Hang-chow.--Ti-pings approach Shanghae.--Their Reception.--The
_Casus Belli_.--The First Blow.--Fillibuster Ward.--Admiral
Hope's Exploits.--Captures Hsiun-tang.--The
Consequences.--Hope's Policy condemned.--The real _Casus
Belli_.--Defence of Shanghae justified.--Inducements to oppose
the Ti-pings.--Official Reports.--Mr. Consul
Meadows.--Recognition of the Ti-pings.--The _Shanghae
Times_.--Mr. John's Report.--Edict of Religious
Toleration.--Report continued.--Mr. Muirhead's Report.
Hang-Chow, the provincial capital, was carried by assault upon the 29th
of December. The Chinese part of the garrison, unable to endure the
horrors of the close siege, after everything in the shape of food had
been consumed, and even human flesh exposed for sale in the
market-place, opened the gates of the outer city and surrendered to the
Ti-pings. The Manchoo troops defended themselves to the last, neither
giving nor accepting quarter, and when the walls of the inner city were
carried by the victorious insurgents, the Tartar general, Luy, and a
number of his men, sprang a mine and blew themselves up with their
citadel.
The capture of this important city and of the treaty port Ningpo having
placed the Ti-pings in possession of the whole Che-kiang province, with
the exception of Shanghae and a few miles around it, they resolved, upon
the termination of the year, as previously agreed to, to follow up the
enemy to this last stronghold.
Although, before his unsuccessful trip to Nankin, Admiral Hope had
seemed willing to treat with the Ti-pings, when he returned to Shanghae,
after finding it impossible to again deceive them, his conduct
underwent a marked change, as evinced by the eager way in which he
sought the opportunity to indulge his warlike propensities. This
opportunity was soon afforded him.
Immediately upon the expiration of the year, Chung-wang, the Ti-ping
Commander-in-Chief, moved an army towards Shanghae. No attack was made
upon the city, but this force gradually occupied every position in the
neighbourhood, till at length not an Imperialist soldier remained beyond
gunshot range of its walls. The Ti-pings again manifested their
extraordinary friendliness towards foreigners by not attacking the city,
and with similar forbearance and moderation to that evinced upon their
approach in 1860, endeavouring to open peaceable negotiation with the
foreign authorities. The leaders of the different _corps d'armee_ sent
in the usual nobly worded proclamations, relating to the oppression of
the Manchoo and their own mission to free and Christianize China; the
success hitherto vouchsafed to their cause by the "Heavenly Father"; the
earnest desire to enter into friendly relations with the "foreign
brethren"; their wish to continue all present trade and to open the
whole country up, &c.
Now, at this time the political position of England with regard to the
rebellion was as follows. By the written guarantee of Sir George Bonham,
by that of Admiral Hope, by that from the British representative at
Ningpo, and by many other acts, her national honour was pledged to
maintain a strict neutrality. The last orders to her officials in China
were, as already quoted:--
"Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain ... neutrality
between the two contending parties;" save British subjects from
punishment, "but otherwise you should abstain from all
interference in the civil war."
[Dated, Foreign Office, August 8, 1861.]
This was the standing order; the only later direction being Lord
Russell's suggestion: "But it _might_ be expedient to defend the treaty
ports _if_ the Chinese would consent not to use those ports for purposes
of aggression."
The way the British Consul, Admiral, and General, at Shanghae, abstained
from all interference was by converting that city into the grand
rendezvous of the Imperialist forces, and then helping them to defend
the Chinese city by garrisoning it with British troops; by conveying
Manchoo soldiery down the Yang-tze to Shanghae in English steamers; by
supplying the Imperialists with artillery, &c., while strictly
prohibiting any trade in the same articles with the other of the two
"contending parties"; and by attacking the Ti-pings when they found that
the Ti-pings would not attack them. That useful triumvirate--the sailor,
the soldier, and the diplomatist--placed the following construction upon
Lord Russell's ambiguous _ifs_ and _ands_. "It _might_ be expedient,"
they singularly understood to mean, it was expedient; and "_if_ the
Chinese, &c.," they converted into assisting and joining the Chinese
"_to use_ those ports for purposes of aggression." Consequently, in
direct violation of their public orders, but in conformity with the
conduct I have just stated, they issued the following reply to the
friendly overtures of the Ti-ping chiefs:--
"Whereas we, the Commanders of the French and British forces now
occupying the city and environs of Shanghae, have received
letters from Lion and Ho, persons styling themselves ...,
informing us that said Lion and Ho are intending to attack and
occupy Shanghae; and whereas we have no means of communicating
with the said Lion and Ho, or any of their people:--Therefore,
this is to give notice to whomsoever it may concern, that
Shanghae city and its environs, Woo-sung included, are at
present in the possession of the troops under our respective
commands, and that if Lion or Ho, or any persons claiming
fraternity with them, attempt to attack these places they will
do so at their peril."
Even this was insufficient to effect the desired object, namely, to
drive the Ti-pings to defiance, and force them to acts of retaliation.
When, therefore, it became apparent that, notwithstanding all the aid
afforded to the Imperialists, they could not succeed, and that
eventually Shanghae must be given up to the revolutionists, or become
annexed to France or England, the British Government threw off the mask,
and prepared for open hostilities.
Consul Medhurst, in a despatch to Admiral Hope, dated "Shanghae,
February 19, 1862," states the grounds upon which the good faith and
honour of England were to be openly violated.
"Granting, of course, that a _strictly neutral policy_ is at
present the only correct one, and that whatever is done in the
protection of this city and settlement must be undertaken with
_careful regard_ to that important axiom, it follows, I think,
that there are two points to be considered as bearing materially
on the present crisis. The first is, what resources we have in
the way of supplies for the city and settlement; and the second,
how far the present action of the Taepings so endangers those
supplies as to make it necessary for us to interfere with them
in our own defence."
The falsity of this shallow pretence for war becomes at once apparent.
In the first place, it was simply necessary to allow the Chinese city to
revert peaceably to the Ti-pings, when the inhabitants as well as they
would have had ample supplies. In the second place, the vast river and
sea communication of Shanghae was entirely open (excepting the Wong-poo
branch), while a fleet of some two hundred European steamers and ships
and several thousand large native junks crowded the anchorage, and could
easily have furnished a line of communication for any amount of
supplies. Evidence is abundant to prove what a mere pretence this _casus
belli_ was, but two reasons will be sufficient justification for so
designating it. First. If the Ti-pings, by surrounding Shanghae,
endangered its supplies, when they came with the most friendly feeling
for Europeans, they would certainly, if driven to become enemies and to
use the justifiable retaliation of enemies, have it in their power to
utterly destroy those supplies by devastating the whole neighbouring
country; therefore, in all human probability, an attack upon them would
render imminent the very crisis to avoid which it was thought
justifiable to violate a nation's pledges. Secondly. The following
extract from Admiral Hope's despatch shows that he conceived that Consul
Medhurst had not made a sufficient case. Upon the 21st of February,
1862, the Admiral struck the first blow. Upon the evening of the same
day, in his despatch to the Admiralty, he gave this reason for his open
violation of his own and his Government's faith:--
"These proceedings" (movements of the Ti-pings) "have been
conducted at a distance much too close to be consistent with the
_respect due to the occupation of the town_ by French and
English forces, or to leave its supplies of provisions and
native trade _unaffected_."
