CHAPTER IX.

RETURN TO THE SENATE.--THE SEVENTH OF MARCH SPEECH.

The principal events of Mr. Polk's administration belong to or grow out of

the slavery agitation, then beginning to assume most terrible proportions.

So far as Mr. Webster is concerned, they form part of the history of his

course on the slavery question, which culminated in the famous speech of

March 7, 1850. Before approaching that subject, however, it will be

necessary to touch very briefly on one or two points of importance in Mr.

Webster's career, which have no immediate bearing on the question of

slavery, and no relation to the final and decisive stand which Mr. Webster

took in regard to it.

The Ashburton treaty was open to one just criticism. It did not go far

enough. It did not settle the northwestern as it did the northeastern

boundary. Mr. Webster, as has been said, made an effort to deal with the

former as well as the latter, but he met with no encouragement, and as he

was then preparing to retire from office, the matter dropped. In regard to

the northwestern boundary Mr. Webster agreed with the opinion of Mr.

Monroe's cabinet, that the forty-ninth parallel was a fair and proper line;

but the British undertook to claim the line of the Columbia River, and this

excited corresponding claims on our side. The Democracy for political

purposes became especially warlike and patriotic. They declared in their

platform that we must have the whole of Oregon and reoccupy it at once. Mr.

Polk embodied this view in his message, together with the assertion that

our rights extended to the line of 54° 40' north, and a shout of

"fifty-four-forty or fight" went through the land from the enthusiastic

Democracy. If this attitude meant anything it meant war, inasmuch as our

proposal for the forty-ninth parallel, and the free navigation of the

Columbia River, made in the autumn of 1845, had been rejected by England,

and then withdrawn by us. Under these circumstances Mr. Webster felt it his

duty to come forward and exert all his influence to maintain peace, and to

promote a clear comprehension, both in the United States and in Europe, of

the points at issue. His speech on this subject and with this aim was

delivered in Faneuil Hall. He spoke of the necessity of peace, of the fair

adjustment offered by an acceptance of the forty-ninth parallel, and

derided the idea of casting two great nations into war for such a question

as this. He closed with a forcible and solemn denunciation of the president

or minister who should dare to take the responsibility for kindling the

flames of war on such a pretext. The speech was widely read. It was

translated into nearly all the languages of Europe, and on the continent

had a great effect. About a month later he wrote to Mr. MacGregor of

Glasgow, suggesting that the British government should offer to accept the

forty-ninth parallel, and his letter was shown to Lord Aberdeen, who at

once acted upon the advice it contained. While this letter, however, was on

its way, certain resolutions were introduced in the Senate relating to the

national defences, and to give notice of the termination of the convention

for the joint occupation of Oregon, which would of course have been nearly

equivalent to a declaration of war. Mr. Webster opposed the resolutions,

and insisted that, while the Executive, as he believed, had no real wish

for war, this talk was kept up about "all or none," which left nothing to

negotiate about. The notice finally passed, but before it could be

delivered by our minister in London, Lord Aberdeen's proposition of the

forty-ninth parallel, as suggested by Mr. Webster, had been received at

Washington, where it was accepted by the truculent administration, agreed

to by the Senate, and finally embodied in a treaty. Mr. Webster's

opposition had served its purpose in delaying action and saving bluster

from being converted into actual war,--a practical conclusion by no means

desired by the dominant party, who had talked so loud that they came very

near blundering into hostilities merely as a matter of self-justification.

The declarations of the Democratic convention and of the Democratic

President in regard to England were really only sound and fury, although

they went so far that the final retreat was noticeable and not very

graceful. The Democratic leaders had had no intention of fighting with

England when all they could hope to gain would be glory and hard knocks,

but they had a very definite idea of attacking without bluster and in good

earnest another nation where there was territory to be obtained for

slavery.

The Oregon question led, however, to an attack upon Mr. Webster which

cannot be wholly passed over. He had, of course, his personal enemies in

both parties, and his effective opposition to war with England greatly

angered some of the most warlike of the Democrats, and especially Mr. C.J.

