AMERICAN ENVOYS IN PARIS--DIRECTORY SEEKING MONEY--TALLEYRAND AND
HIS AGENTS--PROPOSITIONS FOR AN APOLOGY, LOAN, AND BRIBE--INDIGNANT
REFUSAL--ATTEMPTS TO FRIGHTEN THE ENVOYS--TWO OF THEM ORDERED OUT OF
FRANCE--THEY ALL LEAVE--EXCITEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES--CONGRESS
PREPARES FOR WAR--PATRIOTIC ADDRESSES TO THE PRESIDENT--HAMILTON
CALLS WASHINGTON TO THE RESCUE OF HIS COUNTRY--WASHINGTON'S
RESPONSE--THE PRESIDENT PERPLEXED--HE TURNS TO WASHINGTON--APPEAL OF
THE SECRETARY OF WAR--WASHINGTON'S REPLIES--IS APPOINTED
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES--HAMILTON
URGES HIM TO ACCEPT--THE PRESIDENT SENDS HIM A COMMISSION--SECRETARY
OF WAR AT MOUNT VERNON--WASHINGTON ACCEPTS THE APPOINTMENT--HIS
SELECTION OF OFFICERS.
The three United States envoys--Pinckney, Gerry, and Marshall--met in
Paris on the fourth of October, 1797, and were approached by the wily
diplomat, M. de Talleyrand, minister for foreign affairs, in a spirit
not at all pleasing either to their expectations or their desires. They
had been sent upon a mission of peace, charged with honorable purposes,
and were met with propositions insulting and disgraceful. On their
arrival, the envoys sent a joint letter to Talleyrand, informing him of
their presence and purposes, and requesting him to appoint a time for
receiving copies of their letters of credence. He informed them that he
was then engaged upon a report to the Directory on American affairs, and
that, when it should be completed, he would inform them what was to be
done. At the same time he sent them permits (cards of hospitality) to
reside in Paris meanwhile.
The Directory had resolved to extort money from the envoys, if possible;
and in the course of a few days after their first communication with
Talleyrand, that minister, through secret agents, began to sound them.
One of these informed them that he had, as if by accident, learned
through Talleyrand's private secretary that the Directory were very much
exasperated at the tone of the president's speech at the opening of the
special session of Congress. Another, a partner in a noted commercial
house in Paris, volunteered to answer their drafts to any amount; a
third called on them, and, in a private interview with Pinckney, said
that he had a message from Talleyrand, suggesting a plan by which a
reconciliation between the two governments might be brought about. That
"plan" proposed that some of the most offensive passages in the
president's speech should be expunged or softened before the envoys
should be received; a loan to be made to the republic; and a _douceur_
to the Directory of nearly two hundred and fifty thousand dollars. The
envoys were astonished, but resolved to treat the matter in such a way
that they might ascertain the real sentiments of the French government,
without exciting suspicions.
Shortly afterward (October twentieth), Talleyrand's secret agent again
appeared before the envoys, and introduced Mr. Bellamy, a citizen of
Hamburg, who came as an intimate friend of the minister for foreign
affairs, but without, as he said, any diplomatic authority. He assured
the envoys that Talleyrand was well disposed toward the United States;
that if the offensive portions of the president's speech should be
expunged, the loan made, and the _douceur_ given, a new treaty would be
made, and all would be well. "We want money," said Bellamy, speaking for
his principals--"a great deal of money."
Another conference was held on the following day, when the secret agent
and Bellamy breakfasted with the envoys. It was stated that the
Directory insisted upon an apology, or its equivalent, for the offensive
words of the president; but Bellamy gave it as his private opinion that
the matter might be compromised with money. At that conference the
amount of the loan was fixed at six millions four hundred thousand
dollars, to be secured by Dutch "inscriptions," or obligations extorted
from them by the French; and the _douceur_ to the Directory at two
hundred and fifty thousand dollars.
