JAY'S MISSION TO ENGLAND--ITS SPECIFIC OBJECTS--HIS ARRIVAL IN
LONDON--HIS JUDICIOUS CONDUCT THERE--DIFFICULTIES IN THE WAY OF
NEGOTIATION--JAY'S ENCOURAGING LETTER TO WASHINGTON--HIS LETTER TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE--THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY--ITS RECEPTION
BY WASHINGTON--HE KEEPS ITS PROVISIONS SECRET--OPPOSITION TO THE
TREATY--MEETING OF THE SENATE--THE TREATY DISCUSSED AND ITS
RATIFICATION RECOMMENDED--A SYNOPSIS OF ITS CONTENTS MADE PUBLIC.
Mr. Jay's mission to England had been from its inception a cause of much
anxiety to Washington. Its object was beneficent and patriotic in the
highest degree, and yet it had been opposed with the bitterest party
spirit, and regarded with distrust even by friends of the
administration, who had watched the ungenerous and despotic course of
the British government toward the United States ever since the peace of
1783.
Mr. Jay's instructions contemplated three important objects to be
obtained by treaty. These were, compensation for the losses sustained by
American merchants in consequence of the orders in council; a settlement
of all existing disputes in relation to the treaty of peace; and a
commercial treaty. Great discretion was to be given to the envoy. He was
to consider his instructions as recommendatory, not as peremptory. Only
two restrictions were imposed upon him. One was, not to enter into any
stipulation inconsistent with the existing engagements of the United
States with France; the other was, not to conclude any commercial treaty
that did not secure to the United States a direct trade in their own
vessels, of certain defined burdens, with the British West India
islands, in whatever articles were at present allowed to be carried in
British bottoms.
Mr. Jay was fully impressed with the importance of his mission and the
necessity of prompt action. He arrived at Falmouth on the evening of the
eighth of June, and the same night he forwarded a letter to Lord
Grenville, the secretary for foreign affairs, announcing his arrival. He
reached London a few days afterward, took lodgings at the Royal Hotel,
Pall Mall, and on the fifteenth addressed the following note to Lord
Grenville:--
"MY LORD: You have doubtless received a letter which I had the
honor of writing to you from Falmouth. I arrived here this morning.
The journey has given me some health and much pleasure, nothing
having occurred on the road to induce me to make it shorter.
"Colonel Trumbull does me the favor to accompany me as secretary;
and I have brought with me a son, whom I am anxious should form a
right estimate of whatever may be interesting to our country. Will
you be so obliging, my lord, as to permit me to present them to
you, and to inform me of the time when it will be most agreeable to
your lordship that I should wait upon you, and assure you of the
respect with which I have the honor to be, &c."
Mr. Jay's appearance in London was at a time when all Europe was in a
state of the most feverish excitement. Robespierre and his bloody
companions were revelling in all the wantonness of irresponsible power.
The Reign of Terror was at its height, and the resentment against France
by all true friends of freedom in Europe, and especially the British
nation, was hot and uncompromising. England, supported by Russia,
Austria, and Spain, was waging war against the revolutionists; and at
the moment of Jay's arrival, the nation was madly rejoicing because of a
splendid victory obtained by Lord Howe over the French fleet. The fact
that a large party in the United States warmly sympathized with France,
the late proceedings of Congress manifesting a disposition hostile to
Great Britain, and the remaining soreness of wounded pride experienced
by England in the loss of her colonies, combined with the stirring
events then occurring in Europe, made the moment apparently
inauspicious for a mission like that of Mr. Jay. It required, on the
part of the minister, the exercise of the most discreet courtesy.
The views entertained by the two nations as to their rights and
interests were so opposed, on several points, that reconciliation
appeared almost impossible. The Americans complained that, contrary to
express provisions of the treaty of 1783, a large number of negroes had
been carried away by the evacuating British armies at the South, and for
the losses thereby sustained by the owners compensation was demanded.