Ingersoll of Pennsylvania, a bitter Anglophobist. Mr. Ingersoll, in

February, made a savage attack upon the Ashburton negotiation, the treaty

of Washington, and upon Mr. Webster personally, alleging that as Secretary

of State he had been guilty of a variety of grave misdemeanors, including a

corrupt use of the public money. Some of these charges, those relating to

the payment of McLeod's counsel by our government, to instructions to the

Attorney-General to take charge of McLeod's defence, and to a threat by

Mr. Webster that if McLeod were not released New York would be laid in

ashes, were repeated in the Senate by Mr. Dickinson of New York. Mr.

Webster peremptorily called for all the papers relating to the negotiation

of 1842, and on the sixth and seventh of April (1846), he made the

elaborate speech in defence of the Ashburton treaty, which is included in

his collected works. It is one of the strongest and most virile speeches he

ever delivered. He was profoundly indignant, and he had the completest

mastery of his subject. In fact, he was so deeply angered by the charges

made against him, that he departed from his almost invariable practice, and

indulged in a severe personal denunciation of Ingersoll and Dickinson.

Although he did not employ personal invective in his oratory, it was a

weapon which he was capable of using with most terrible effect, and his

blows fell with crushing force upon Ingersoll, who writhed under the

strokes. Through some inferior officers of the State Department Ingersoll

got what he considered proofs, and then introduced resolutions calling for

an account of all payments from the secret service fund; for communications

made by Mr. Webster to Messrs. Adams and Gushing of the Committee on

Foreign Affairs; for all papers relating to McLeod, and for the minutes of

the committee on Foreign Affairs, to show that Mr. Webster had expressed an

opinion adverse to our claim in the Oregon dispute. Mr. Ingersoll closed

his speech by a threat of impeachment as the result and reward of all this

evil-doing, and an angry debate followed, in which Mr. Webster was attacked

and defended with equal violence. President Polk replied to the call of the

House by saying that he could not feel justified, either morally or

legally, in revealing the uses of the secret service fund. Meantime a

similar resolution was defeated in the Senate by a vote of forty-four to

one, Mr. Webster remarking that he was glad that the President had refused

the request of the House; that he should have been sorry to have seen an

important principle violated, and that he was not in the least concerned at

being thus left without an explanation; he needed no defence, he said,

against such attacks.

Mr. Ingersoll, rebuffed by the President, then made a personal explanation,

alleging specifically that Mr. Webster had made an unlawful use of the

secret service money, that he had employed it to corrupt the press, and

that he was a defaulter. Mr. Ashmun of Massachusetts replied with great

bitterness, and the charges were referred to a committee. It appeared, on

investigation, that Mr. Webster had been extremely careless in his

accounts, and had delayed in making them up and in rendering vouchers,

faults to which he was naturally prone; but it also appeared that the money

had been properly spent, that the accounts had ultimately been made up, and

that there was no evidence of improper use. The committee's report was

laid upon the table, the charges came to nothing, and Mr. Ingersoll was

left in a very unpleasant position with regard to the manner in which he

had obtained his information from the State Department. The affair is of

interest now merely as showing how deeply rooted was Mr. Webster's habitual

carelessness in money matters, even when it was liable to expose him to

very grave imputations, and what a very dangerous man he was to arouse and

put on the defensive.

Mr. Webster was absent when the intrigue and scheming of Mr. Polk

culminated in war with Mexico, and so his vote was not given either for or

against it. He opposed the volunteer system as a mongrel contrivance, and

resisted it as he had the conscription bill in the war of 1812, as

unconstitutional. He also opposed the continued prosecution of the war,

and, when it drew toward a close, was most earnest against the acquisition

of new territory. In the summer of 1847 he made an extended tour through

the Southern States, and was received there, as he had been in the West,

with every expression of interest and admiration.

The Mexican war, however, cost Mr. Webster far more than the anxiety and

disappointment which it brought to him as a public man. His second son,

Major Edward Webster, died near the City of Mexico, from disease contracted

by exposure on the march. This melancholy news reached Mr. Webster when

important matters which demanded his attention were pending in Congress.

