Under these circumstances we are constrained to conclude

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, : CIVIL ACTION

INC., et al. :

:

v. :

:

UNITED STATES, et al. : NO. 01-1303

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

MULTNOMAH COUNTY PUBLIC : CIVIL ACTION

LIBRARY, et al. :

:

v. :

:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al. : NO. 01-1322

Before: BECKER, Chief Circuit Judge,

FULLAM and BARTLE, District Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

May 31, 2002

Becker, Chief Circuit Judge

CONTENTS

I. Preliminary Statement

II. Findings of Fact

A. Statutory Framework

1. Nature and Operation of the E-rate and LSTA Programs

2. CIPA

a. CIPA's Amendments to the E-rate Program

b. CIPA's Amendments to the LSTA Program

B. Identity of the Plaintiffs

1. Library and Library Association Plaintiffs

2. Patron and Patron Association Plaintiffs

3. Web Publisher Plaintiffs

C. The Internet

1. Background

2. The Indexable Web, the "Deep Web"; Their Size and

Rates of Growth and Change

3. The Amount of Sexually Explicit Material on the Web

D. American Public Libraries

1. The Mission of Public Libraries, and Their

Reference and Collection Development Practices

2. The Internet in Public Libraries

a. Internet Use Policies in Public Libraries

b. Methods for Regulating Internet Use

E. Internet Filtering Technology

1. What Is Filtering Software, Who Makes It, and What Does It Do?

2. The Methods that Filtering Companies Use to

Compile Category Lists

a. The "Harvesting" Phase

b. The "Winnowing" or Categorization Phase

c. The Process for "Re-Reviewing" Web Pages

After Their Initial Categorization

3. The Inherent Tradeoff Between Overblocking and

Underblocking

4. Attempts to Quantify Filtering Programs' Rates of

Over- and Underblocking

5. Methods of Obtaining Examples of Erroneously

Blocked Web Sites

6. Examples of Erroneously Blocked Web Sites

7. Conclusion: The Effectiveness of Filtering Programs

III. Analytic Framework for the Opinion: The Centrality of Dole

and the Role of the Facial Challenge

IV. Level of Scrutiny Applicable to Content-based Restrictions

on Internet Access in Public Libraries

A. Overview of Public Forum Doctrine

B. Contours of the Relevant Forum: the Library's

Collection as a Whole or the Provision of Internet Access?

C. Content-based Restrictions in Designated Public Fora

D. Reasons for Applying Strict Scrutiny

1. Selective Exclusion From a "Vast Democratic Forum"

2. Analogy to Traditional Public Fora

V. Application of Strict Scrutiny

A. State Interests

1. Preventing the Dissemination of Obscenity, Child

Pornography, and Material Harmful to Minors

2. Protecting the Unwilling Viewer

3. Preventing Unlawful or Inappropriate Conduct

4. Summary

B. Narrow Tailoring

C. Less Restrictive Alternatives

D. Do CIPA's Disabling Provisions Cure the Defect?

VI. Conclusion; Severability

FOOTNOTES

1. Preliminary Statement

This case challenges an act of Congress that makes the use

of filtering software by public libraries a condition of the

receipt of federal funding. The Internet, as is well known, is a

vast, interactive medium based on a decentralized network of

computers around the world. Its most familiar feature is the

World Wide Web (the "Web"), a network of computers known as

servers that provide content to users. The Internet provides

easy access to anyone who wishes to provide or distribute

information to a worldwide audience; it is used by more than 143

million Americans. Indeed, much of the world's knowledge

accumulated over centuries is available to Internet users almost

instantly. Approximately 10% of the Americans who use the

Internet access it at public libraries. And approximately 95% of

all public libraries in the United States provide public access

to the Internet.

While the beneficial effect of the Internet in expanding the

amount of information available to its users is self-evident,

its low entry barriers have also led to a perverse result,

facilitation of the widespread dissemination of hardcore

pornography within the easy reach not only of adults who have

every right to access it (so long as it is not legally obscene or

child pornography), but also of children and adolescents to whom

it may be quite harmful. The volume of pornography on the

Internet is huge, and the record before us demonstrates that

public library patrons of all ages, many from ages 11 to 15, have

regularly sought to access it in public library settings. There

are more than 100,000 pornographic Web sites that can be accessed

for free and without providing any registration information, and

tens of thousands of Web sites contain child pornography.

