucretius also speaks of him in terms of high

admiration (_De Nat. Rer. i. 716 sqq._): "Foremost among them is

Empedocles of Agrigentum, child of the island with the triple capes, a

land wondrous deemed in many wise, and worthy to be viewed of all men.

Rich it is in all manner of good things, and strong {60} in the might

of its men, yet naught within its borders men deem more divine or more

wondrous or more dear than her illustrious son. Nay, the songs which

issued from his godlike breast are eloquent yet, and expound his

findings wondrous well, so that hardly is he thought to have been of

mortal clay."

[180]

Like the Eleatics he denies that the senses are an absolute test of

truth. "For straitened are the powers that have been shed upon our

frames, and many the frets that cross us and defeat our care, and short

the span of unsatisfying existence wherein 'tis given us to see.

Shortlived as a wreath of smoke men rise and fleet away, persuaded but

of that alone which each has chanced to light upon, driven hither and

thither, and vainly do they pray to find _the whole_. For this men may

not see or hear or grasp with the hand of thought." Yet that there is

a kind or degree of knowledge possible for man his next words suggest

when he continues: "Thou therefore since hither thou hast been borne,

hear, and thou shalt learn so much as 'tis given to mortal thought to

reach." Then follows an invocation in true Epic style to the

"much-wooed white-armed virgin Muse," wherein he prays that "folly and

impurity may be far from the lips of him the teacher, and that sending

forth her swift-reined chariot from the shrine of Piety, the Muse may

grant him to hear so much as is given to mortal hearing."

{61}

Then follows a warning uttered by the Muse to her would-be disciple:

"Thee the flowers of mortal distinctions shall not seduce to utter in

daring of heart more than thou mayest, that thereby thou mightest soar

to the highest heights of wisdom. And now behold and see, availing

thyself of every device whereby the truth may in each matter be

revealed, trusting not more to sight for thy learning than to hearing,

nor to hearing with its loud echoings more than to the revelations of

the tongue, nor to any one of the many ways whereby there is a path to

knowledge. Keep a check on the revelation of the hands also, and

apprehend each matter in the way whereby it is made plain to thee."

The correction of the one sense by the others, and of all by reason,

this Empedocles deemed the surest road to knowledge. He thus

endeavoured to hold a middle place between the purely abstract

reasoning of the Eleatic philosophy and the unreasoned first guesses of

ordinary observation suggested by this or that sense, and chiefly by

the eyes. The senses might supply the raw materials of knowledge,

unordered, unrelated, nay even chaotic and mutually destructive; but in

their contradictions of each other he hoped to find a starting-point

for order amidst the seeming chaos; reason should weigh, reason should

reject, but reason also should find a residuum of truth.

{62}

[181]

In our next fragment we have his enunciation in symbolical language of

the _four_ elements, by him first formulated: "Hear first of all what

are the root principles of all things, being four in number,--Zeus the

bright shiner (_i.e._ fire), and Hera (air), and life-bearing Aidoneus

(earth), and Nestis (water), who with her teardrops waters the fountain

of mortality. Hear also this other that I will tell thee. Nothing of

all that perisheth ever is created, nothing ever really findeth an end

in death. There is naught but a mingling, and a parting again of that

which was mingled, and this is what men call a coming into being.

Foolish they, for in them is no far-reaching thought, that they should

dream that what was not before can be, or that aught which is can

utterly perish and die." Thus again Empedocles shows himself an

Eclectic; in denying that aught can come into being, he holds with the

Eleatics (see above, p. 47); in identifying all seeming creation, and

ceasing to be with certain mixtures and separations of matter eternally

existing, he links himself rather to the doctrine of Anaxagoras (see

above, p. 53).

[132]

These four elements constitute the total _corpus_ of the universe,

eternal, as a whole unmoved and immovable, perfect like a sphere. But

within this sphere-like self-centred All there are eternally proceeding

separations and new unions of the elements of things; and every one of

these is at once a birth {63} and an infinity of dyings, a dying and an

infinity of births. Towards this perpetual life in death, and death in

life, two forces work inherent in the universe. One of these he names

Love, Friendship, Harmony, Aphrodite goddess of Love, Passion, Joy; the

other he calls Hate, Discord, Ares god of War, Envy, Strife. Neither

of the one nor of the other may man have apprehension by the senses;

they are spiritually discerned; yet of the first men have some

adumbration in the creative force within their own members, which they

name by the names of Love and Nuptial Joy.