"The proposition for a loan can not be met by any construction of our
instructions," said the envoys. "One of us, however, will return home
and consult our government on that point, provided the Directory will
agree to suspend, in the interval, all further captures of American
vessels, and all proceedings on captures already made." The agents of
the Directory were quite surprised at this answer. Bellamy spoke of the
resentment of that body, and said that, if money could not be had from
the envoys, the apology would be expected. To his astonishment, he was
informed that such a proceeding was wholly out of the question; that the
president had exercised his constitutional privilege in giving to
Congress his ideas on national affairs, and that in doing so he had only
stated facts in regard to French relations with which the American
people were already familiar. The agents seemed greatly astonished at
the audacity of the envoys, and withdrew, satisfied that they could
accomplish nothing.
An interview between the envoys and Talleyrand was arranged for the
twenty-seventh. The minister repeated, in substance, the proposition of
his agents; but the representatives of America were firm. Finally, after
more unofficial interviews with other agents of the Directory, who had
endeavored to frighten the American ministers by menaces of the
hostility of France; who had painted, in glowing colors, the immense
power and resources of the French nation, and the dangers to be
apprehended from its indignation; who claimed that in the friendship of
France alone could America look for safety--the envoys told them
plainly: "Gentlemen, we will not give you a dollar. Before coming here,
we should not have thought it possible that such an offer would have
been made to us. A transaction such as you propose, would be disgraceful
to all parties concerned." And then it was that Pinckney made that terse
and indignant remark which has become proverbial: "Millions for defence,
but not one cent for tribute!"
Startled by the indignation and boldness of the envoys, the agent of the
executive government intimated that if they would pay, for the private
use of the Directory, the sum named, by way of _fees_, as they would
pay a lawyer, they might remain in Paris until they should receive
further orders from home respecting the loan required for the
government. This base proposition to purchase the services of the
Directory was rejected with disdain; and the French executive
government, in the persons of its agents, withdrew abashed, and did not
prosecute the disgraceful measures any further. Indeed, the envoys
refused to have any further intercourse with them.
The American ministers remained several months in Paris, urging the
objects of their mission at all proper times, but without success. The
Directory refused to acknowledge them in their official character, and
they were, from time to time, importuned for money by Talleyrand, in his
unofficial visits to them. Finally, perceiving that their reception was
out of the question, they prepared a full statement, in a letter
addressed to Talleyrand, in which they made explanations, and gave
proofs unequivocal of the friendliness of the government of the United
States toward that of France. To this Talleyrand made an elaborate
reply, and the envoys, in April, met it with a rejoinder.
Talleyrand's tactics were now changed, and he endeavored by various
attempts to induce Pinckney and Marshall, who were federalists,
voluntarily to relinquish their station, and leave negotiations with
Gerry, who belonged to the republican party, and was supposed to
sympathize with the French Directory. In this the wily diplomat did not
succeed. Satisfied that nothing could seduce them from the path of
rectitude, the Directory ordered those two envoys to quit the
territories of the French republic immediately; while, to aggravate the
insult to the American government, Mr. Gerry, because he belonged to a
party favorable to France, was permitted to remain. Gerry, frightened
(as he afterward said, in excuse for his conduct) by Talleyrand's threat
of an immediate declaration of war against the United States by France
if he should leave, consented to remain. Yet he refused to sanction the
expulsion of his colleagues. He would not treat independently of them;
and, finally, the entire embassy returned home. Marshall left France at
the middle of April, Gerry on the twenty-sixth of July, but Pinckney
was detained until October, on account of the ill health of his
daughter.
During the whole time of these attempts at negotiation, the French
Directory allowed many gross insults to the United States government to
be perpetrated. Open war was waged upon American commerce by French
cruisers; and the American flag floating over a vessel was deemed a
sufficient justification for the capture and condemnation of such
vessel.
When the final despatches of the envoys reached the public eye and ear
in the United States, there was an outburst of indignation over all the
land, that proclaimed the dignity of true patriotism in the presence of
mere party considerations. The nation felt insulted by the attempt to
degrade the republic into a tributary dependant of France; and the
indignities offered to the representatives of their government, and the
injuries inflicted upon their commerce, were resented with great warmth.
The words of Pinckney were reported, and in every part of the continent
was heard the cry--"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute!"