Is it to be supposed that any city could be captured or placed in a
state of siege without native trade or supplies being affected, or is it
to be argued that the Ti-pings should be crushed in consequence of the
natural results of their patriotic struggle?
The presence of the Ti-pings only "_affected_" the trade and supplies it
seems; when, had they been so disposed, they might have stopped the
entire, excepting what could have been obtained by water.
The only thing that affected the supplies of Shanghae so far as
Europeans and citizens were concerned, was the increase in the price,
which was quickly raised by the provision-dealers, who are always ready
to seize the smallest opportunity to make a little extra profit.
Probably Admiral Hope saw this, and its damaging bearing upon his
alleged _casus belli_; at all events, he thought fit to add another,
though equally flimsy.
"The tract of country enclosed within the line BC, which this
village, with others in their" (Ti-pings) "possession, entirely
commanded, is that from which the supplies of Shanghae are
chiefly drawn, and its proximity to the Woo-sung river was such
as to afford the PROSPECT of the Chinese traffic, also material
to the support of the town, being seriously impeded, if not
altogether stopped; and for these reasons I considered the case
to be one calling for my interference."
On these pretences war was made upon the Ti-pings. It will be noticed
that nothing material has ever been _proved_ against the revolutionists,
or urged as an established fact, sufficient to justify hostilities, or
even a remonstrance. The British officials in China and the Government
at home attempt to justify their course of action by mere conjecture as
to what they might do, but never do we find a plain or straightforward
accusation made against them for anything they _had done_.
Admiral Hope, in his attack upon the Ti-pings, associated himself with
one Ward, an American filibuster, in the service of the Manchoos.
Previous to this, and to the Admiral's unsuccessful attempt to juggle
the Ti-ping authorities into another agreement not to approach Shanghae,
the said Ward was persecuted and reviled very fiercely; but no sooner
did the Admiral and his colleagues think it necessary to pull in the
same boat, than the Yankee filibuster became their pattern and ally. The
whilom _rowdie_ companion of _ci-devant_ General Walker, of Nicaraguan
memory, mercenary leader of a band of Anglo-Saxon freebooters in Manchoo
pay, and sometime fugitive from English marines sent to weed his
ruffians of their countrymen, suddenly became the friend and ally of the
British and French Admirals, Generals, and Consuls. The surprise of Ward
can only have been equalled by his gratification upon finding his very
questionable presence, and still more doubtful pursuits, patronized and
imitated. No doubt, at first, he felt considerably elated and vastly
astonished at the idea of filibusting having become an honourable and
recognised profession; but soon, poor fellow! a black, or rather green,
shadow came across his uncertain dream of happiness and
respectability--he became jealous of his friend Admiral Hope, whose
talent and zeal for making war without declaring it or being authorized
so to do by any Government, he found surpassed even his own.
The village of Kao-kiau was garrisoned by a few hundred Ti-pings, and
several thousand country people, who had just joined them, the whole
mostly armed with bamboo spears. The force led against them by Admiral
Hope comprised 350 British seamen with a six-pound rocket-tube, and
about 600 disciplined Chinese, under Ward, besides which, the French
Admiral, Protet, commanded 160 Frenchmen, with a couple of field-pieces.
Of course, the ill-armed Ti-pings were unable to resist the European
artillery and arms of precision, and were consequently driven from the
village, with a loss of more than 100 men killed. This gallant exploit
was safely performed by the Anglo-Franco contingent, who, completely out
of range of the few wretched matchlocks of the Ti-pings, shot them down
at their ease with rifles and artillery, with a loss to themselves of
_only one_ French sailor, killed by a stray shot.
This murderous and cowardly deed was quickly followed up by the gallant
Admiral, who seemed unable to refrain from action, especially when it
could be indulged with comparative safety.
We have already noticed that one excuse Admiral Hope made to justify his
broken faith was the probability that the Ti-pings might injure the
supply of provisions. Strange to say, the Admiral did the very things he
pretended the rebels might have done. At the capture of Kao-kiau all
hands dispersed to loot whatever the Ti-pings had left behind; and,
quoting from the official report of the affair, "Large stores of grain
were discovered about the place, _the greater part of which were
burned_."
After the exploit of Kao-kiau, Admiral Hope, with a small party of
seamen and Ward's filibusters, went roving about the country for a week
in search of some one to fight. His warlike spirit was gratified at a
place named Hsiau-tang, in the vicinity of Ming-hong (nearly twenty
miles away from Shanghae), a fortified village occupied by several
thousand Ti-pings. Directly he found this place in the way, an order
was sent to Shanghae for reinforcements to attack it with. These having
arrived, upon the 1st of March, 1862, the whole force, consisting of 750
of Ward's disciplined Chinese, 350 British sailors and marines, and 35
artillery-men, with four light howitzers, one field-piece, and some
rocket-tubes, and 200 French, with two brass howitzers, moved forward to
the attack. Again, as at Kao-kiau, the murderous work was executed, and
the poorly-armed Ti-pings slaughtered with impunity. For more than an
hour they bravely held their mud and brick entrenchments, but at last
the crushing fire from the foreign artillery, and the sharp practice of
the Enfield rifles, carried the day. After standing to their few
gingalls to the last, amid a storm of shot and shell (all fresh from
British arsenals and paid for by British tax-payers), they were driven
from the lines of defence and through the village with immense
slaughter. As they retreated from the rear, the shell from the
irresistible foreign artillery "were thrown rapidly amongst them,
committing fearful havoc. Numbers also fell under the fire from the
rifles of the French and English sailors." In the centre of the village
the rear guard made a gallant effort to repulse their pursuers, but they
could not withstand the deadly volleys and bayonet charge of the
marines; and although their bravest men fell in heaps, while many
hand-to-hand conflicts took place, they were ultimately driven out with
a loss of 1,000 killed and 300 taken prisoners, the English and French
_not losing a single man_. A great massacre of the unfortunate
non-combatants was perpetrated by the Imperialist soldiery, who actually
forced very many of the living wounded into the flames of the burning
village. In one official report it is stated:--
"The streets and houses presented an awful spectacle, the bodies
in some places lying in heaps; and the plain beyond the village
was strewed with those shot down in the flight."
Another report states:--
"The rebels ran from the fortifications and came to a stand in
the main street.... Upon this, the field-piece from the
_Imperieuse_, in charge of Lieutenants Stuart and Richardson,
swept them down with grape and canister shot; after this their
retreat became a flight, when the party of marines and Chinese
detached to cut them off did considerable execution, some 900 or
1,000 having been killed and wounded."
The same report concludes with this sentence:--
"After all was over, _the village was set on fire_,[1] and the
foreign troops embarked for Shanghae."
What will those who falsely accuse the Ti-pings of devastating and
destroying say to this? They have declared that the Christian patriots'
"success in any locality is attended with its total destruction," &c.;
but it appears that these totally destroyed places were reserved for
Admiral Hope to burn down.