Somewhat prosaically summing up the teaching of Empedocles, Aristotle

says that he thus posited _six_ first principles in nature--four

material, two motive or efficient. And he goes on to remark that in

the working out of his theory of nature Empedocles, though using his

originative principles more consistently than Anaxagoras used his

principle of _Nous_ or Thought, not infrequently, nevertheless, resorts

to some natural force in the elements themselves, or even to chance or

necessity. "Nor," he continues, "has he clearly marked off the

functions of his two efficient forces, nay, he has so confounded them

that at times it is Discord that through separation leads to new

unions, and Love that through union causes diremption of that which was

before." At times, too, Empedocles seems to have had a vision of these

two forces, not as the counteracting yet {64} co-operative

_pulsations_, so to speak, of the universal life, but as rival forces

having had in time their periods of alternate supremacy and defeat.

While all things were in union under the influence of Love, then was

there neither Earth nor Water nor Air nor Fire, much less any of the

individual things that in eternal interchange are formed of them; but

all was in perfect sphere-like balance, enwrapped in the serenity of an

eternal silence. Then came the reign of Discord, whereby war arose in

heaven as of the fabled giants, and endless change,--endless birth, and

endless death.

These inconsistencies of doctrine, which Aristotle notes as faults in

Empedocles, are perhaps rather proofs of the philosophic value of his

conceptions. Just as Hegel in modern philosophy could only adequately

formulate his conceptions through logical contradictions, so also,

perhaps, under the veil of antagonisms of utterance, Empedocles sought

to give a fuller vision,--Discord, in his own doctrine, not less than

in his conception of nature, being thus the co-worker with Love. The

ordinary mind for the ordinary purposes of science seeks exactness of

distinction in things, and language, being the creation of ordinary

experience, lends itself to such a purpose; the philosophic mind,

finding ready to its hand no forms of expression adapted to its

conceptions, which have for their final end Union and not Distinction,

{65} can only attain its purpose by variety, or even contradictoriness,

of representation. Thus to ordinary conception cause must precede

effect; to the philosophic mind, dealing as it does with the idea of an

organic whole, everything is at once cause and effect, is at once

therefore prior to and subsequent to every other, is at once the ruling

and the ruled, the conditioning and that which is conditioned.

So, to Empedocles there are four elements, yet in the eternal

perfection, the silent reign of Love, there are none of them. There

are two forces working upon these and against each other, yet each is

like the other either a unifying or a separating force, as one pleases

to regard them; and in the eternal silence, the ideal perfectness,

there is no warfare at all. There is joy in Love which creates, and in

creating destroys; there is joy in the eternal Stillness, nay, this is

itself the ultimate joy. There are two forces working, Love and Hate,

yet is there but one force, and that force is Necessity. And for final

contradiction, the universe is self-balanced, self-conditioned, a

perfect sphere; therefore this Necessity is perfect self-realisation,

and consequently perfect freedom.

The men who have had the profoundest vision of things--Heraclitus,

Empedocles, Socrates, Plato, ay, and Aristotle himself when he was the

thinker and not the critic; not to speak of the great moderns, whether

preachers or philosophers--have none of {66} them been greatly

concerned for consistency of expression, for a mere logical

self-identity of doctrine. Life in every form, nay, existence in any

form, is a union of contradictories, a complex of antagonisms; and the

highest and deepest minds are those that are most adequate to have the

vision of these antagonisms in their contrariety, and also in their

unity; to see and hear as Empedocles did the eternal war and clamour,

but to discern also, as he did in it and through it and behind it and

about it, the eternal peace and the eternal silence.