The British contended that the claim in the treaty referred to did not
apply to negroes who had been set at liberty in the course of the war,
under proclamations of the British commanders; and as those carried away
were all of that kind, no compensation should be allowed.
The Americans also complained of the continued occupancy of the western
posts by British garrisons, and attributed the protracted hostility of
the Indian tribes, to the influence of the British commanders there.
They also alleged numerous invasions of their neutral rights, not only
under the orders in council, issued as instructions to the commanders of
British cruisers, but in the seizure of many vessels without sufficient
warrant, and their condemnation by the local admiralty courts. They also
complained of the impressment into the British service of seamen from on
board American vessels, and the exclusion of American shipping from the
trade to the British West Indies.
The British were unwilling to relinquish their right of impressment, as
a means of manning their fleets at that important crisis; and they
regarded the claim of the Americans to an equal participation in the
West India trade as unreasonable, because it would require England to
renounce the long-settled principles of her commercial system. The most
important questions to be settled, and those which involved matters most
dangerous to the peace between the two countries, were those of neutral
rights and the occupancy of the western posts. Such in brief were the
chief points in the controversy to be settled by treaty.
"By a deportment respectful yet firm," says Marshall, "mingling a
decent deference for the government to which he was deputed, with a
proper regard for the dignity of his own, this minister avoided those
little asperities which frequently embarrass measures of great concern,
and smoothed the way to the adoption of those which were suggested by
the real interests of both nations."[75]
Mr. Jay found Lord Grenville commissioned by the king to treat with him,
and the sincerity and candor of each soon led to the highest degree of
mutual confidence. "Instead of adopting the usual wary but tedious mode
of reducing every proposition to writing," says Mr. Jay's biographer,[76]
"they conducted the negotiation chiefly by conferences, in which the
parties frankly stated their several views, and suggested the way in
which the objections to these views might be obviated. It was understood
that neither party was to be committed by what passed in these
conversations, but that the propositions made in them might be recalled
or modified at pleasure. In this manner the two ministers speedily
discovered on what points they could agree, where their views were
irreconcilable, and on what principles a compromise might be effected."
While at Fort Cumberland, in October, Washington received a most
gratifying letter from Mr. Jay, accompanied by despatches from Mr.
Randolph, the secretary of state. They came by the Packet _William
Penn_. Mr. Jay's letter was dated the fifth of August. Concerning the
business of his mission he wrote as follows:--
"I am this moment returned from a long conference with Lord
Grenville. Our prospects become more and more promising as we
advance in the business. The compensation cases (as described in
the answer) and the amount of damages will, I have reason to hope,
be referred to the decision of commissioners, mutually to be
appointed by the two governments, and the money paid without delay
on their certificates, and the business closed as speedily as may
be possible. The question of admitting our vessels into the islands
under certain limitations is under consideration, and will soon be
decided. A treaty of commerce is on the carpet. All things being
agreed, the posts will be included. They contend that the article
about the _negroes_ does not extend to those who came in on their
proclamations, to whom (being vested with the property in them by
the right of war) they gave freedom, but only to those who were,
_bona fide_, the property of Americans when the war ceased. They
will, I think, insist that British debts, so far as _injured_ by
lawful impediments, should be repaired by the United States by
decision of mutual commissioners. These things have passed in
conversation, but no commitments on either side, and not to have
any official weight or use whatever.
"The king observed to me, the other day, 'Well, sir, I imagine you
begin to see that your mission will probably be successful.'--'I am
happy, may it please your majesty, to find that you entertain that
idea.'--'Well, but don't you perceive that it is like to be
so?'--'There are some recent circumstances (the answer to my
representation, etc.) which induce me to flatter myself that it
will be so.' He nodded with a smile, signifying that it was to
those circumstances that he alluded. The conversation then turned
to indifferent topics. This was at the drawing-room.
"I have never been more unceasingly employed than I have been for
some time past and still am; I hope for good, but God only knows.