As this history progresses we shall find that although the Admiral made
the damaging effect which the presence of the Ti-pings _might_ have upon
supplies one element of his _casus belli_, _he_ actually destroyed the
very supply of grain which he dreaded might be affected by the rebels!
There is a more serious matter to be deplored with regard to the
numerous raids commenced and followed up by Admiral Hope, namely, the
cruel slaughter of so many hundreds of his fellow-men. We have reviewed
the unmeaning pretences invented by the Admiral and his co-adjutors, but
even should it be admitted they were valid, is it possible any
Englishman can be found willing to justify the massacre of thousands of
human beings, because, although ever friendly to them, they affected the
mercenary speculations of a few merchants? If, in order to maintain the
immediate profit of their mercantile adventurers, any Englishman can
attempt to justify or palliate these summary proceedings against the
unfortunate Ti-pings, then I say, far better should that unholy traffic
perish, cursed as it is by the slaughter of thousands of our
fellow-creatures, whose blood has cried aloud to Heaven for vengeance
upon their assailants.
Even the pretence that the revolutionists would have injured our
"commercial interests" falls to the ground by the testimony of the very
merchants themselves, for the leading mercantile house in China, Messrs.
Jardine, Matheson, & Co., in their business circular, dated "Kong-kong,
27th February, 1862," referring to Admiral Hope's first massacre of
Ti-pings, state:--
"During the interval that has elapsed since the date of our last
circular there is no particular change to notice in the state of
matters about Shanghae; but the policy the Allied Commanders are
adopting will, it is feared, lead to disastrous consequences....
_Our interests call for a strict neutrality_, but so far from
this course being pursued, our last advices report a combined
expedition of English and French marines and sailors in
conjunction with a force of Imperialists, commanded in person by
their respective Admirals, against a body of some 6,000 rebels,
which of course they defeated with great slaughter.... The whole
country being in the hands of the Taepings, should this
_suicidal_ policy be persisted in, must in the end materially
interfere with, if not ruin, all trade, as it cannot do
otherwise than exasperate a foe by no means to be despised."
What stronger condemnation of the policy pursued against the Ti-pings
can be made, coming, as it does, from the principal representative of
the very class whose interests it was pretended necessary to protect?
That this opinion of Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Co. was correct has at
the present time been pretty well ascertained, for it did "in the end
materially interfere with" trade, as the fall off of silk _after_ the
expulsion of the Ti-pings from the producing district proves. This,
however, was not occasioned, as that firm expected, by the exasperation
of "a foe by no means to be despised," for the Ti-pings (with a
Christian humanity far excelling that possessed by their _civilized_
enemies) never retaliated either upon the trade (entirely in their
power) or the lives of Europeans. The decrease of silk was caused
entirely by the ruthless nature of the war carried by British officers
and Imperialists into the once happy districts of Ti-ping-tien-kwo. The
Ti-ping patriots were either fools or saints, for by their mad
forbearance they suffered themselves to be driven from their former
possessions with incalculable loss of life; whereas, a system of
retaliation on their part would have endangered the entire trade of the
district, and consequently have forced the enemy to relinquish
hostilities which so conclusively endangered the prospect of our
"commercial interests."
As the first mercantile house in China considered the policy of the
British Government "suicidal," we may safely pronounce the affected
anxiety for commercial interests a shallow pretext. What then remains to
constitute the real _casus belli_, unless it be "the temporary interest
arising out of the indemnities," and the great revenue arising out of
the vile opium traffic, the loss of which would have caused a deficit of
many millions in the British treasury?
The seeming inconsistency of allowing the Ti-pings to take Ningpo and
yet defending Shanghae against them is easily explained. At the capture
of the former city no British force was present, and although the seven
days' grace so cunningly obtained from the Ti-ping leaders seems to have
been employed in endeavouring to raise a sufficient force to oppose
their entrance, this, in the shape of H.M.S. _Scout_ and several other
vessels, arrived too late, having reached Ningpo some hours after its
fall. Then, as Admiral Hope very wisely observed with regard to the
policy of exasperating the Ti-pings, "We cannot afford to quarrel with
them, as at any moment they _might_ stop the whole trade of Shanghae."
Their wonderful forbearance had not at that time become assured;
directly it was, hostilities were commenced. Before taking up the sword
for good, it became necessary to try the temper of the Ti-pings. This
Admiral Hope effectually did by his arrogance at Nankin; his "every
obstruction" plan at Ningpo; his raids around Shanghae; an example
followed by the British and French authorities by their unwarrantable
notifications and defence of Shanghae Chinese city.
There are, in fact, very many reasons by which the defence of Shanghae
may be accounted for; but five of the most important will sufficiently
illustrate the principle of the whole.
Firstly. The British Government and its officials interfered in order to
save the indemnity and opium trade, which the capture of Shanghae by the
Ti-pings would have annihilated, and they were strongly supported by the
opium merchants, who, by this vile traffic, made their largest profits.
Secondly. A large number of the Shanghae foreign landholders approved of
the defence of the city, because it enabled them to obtain fresh lots at
their own prices from the Chinese proprietors. From the "minutes of a
meeting of land-renters, held at the British Consulate, Shanghae,
January 12, 1862," it appears that during a council of war with the
Manchoo authorities of the Chinese city (all in accordance with the
pledges of "strict neutrality," of course?)--
"The Taoutae undertook to do this also" (open a road to
facilitate military operations) "_by obliging the Chinese
renters interested to part with their land to the foreign
applicants whose names stood recorded first for purchase_."
Thirdly. A certain proportion of traders having taken advantage of the
Ti-ping movement to circulate unfounded reports as to its brigandage, in
order to monopolize the trade by frightening outsiders away, naturally
sanctioned the defence of Shanghae, as the capture of the city would
have exposed the trick by proving the Ti-pings were not brigands and
robbers.
Fourthly. Many land and house speculators opposed the success of the
insurgents for this reason. The foreign settlements in the vicinity of
the Chinese city had become crowded with fugitives awaiting the firm
establishment of Ti-ping jurisdiction in the interior; by numerous
lawless Chinamen attracted by the shadow of foreign protection and the
opportunity of establishing gambling hells and bagnios, _ad libitum_;
and by the manifold parasites and hangers-on of the Imperial authority
in its last stronghold. Therefore, while this state of affairs lasted,
the land speculators made prodigious wealth by the letting of their
property to the natives at almost fabulous rents, but the capture of the
city by the Ti-pings would have altered all this. The vile manner in
which many colossal fortunes have thus been obtained is lost sight of in
England by the glitter of the ingots.
Fifthly. A large proportion of partners in mercantile houses _upon the
spot_, expected to make their fortunes and retire to their home in three
years; but the occupation of Shanghae by the Ti-pings, and the natural
effect of the civil war, must have interfered with the import trade and
injured their immediate profits.
Upon these grounds British faith was dishonoured and a murderous war
waged against the unfortunate Ti-pings. Admiral Hope continued the work
of destruction with his artillery and rifles from a safe distance, until
his recall to England. Violation of good faith, misrepresentation, and
partial aggression, became superseded by regular hostilities, carried on
without any previous declaration of war, or even statement of grievance.