And yet there were those slavish enough to justify France, by
criminating the American government. The _Aurora_ was foremost in this
labor; and, preparatory to such defense, it had published Talleyrand's
reply to the statement of the envoys, which had been received by Bache
before it reached the government of the United States.
It was argued that the intentions of France were not really hostile;
that men under British influence, who wished for war, had misrepresented
her conduct; that, admitting her position to be hostile, she only
demanded those marks of friendship which, at a critical moment, she had
herself afforded America; that the real interests of the United States
required a compliance with the demands of the Directory for a loan and a
bribe; that it would cost more money to resist than to comply; that
resistance would be inevitably ineffectual; and that national honor was
never secured by national defeat.
But such logic, degrading and unpatriotic in tendency, did not suit the
temper of the American people at that time. A war-spirit was aroused
not easily to be appeased, except by the ministrations of justice. In
Congress, vigorous measures for defence and retaliation were adopted.
Means for administering chastisement for injuries received, and for
repelling those which were threatened, were provided with willing
alacrity. A regular army was authorized. A regiment of artillerists and
engineers was added to the permanent establishment; and the president
was authorized to raise twelve additional regiments of infantry and one
regiment of cavalry, to serve during the continuance of existing
difficulties with France, if not sooner discharged. He was also
authorized to appoint officers for a provisional army, and to receive
and organize volunteer corps, which should be exempt from ordinary
militia duty.
These measures of Congress were fully approved by the great mass of the
people. The president received addresses from all parts of the Union,
whose spirit attested the patriotic sentiment of the nation; and the
executive, in turn, warmed by like sentiments, made responses that
sustained the ardor of the people.
Then arose spontaneously in every mind the question, "Who shall command
our army in this crisis?" and in every mind was the same response. All
hearts turned instinctively toward Washington as the only man in the
nation fitted for that important trust. The loud, harsh voice of party
spirit was hushed to a whisper; and men who had joined in the clamor of
reproach against the late president because of his public measures, were
among the first, in this hour of peril, to turn to him as the only
leader in whom they might implicitly trust. Intimations of this nature
reached Washington almost daily while Congress were busy in preparing
for war; and finally, near the close of May, Hamilton, in a confidential
and highly interesting letter, wrote to him, saying:--
"At the present dangerous crisis of public affairs, I make no
apology for troubling you with a political letter. Your impressions
of our situation, I am persuaded, are not different from mine.
There is certainly great probability that we may have to enter into
a very serious struggle with France; and it is more and more
evident that the powerful faction which has for years opposed the
government is determined to go every length with France. I am
sincere in declaring my full conviction, as the result of a long
course of observation, that they are ready to _new model_ our
constitution, under the _influence_ or _coercion_ of France; to
form with her a perpetual alliance, _offensive_ and _defensive_;
and to give her a monopoly of our trade, by _peculiar_ and
_exclusive_ privileges. This would be in substance, whatever it
might be in name, to make this country a province of France.
Neither do I doubt that her standard, displayed in this country,
would be directly or indirectly seconded by them, in pursuance of
the project I have mentioned.
"It is painful and alarming to remark that the opposition faction
assumes so much a geographical complexion. As yet, from the south
of Maryland, nothing has been heard but accounts of disapprobation
of our government, and approbation of our apology for France. This
is a most portentous symptom, and demands every human effort to
change it.
"In such a state of public affairs, it is impossible not to look up
to you, and to wish that your influence could in some proper mode
be brought into direct action." Hamilton then suggested the
propriety of Washington's taking a tour southward, which would call
out the people in public demonstrations, and would give him an
opportunity of expressing sentiments which would throw the weight
of his character into the scale of the government, and revive an
enthusiasm for his person that might be turned into a right
channel. He concluded by saying: "You ought to be aware, my dear
sir, that in the event of an open rupture with France, the public
voice will again call you to command the armies of your country;
and, though all who are attached to you will, from attachment, as
well as public considerations, deplore an occasion which should
once more tear you from that repose to which you have so good a
right, yet it is the opinion of all those with whom I converse that
you will be compelled to make the sacrifice. All your past labor
may demand, to give it efficacy, this further--this great
sacrifice."