The _William Penn_ sails in the morning. I write these few lines in
haste, to let you see that the business is going on as fast as can
reasonably be expected, and that it is very _important_ that peace
and quiet should be preserved for the present. On hearing last
night that one of our Indiamen had been carried into Halifax, I
mentioned it to Lord Grenville. He will write immediately by the
packet on the subject. Indeed, I believe they are endeavoring to
restore a proper conduct toward us _everywhere_; but it will take
some time before the effects will be visible. I write all this to
you in _confidence_, and for your own _private_ satisfaction. I
have not time to explain my reasons, but they are _cogent_. I could
fill some sheets with interesting communications if I had leisure,
but other matters press, and must not be postponed; for 'there is a
tide in the affairs of men,' of which every moment is precious.
Whatever may be the issue, nothing in my power to insure success
shall be neglected or delayed."[77]
To Mr. Randolph he wrote: "I shall persevere in my endeavors to acquire
the confidence and esteem of this government--not by improper
compliances, but by that sincerity, candor, truth, and prudence, which,
in my opinion, will always prove to be more wise and more effectual than
finesse and chicane. Formal discussions of disputed points should, in my
judgment, be postponed until the case becomes desperate; my present
object is to accommodate, rather than to convert or convince. Men who
sign their names to arguments seldom retract. If, however, my present
plan should fail, I shall then prepare and present such formal, and at
the same time such temperate and _firm_, representations as may be
necessary to place the claims and conduct of the two governments in
their proper point of view."
A treaty was finally signed at London, on the nineteenth of November,
1794, by Mr. Jay and Lord Grenville, and submitted to their respective
governments for ratification. It was defective in some parts and
objectionable in others; but, as it was the best that could be obtained,
Mr. Jay was induced to sign it.
In a private letter to Washington, written on the same day that he
signed the treaty, Mr. Jay said, "To do more was impossible. I ought not
to conceal from you," he added, "that the confidence reposed in your
personal character was visible and useful throughout the negotiation."
To the secretary of state he wrote:--
"The long-expected treaty accompanies this letter. The difficulties
which retarded its accomplishment frequently had the appearance of
being insurmountable. They have at last yielded to modifications of
the articles in which they existed, and to that mutual disposition
to agreement which reconciled Lord Grenville and myself to an
unusual degree of trouble and application. They who have levelled
uneven ground know how little of the work afterward appears.
"Since the building is finished, it can not be very important to
describe the scaffolding, nor to go into all the details which
respected the business. My opinion of the treaty is apparent from
my having signed it. I have no reason to believe or conjecture that
one more favorable to us is attainable."
This treaty provided for the establishment of three boards of
commissioners; one to determine the eastern boundary of the United
States, by deciding which was the river St. Croix named in the treaty of
peace in 1783; another to ascertain the amount of losses which British
subjects had experienced in consequence of legal impediments to the
recovery of debts due them by citizens of the United States, contracted
before the Revolution--such amount, on their report being made, to be
paid by the government of the United States; and a third to estimate the
losses sustained by American citizens in consequence of irregular and
illegal captures by British cruisers, for which the sufferers had no
adequate remedy in suits of law--such losses to be paid by the British
government.
It was provided that the western posts should be given up to the United
States on the first of June, 1796, in consideration of the adjustment of
the ante-revolutionary debts, the then residents in their respective
neighborhoods having the option of remaining, or of becoming American
citizens. The important Indian traffic in the interior was left open to
both nations, by a mutual reciprocity of inland trade and free
intercourse between the North American territories of the two nations,
including the navigation of the Mississippi. The British were to be
allowed to enter all American harbors, with the right to ascend all
rivers to the highest port of entry. This reciprocity did not extend to
the possessions of the Hudson's Bay company, nor to the admission of
American vessels into the harbors of the British North American
colonies, nor to the navigation of the rivers of those colonies below
the highest port of entry.