What would such manner of warfare be denominated in Europe?
Having reviewed the policy of the British Government, and the conduct of
its officials in China, it may be well to notice a few reports upon the
Ti-ping rebellion, well worthy of attention, even though ignored by the
British Ministry. These testimonies prove that the Ti-pings have not
been decimated because they were misunderstood by the British
Government, but that the latter were as well acquainted with their
Christianity, friendliness, political object, superiority to the
Manchoos, and generally improved character, as the writer of this
history, or the authors of the statements he quotes. Therefore, when the
evil policy of those who authorized the unnecessary and unjustifiable
hostilities upon the part of England shall become more generally
admitted, they cannot palliate their wickedness by pleading ignorance of
the true merits of the people. It is difficult to speak of this British
interference in any but the most forcible and unmeasured terms of
condemnation. Not a solitary excuse can be truly made for it; and when
the selfishness of that policy is thoroughly appreciated (which is
rapidly becoming the case), the atrocities committed by its sanction,
and their consequences, will be looked back upon with grief and sadness
by every loyal Englishman.
The first and most important of the above-mentioned reports was made by
Mr. Consul Meadows to Lord Russell. Mr. Meadows was better acquainted
with the Ti-pings than any other English official in existence. He was
the most talented in China, the most honourable and disinterested;
therefore, it may be that his statements were not regarded, and that his
presence at Shanghae became an inconvenience. This difficulty was soon
surmounted by the removal of Mr. Meadows from Shanghae to New-chwang,
very soon after his truthful and independent exposition of the Ti-ping
rebellion, and by naming as his successor a Consul who was more pliable.
The following despatch of Mr. Meadows bears date "February 19, 1861,"
and is worthy of most attentive perusal:--
"CONSUL MEADOWS TO LORD J. RUSSELL.--(Received April 12.)
"Shanghae, February 19, 1861.
"British trade and British-India trade with this country, and
the revenues derived from the one and the other, are among the
most important of British interests abroad. A necessary
condition to the flourishing of these is the existence of
order--of security to life and property--in this country; and
the existence of this order and security, again, requires the
existence of a strong national government. These propositions
are so well established that I merely state them.
"But the hitherto existing Imperial Government, that of the
Manchoo or Ta-tsing dynasty, which was already becoming weak
from internal causes, has received its death-blows from the
external action, first of British arms alone, and now of British
and French combined. No strong national government now exists
anywhere; and in large, and to us very important, portions of
the country, anarchy and insecurity prevail.
"It becomes, therefore, of the utmost importance to look around
us for some other power in the nation to take its place. If we
find any such other power, we must not only not attack it, but
must earnestly desire its speedy growth. An adherence, not less
wise than just, to the principle of non-intervention, together
with the due observance of the treaties with the Ta-tsing
Government, should prevent our taking direct positive steps to
aid that growth; but assuredly it would be a most suicidal
course, as regards those large interests to which I have
pointed, first to achieve the destruction of the government we
find existing, and then to proceed to prevent any other from
coming into existence.
"Now we have such another power in the Taepings, and such
another government in the government which they have established
at Nanking.
"It has been, and by many is still, denied that the Taepings
have any regular government, or can be considered a political
power.
"For one moment I will grant this, but only in order to point
out that after maintaining themselves for eleven years in arms
in China, and for eight in the centre of the empire, the
Taepings are manifestly a power of some sort, and to ask--Are
we, because this power does not come up to all that is expected
of it, are we, therefore, gratuitously to attack it, and either
greatly lessen or altogether destroy its chances of ever
realizing those expectations? What else have we got to look to
for the re-establishment of a government having power to
preserve order?
"But I entirely deny that the Taepings have no regular
government, and have no claim to be considered a political
power.
"Ten years ago, almost immediately after they rose in arms, they
threw off the characteristics of local insurgents, and
proclaimed themselves the irreconcilable enemies of the Ta-tsing
dynasty. From that time to this they have never left us in doubt
of their object. It has always been the great one of making
themselves the heads of the first state in Asia, and the
governors of the largest people in the world. So much has been
established, not only by their own published manifestoes, but by
the official documents of their enemies.
"As to their manner of pursuing that object, whether it is such
as befits a power assuming to be political, it would too much
prolong even this letter to meet in detail all the objections
of those foreigners who declaim against them.
"Speaking generally, these objections may be classed under two
heads. First, those which are based on the application to this
region and its peoples, of arguments drawn from the state of
society and modes of political action of Western Europe, in
defiance of the fact that these arguments are wholly
inapplicable to a state of civilization and a polity so
different; and secondly, those which are applied in entire
disregard of the parallel transactions in Western Europe itself,
a disregard of obvious analogies, which can only be the result
of great ignorance or of wilful prejudice.
"Among the former, are nearly all the objections to their
military discipline, tactics, and strategy, and to their
administrative forms, whether of a civil or a military nature.
"Among the latter, are objections such as that they do not fix
themselves in the places they take; that they take them and then
leave them again, &c.
"The obvious rejoinder, drawn from the history of Western Europe
is, how often, during the great rebellion in England, were
important cities and strong places taken and evacuated or
retaken? Did that prove that the English noblemen and gentlemen
who first headed that rebellion were unfit to establish a
government? Did it prove that Cromwell was neither a general nor
an administrator? And when, ten years ago, the Italians left
Milan to be reoccupied by its former oppressors, after these had
been once expelled, and also allowed the foreign dynasties to
reinstate themselves in their principalities, did that prove
that the Italian party which aimed at expelling all these
foreigners was not a political power?
"A stock argument against the Taepings was drawn from their
destruction of the suburbs of the cities they occupied. This,
however, was finally silenced when, on the approach of the
Taepings to Shanghae a few months ago, the British and French
garrison in that city fired all its suburbs, not excepting the
densely peopled and commercially important suburb between the
city and the river.
"Then, again, ruthless and wanton slaughter, not only of the
foreign Manchoos, but of their Chinese countrymen, has been
urged against the Taepings as a proof that they were a mere gang
of robbers and murderers. But was there during the revolutionary
struggle in France no mutual killing of the opposing parties of
Frenchmen? I mention only the Reign of Terror, and the
'Noyades,' and, leaving it to your Lordship's memory to add
further illustrative transactions, I ask, do such
well-established historical facts prove that the revolutionary
party were merely a large gang of robbers and murderers, and not
a political power?
"While, however, considering it an established fact in the
history of the Taepings that they, on taking Nanking, put the
whole of the Manchoos to death, not sparing even the women and
children; and while thinking it highly probable that they will
treat in the same way any other of the military colonies of the
Tartar conquerors of their country that may fall into their
power, I have long ago arrived at the full conviction that the
tales of the slaughter committed by them on their own countrymen
are not only exaggerated, but very grossly exaggerated.