Notwithstanding these alarm-bell notes from Hamilton, in whose political
sagacity Washington had unbounded confidence, he could not bring
himself to believe that actual war between the two countries would
ensue. "You may be assured," he replied, "that my mind is deeply
impressed with the present situation of our public affairs, and not a
little agitated by the outrageous conduct of France toward the United
States, and at the unparalleled conduct of its partisans, who aid and
abet their measures. You may believe further, from assurances equally
sincere, that, if there was anything in my power, which could be done
with consistency, to avert or lessen the danger of the crisis, it should
be rendered with hand and heart.
"But, my dear sir, dark as matters appear at present, and expedient as
it is to be prepared at all points for the worst that can happen--and no
one is more disposed to this measure than I am--I can not make up my
mind yet for the expectation of _open war_, or, in other words, for a
formidable invasion by France. I can not believe, although I think them
capable of anything bad, that they will attempt to do more than they
have done; or that, when they perceive the spirit and policy of this
country rising into resistance, and that they have falsely calculated
upon support from a large part of the _people_ thereof to promote their
views and influence in it, they will not desist even from these
practices, unless unexpected events in Europe, and their possession of
Louisiana and the Floridas, should induce them to continue the measure.
And I believe further, that, although the _leaders_ of their party in
this country will not change their sentiments, they will be obliged,
nevertheless, to change their plan, or the mode of carrying it on, from
the effervescence which is appearing in all quarters, and from the
desertion of their followers, which must frown them into silence, at
least for awhile.
"If I did not view things in this light, my mind would be infinitely
more disquieted than it is; for, if a crisis should arrive when a sense
of duty or a call from my country should become so imperious as to leave
me no choice, I should prepare for the relinquishment, and go with as
much reluctance from my present peaceful abode, as I should do to the
tomb of my ancestors.
"To say at this time, determinately, what I should do under such
circumstances, might be improper, having once before departed from a
similar resolution; but I may declare _to you_, that, as there is no
conviction in my breast that I could serve my country with more
efficiency in the command of the armies it might levy than many others,
an expression of its wish that I should do so must, somehow or other, be
unequivocally known, to satisfy my mind, that, notwithstanding the
respect in which I may be held on account of former services, a
preference might not be given to a man more in his prime; and it might
well be supposed, too, that I should like precisely to know who would be
my coadjutors, and whether you would be disposed to take an active part,
if arms are to be resorted to."[127]
President Adams found himself placed in a most perplexing position by
the authority given him by Congress to form a provisional army, with its
complement of major-generals and their subordinate officers. He had no
military knowledge upon which his judgment might rely. Among the
surviving officers of the Revolution, he perceived none in whom he felt
implicit confidence as a wise adviser, or as a proper person for
generalissimo of the new army; and, like all his fellow citizens, he
turned to Washington as the Mæcenas upon whose sagacious counsels the
safety of the republic depended in that critical hour. He well knew how
painful it would be for the retired president to be again drawn into
active public life; and he also well knew that it had ever been a
controlling maxim of Washington's life never to allow personal
considerations to interfere with the public welfare. Impressed with this
fact, Adams wrote to Washington on the twenty-second of June, saying:
"In forming an army, whenever I must come to that extremity, I am at an
immense loss whether to call on all the old generals, or to appoint a
young set. If the French come here, we must learn to march with a quick
step, and to attack, for in that way only they are said to be
vulnerable. I must tax you sometimes for advice. We must have your name,
if you will in any case permit us to use it. There will be more
efficiency in it than in many an army."
Four days afterward, M'Henry, the secretary of war, wrote: "You see how
the storm thickens, and that our vessel will soon require its ancient
pilot. Will you--may we flatter ourselves that, in a crisis so awful
and important, you will accept the command of all our armies? I hope you
will, because you alone can unite all hearts and all hands, if it is
possible that they can be united."
The letters of the president and of the secretary of war were detained
on the way. They both reached Washington on the fourth of July, and were
answered on the same day. He assured the president that, as far as was
in his power, he should be ready to support the administration; and, "to
render it easy, happy, and honorable," he said, "you may command me
without reserve." After alluding to his former opinion that the United
States were in no danger of invasion from a foreign power, he added:
"But this seems to be an age of wonders; and it is reserved for
intoxicated and lawless France (for purposes of Providence far beyond
the reach of human ken) to slaughter its own citizens, and to disturb
the repose of all the world besides.