Libraries have reacted to this situation by utilizing a

number of means designed to insure that patrons avoid illegal

(and unwanted) content while also enabling patrons to find the

content they desire. Some libraries have trained patrons in how

to use the Internet while avoiding illegal content, or have

directed their patrons to "preferred" Web sites that librarians

have reviewed. Other libraries have utilized such devices as

recessing the computer monitors, installing privacy screens, and

monitoring implemented by a "tap on the shoulder" of patrons

perceived to be offending library policy. Still others, viewing

the foregoing approaches as inadequate or uncomfortable (some

librarians do not wish to confront patrons), have purchased

commercially available software that blocks certain categories of

material deemed by the library board as unsuitable for use in

their facilities. Indeed, 7% of American public libraries use

blocking software for adults. Although such programs are

somewhat effective in blocking large quantities of pornography,

they are blunt instruments that not only "underblock," i.e., fail

to block access to substantial amounts of content that the

library boards wish to exclude, but also, central to this

litigation, "overblock," i.e., block access to large quantities

of material that library boards do not wish to exclude and that

is constitutionally protected.

Most of the libraries that use filtering software seek to

block sexually explicit speech. While most libraries include in

their physical collection copies of volumes such as The Joy of

Sex and The Joy of Gay Sex, which contain quite explicit

photographs and descriptions, filtering software blocks large

quantities of other, comparable information about health and

sexuality that adults and teenagers seek on the Web. One

teenager testified that the Internet access in a public library

was the only venue in which she could obtain information

important to her about her own sexuality. Another library patron

witness described using the Internet to research breast cancer

and reconstructive surgery for his mother who had breast surgery.

Even though some filtering programs contain exceptions for

health and education, the exceptions do not solve the problem of

overblocking constitutionally protected material. Moreover, as

we explain below, the filtering software on which the parties

presented evidence in this case overblocks not only information

relating to health and sexuality that might be mistaken for

pornography or erotica, but also vast numbers of Web pages and

sites that could not even arguably be construed as harmful or

inappropriate for adults or minors.

The Congress, sharing the concerns of many library boards,

enacted the Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"), Pub. L.

No. 106-554, which makes the use of filters by a public library a

condition of its receipt of two kinds of subsidies that are

important (or even critical) to the budgets of many public

libraries – grants under the Library Services and Technology Act,

20 U.S.C. Sec. 9101 et seq. ("LSTA"), and so-called "E-rate

discounts" for Internet access and support under the

Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254. LSTA grant funds are

awarded, inter alia, in order to: (1) assist libraries in

accessing information through electronic networks, and (2)

provide targeted library and information services to persons

having difficulty using a library and to underserved and rural

communities, including children from families with incomes below

the poverty line. E-rate discounts serve the similar purpose of

extending Internet access to schools and libraries in low-income

communities. CIPA requires that libraries, in order to receive

LSTA funds or E-rate discounts, certify that they are using a

"technology protection measure" that prevents patrons from

accessing "visual depictions" that are "obscene," "child

pornography," or in the case of minors, "harmful to minors." 20

U.S.C. Sec. 9134(f)(1)(A) (LSTA); 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)(6)(B) & (C) (E-

rate).

The plaintiffs, a group of libraries, library associations,

library patrons, and Web site publishers, brought this suit

against the United States and others alleging that CIPA is

facially unconstitutional because: (1) it induces public

libraries to violate their patrons' First Amendment rights

contrary to the requirements of South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.

203 (1987); and (2) it requires libraries to relinquish their

First Amendment rights as a condition on the receipt of federal

funds and is therefore impermissible under the doctrine of

unconstitutional conditions. In arguing that CIPA will induce

public libraries to violate the First Amendment, the plaintiffs

contend that given the limits of the filtering technology, CIPA's

conditions effectively require libraries to impose content-based

restrictions on their patrons' access to constitutionally

protected speech. According to the plaintiffs, these content-

based restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny under public

forum doctrine, see Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of

Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995), and are therefore permissible only

if they are narrowly tailored to further a compelling state

interest and no less restrictive alternatives would further that

interest, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). The

government responds that CIPA will not induce public libraries to

violate the First Amendment, since it is possible for at least

some public libraries to constitutionally comply with CIPA's

conditions. Even if some libraries' use of filters might violate

the First Amendment, the government submits that CIPA can be

facially invalidated only if it is impossible for any public

library to comply with its conditions without violating the First

Amendment.

Pursuant to CIPA, a three-judge Court was convened to try

the issues. Pub. L. No. 106-554. Following an intensive period

of discovery on an expedited schedule to allow public libraries

to know whether they need to certify compliance with CIPA by July

1, 2002, to receive subsidies for the upcoming year, the Court

conducted an eight-day trial at which we heard 20 witnesses, and

received numerous depositions, stipulations and documents. The

principal focus of the trial was on the capacity of currently

available filtering software. The plaintiffs adduced substantial

evidence not only that filtering programs bar access to a

substantial amount of speech on the Internet that is clearly

constitutionally protected for adults and minors, but also that

these programs are intrinsically unable to block only illegal

Internet content while simultaneously allowing access to all

protected speech.