"My own experience has furnished me with an instructive example
of gross exaggeration of the kind. In the beginning of
September, 1853, when, not the Taepings, but the Triad Society
rebels, suddenly rose and seized the city of Shanghae, I was
travelling alone from Ningpo to Shanghae, _via_ Chapoo. It was
on reaching this latter place, about sixty miles from Shanghae,
that I first got the news from the crew of my own river-craft,
which had come there to meet me. The insurrection having broken
out just as they had left, they themselves could give no
particulars about it. But from other vessels, and from the local
merchants and officials, I learnt that there had been a fearful
slaughter in the city of Shanghae; that the streets were covered
with dead bodies and blood; that the foreigners and the rebels
had been fighting; and that the whole of the foreign community
had retired in the shipping outside of Woo-sung. So uniform and
consistent were these reports, and so certain did it appear that
I should be unable to pass Shanghae out to Woo-sung, that I set
about studying the Chinese maps, with a view of finding a
succession of river-passages by which I might, keeping some
twenty or thirty miles distant, make my way through the country
inside of it, and so out into the Great River, and down that to
the reported position of the foreign shipping. But before
undertaking so serious a circuit I, of course, determined to
approach nearer to Shanghae city. As I did so, I found the
prevalent reports less and less alarming; and at length, when
about twelve miles distant, ascertained the fact--one well known
here at the time--that there had been no fighting whatever with
the foreigners, and that, in the whole city the slaughter and
bloodshed was limited to the killing of one man. Yet the current
and fully-believed reports only sixty miles off were exactly
like those we have so often heard of the slaughter committed by
the Taepings. We know, from the experience of British troops
during the last twenty years, that much loss of life usually
ensues on the forcible occupation of Chinese cities from men
destroying their families, and then themselves; from women,
young and old, committing suicide; and from an unreasoning
terror, that drives people into deep canals or rivers, in vain
attempts to cross them. In these very ways several lives were
nearly lost, a few months back, in the Chinese portion of this
settlement before an alarm subsided which was caused by a sudden
outcry that the Taepings were entering it, none being at the
time within twenty miles' distance.
"From these habits of the Chinese, we may infer that there has
been, in the many populous cities occupied by the Taepings in
this province, much loss of life among women and children, as
well as grown men--non-combatants; and the inference is
supported by the fact of foreigners who having visited such
cities seeing in the canals many unwounded bodies. But that the
Taeping troops have directly put to death a greater proportion
of their non-combatant countrymen, or have even refused quarter
to the armed, to a greater extent than have done revolutionary
parties in the civil wars of England and France, is, I am fully
satisfied, a prejudiced repetition on the part of inimical
foreigners of the interested calumnies of the Ta-tsing party.
"Some time back it had become a good conclusion that in the
tracts of country occupied by the Taepings there must be greater
security for life and property than in those occupied by the
Ta-tsings. We knew that the Taepings had long given up that
system of universal conscription on which they acted in 1853,
and which then made their approach a source of peculiar terror.
We knew that they depended on voluntary enrolment for the
support of their fighting force, and that they were earnestly
endeavouring to get the inhabitants generally of hamlets and
open towns to remain at their usual occupations. This being the
case, it was plain that the Taepings could preserve the public
peace better than the Ta-tsings. For the bulk of the leading
officials among the former were themselves not only fighting
men, but about the best fighting men that they had; men who owed
their position to their military qualities. To them there could,
among their own party, be no open defiance. There might be
nothing of that military drill and tactics which characterize
European armies, but that discipline, which consists in strict
obedience to orders could not fail to be there. On the other
hand, the bulk of the leading Ta-tsing officials, the mandarins,
were about the most inactive and timid, the most unwarlike of
their party, and were, we knew, compelled to employ, as their
chief fighting men, the ex-pirates of the south-eastern
coast-land, who, with their followers, would not content
themselves with their official pay, but would also, in defiance
of the wishes of their weak employers, exact money from, or
plunder outright, the peaceable populations whom they were hired
to protect.
"These inferences have been amply confirmed by recent
unquestionable experiences. Mr. John, an English missionary of
education and intelligence, went two or three months ago from
Shanghae to Soo-chow, and thence to Nanking, where he stayed for
seven days. Mr. John put the question to the Taeping officials
why it was that the walled cities held by them were so entirely
deserted by their former populations of tradesmen, artificers,
&c. He received answers to the effect that those cities had been
transformed into fortresses, necessary to be held for the
reconquest of the country from the Manchoos; that having been
once deserted, no population was readmitted, as, under the guise
of tradesmen, &c., they might gradually be filled with hostile
forces; but that, as soon as their own progress advanced their
frontier to other points, they themselves would be anxious to
see these places repeopled by a peaceful population. In the mean
time they were doing their best to protect, in the hamlets,
villages, and open towns, all who choose to remain in them, in
quiet submission to the Taeping rule.
"Now these explanations and statements were fully supported by
the nature of the circumstances and by what Mr. John saw
himself. He was altogether about a month in the country held by
the Taepings. He traversed a tract of that country of about 120
miles in extent (Tsing-poo to Nanking), and travelled by night
as well as by day, quite unarmed, and never molested. He found
the country people quietly pursuing their usual occupations;
and--a proof of the understanding between them and their Taeping
rulers--saw the soldiers of the latter moving from place to
place in large bodies without inspiring terror, and in parties
of three or two without being assailed. At Soo-chow, both Mr.
John and a well-educated and observant Chinese who accompanied
him, and whom I questioned closely, saw the veritable landed
gentry coming in parties to give in to the civil governor their
adhesion to the Taeping dynasty.
"What, on the other hand, is the state of the country on this
side of the Ta-tsing lines? Not only do the exactions of the
mandarins for military objects equal any similar demands that
can be made by the Taepings, but piracy and robbery are well
known to be everywhere rife. During an excursion, in the end of
October, of some ninety miles up the Yang-tze, I had myself full
opportunity of observing the prevalence of piracy and the alarm
of the country people; and reports came constantly in, on all
sides, showing that the reign of lawless violence is rather
increasing than diminishing.
"It is impossible to say how much of China proper the Taepings
hold altogether, clear of Ta-tsing authorities or troops. But in
proof of their right to be considered a political power, we have
the fact that their armies are operating successfully up into
Shang-tung in the North, down into Kwang-tung and Kwang-se in the
South, and in Sze-chuen in the West, while nothing prevents
their penetrating to the sea in the East but the presence of the
foreign forces at Shanghae.
"On the religion of the Taepings little need here be said.
Viewed as a piece of contemporary history, the fact of the rise
and progress, in this old seat of Confucianism and Buddhism, of
the Bible-spreading Taeping Christianity--be its exact character
what it may--is one of the most interesting spectacles that the
annals of the human race present; and if the Taepings succeed in
becoming the rulers of the Chinese people, it will prove one of
the most momentous. A foreign official agent, whose nature or
the limited extent of whose information permits of his viewing
that spectacle with indifference, must surely be adjudged
mentally unfitted for the career he has chosen. But except as a
deeply interesting piece of contemporary history, we have
nothing to do with it. If we aid the Taepings on account of
their professed creed, we propagate religion by the sword; if we
attack them on account of it, we engage in a religious
persecution.