It was stipulated that the subjects or citizens of one government,
holding lands in the dominions of the other government, should continue
to hold them without alienage; nor, in the event of war or other
national differences, should there be any confiscation by either party
of debts, or of public or private stocks, due to or held by the citizens
or subjects of the other. In a word, there should be no disturbance of
existing conditions of property; and merchants and traders on each side
should enjoy the most complete protection and security for their
property.
The foregoing is the material substance of the first ten articles of the
treaty, which it was declared should be perpetual; the remaining
eighteen, having reference chiefly to the regulation of commerce and
navigation between the two countries, were limited in their operations
to two years after the termination of the war in which Great Britain was
then engaged.
The commercial portion of the treaty provided for the admission of
American vessels into British ports in Europe and the East Indies, on
terms of equality with British vessels. But participation in the East
Indian coasting trade, and the trade between European and British East
Indian ports, was left to rest on the contingency of British permission.
The right was also reserved to the British to meet the existing
discrimination in the American tonnage and import duties by
countervailing measures. American vessels, not exceeding seventy tons
burden, were to be allowed to trade to the British West Indies, but only
on condition of a renunciation, during the continuance of the treaty, of
the right to transport from America to Europe any of the principal
colonial products. British vessels were to be admitted into American
ports without any further addition to the existing discriminating
duties, and on terms equal to the most favored nations.
It was also stipulated that privateers should give bonds, with security,
to make equivalent restitution for any injury they might inflict upon
neutrals, in the event of the condemnation of any prize. Other
provisions, favorable to neutral property captured by privateers, were
made; and it was determined that the list of contraband articles should
include, besides ammunition and warlike implements, all articles serving
directly for the equipment of vessels, except unwrought iron and
fir-plank.
It was also provided that no vessel attempting to enter a blockaded
port should be captured, unless previously notified of the blockade;
that neither nation should allow enlistments within its territory by any
third nation at war with the other; nor should the citizens or subjects
of either be allowed to accept commissions from such third nation, or to
enlist in its service--citizens or subjects acting contrary to this
stipulation to be treated as pirates. Provision was also made for the
exercise of hospitality and courtesy between ships-of-war and privateers
of the two countries; also for prohibiting the arming of privateers of
any nation at war with either of the contracting parties, or fitting
them out in the ports of the other; and for excluding the privateers of
a third nation from the ports of the contracting parties, which had made
prizes of vessels belonging to citizens or subjects of either country.
It was also agreed that neither nation should allow vessels or goods of
the other to be captured in any of its bays or other waters, or within
cannon-shot of its coast.
It was further stipulated, that in the event of war between the two
nations, the citizens or subjects of each, residing within the limits of
the other, should be allowed to continue peaceably in their respective
employments, so long as they should behave themselves properly. It was
also provided that fugitives from justice, charged with murder or
forgery, should be mutually given up.
Such was the substance of the famous treaty, the ratification of which
caused a tempest in the political atmosphere, whose fury shook the Union
to its foundation, and proved to the utmost test the stability of the
character and popularity of Washington.
Rumors of the conclusion of a treaty reached the Congress before its
adjournment in March, 1795; but the treaty itself did not arrive until
two days afterward. The president received it on the fifth of March, but
its contents were kept a profound secret for several months. Washington
studied it carefully, fully digested every article, and resolved to
ratify it, should it be approved by the senate. Parts of it he approved,
parts he disapproved; but he saw in it the basis for a satisfactory
adjustment of the relations of the two governments, and a guaranty of
peace.
The president issued a circular calling the senate together in June, for
the purpose of considering the treaty. He resolved to keep its
provisions a secret until that time, because there was a predisposition
in the public mind to condemn it. Already, as we have seen, the
appointment of a special envoy to negotiate with Great Britain had been
denounced as a cowardly overture, and degrading to the United States;
and it was declared that the mission of a special envoy, if one was to
be sent, should be to make a formal and unequivocal demand of reparation
for wrongs inflicted on our commerce, the payment of damages to owners
of slaves carried away, and the immediate surrender of the western
posts.