"From a view of the past and the present," he continued, "and from the
prospect of that which seems to be expected, it is not easy for me to
decide satisfactorily on the part it might best become me to act. In
case of _actual invasion_ by a formidable force, I certainly should not
intrench myself under the cover of age and retirement, if my services
should be required by my country to assist in repelling it. If there be
good cause--which must be better known to the government than to private
citizens--to expect such an event, delay in preparing for it might be
dangerous, improper, and not to be justified by prudence."
After again expressing his conviction that the French would not, in the
face of the unequivocal display of public opinion in the United States
in favor of resenting the national insults, proceed to the extremity of
actual war, he said: "Having with candor made this disclosure of the
state of my mind, it remains only that I should add, that, to those who
know me best, it is best known that, if imperious circumstances should
induce me to renounce the smooth paths of retirement for the thorny ways
of public life--at a period, too, when repose is most congenial to
nature, and a calm indispensable to contemplation--it would be
productive of sensations more easily conceived than expressed."
Washington concluded his letter with valuable hints about officering the
provisional army. He suggested that the "old set of generals," who were
in the War for Independence, might not have "sufficient activity,
energy, and health," for the widely-different service into which they
would be called; and that the more energetic of younger officers should
be preferred. He specially advised the president to be very judicious in
the choice of the general staff of the army. "If this corps," he said,
"is not composed of respectable characters, who have a knowledge of the
duties of their respective departments--able, active, and firm, and of
incorruptible integrity and prudence, and withal such as the
commander-in-chief can place entire confidence in--his plans and
movements, if not defeated altogether, may be so embarrassed and
retarded as to amount nearly to the same thing."
To M'Henry, Washington wrote with all the freedom of intimate
friendship, saying: "I see, as you do, that clouds are gathering, and
that a storm may ensue; and I find, too, from a variety of hints, that
my quiet under these circumstances does not promise to be of long
continuance.... As my whole life has been dedicated to my country, in
one shape or another, for the poor remains of it, it is not an object to
contend for ease and quiet, when all that is valuable in it is at stake,
farther than to be satisfied that the sacrifice I should make of them is
acceptable and desired by my country.
"The principles by which my conduct has been actuated through life would
not suffer me, in any great emergency, to withhold any services I could
render, required by my country; especially in a case where its dearest
rights are assailed by lawless ambition and intoxicated power, contrary
to every principle of justice, and in violation of solemn compacts and
laws, which govern all civilized nations.... In circumstances like
these, accompanied by an actual invasion of our territorial rights, it
would be difficult at any time for me to remain an idle spectator under
the plea of age and retirement. With sorrow, it is true, I should quit
the shades of my peaceful abode, and the ease and happiness I now enjoy,
to encounter anew the turmoils of war, to which, possibly, my strength
and powers might be found incompetent. These, however, should not be
stumbling-blocks in _my own_ way; but there are other things highly
important for me to ascertain and settle before I could give a decided
answer to your question.
"First, the propriety, in the opinion of the public, so far as that
opinion has been expressed in conversation, of my appearing again on a
public theatre, after declaring the sentiments I did in my Valedictory
Address, of September, 1796.
"Secondly, a conviction in my own breast, from the best information that
can be obtained, that it is the wish of my country that the military
force of it should be committed to my charge; and--
"Thirdly, that the army now to be formed should be so appointed as to
afford a well-grounded hope of its doing honor to the country, and
credit to him who commands it in the field. On each of these heads you
must allow me to make observations."
Washington then proceeded to give his views in detail, upon these three
points, without reserve. He did not feel at liberty to do so to the
president directly, because his excellency had only _hinted_ his wishes
in delicate terms. His habits of intimacy with the secretary of war, and
that officer's more explicit solicitations, made him feel free to lay
his sentiments before him. At the same time, he gave Mr. M'Henry liberty
to show his letter to the president.