"One circumstance, which does not directly interest us, remains
to be considered; the disposition of the Taepings towards us. On
this point, the testimony is continuous, always consistent, and
remarkably satisfactory. On three or four occasions, on which
foreign war-vessels have, without any previous communication,
steamed right up to the river batteries of the Taeping fortified
places, they have exercised the right--a right inherent in every
belligerent power--of endeavouring to keep off a suspicious and,
for their means of defence, formidable force. But so soon as
they have been told that it was not the hired foreign steamers
of their Ta-tsing enemies, but the Government vessels of neutral
foreigners that were before them, they have in every instance at
once ceased firing. Their superior officers have fully explained
that if foreign neutral vessels would send small unarmed boats
in advance, they would not be fired at; and whenever this has
been done, they have kept faith. As for the white flag of truce,
it is simply absurd to suppose that that purely conventional
signal of the Western world can be known to the commander of
every Taeping battery. But the Taepings have a complete
justification for disregarding it, even if they knew it; they
are fighting with an enemy who would not hesitate an instant
about sending in his own foreign steamers to open fire or effect
a hostile landing, with a white flag or a British ensign flying
at each mast-head. In no one of the numerous cases of one or
more unarmed foreigners advancing to the Taeping outposts, since
I first landed at Nanking in April, 1853, up till the most
recent visits of Shanghae traders to Soo-chow, have they been
received otherwise than peacefully; while in several cases those
who have visited them as prejudiced unfriends have been
converted into well-wishers by the friendliness of their
reception.
"They appeared in force before Shanghae six months ago, but I
have good reasons for feeling satisfied that they were deluded
into so doing by certain foreigners who wished to bring on an
irremediable hostility between them and us, and who had held out
to them the hope that we should give up the place to them. They
fired a few ineffectual shots at the Chinese troops who were
mingled with the British on the walls, and who kept discharging
their matchlocks. But they did not fire at all where there were
only British in front of them, and not one of the foreign
soldiers received a wound, though a number of the Taepings were
killed by our fire. Lastly, during the half-year that has
elapsed since they retired, foreigners have been received at
their places, if not with the same hopeful cordiality, as
peacefully and as civilly as before.
"We have a long succession of irrefragable proofs that the
Taepings do earnestly desire friendly commercial relations with
us. The fact is so well known that inimical foreigners have been
constrained to endeavour, with a curiously blind ingenuity, to
turn it against them. 'All that is mere pretence,' it has been
argued; 'if they felt sure they were strong enough to attack us
with advantage, they would do it.' In reply, I ask if it be so,
in how far do the Taepings differ in that respect from the
Russians, French, and Americans? Is the peaceful and civil
reception the English get from these nations the result of pure
friendliness or of policy? Would they attack us if they felt
sure they could do so with advantage? What are our Channel
fleets, our fortifications, and our 150,000 volunteers for?
"A few years back the aid of a small British army and naval
squadron, operating along a portion of the Great River, could
perhaps have enabled the Manchoos to suppress this particular
Chinese rising against their rule; but now it would require a
large fleet of steamers, operating throughout some 1,500 to
2,000 miles of the Great River and its larger branches, and some
20,000 troops, operating in three or four complete small armies
in different parts of the tract of country mentioned above as
being more or less in the occupation of Taeping forces, and
which extends about 800 to 900 miles from north to south, and
1,000 to 1,100 from east to west. It would prove one of the most
troublesome and costly wars that England ever engaged in; costly
as regarded the direct outlay, and still more costly as regarded
the consequences to our trade; for the region in question is
that which, practically speaking, produces the whole of our tea
and silk exports, and which consumes the larger portion of our
manufactured imports; and the effect of our hostilities in it
would be to overspread it with anarchy and desolation."
From this despatch it will be seen that every point upon which the
British Government has based its hostilities against the Ti-pings is
plainly disproved. The last paragraph may be regarded by some few
bigoted pro-Imperialists as an exaggeration; but when they glance at the
present state of China (1865), and see the Ti-pings still victoriously
disputing the supremacy of the Manchoo, when they look upon the very
diminished export of silk, and upon the rebellion rampant in every
province of China, they can hardly dispute that a "large fleet of
steamers" and 20,000 troops was correctly considered by Mr. Meadows
necessary to suppress the revolution.
As for the justice of the British intervention, it is hardly necessary
to speak any further. The belligerent character of the Ti-ping rebellion
was recognised immediately after its origin, simply because the British
remained neutral towards a Power carrying on war, and moreover, from the
fact that English representatives sought out and made guarantees of
neutrality with the Ti-ping authorities. But, while openly recognising
the belligerent rights of the revolutionists, the British Government has
invariably evaded a strict interpretation of its professions, and given
a tacit support to the Manchoos, thereby making themselves a party to
the war, and constituting themselves the allies of the latter Power.
The Ti-pings were fully entitled to equal rights with the Imperialists,
whether upon the high seas, neutral waters, at the treaty ports, or
elsewhere. They possessed a settled Government at Nankin, a vast
territory, and _several_ ports; and such being the case, should, and had
the British authorities acted honourably would, have enjoyed any and
every privilege given or allowed to the other party in the civil war.
When the Spanish colonies cast off their allegiance to Spain, when
Brazil revolted against Portugal, when Texas seceded from Mexico, when
Greece rebelled against its Turkish rulers, when the Southern States of
America seceded from the Union, when Santo Domingo rose against Spain,
when the Neapolitans revolted against their Government, in every one of
these, and countless other cases, each belligerent as a matter of right
received equal privileges from neutral Powers.
Had England and other neutral Powers acted according to their own laws,
they would have been bound to recognise the independence of the
Ti-pings, for the utter inability of the ousted Manchoo Government to
recover its authority within a reasonable time was apparent. More than
this, it was universally admitted that the Tartars, if unassisted by
foreigners, would be overthrown, and when such contingency became
certain, England was dragged in to assist them. The excuse about danger
to British lives and property from the occupation of the treaty ports by
the insurgents is proved false by the capture of Shanghae in 1853, and
the capture of Ningpo in 1861. The only other excuse of any moment is
the "_might_ injure trade" one; but is that to be considered a
sufficient justification? In all the cases of rebellion just cited,
England remained neutral; why then has she been made to assume to
herself, in China _only_, the right to interfere in internecine strife?
Why not interfere in America for the sake of trade and to prevent
so-called rebels from collecting duties? As principle has nothing to do
with the policy pursued in China, why should it elsewhere? Or why may it
not be boasted that England feared to interfere in America, and
therefore refrained; but acted differently in China, having no fear.
The _Shanghae Times_, a paper giving its general support to the
Government, in its issue of March 15, 1862, thus describes the
initiation of hostilities against the Ti-pings:--
"We believe that Admiral Hope is the first English officer of
the present century who has adopted the unsoldierly practice of
making war without having declared war. Having recognised the
Taepings as a Power, according to the usage of civilized
nations, he ought to have given them the alternative of retreat,
submission, or butchery, before commencing the latter. This he
did not. But as the Imperialists served him at Taku, he served
the Taepings at Ming-hong. Honourable men condemned the conduct
of the Imperial general at the Taku, and if the code of honour
has not changed since then, it has been _grossly_ violated in
the two recent attacks on the Taepings."