As our extensive findings of fact reflect, the plaintiffs

demonstrated that thousands of Web pages containing protected

speech are wrongly blocked by the four leading filtering

programs, and these pages represent only a fraction of Web pages

wrongly blocked by the programs. The plaintiffs' evidence

explained that the problems faced by the manufacturers and

vendors of filtering software are legion. The Web is extremely

dynamic, with an estimated 1.5 million new pages added every day

and the contents of existing Web pages changing very rapidly.

The category lists maintained by the blocking programs are

considered to be proprietary information, and hence are

unavailable to customers or the general public for review, so

that public libraries that select categories when implementing

filtering software do not really know what they are blocking.

There are many reasons why filtering software suffers from

extensive over- and underblocking, which we will explain below in

great detail. They center on the limitations on filtering

companies' ability to: (1) accurately collect Web pages that

potentially fall into a blocked category (e.g., pornography); (2)

review and categorize Web pages that they have collected; and (3)

engage in regular re-review of Web pages that they have

previously reviewed. These failures spring from constraints on

the technology of automated classification systems, and the

limitations inherent in human review, including error,

misjudgment, and scarce resources, which we describe in detail

infra at 58-74. One failure of critical importance is that the

automated systems that filtering companies use to collect Web

pages for classification are able to search only text, not

images. This is crippling to filtering companies' ability to

collect pages containing "visual depictions" that are obscene,

child pornography, or harmful to minors, as CIPA requires. As

will appear, we find that it is currently impossible, given the

Internet's size, rate of growth, rate of change, and

architecture, and given the state of the art of automated

classification systems, to develop a filter that neither

underblocks nor overblocks a substantial amount of speech.

The government, while acknowledging that the filtering

software is imperfect, maintains that it is nonetheless quite

effective, and that it successfully blocks the vast majority of

the Web pages that meet filtering companies' category definitions

(e.g., pornography). The government contends that no more is

required. In its view, so long as the filtering software

selected by the libraries screens out the bulk of the Web pages

proscribed by CIPA, the libraries have made a reasonable choice

which suffices, under the applicable legal principles, to pass

constitutional muster in the context of a facial challenge.

Central to the government's position is the analogy it advances

between Internet filtering and the initial decision of a library

to determine which materials to purchase for its print

collection. Public libraries have finite budgets and must make

choices as to whether to purchase, for example, books on

gardening or books on golf. Such content-based decisions, even

the plaintiffs concede, are subject to rational basis review and

not a stricter form of First Amendment scrutiny. In the

government's view, the fact that the Internet reverses the

acquisition process and requires the libraries to, in effect,

purchase the entire Internet, some of which (e.g., hardcore

pornography) it does not want, should not mean that it is

chargeable with censorship when it filters out offending

material.

The legal context in which this extensive factual record is

set is complex, implicating a number of constitutional doctrines,

including the constitutional limitations on Congress's spending

clause power, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and

subsidiary to these issues, the First Amendment doctrines of

prior restraint, vagueness, and overbreadth. There are a number

of potential entry points into the analysis, but the most logical

is the spending clause jurisprudence in which the seminal case is

South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Dole outlines four

categories of constraints on Congress's exercise of its power

under the Spending Clause, but the only Dole condition disputed

here is the fourth and last, i.e., whether CIPA requires

libraries that receive LSTA funds or E-rate discounts to violate

the constitutional rights of their patrons. As will appear, the

question is not a simple one, and turns on the level of scrutiny

applicable to a public library's content-based restrictions on

patrons' Internet access. Whether such restrictions are subject

to strict scrutiny, as plaintiffs contend, or only rational basis

review, as the government contends, depends on public forum

doctrine.

The government argues that, in providing Internet access,

public libraries do not create a public forum, since public

libraries may reserve the right to exclude certain speakers from

availing themselves of the forum. Accordingly, the government

contends that public libraries' restrictions on patrons' Internet

access are subject only to rational basis review.

Plaintiffs respond that the government's ability to restrict

speech on its own property, as in the case of restrictions on

Internet access in public libraries, is not unlimited, and that

the more widely the state facilitates the dissemination of

private speech in a given forum, the more vulnerable the state's

decision is to restrict access to speech in that forum. We agree

with the plaintiffs that public libraries' content-based

restrictions on their patrons' Internet access are subject to

strict scrutiny. In providing even filtered Internet access,

public libraries create a public forum open to any speaker around

the world to communicate with library patrons via the Internet on

a virtually unlimited number of topics. Where the state provides

access to a "vast democratic forum[]," Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.

844, 868 (1997), open to any member of the public to speak on

subjects "as diverse as human thought," id. at 870 (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted), the state's decision

selectively to exclude from the forum speech whose content the

state disfavors is subject to strict scrutiny, as such exclusions

risk distorting the marketplace of ideas that the state has

facilitated. Application of strict scrutiny finds further

support in the extent to which public libraries' provision of

Internet access uniquely promotes First Amendment values in a

manner analogous to traditional public fora such as streets,

sidewalks, and parks, in which content-based restrictions are

always subject to strict scrutiny.