Measures to continue the war were before the Senate even after they had

ratified the peace. These measures Mr. Webster strongly resisted, and he

also opposed, in a speech of great power, the acquisition of new

territories by conquest, as threatening the very existence of the nation,

the principles of the Constitution, and the Constitution itself. The

increase of senators, which was, of course, the object of the South in

annexing Texas and in the proposed additions from Mexico, he regarded as

destroying the balance of the government, and therefore he denounced the

plan of acquisition by conquest in the strongest terms. The course about to

be adopted, he said, will turn the Constitution into a deformity, into a

curse rather than a blessing; it will make a frame of government founded on

the grossest inequality, and will imperil the existence of the Union. With

this solemn warning he closed his speech, and immediately left Washington

for Boston, where his daughter, Mrs. Appleton, was sinking in consumption.

She died on April 28th and was buried on May 1st. Three days later, Mr.

Webster followed to the grave the body of his son Edward, which had been

brought from Mexico. Two such terrible blows, coming so near together, need

no comment. They tell their own sad story. One child only remained to him

of all who had gathered about his knees in the happy days at Portsmouth

and Boston, and his mind turned to thoughts of death as he prepared at

Marshfield a final resting-place for himself and those he had loved.

Whatever successes or defeats were still in store for him, the heavy cloud

of domestic sorrow could never be dispersed in the years that remained, nor

could the gaps which had been made be filled or forgotten.

But the sting of personal disappointment and of frustrated ambition,

trivial enough in comparison with such griefs as these, was now added to

this heavy burden of domestic affliction. The success of General Taylor in

Mexico rendered him a most tempting candidate for the Whigs to nominate.

His military services and his personal popularity promised victory, and the

fact that no one knew Taylor's political principles, or even whether he was

a Whig or a Democrat, seemed rather to increase than diminish his

attractions in the eyes of the politicians. A movement was set on foot to

bring about this nomination, and its managers planned to make Mr. Webster

Vice-President on the ticket with the victorious soldier. Such an offer was

a melancholy commentary on his ambitious hopes. He spurned the proposition

as a personal indignity, and, disapproving always of the selection of

military men for the presidency, openly refused to give his assent to

Taylor's nomination. Other trials, however, were still in store for him.

Mr. Clay was a candidate for the nomination, and many Whigs, feeling that

his success meant another party defeat, turned to Taylor as the only

instrument to prevent this danger. In February, 1848, a call was issued in

New York for a public meeting to advance General Taylor's candidacy, which

was signed by many of Mr. Webster's personal and political friends. Mr.

Webster was surprised and grieved, and bitterly resented this action. His

biographer, Mr. Curtis, speaks of it as a blunder which rendered Mr.

Webster's nomination hopeless. The truth is, that it was a most significant

illustration of the utter futility of Mr. Webster's presidential

aspirations. These friends in New York, who no doubt honestly desired his

nomination, were so well satisfied that it was perfectly impracticable,

that they turned to General Taylor to avoid the disaster threatened, as

they believed, by Mr. Clay's success. Mr. Webster predicted truly that Clay

and Taylor would be the leading candidates before the convention, but he

was wholly mistaken in supposing that the movement in New York would bring

about the nomination of the former. His friends had judged rightly. Taylor

was the only man who could defeat Clay, and he was nominated on the fourth

ballot. Massachusetts voted steadily for Webster, but he never approached a

nomination. Even Scott had twice as many votes. The result of the

convention led Mr. Webster to take a very gloomy view of the prospects of

the Whigs, and he was strongly inclined to retire to his tent and let them

go to deserved ruin. In private conversation he spoke most disparagingly of

the nomination, the Whig party, and the Whig candidate. His strictures were

well deserved, but, as the election drew on, he found or believed it to be

impossible to live up to them. He was not ready to go over to the Free-Soil

party, he could not remain silent, yet he could not give Taylor a full

support. In September, 1848, he made his famous speech at Marshfield, in

which, after declaring that the "sagacious, wise, far-seeing doctrine of

_availability_ lay at the root of the whole matter," and that "the

nomination was one not fit to be made," he said that General Taylor was

personally a brave and honorable man, and that, as the choice lay between

him and the Democratic candidate, General Cass, he should vote for the

former and advised his friends to do the same. He afterwards made another

speech, in a similar but milder strain, in Faneuil Hall. Mr. Webster's

attitude was not unlike that of Hamilton when he published his celebrated

attack on Adams, which ended by advising all men to vote for that

objectionable man. The conclusion was a little impotent in both instances,

but in Mr. Webster's case the results were better. The politicians and

lovers of availability had judged wisely, and Taylor was triumphantly

elected.