We have in a former chapter noticed the false assertion of the British
minister in China with regard to "all classes of observers" condemning
the religion of the revolutionists, and his equally unfounded statement
that the Revds. J. Edkins and Griffith John met with an "ungracious
reception." The following reports by the Rev. G. John (of the London
Missionary Society) will not only expose the truthlessness of Mr. Bruce,
but also multiply proofs as to the Christianity of the Ti-pings, the
evil policy of the British Government, and the astounding apathy of the
missionary body at large.
The Rev. Griffith John, in a report to the secretary of his society,
dated "Shanghae, December 6, 1860," states:--
"They" (the Ti-pings) "have created a vacuum, not only in the
temples, but also in the hearts of the people, which remains to
be filled. This is the missionary's work--_a work that might be
done immediately, were it not for the unaccountable policy of
the representatives of foreign Powers at this port_. My
principal object in going has been fully realized.
"My object was to obtain from the chief an edict of religious
toleration. This I have obtained. It gives full permission to
missionaries of every persuasion to enter into and live in the
insurgents' territory, for the purpose of carrying on missionary
work. The phraseology, in some parts, is bombastic, and
therefore objectionable; but the simple meaning is full
toleration to all Christians, whether Protestant or Catholic. 'I
see that the missionaries are sincere and faithful men, and that
they do not count suffering with Christ anything; and because of
this I esteem them very highly.' Such are the words of the
edict. Then comes a command to the chief officers to issue
orders to all the (insurgent) brethren to treat the missionaries
well. I showed the edict at Su-cheu, and asked the chiefs if
they would help me to get a house, a chapel, &c. 'Yes,' said
they, 'you come, and it will be all right.' I send you the
original of this edict, written by the young prince himself, and
bearing the seal of his father, and I intend to furnish you with
a translation by the first opportunity. _I firmly believe that
God is uprooting idolatry in the land, through the insurgents,
and that He will by means of them_, in connection with the
foreign missionary, plant Christianity in its stead. Let the
prayers of our brethren in England be more fervent than ever in
behalf of China. If these men succeed, the days of idolatry are
numbered in the land. I am fully convinced that, should they
succeed to establish order within the boundary of the Keang-su
province, it would be _nominally_ a Christian province before
the expiration of twenty years. The same observation will hold
good of all the other provinces."
This is the edict referred to by Mr. John:--
"'EDICT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION,' BY THE CHIEF OF THE CHINESE
INSURGENTS.[2]
"'Having received the decree of my Heavenly Father (God), of my
Heavenly adopted Father (Christ), and of my Father (the
Celestial King), I command all the King's officers, both civil
and military, and all the Brethren, to be acquainted with it.
The true doctrine of my Father (God), and of my adopted Father
(Christ), is the religion of Heaven. The religion of Christ
(Protestant religion), and the religion of the Lord of Heaven
(Roman Catholic religion), are included in it. The whole world,
together with my father and myself, are one family. Those who
lovingly and harmoniously observe the regulations of the
heavenly religion are permitted to come and visit (us). Now,
from the _memorial_ presented to us by my uncles, Kan, Tsan,
Chung, and others, I learn that the foreign teacher G. John and
his friends, esteeming the Kingdom of Heaven, and reverencing
and believing in my Father (God), and my adopted Father
(Christ), to whom be thanks for the bestowment upon us of
authority, power, and wonders, of which those who are far and
near have reverentially heard--have come for the express purpose
of seeing the light, of beholding God and Christ, and of
requesting permission to spread abroad the true doctrine.
Seeing, however, that the present time is a time of war, and
that the soldiers are scattered abroad in every direction, I am
truly afraid that the missionaries might be injured by following
the rabble soldiery, and that thus serious consequence might
ensue. Still, I truly perceive that these (missionaries) are
sincere and faithful men, and that they count it nothing to
suffer with Christ; and because of this I esteem them very
highly.
"'Let the kings inform all the officers and others, that they
must all act lovingly and harmoniously towards these men, and by
no means engender contention and strife. Let all know, that the
Father (God), my adopted Father (Christ), my father and myself,
are one family; and let these men (missionaries) be treated
exceedingly well.
"'Respect this.'
"NOTE.--The Kan-wang told us that the chief is anxious that his
son should feel an interest in the propagation of the Gospel,
and therefore directed him to write it....
"The expressions 'to the light,' and 'behold Christ and God,'
are explained in the fact that Nanking is the Jerusalem of the
Celestial dynasty. I asked the Kan-wang if the above edict opens
up the whole of the insurgents' territory--Nanking not
excepted--to missionary operations. He replied that it does....
"Thus, then, the above throws open the whole of the insurgents'
territory to missionary work, so far as the insurgents
themselves are concerned. Here and there the phraseology is
objectionable; still, this point is quite clear: they have done
this not in ignorance, but with their eyes quite open to the
difference which exists between them and ourselves."
In a letter, dated twelve days later than that already quoted from, Mr.
John gives this reason for not going to live among the Ti-pings:--
"When I returned from Nankin I fully intended to go to live in
that city, if practicable; but after much thought, _and some
consultation with those who are in authority_, I have come to
the conclusion that it would be premature to do so just now....
The river, I am told on good authority, is to be opened at once,
and the ports of Han-kow and Kin-kiang are to become consular
ports. Another expedition is about to go up the river, and then
it will be determined what is to be done with the insurgents.
They may be treated as friends, or, on the other hand, as foes.
If not as friends, I AM CONVINCED THAT IT WILL BE OUR FAULT,
because they cherish the kindliest feeling towards us, in spite
of our conduct towards them when they visited Shanghae."
We will conclude Mr. John's reports with three short extracts; the first
of which clearly shows what good might have been effected by the British
missionaries had they performed their duty; the second goes far to
establish the superiority of the Ti-pings over the Manchoos.
1. "The insurgents are making rapid strides, and are determined,
as you will learn from my journal, to uproot idolatry in the
land, _and to plant Christianity in its room_. The former they
will do with a strong hand, and the latter will not be left
undone, _if the Churches and missionaries are alive to their
duty in reference to this great movement_."
2. "They have doubtless gross defects; but in every
respect--religious, political, social, &c.--they are centuries
ahead of the Imperialists, and I cannot but wish them God
speed."
The third and last extract from Mr. John's reports is taken from one
dated "February 2, 1861," and fully shadows forth what England has _now_
been compelled to understand, and what every sensible person fully
comprehended long since. Mr. John states:--
"It is fortunate for us that the Tartars have their hands full
just now, _as the value of the recent treaty rests solely on the
weakness of the existing dynasty_. The Tartars hate us with an
insatiable hatred, and would, in spite of the treaty, recommence
warlike operations to-morrow had they the power. To break faith
with the _barbarian_ is not crime but virtue, according to their
creed, if his humiliation and expulsion might thereby be
effected. From the Manchoos we have nothing to hope, but
everything to fear. They are sworn enemies to Christianity and
civilization, and they have set their iron faces determinedly
against both. They _can_ do but little at present. The wonderful
progress of the insurrection in the South, during the last
year, and the repeated defeats and the complete discomfiture of
the Tartar hosts in the North, have thoroughly undermined the
Manchoo power. It must fall. There is no power in China to
uphold it. The Kwang-si insurrection, on the other hand, must
triumph, _if foreign Powers do not interfere_. The Manchoos
might as well attempt to blow the sun out of the heavens as to
quench this flame which their folly and tyranny have kindled....