Under strict scrutiny, a public library's use of filtering

software is permissible only if it is narrowly tailored to

further a compelling government interest and no less restrictive

alternative would serve that interest. We acknowledge that use

of filtering software furthers public libraries' legitimate

interests in preventing patrons from accessing visual depictions

of obscenity, child pornography, or in the case of minors,

material harmful to minors. Moreover, use of filters also helps

prevent patrons from being unwillingly exposed to patently

offensive, sexually explicit content on the Internet.

We are sympathetic to the position of the government,

believing that it would be desirable if there were a means to

ensure that public library patrons could share in the

informational bonanza of the Internet while being insulated from

materials that meet CIPA's definitions, that is, visual

depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or in the case of

minors, harmful to minors. Unfortunately this outcome, devoutly

to be wished, is not available in this less than best of all

possible worlds. No category definition used by the blocking

programs is identical to the legal definitions of obscenity,

child pornography, or material harmful to minors, and, at all

events, filtering programs fail to block access to a substantial

amount of content on the Internet that falls into the categories

defined by CIPA. As will appear, we credit the testimony of

plaintiffs' expert Dr. Geoffrey Nunberg that the blocking

software is (at least for the foreseeable future) incapable of

effectively blocking the majority of materials in the categories

defined by CIPA without overblocking a substantial amount of

materials. Nunberg's analysis was supported by extensive record

evidence. As noted above, this inability to prevent both

substantial amounts of underblocking and overblocking stems from

several sources, including limitations on the technology that

software filtering companies use to gather and review Web pages,

limitations on resources for human review of Web pages, and the

necessary error that results from human review processes.

Because the filtering software mandated by CIPA will block

access to substantial amounts of constitutionally protected

speech whose suppression serves no legitimate government

interest, we are persuaded that a public library's use of

software filters is not narrowly tailored to further any of these

interests. Moreover, less restrictive alternatives exist that

further the government's legitimate interest in preventing the

dissemination of obscenity, child pornography, and material

harmful to minors, and in preventing patrons from being

unwillingly exposed to patently offensive, sexually explicit

content. To prevent patrons from accessing visual depictions

that are obscene and child pornography, public libraries may

enforce Internet use policies that make clear to patrons that the

library's Internet terminals may not be used to access illegal

speech. Libraries may then impose penalties on patrons who

violate these policies, ranging from a warning to notification of

law enforcement, in the appropriate case. Less restrictive

alternatives to filtering that further libraries' interest in

preventing minors from exposure to visual depictions that are

harmful to minors include requiring parental consent to or

presence during unfiltered access, or restricting minors'

unfiltered access to terminals within view of library staff.

Finally, optional filtering, privacy screens, recessed monitors,

and placement of unfiltered Internet terminals outside of sight-

lines provide less restrictive alternatives for libraries to

prevent patrons from being unwillingly exposed to sexually

explicit content on the Internet.

In an effort to avoid the potentially fatal legal

implications of the overblocking problem, the government falls

back on the ability of the libraries, under CIPA's disabling

provisions, see CIPA Sec. 1712 (codified at 20 U.S.C. Sec. 9134(f)(3)),

CIPA Sec.1721(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)(6)(D)), to unblock

a site that is patently proper yet improperly blocked. The

evidence reflects that libraries can and do unblock the filters

when a patron so requests. But it also reflects that requiring

library patrons to ask for a Web site to be unblocked will deter

many patrons because they are embarrassed, or desire to protect

their privacy or remain anonymous. Moreover, the unblocking may

take days, and may be unavailable, especially in branch

libraries, which are often less well staffed than main libraries.

Accordingly, CIPA's disabling provisions do not cure the

constitutional deficiencies in public libraries' use of Internet

filters.

Under these circumstances we are constrained to conclude

that the library plaintiffs must prevail in their contention that

CIPA requires them to violate the First Amendment rights of their

patrons, and accordingly is facially invalid, even under the

standard urged on us by the government, which would permit us to

facially invalidate CIPA only if it is impossible for a single

public library to comply with CIPA's conditions without violating

the First Amendment. In view of the limitations inherent in the

filtering technology mandated by CIPA, any public library that

adheres to CIPA's conditions will necessarily restrict patrons'

access to a substantial amount of protected speech, in violation

of the First Amendment. Given this conclusion, we need not reach

plaintiffs' arguments that CIPA effects a prior restraint on

speech and is unconstitutionally vague. Nor do we decide their

cognate unconstitutional conditions theory, though for reasons

explained infra at note 36, we discuss the issues raised by that

claim at some length.