On the second of July, before Washington had received these letters,
President Adams nominated him to the senate as "lieutenant-general and
commander-in-chief of all the armies raised and to be raised in the
United States." The senate confirmed the nomination, by unanimous vote,
on the same day; and Secretary M'Henry was despatched to Mount Vernon a
few days afterward, to bear the commission to Washington. He also bore a
letter from the president, and open instructions concerning his
interview with the new commander-in-chief.[128] "Mr. M'Henry, secretary of
war," wrote the president, "will have the honor to wait on you in my
behalf, to impart to you a step I have ventured to take, which I should
have been happy to have communicated in person, had such a journey, at
this time, been in my power. My reasons for this measure will be too
well known to need any explanation to the public. Every friend and every
enemy to America will comprehend them at first blush. To you, sir, I owe
all the apology I can make. The urgent necessity I am in of your advice
and assistance--indeed, of your conduct and direction of the war--is all
I can urge; and that is a sufficient justification to myself and to the
world. I hope it will be so considered by yourself. Mr. M'Henry will
have the honor to consult you upon the organization of the army, and
upon everything relating to it."
On the day of the nomination, M'Henry wrote to Washington, not knowing
at that moment that he would be the bearer of the general's commission.
After speaking of the nomination and the confirmation, he added: "Thus
you are again called upon by all voices to fill a station which all
think you alone qualified for at this moment. I know what must be your
feelings, and how many motives you must have for preferring the privacy
you are in the enjoyment of, to the troubles and perplexities of a
commander of an army. This, however, is the crowning sacrifice which I
pray to God you may agree to make for the sake of your country, and give
the last finish to a fame nothing short of such a call and the present
occasion could have been capable of increasing."
On the eighth of July, Hamilton wrote to Washington, saying: "I was
surprised that your nomination had been without any previous
consultation of you. Convinced of the goodness of the motives, it would
be useless to scan the propriety of the step. It is taken, and the
question is, 'What, under the circumstances, ought to be done?' I use
the liberty which my attachment to you and to the public authorizes, to
offer my opinion that you should not decline the appointment. It is
evident that the public satisfaction at it is lively and universal. It
is not to be doubted that the circumstances will give an additional
spring to the public mind--will tend much to unite, and will facilitate
the measures which the conjunction requires. On the other hand, your
declining would certainly produce the opposite effects--would throw a
great damp upon the ardor of the country, inspiring the idea that the
crisis was not really serious or alarming. At least, then, let me
entreat you--and in this all your friends, indeed all good citizens,
will unite--that, if you do not give an unqualified acceptance, that you
accept provisionally, making your entering upon the duties to depend on
future events, so that the community may look up to you as their certain
commander. But I prefer a simple acceptance."
The meeting of Washington and the secretary of war was cordial, and
their communications were free and unreserved. The former had reflected
upon the situation of his country, and its demands upon his services,
and had, though with a heavy heart, determined to accept the
appointment, provided he could be permitted to select for the higher
departments of the army, and especially for the military staff, those
in whom he could place the greatest confidence. M'Henry assured him that
his wishes in that respect would be complied with; and, before the
secretary left, Washington gave him a list of officers, according to an
arrangement which he should recommend.[129]
On the thirteenth of July, Washington wrote his letter of acceptance to
President Adams, and placed it in the hands of the secretary of war, who
left Mount Vernon on that day. "I can not express," he said, "how
greatly affected I am at this new proof of public confidence, and the
highly flattering manner in which you have been pleased to make the
communication; at the same time, I must not conceal from you my earnest
wish that the choice had fallen on a man less declined in years, and
better qualified to encounter the usual vicissitudes of war.
"You know, sir, what calculations I had made relative to the probable
course of events on my retiring from office, and the determination I had
consoled myself with, of closing the remnant of my days in my present
peaceful abode. You will, therefore, be at no loss to conceive and
appreciate the sensations I must have experienced to bring my mind to
any conclusion that would pledge me, at so late a period of life, to
leave scenes I sincerely love, to enter upon the boundless field of
public action, incessant trouble, and high responsibility.