A large party in the United States had resolved that the treaty,
whatever it might be, especially if it should remove all pretexts for a
war with Great Britain, should be rejected; and, even before its
arrival, preparations for opposition were made. In the course of a few
days after Washington received it, and had submitted it, under the seal
of strict privacy, to Mr. Randolph, the secretary of state, sufficient
information concerning it leaked out to awaken public distrust, and yet
not enough was known for the formation of any definite opinion
concerning it. But instantly the opposition press commenced a crusade
against it.
"Americans, awake!" cried a writer in one of these. "Remember what you
suffered during a seven-years' war with the satellites of George the
Third (and I hope the last). Recollect the services rendered by your
allies, now contending for liberty. Blush to think that America should
degrade herself so much as to enter into _any kind of treaty_ with a
power, now tottering on the brink of ruin, whose principles are directly
contrary to the spirit of republicanism.
"The United States are a republic. Is it advantageous to a republic to
have a connection with a monarch? Treaties lead to war, and war is the
bane of a republican government. If the influence of a treaty is added
to the influence which Great Britain has already in our government, we
shall be colonized anew.
"Commercial treaties are an artificial means to obtain a natural
end--they are the swathing bands of commerce that impede the free
operations of nature. Treaties are like partnerships; they establish
intimacies which sometimes end in profligacy, and sometimes in ruin and
bankruptcy, distrust, strife, and quarrel.
"_No treaty_ ought to have been made with Great Britain, for she is
famed for perfidy and double dealing; her polar star is interest;
artifice, with her, is a substitute for nature. To make a treaty with
Great Britain is forming a connection with a monarch; and the
introduction of the fashions, forms, and precedents of monarchical
governments has ever accelerated the destruction of republics.
"If foreign connections are to be formed, they ought to be made with
nations whose influence would not poison the fountain of liberty, and
circulate the deleterious streams to the destruction of the rich harvest
of our Revolution. _France_ is our natural ally; she has a government
congenial with our own. There can be no hazard of introducing from her,
principles and practices repugnant to freedom. That gallant nation,
whose proffers we have neglected, is the sheet-anchor that sustains our
hopes; and should her glorious exertions be incompetent to the great
object she has in view, we have little to flatter ourselves with from
the faith, honor, or justice of Great Britain. The nation on whom _our
political existence depends_, we have treated with indifference
bordering on contempt. _Citizens_, your only security depends on
_France_; and, by the conduct of your government, that security has
become precarious.
"To enter into a treaty with Great Britain at the moment when we have
evaded a treaty with France; to treat with an enemy against whom France
feels an implacable hatred, an enemy who has neglected no means to
desolate that country and crimson it with blood, is certainly insult.
Citizens of America, sovereigns of a free country, your hostility to the
French republic has been spoken of in the National Convention, and a
motion for an inquiry into it has been only suspended from prudential
motives--the book of account may soon be opened against you. What then,
alas, will be your prospects! To have your friendship questioned by that
nation is indeed alarming!"
Such was the logic--or rather the mad, seditious cry of
faction--employed to forestall public opinion, and defeat the noble and
humane intentions of the government. The Democratic Societies, though
infirm and tottering, joined in the clamor. One of these in Virginia
exclaimed, "Shall we Americans, who have kindled the spark of liberty,
stand aloof and see it extinguished when burning a bright flame in
France, which hath caught it from us? If all tyrants unite against a
free people, should not all free people unite against tyrants? Yes, let
us unite with France, and stand or fall together."
The Massachusetts Society, in an address to all sister societies of the
Union, put forth similar sentiments, and declared that the political
interests of the United States and France were "one and indivisible."
The Pennsylvania Society exhorted that of New York to be ready and
oppose the treaty if its provisions should be found dishonorable to the
country; and newspapers and pamphleteers joined in the general cry of
factious opposition.