For these reasons, we will enter an Order declaring Sections

1712(a)(2) and 1721(b) of the Children's Internet Protection

Act, codified at 20 U.S.C. Sec. 9134(f) and 47 U.S.C. Sec.

254(h)(6), respectively, to be facially invalid under the

First Amendment and permanently enjoining the defendants

from enforcing those provisions.II.

Findings of Fact

1. Statutory Framework

1. Nature and Operation of the E-rate and LSTA

Programs

In the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("1996 Act"), Congress

directed the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to take

the steps necessary to establish a system of support mechanisms

to ensure the delivery of affordable telecommunications service

to all Americans. This system, referred to as "universal

service," is codified in section 254 of the Communications Act of

1934, as amended by the 1996 Act. See 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254. Congress

specified several groups as beneficiaries of the universal

service support mechanism, including consumers in high-cost

areas, low-income consumers, schools and libraries, and rural

health care providers. See 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)(1). The extension

of universal service to schools and libraries in section 254(h)

is commonly referred to as the Schools and Libraries Program, or

"E-rate" Program.

Under the E-rate Program, "[a]ll telecommunications carriers

serving a geographic area shall, upon a bona fide request for any

of its services that are within the definition of universal

service . . ., provide such services to elementary schools,

secondary schools, and libraries for educational purposes at

rates less than the amounts charged for similar services to other

parties." 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)(1)(B). Under FCC regulations,

providers of "interstate telecommunications" (with certain

exceptions, see 47 C.F.R. Sec. 54.706(d)), must contribute a portion

of their revenue for disbursement among eligible carriers that

are providing services to those groups or areas specified by

Congress in section 254. To be eligible for the discounts, a

library must: (1) be eligible for assistance from a State library

administrative agency under the Library Services and Technology

Act, see infra; (2) be funded as an independent entity,

completely separate from any schools; and (3) not be operating as

a for-profit business. See 47 C.F.R. Sec. 54.501(c). Discounts on

services for eligible libraries are set as a percentage of the

pre-discount price, and range from 20% to 90%, depending on a

library's level of economic disadvantage and its location in an

urban or rural area. See 47 C.F.R. Sec. 54.505. Currently, a

library's level of economic disadvantage is based on the

percentage of students eligible for the national school lunch

program in the school district in which the library is located.

The Library Services and Technology Act ("LSTA"), Subchapter

II of the Museum and Library Services Act, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 9101 et

seq., was enacted by Congress in 1996 as part of the Omnibus

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208.

The LSTA establishes three grant programs to achieve the goal of

improving library services across the nation. Under the Grants

to States Program, LSTA grant funds are awarded, inter alia, in

order to assist libraries in accessing information through

electronic networks and pay for the costs of acquiring or sharing

computer systems and telecommunications technologies. See 20

U.S.C. Sec. 9141(a). Through the Grants to States program, LSTA

funds have been used to acquire and pay costs associated with

Internet-accessible computers located in libraries.

2. CIPA

The Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA") was enacted

as part of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, which

consolidated and enacted several appropriations bills, including

the Miscellaneous Appropriations Act, of which CIPA was a part.

See Pub. L. No. 106-554. CIPA addresses three distinct types of

federal funding programs: (1) aid to elementary and secondary

schools pursuant to Title III of the Elementary and Secondary

Education Act of 1965, see CIPA Sec. 1711 (amending Title 20 to add

Sec. 3601); (2) LSTA grants to states for support of libraries, see

CIPA Sec. 1712 (amending the Museum and Library Services Act, 20

U.S.C. Sec. 9134); and (3) discounts under the E-rate program, see

CIPA Sec. 1721(a) & (b) (both amending the Communications Act of

1934, 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)). Only sections 1712 and 1721(b) of

CIPA, which apply to libraries, are at issue in this case.

As explained in more detail below, CIPA requires libraries

that participate in the LSTA and E-rate programs to certify that

they are using software filters on their computers to protect

against visual depictions that are obscene, child pornography, or

in the case of minors, harmful to minors. CIPA permits library

officials to disable the filters for patrons for bona fide

research or other lawful purposes, but disabling is not permitted

for minor patrons if the library receives E-rate discounts.

1. CIPA's Amendments to the E-rate Program

Section 1721(b) of CIPA imposes conditions on a library's

participation in the E-rate program. A library "having one or

more computers with Internet access may not receive services at

discount rates," CIPA Sec. 1721(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec.

254(h)(6)(A)(i)), unless the library certifies that it is

"enforcing a policy of Internet safety that includes the

operation of a technology protection measure with respect to any

of its computers with Internet access that protects against

access through such computers to visual depictions that are – (I)

obscene; (II) child pornography; or (III) harmful to minors," and

that it is "enforcing the operation of such technology protection

measure during any use of such computers by minors." CIPA Sec.