Philosophy, in fact, is a form of poesy; it is, if one pleases so to

call it, 'fiction founded upon fact.' It is not for that reason the

less noble a form of human thought, rather is it the more noble, in the

same way as poetry is nobler than mere narrative, and art than

representation, and imagination than perception. Philosophy is indeed

one of the noblest forms of poetry, because the facts which are its

basis are the profoundest, the most eternally interesting, the most

universally significant. And not only has it nobility in respect of

the greatness of its subject matter, it has also possibilities of an

essential truth deeper and more far-reaching and more fruitful than any

demonstrative system of fact can have. A great poem or work of art of

any kind is an adumbration of truths which transcend any actual fact,

and as such it brings us nearer to the underlying fundamentals of {67}

reality which all actual occurrences only by accumulation _tend_ to

realise. Philosophy, then, in so far as it is great, is, like other

great art, prophetic in both interpretations of the word, both as

expounding the inner truth that is anterior to actuality, and also as

anticipating that final realisation of all things for which 'the whole

creation groaneth.' It is thus at the basis of religion, of art, of

morals; it is the accumulated sense of the highest in man with respect

to what is greatest and most mysterious in and about him.

The facts, indeed, with which philosophy attempts to deal are so vital

and so vast that even the greatest intellects may well stagger

occasionally under the burden of their own conceptions of them. To

rise to the height of such an argument demands a more than Miltonic

imagination; and criticisms directed only at this or that fragment of

the whole are as irrelevant, if not as inept, as the criticism of the

mathematician directed against _Paradise Lost_, that it 'proved

nothing.' The mystery of being and of life, the true purport and

reality of this world of which we seem to be a part, and yet of which

we seem to have some apprehension as though we were other than a part;

the strange problems of creation and change and birth and death, of

love and sin and purification; of a heaven dreamt of or believed in, or

somehow actually apprehended; of life here, and of an immortality

yearned after and hoped for--these {68} problems, these mysteries, no

philosophy ever did or ever can empty of their strangeness, or bring

down to the level of the commonplace 'certainties' of daily life or of

science, which are no more than shadows after all, that seem

certainties because of the background of mystery on which they are cast.

But just as an individual is a higher being, a fuller, more truly human

creature, when he has got so far removed from the merely animal

existence as to realise that there are such problems and mysteries, so

also the humanisation of the race, the development of its noblest

peoples and its noblest literatures, have been conditioned by the

successive visions of these mysteries in more and more complex

organisation by the great philosophers and poets and preachers. The

systems of such men may die, but such deaths mean, as Empedocles said

of the ordinary deaths of things, only an infinity of new births.

Being dead, their systems yet speak in the inherited language and ideas

and aspirations and beliefs that form the never-ending, still-renewing

material for new philosophies and new faiths. In Thales, Heraclitus,

Pythagoras, Parmenides, Empedocles we have been touching hands with an

apostolic succession of great men and great thinkers and great

poets--men of noble life and lofty thoughts, true prophets and

revealers. And the apostolic succession even within the Greek world

does not fail for centuries yet.

{69}

Passing from the general conceptions of Empedocles to those more

particular rationalisations of particular problems which very largely

provided the motive of early philosophies, while scientific methods

were in an undeveloped and uncritical condition, we may notice such

interesting statements as the following: [135] "The earth, which is at

the centre of the sphere of the universe, remains firm, because the

spin of the universe as a whole keeps it in its place like the water in

a spinning cup." He has the same conception of the early condition of

the earth as in other cosmogonies. At first it was a chaos of watery

slough, which slowly, under the influence of sky and sun, parted off

into earth and sea. The sea was the 'sweat' of the earth, and by

analogy with the sweat it was salt. The heavens, on the other hand,

were formed of air and fire, and the sun was, as it were, a speculum at

which the effulgence and the heat of the whole heavens concentrated.

But that the aether and the fire had not been fully separated from

earth and water he held to be proved by the hot fountains and fiery

phenomena which must have been so familiar to a native of Sicily.

Curiously enough he imagined fire to possess a solidifying power, and

therefore attributed to it the solidity of the earth and the hardness

of the rocks. No doubt he had observed some effects of fire in

'metamorphic' formations in his own vicinity.

{70}

[137]

He had also a conception of the gradual development on the earth of

higher and higher forms of life, the first being rude and imperfect,

and a 'struggle for existence' ensuing in which the monstrous and the

deficient gradually were eliminated--the "two-faced, the

double-breasted, the oxen-shaped with human prows, or human-shaped with

head of ox, or hemaphrodite," and so forth. Love and Strife worked out

their ends upon these varied forms; some procreated and reproduced

after their image, others were incapable of reproduction from mere

monstrosity or [138] weakness, and disappeared. Something other than

mere chance thus governed the development of things; there was a law, a

reason, a _Logos_ governing the process. This law or reason he perhaps

fancifully illustrated by attributing the different characters of flesh

and sinew and bone to the different numerical proportions, in which

they severally contain the different elements.