"It was not possible for me to remain ignorant of, or indifferent to,
recent transactions. The conduct of the Directory of France toward our
country, their insidious hostilities to its government, their various
practices to withdraw the affections of the people from it, the evident
tendency of their arts and those of their agents to countenance and
invigorate opposition, their disregard of solemn treaties and the laws
of nations, their war upon our defenceless commerce, their treatment of
our minister of peace, and their demands amounting to tribute, could not
fail to excite in me corresponding sentiments with those which my
countrymen have so generally expressed in their addresses to you.
Believe me, sir, no one can more cordially approve of the wise and
prudent measures of your administration. They ought to inspire universal
confidence; and will, no doubt, combined with the state of things, call
from Congress such laws and means as will enable you to meet the full
force and extent of the crisis.
"Satisfied, therefore, that you have sincerely wished and endeavored to
avert the war, and exhausted to the last drop the cup of reconciliation,
we can with pure hearts appeal to Heaven for the justice of our cause,
and may confidently trust the final result to that kind Providence which
has heretofore and so often signally favored the people of these United
States.
"Thinking in this manner, and feeling how incumbent it is upon every
person, of every description, to contribute at all times to his
country's welfare, and especially in a moment like the present, when
everything we hold dear is so seriously threatened, I have finally
determined to accept the commission of commander-in-chief of the armies
of the United States; with the reserve only, that I shall not be called
into the field until the army is in a situation to require my presence,
or it becomes indispensable by the urgency of circumstances.
"In making this reservation, I beg to be understood that I do not mean
to withhold any assistance to arrange and organize the army which you
may think I can afford. I take the liberty also to mention that I must
decline having my acceptance considered as drawing after it any
immediate charge upon the public, and that I can not receive any
emoluments annexed to the appointment before entering into a situation
to incur expense."
FOOTNOTES:
[127] Hamilton expressed his willingness to enter the army, if he should
be invited to a station in which the service he might render might be
proportionate to the sacrifice he was to make. "If you command," he
said, "the place in which I should hope to be most useful is that of
inspector-general, with a command in the line. This I would accept."
[128] The following were M'Henry's instructions:--
"It is my desire that you embrace the first opportunity to set out
on your journey to Mount Vernon, and wait on General Washington
with the commission of lieutenant-general and commander-in-chief of
the armies of the United States, which, by the advice and consent
of the senate, has been signed by me.
"The reasons and motives which prevailed on me to venture on such a
step as the nomination of this great and illustrious character,
whose voluntary resignation alone occasioned my introduction to the
office I now hold, were too numerous to be detailed in this letter,
and are too obvious and important to escape the observation of any
part of America or Europe. But, as it is a movement of great
delicacy, it will require all your address to communicate the
subject in a manner that shall be inoffensive to his feelings, and
consistent with all the respect that is due from me to him.
"If the general should decline the appointment, all the world will
be silent, and respectfully acquiesce. If he should accept, all the
world, except the enemies of his country, will rejoice. If he
should come to no decisive determination, but take the subject into
consideration, I shall not appoint any other lieutenant-general
until his conclusion is known.
"His advice in the formation of a list of officers would be
extremely desirable to me. The names of Lincoln, Morgan, Knox,
Hamilton, Gates, Pinckney, Lee, Carrington, Hand, Muhlenburg,
Dayton, Burr, Brooks, Cobb, Smith, as well as the present
commander-in-chief, may be mentioned to him, and any others that
occur to you. Particularly I wish to have his opinion on the men
most suitable for inspector-general, adjutant-general, and
quartermaster-general.
"His opinion on all subjects would have great weight, and I wish
you to obtain from him as much of his reflections upon the names
and the service as you can."
[129] The arrangement was as follows:--
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Inspector. }
CHARLES C. PINCKNEY, } Major-Generals.
HENRY KNOX, or, if either refuses, }
HENRY LEE, }
HENRY LEE (if not major-general), }
JOHN BROOKS, }
WILLIAM S. SMITH, or } Brigadiers.
JOHN EAGER HOWARD, }
EDWARD HAND, or }
JONATHAN DAYTON, or } Adjutant-General
WILLIAM S. SMITH (if not brigadier),}
EDWARD CARRINGTON, Quartermaster-General.
JAMES CRAIK, Director of Hospitals.