1721(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)(6)(B)). CIPA defines a

"technology protection measure" as "a specific technology that

blocks or filters access to visual depictions that are obscene, .

. . child pornography, . . . or harmful to minors." CIPA Sec.

1703(b)(1) (codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)(7)(I)).

To receive E-rate discounts, a library must also certify

that filtering software is in operation during adult use of the

Internet. More specifically, with respect to adults, a library

must certify that it is "enforcing a policy of Internet safety

that includes the operation of a technology protection measure

with respect to any of its computers with Internet access that

protects against access through such computers to visual

depictions that are – (I) obscene; or (II) child pornography,"

and that it is "enforcing the operation of such technology

protection measure during any use of such computers." CIPA Sec.

1721(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)(6)(C)). Interpreting the

statutory terms "any use," the FCC has concluded that "CIPA makes

no distinction between computers used only by staff and those

accessible to the public." In re Federal-State Joint Board on

Universal Service: Children's Internet Protection Act, CC Docket

No. 96-45, Report and Order, FCC 01-120, 30 (Apr. 5, 2001).

With respect to libraries receiving E-rate discounts, CIPA

further specifies that "[a]n administrator, supervisor, or other

person authorized by the certifying authority . . . may disable

the technology protection measure concerned, during use by an

adult, to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful

purpose." CIPA Sec.1721(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C. Sec. 254(h)(6)(D)).

2. CIPA's Amendments to the LSTA Program

Section 1712 of CIPA amends the Museum and Library Services

Act (20 U.S.C. Sec. 9134(f)) to provide that no funds made available

under the Act "may be used to purchase computers used to access

the Internet, or to pay for direct costs associated with

accessing the Internet," unless such library "has in place" and

is enforcing "a policy of Internet safety that includes the

operation of a technology protection measure with respect to any

of its computers with Internet access that protects against

access through such computers to visual depictions" that are

"obscene" or "child pornography," and, when the computers are in

use by minors, also protects against access to visual depictions

that are "harmful to minors." CIPA Sec. 1712 (codified at 20 U.S.C.

Sec. 9134(f)(1)). Section 1712 contains definitions of "technology

protection measure," "obscene," "child pornography," and "harmful

to minors," that are substantially similar to those found in the

provisions governing the E-rate program. CIPA Sec. 1712 (codified

at 20 U.S.C. Sec. 9134(f)(7)); see also supra note 2.

As under the E-rate program, "an administrator, supervisor

or other authority may disable a technology protection measure .

. . to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful

purposes." CIPA Sec. 1712 (codified at 20 U.S.C. Sec. 9134(f)(3)).

Whereas CIPA's amendments to the E-rate program permit disabling

for bona fide research or other lawful purposes only during adult

use, the LSTA provision permits disabling for both adults and

minors.

2. Identity of the Plaintiffs

1. Library and Library Association Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs American Library Association, Alaska Library

Association, California Library Association, Connecticut Library

Association, Freedom to Read Foundation, Maine Library

Association, New England Library Association, New York Library

Association, and Wisconsin Library Association are non-profit

organizations whose members include public libraries that receive

either E-rate discounts or LSTA funds for the provision of

Internet access. Because it is a prerequisite to associational

standing, we note that the interests that these organizations

seek to protect in this litigation are central to their raison

d'être.

Plaintiffs Fort Vancouver Regional Library District, in

southwest Washington state; Multnomah County Public Library, in

Multnomah County, Oregon; Norfolk Public Library System, in

Norfolk, Virginia; Santa Cruz Public Library Joint Powers

Authority, in Santa Cruz, California; South Central Library

System ("SCLS"), centered in Madison, Wisconsin; and the

Westchester Library System, in Westchester County, New York, are

public library systems with branch offices in their respective

localities that provide Internet access to their patrons.

The Fort Vancouver Regional Library District, for over three

years from 1999-2001, received $135,000 in LSTA grants and

$19,500 in E-rate discounts for Internet access. The Multnomah

County Public Library received $70,000 in E-rate discounts for

Internet access this year, and has applied for $100,000 in E-rate

discounts for the upcoming year. The Norfolk Public Library

System received $90,000 in E-rate discounts for Internet access

this year, and has received a $200,000 LSTA grant to put computer

labs in eight of its libraries. The Santa Cruz Public Library

Joint Powers Authority received $20,560 in E-rate discounts for

Internet access in 2001-02. The SCLS received between $3,000 and

$5,000 this year in E-rate discounts for Internet access.

The Fort Vancouver Regional Library District Board is a

public board whose members are appointed by elected county

commissioners. The Multnomah County Library is a county

department, whose board is appointed by the county chair and

confirmed by the other commissioners. The SCLS is an aggregation

of 51 independently governed statutory member public libraries,

whose relationship to SCLS is defined by state law. The

governing body of the SCLS is the Library Board of Trustees,

which consists of 20 members nominated by county executives and

ratified by county boards of supervisors.