On this Aristotle, keen-scented critic as he was, has a question, or

series of questions, to ask as to the relation between this Logos, or

principle of orderly combination, and Love as the ruling force in all

unions of things. "Is Love," he asks, "a cause of mixtures of any

sort, or only of such sorts as Logos dictates? And whether then is

Love identical with this Logos, or are they separate and distinct; and

if so, what settles their separate functions?" Questions {71} which

Empedocles did not answer, and perhaps would not have tried to answer

had he heard them.

[139]

The soul or life-principle in man Empedocles regarded as an ordered

composite of all the elements or principles of the life in nature, and

in this kinship of the elements in man and the elements in nature he

found a rationale of our powers of perception. "By the earth," said

he, "we have perception of earth; by water we have perception of water;

of the divine aether, by aether; of destructive fire, by fire; of love,

by love; of strife, by strife." He therefore, as Aristotle observes,

drew no radical distinction between sense-apprehension and thought. He

located the faculty of apprehension more specifically in the blood,

conceiving that in it the combination of the elements was most

complete. And the variety of apprehensive gift in different persons he

attributed to the greater or lesser perfectness of this blood mixture

in them individually. Those that were dull and stupid had a relative

deficiency of the lighter and more invisible elements; those that were

quick and impulsive had a relatively larger proportion of these.

Again, specific faculties depended on local perfection of mixture in

certain organs; orators having this perfectness in their tongues,

cunning craftsmen possessing it in their hands, and so on. And the

degrees of capacity of sensation, which he found in various animals, or

even plants, he explained in similar fashion.

{72} The process of sensation he conceived to be conditioned by an

actual emission from the bodies perceived of elements or images of

themselves which found access to our apprehension through channels

[140] congruous to their nature. But ordering, criticising, organising

these various apprehensions was the Mind or _Nous_, which he conceived

to be of divine nature, to be indeed an expression or emanation of the

Divine. And here has been preserved a strangely interesting passage,

in which he incorporates and develops in characteristic fashion the

doctrine of transmigration [141] of souls: "There is a decree of

Necessity, a law given of old from the gods, eternal, sealed with

mighty oaths, that when any heavenly creature (daemon) of those that

are endowed with length of days, shall in waywardness of heart defile

his hands with sin of deed or speech, he shall wander for thrice ten

thousand seasons far from the dwellings of the blest, taking upon him

in length of time all manner of mortal forms, traversing in turn the

many toilsome paths of existence. Him the aetherial wrath hurries

onward to the deep, and the deep spews him forth on to the threshold of

earth, and unworn earth casts him up to the fires of the sun, and again

the aether hurls him into the eddies. One receives him, and then

another, but detested is he of them all. Of such am I also one, an

exile and a wanderer from God, a slave to strife and its madness."

{73}

Thus to his mighty conception the life of all creation, and not of man

only, was a great expiation, an eternal round of punishment for sin;

and in the unending flux of life each creature rose or fell in the

scale of existence according to the deeds of good or ill done in each

successive life; rising sometimes to the state of men, or among men to

the high functions of physicians and prophets and kings, or among

beasts to the dignity of the lion, or among trees to the beauty of the

laurel; or, on the contrary, sinking through sin to lowest forms of

bestial or vegetable life. Till at the last they who through obedience

and right-doing have expiated their wrong, are endowed by the blessed

gods with endless honour, to dwell for ever with them and share their

banquets, untouched any more with human care and sorrow and pain.

[143]

The slaying of any living creature, therefore, Empedocles, like

Pythagoras, abhorred, for all were kin. All foul acts were forms of

worse than suicide; life should be a long act of worship, of expiation,

of purification. And in the dim past he pictured a vision of a golden

age, in which men worshipped not many gods, but Love only, and not with

sacrifices of blood, but with pious images, and cunningly odorous

incense, and offerings of fragrant myrrh. With abstinence also, and

above all with that noblest abstinence, the abstinence from vice and

wrong.

{74}

A Short History of Greek Philosophy · 第 7 / 22 章