The senate, pursuant to proclamation, assembled at Philadelphia on the
eighth of June. Some changes had taken place in the material of that
body, favorable to the government. Mr. Jay's treaty, with accompanying
documents, was laid before it on the first day of the session. That
gentleman had arrived from England a fortnight previously, and found
himself elected governor of the state of New York by a large majority;
and when he landed, he was greeted by thousands of his fellow-citizens,
who gathered to welcome their new chief magistrate, and to testify their
respect to the envoy who had so faithfully, as they believed, executed a
mission of peace. A great crowd attended him to his dwelling, and the
firing of cannon and ringing of bells attested the public joy. He
immediately resigned his seat as chief justice of the United States, and
three days after his arrival home he took the oath of office as governor
of the state of New York.
The senate held secret sessions when considering the treaty, and for a
fortnight it was discussed in that body with the greatest freedom and
candor. Finally, on the twenty-fourth of June, the senate by a vote of
twenty to ten--precisely a constitutional majority--advised the
ratification of the treaty, that article excepted which related to the
West India trade.
"An insuperable objection," says Marshall, "existed to an article
regulating the intercourse with the British West Indies, founded on a
fact which is understood to have been unknown to Mr. Jay. The intention
of the contracting parties was to admit the direct intercourse between
the United States and those islands, but not to permit the productions
of the latter to be carried to Europe in the vessels of the former. To
give effect to this intention, the exportation from the United States of
those articles which were the principal productions of the islands was
to be relinquished. Among these was cotton. This article, which a few
years before was scarcely raised in sufficient quantity for domestic
consumption, was becoming one of the richest staples of the southern
states. The senate, being informed of this fact, advised and consented
that the treaty should be ratified on condition that an article be added
thereto, suspending that part of the twelfth article which related to
the intercourse with the West Indies.
"Although, in the mind of the president, several objections to the
treaty had occurred, they were overbalanced by its advantages; and,
before transmitting it to the senate, he had resolved to ratify it, if
approved by that body. The resolution of the senate presented
difficulties which required consideration. Whether they could advise and
consent to an article which had not been laid before them, and whether
their resolution was to be considered as the final exercise of their
power, were questions not entirely free from difficulty. Nor was it
absolutely clear that the executive could ratify the treaty, under the
advice of the senate, until the suspending article should be introduced
into it. A few days were employed in the removal of these doubts; at the
expiration of which, intelligence was received from Europe which
suspended the resolution which the president had formed.
"The English papers contained an account, which, though not official,
was deemed worthy of credit, that the order of the eighth of June,
1793, for the seizure of provisions going to French ports, was renewed.
In the apprehension that this order might be construed and intended as a
practical construction of that article in the treaty which seemed to
favor the idea that provisions, though not generally contraband, might
occasionally become so, a construction in which he had determined not to
acquiesce, the president thought it wise to reconsider his decision. Of
the result of this reconsideration there is no conclusive testimony. A
strong memorial against this objectionable order was directed; and the
propositions to withhold the ratification of the treaty until the order
should be repealed; to make the exchange of ratifications dependent upon
that event; and to adhere to his original purpose of pursuing the advice
of the senate, connecting with that measure the memorial which had been
mentioned, as an act explanatory of the sense in which his ratification
was made, were severally reviewed by him. In conformity with his
practice of withholding his opinion on controverted points until it
should become necessary to decide them, he suspended his determination
on these propositions until the memorial should be prepared and laid
before him."[78]
The senate, on voting to recommend the ratification of the treaty,
removed the seal of secrecy, but forbade any publication of the treaty
itself. Regardless alike of the rules of the senate, and of official
decorum, Senator Mason, of Virginia, sent to Bache, the editor of the
_Aurora_ (the democratic newspaper) a full abstract of the treaty, which
was published on the second of July. In this, Mason had only anticipated
Washington, who, to counteract statements concerning the contents of the
treaty, and malignant comments which began to appear, had resolved to
have the whole document published.
FOOTNOTES:
[75] Life of Washington, ii, 360.
[76] His son, William Jay.
[77] Life and Writings of John Jay, by his Son, William Jay, i, 323.
[78] Life of Washington, ii, 361.