2. Patron and Patron Association Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs Association of Community Organizations for Reform

Now, Friends of the Philadelphia City Institute Library, and the

Pennsylvania Alliance for Democracy are nonprofit organizations

whose members include individuals who access the Internet at

public libraries that receive E-rate discounts or LSTA funds for

the provision of public Internet access. We note for the purpose

of associational standing that the interests that these

organizations seek to protect in this litigation are germane to

their purposes.

Plaintiffs Emmalyn Rood, Mark Brown, Elizabeth Hrenda, C.

Donald Weinberg, Sherron Dixon, by her father and next friend

Gordon Dixon, James Geringer, Marnique Tynesha Overby, by her

next friend Carolyn C. Williams, William J. Rosenbaum, Carolyn C.

Williams, and Quiana Williams, by her mother and next friend

Sharon Bernard, are adults and minors who use the Internet at

public libraries that, to the best of their knowledge, do not

filter patrons' access to the Internet. Several of these

plaintiffs do not have Internet access from home.

Emmalyn Rood is a sixteen-year-old who uses the Multnomah

County Public Library. When she was 13, she used the Internet at

the Multnomah County Public Library to research issues relating

to her sexual identity. Ms. Rood did not use her home or school

computer for this research, in part because she wished her

searching to be private. Although the library offered patrons

the option of using filtering software, Ms. Rood did not use that

option because she had had previous experience with such programs

blocking information that was valuable to her, including

information relating to gay and lesbian issues.

Plaintiff Mark Brown used the Internet at the Philadelphia

Free Library to research breast cancer and reconstructive surgery

for his mother who had breast surgery. Mr. Brown's research at

the library provided him and his mother with essential

information about his mother's medical condition and potential

treatments.

3. Web Publisher Plaintiffs

Plaintiff Afraid to Ask, Inc., based in Saunderstown, Rhode

Island, publishes a health education Web site,

www.AfraidtoAsk.com. Dr. Jonathan Bertman, the president and

medical director of Afraid to Ask, is a family practice physician

in rural Rhode Island and a clinical assistant professor of

family medicine at Brown University. AfraidtoAsk.com's mission

is to provide detailed information on sensitive health issues,

often of a sexual nature, such as sexually transmitted diseases,

male and female genitalia, and birth control, sought by people of

all ages who would prefer to learn about sensitive health issues

anonymously, i.e., they are "afraid to ask." As part of its

educational mission, AfraidtoAsk.com often uses graphic images of

sexual anatomy to convey information. Its primary audience is

teens and young adults. Based on survey data collected on the

site, half of the people visiting the site are under 24 years old

and a quarter are under 18. AfraidtoAsk.com is blocked by

several leading blocking products as containing sexually explicit

content.

Plaintiff Alan Guttmacher Institute has a Web site that

contains information about its activities and objectives,

including its mission to protect the reproductive choices of

women and men. Plaintiff Planned Parenthood Federation of

America, Inc. ("Planned Parenthood") is a national voluntary

organization in the field of reproductive health care. Planned

Parenthood owns and operates several Web sites that provide a

range of information about reproductive health, from

contraception to prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, to

finding an abortion provider, and to information about the drug

Mifepristone. Plaintiff Safersex.org is a Web site that offers

free educational information on how to practice safer sex.

Plaintiff Ethan Interactive, Inc., d/b/a Out In America, is

an online content provider that owns and operates 64 free Web

sites for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered persons

worldwide. Plaintiff PlanetOut Corporation is an online content

provider for gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered persons.

Plaintiff the Naturist Action Committee ("NAC") is the nonprofit

political arm of the Naturist Society, a private organization

that promotes a way of life characterized by the practice of

nudity. The NAC Web site provides information about Naturist

Society activities and about state and local laws that may affect

the rights of Naturists or their ability to practice Naturism,

and includes nude photographs of its members.

Plaintiff Wayne L. Parker was the Libertarian candidate in

the 2000 U.S. Congressional election for the Fifth District of

Mississippi (and is running again in 2002). He publishes a Web

site that communicates information about his campaign and that

provides information about his political views and the

Libertarian Party to the public. Plaintiff Jeffrey Pollock was

the Republican candidate in the 2000 U.S. Congressional election

for the Third District of Oregon. He operates a Web site that is

now promoting his candidacy for Congress in 2002.

3. The Internet

1. Background

As we noted at the outset, the Internet is a vast,

interactive medium consisting of a decentralized network of

computers around the world. The Internet presents low entry

barriers to anyone who wishes to provide or distribute

information. Unlike television, cable, radio, newspapers,

magazines or books, the Internet provides an opportunity for

those with access to it to communicate with a worldwide audience

at little cost. At least 400 million people use the Internet

worldwide, and approximately 143 million Americans were using the

Internet as of September 2001. Nat'l Telecomm. & Info. Admin., A

Nation Online: How Americans Are Expanding Their Use of the

Internet (February 2002), available at

http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/dn/.