"The insurgents themselves are still determinately opposed to
idolatry in all its features. At their approach the idols
vanish, and the priests of Buddh and Tau disappear. The downfall
of idolatry in the land seems to be bound up with their success.
Never did China present such a spectacle to the Christian world.
Will the Church, _unfaithful to her Head and false to herself_,
as the depository of the blessings of light and life for the
world, look on with indifference? Shall the four hundred
millions of China remain in their state of darkness and death,
_because of the worldliness and deadness_ of the people of God?"
To these questions the British Government appears to have returned an
affirmative answer.
A few extracts from a report of the Rev. W. Muirhead, in harmony with
the testimonies of other missionaries, both as to the death-blow
idolatry had received from the victorious arms of the Ti-pings, and the
general knowledge of Christianity possessed by them, shall close our
quoted evidence for the present. In the spring of 1861, Mr. Muirhead
spent a month among the Ti-pings at Nankin, and while there was
constantly engaged in preaching about the city, and thus describes his
experience:--
"Going about sometimes for several hours a day, I have been
abundantly encouraged by the number and attention of the
audiences. It seems as if there were a foundation to go upon,
from the amount of religious knowledge diffused among the
people. There is a response, if not in their hearts, at least in
their thoughts, to the tidings of mercy. They are made familiar
at every step with the name and compassion of the Heavenly
Father, _by the unprecedented practice of recording the fact
over every door_. When, therefore, the same truths are announced
in their hearing by a foreign missionary, _they give a ready
assent, and express their cordial approval_. How different is
all this from our experience in Shanghae and elsewhere! There we
have a hard and strong ground to work upon; ignorance and
_opposition_ prevail in abundant measure. Here, on the part
both of the military and civilians, there _is_ knowledge, and
there _is_ appreciation of the truth to a certain extent, which
renders the spiritual enforcement of it a more easy and pleasant
duty."
These extracts must naturally make one believe that the "all classes of
observers," so cunningly invented by Mr. Bruce and his ministerial
friends, consist of Mr. American Baptist Missionary Holmes.
The Kan-wang, the missionaries' friend, having left the city while Mr.
Muirhead was there, that event was mentioned in the following
language:--
"In prospect of his going out, I had occasion some time ago to
allude to his constant dependence on God, and to urge upon him
the duty of earnest prayer. But in this I was anticipated by a
previous request of his own, when, after describing the trials
and difficulties of his situation, he said to me: '_Mr.
Muirhead, pray for me!_' He has need of our prayers, and I trust
his request will be attended to by many friends at home."
Poor Kan-wang! The only prayers have been those devoutly entertained by
opium traders and "indemnity" interested people for the destruction of
him and his confederates.
Of the Ti-ping women Mr. Muirhead states:--
"While walking along the streets, the number of females that are
seen on the way is rather a novelty. They are in general well
dressed, and of very respectable appearance. Many are riding on
horseback, others are walking, and most of them have large feet.
Not a few stop to hear our preaching, and always conduct
themselves with perfect propriety. _This is new, as compared
with the former course of things, and the whole reminds one
partly of home life._ It will be a blessing if the revolution
should tend to break up the system of female exclusion, hitherto
practised."
We will conclude our extracts from Mr. Muirhead's report with the
following interesting account of a conversation between himself and a
young Ti-ping soldier:--
"And now a word or two, with regard to the character and
prospects of the movement. Those engaged in it speak not
boastfully, but calmly and confidently, of its success. They
acknowledge the difficulties in the way, yet believe in the Lord
God that they shall be established. They do not apprehend it
will be an easy thing to overcome their enemies; but fighting,
as they think, under the banners of the 'Heavenly Father' and
'Heavenly Brother,' they contemplate a happy issue as a matter
of course.
"As Kan-wang's followers were assembling in front of his palace,
a young man came upstairs. I asked him if he was going out to
join the army. He said yes. 'Was he not afraid of being wounded
or killed?' 'Oh, no,' he replied, 'the Heavenly Father will
befriend me.' 'Well, but suppose you should be killed, what
then?' 'Why, my soul will go to heaven.' 'How can you expect to
go to heaven? What merit have you to get there?' 'None, none in
myself. It is entirely through the merits of the Heavenly
Brother that this is to be done.' 'Who is the Heavenly Brother?'
'I am not very learned,' he said, 'and request instruction.' I
then began to tell him that He was the Son of the Heavenly
Father; but before I had finished the sentence, he replied
correctly. 'What great work did Christ do?' I asked. The young
man gave an explicit statement of the Saviour's work for
sinners, of his coming into the world, suffering and dying in
the room of sinful man, in order to redeem us from sin and
misery. I inquired if he believed all this. 'Assuredly,' was his
reply. 'When did you join the dynasty?' 'Last year.' 'Can you
read?' 'No.' 'Who instructed you in these things?' 'The
Tsan-wang.' 'What does he in the way of instructing his people?'
'He has daily service in his palace, and often preaches to them
alike at home and when engaged in the field.' 'What book does he
use?' 'He has a number belonging to the dynasty.' 'Do you know
the New Testament?' 'Yes, but cannot read it.' 'Can you repeat
the doxology of the Heavenly Father?' He went over it correctly.
It contains in simple language the fundamental tenets of
Christianity. 'Are there any special laws or commands connected
with the dynasty?' 'There are the ten commandments.' 'Repeat
them.' He went over a number of them, till he came to the sixth.
'Now,' I said, 'how is this command observed by you, seeing that
so much cruelty and wickedness are practised by your brethren
all around?' 'Oh,' he replied, 'in so far as fighting in the
open field is concerned, that is all fair play and cannot be
helped. It is not intended in the command.' 'No,' I remarked,
'that is not my meaning; but look at your brethren going
privately into the country and robbing and killing the innocent
people; what of that?' 'It is very bad, and such will only go to
hell.' 'What, notwithstanding their adherence to the dynasty,
and fighting under the same banners as yourself?' 'Yes, that is
no matter; when the laws of Christ and the Heavenly Father are
not attended to, these guilty individuals ought to die and go to
hell.' 'But is not this the case with a great number of your
adherents?' 'Alas! it is especially among our new recruits,
whose hearts are not impressed with the true doctrine.' 'In all
the public offices is care taken to instruct the soldiers and
civilians connected with them?' 'Yes, every man, woman, and
child of reasonable age in the capital, can repeat the doxology
of the Heavenly Father.' 'And what about those in the country?'
'Those who have short hair are not yet sufficiently taught, but
books are being distributed amongst them, in order that they may
learn those things."
Can this be called a "blasphemous and immoral" basis of religion? If
those who so designated it possessed but a tithe of the temporal
practice and spiritual faith of this illiterate young Ti-ping, they
would be happier men; but it must be admitted that their sentiments and
actions hardly induce such a belief.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] _Vide_ p. 6, "Further Papers relating to the Rebellion in China,
1862."
[2] "The original is written by the young prince, in the name of his
father, on satin, with the vermilion pencil, and stamped with the seal
of the Taeping-wang, the Celestial king."