The World Wide Web is a part of the Internet that consists

of a network of computers, called "Web servers," that host

"pages" of content accessible via the Hypertext Transfer Protocol

or "HTTP." Anyone with a computer connected to the Internet can

search for and retrieve information stored on Web servers located

around the world. Computer users typically access the Web by

running a program called a "browser" on their computers. The

browser displays, as individual pages on the computer screen, the

various types of content found on the Web and lets the user

follow the connections built into Web pages – called "hypertext

links," "hyperlinks," or "links" – to additional content. Two

popular browsers are Microsoft Internet Explorer and Netscape

Navigator.

A "Web page" is one or more files a browser graphically

assembles to make a viewable whole when a user requests content

over the Internet. A Web page may contain a variety of different

elements, including text, images, buttons, form fields that the

user can fill in, and links to other Web pages. A "Web site" is

a term that can be used in several different ways. It may refer

to all of the pages and resources available on a particular Web

server. It may also refer to all the pages and resources

associated with a particular organization, company or person,

even if these are located on different servers, or in a

subdirectory on a single server shared with other, unrelated

sites. Typically, a Web site has as an intended point of entry,

a "home page," which includes links to other pages on the same

Web site or to pages on other sites. Online discussion groups

and chat rooms relating to a variety of subjects are available

through many Web sites.

Users may find content on the Web using engines that search

for requested keywords. In response to a keyword request, a

search engine will display a list of Web sites that may contain

relevant content and provide links to those sites. Search

engines and directories often return a limited number of sites in

their search results (e.g., the Google search engine will return

only 2,000 sites in response to a search, even if it has found,

for example, 530,000 sites in its index that meet the search

criteria).

A user may also access content on the Web by typing a URL

(Uniform Resource Locator) into the address line of the browser.

A URL is an address that points to some resource located on a

Web server that is accessible over the Internet. This resource

may be a Web site, a Web page, an image, a sound or video file,

or other resource. A URL can be either a numeric Internet

Protocol or "IP" address, or an alphanumeric "domain name"

address. Every Web server connected to the Internet is assigned

an IP address. A typical IP address looks like "13.1.64.14."

Typing the URL "http://13.1.64.14/" into a browser will bring the

user to the Web server that corresponds to that address. For

convenience, most Web servers have alphanumeric domain name

addresses in addition to IP addresses. For example, typing in

"http://www.paed.uscourts.gov" will bring the user to the same

Web server as typing in "http://204.170.64.143."

Every time a user attempts to access material located on a

Web server by entering a domain name address into a Web browser,

a request is made to a Domain Name Server, which is a directory

of domain names and IP addresses, to "resolve," or translate, the

domain name address into an IP address. That IP address is then

used to locate the Web server from which content is being

requested. A Web site may be accessed by using either its domain

name address or its IP address.

A domain name address typically consists of several parts.

For example, the alphanumeric URL

http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents/opinions can be broken

down into three parts. The first part is the transfer protocol

the computer will use in accessing the content (e.g., "http" for

Hypertext Transfer Protocol); next is the name of the host server

on which the information is stored (e.g., www.paed.uscourts.gov);

and then the name of the particular file or directory on that

server (e.g., /documents/opinions).

A single Web page may be associated with more than one URL.

For example, the URLs http://www.newyorktimes.com and

http://www.nytimes.com will both take the user to the New York

Times home page. The topmost directory in a Web site is often

referred to as that Web site's root directory or root URL. For

example, in http://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents, the root URL

is http://www.paed.uscourts.gov. There may be hundreds or

thousands of pages under a single root URL, or there may be one

or only a few.

There are a number of Web hosting companies that maintain

Web sites for other businesses and individuals, which can lead to

vast amounts of diverse content being located at the same IP

address. Hosting services are offered either for a fee, or in

some cases, for free, allowing any individual with Internet

access to create a Web site. Some hosting services are provided

through the process of "IP-based hosting," where each domain name

is assigned a unique IP number. For example, www.baseball.com

might map to the IP address "10.3.5.9" and www.XXX.com might map

to the IP address "10.0.42.5." Other hosting services are

provided through the process of "name-based hosting," where

multiple domain name addresses are mapped to a single IP address.

If the hosting company were using this method, both

www.baseball.com and www.XXX.com could map to a single IP

address, e.g., "10.3.5.9." As a result of the "name-based

hosting" process, up to tens of thousands of pages with

heterogeneous content may share a single IP address.

2. The Indexable Web, the "Deep Web"; Their Size

and Rates of Growth and Change

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