Before the new President was inaugurated, in the winter of 1848-49, the

struggle began in Congress, which led to the delivery of the 7th of March

speech by Mr. Webster in the following year. At this point, therefore, it

becomes necessary to turn back and review briefly and rapidly Mr. Webster's

course in regard to the question of slavery.

His first important utterance on this momentous question was in 1819, when

the land was distracted with the conflict which had suddenly arisen over

the admission of Missouri. Massachusetts was strongly in favor of the

exclusion of slavery from the new States, and utterly averse to any

compromise. A meeting was held in the state-house at Boston, and a

committee was appointed to draft a memorial to Congress, on the subject of

the prohibition of slavery in the territories. This memorial,--which was

afterwards adopted,--was drawn by Mr. Webster, as chairman of the

committee. It set forth, first, the belief of its signers that Congress had

the constitutional power "to make such a prohibition a condition on the

admission of a new State into the Union, and that it is just and proper

that they should exercise that power." Then came an argument on the

constitutional question, and then the reasons for the exercise of the power

as a general policy. The first point was that it would prevent further

inequality of representation, such as existed under the Constitution in

the old States, but which could not be increased without danger. The next

argument went straight to the merits of the question, as involved in

slavery as a system. After pointing out the value of the ordinance of 1787

to the Northwest, the memorial continued:--

"We appeal to the justice and the wisdom of the national councils

to prevent the further progress of a great and serious evil. We

appeal to those who look forward to the remote consequences of

their measures, and who cannot balance a temporary or trifling

convenience, if there were such, against a permanent growing and

desolating evil.

"... The Missouri territory is a new country. If its extensive and

fertile fields shall be opened as a market for slaves, the

government will seem to become a party to a traffic, which in so

many acts, through so many years, it has denounced as impolitic,

unchristian, and inhuman.... The laws of the United States have

denounced heavy penalties against the traffic in slaves, because

such traffic is deemed unjust and inhuman. We appeal to the spirit

of these laws; we appeal to this justice and humanity; we ask

whether they ought not to operate, on the present occasion, with

all their force? We have a strong feeling of the injustice of any

toleration of slavery. Circumstances have entailed it on a portion

of our community, which cannot be immediately relieved from it

without consequences more injurious than the suffering of the evil.

But to permit it in a new country, where yet no habits are formed

which render it indispensable, what is it but to encourage that

rapacity and fraud and violence against which we have so long

pointed the denunciation of our penal code? What is it but to

tarnish the proud fame of the country? What is it but to render

questionable all its professions of regard for the rights of

humanity and the liberties of mankind."

A year later Mr. Webster again spoke on one portion of this subject, and in

the same tone of deep hostility and reproach. This second instance was that

famous and much quoted passage of his Plymouth oration in which he

denounced the African slave-trade. Every one remembers the ringing words:--

"I hear the sound of the hammer, I see the smoke of the furnaces

where manacles and fetters are still forged for human limbs. I see

the visages of those who, by stealth and at midnight, labor in this

work of hell,--foul and dark as may become the artificers of such

instruments of misery and torture. Let that spot be purified, or

let it cease to be of New England. Let it be purified, or let it be

set aside from the Christian world; let it be put out of the circle

of human sympathies and human regards, and let civilized man

henceforth have no communion with it."

This is directed against the African slave-trade, the most hideous feature,

perhaps, in the system. But there was no real distinction between slavers

plying from one American port to another and those which crossed the ocean

for the same purpose. There was no essential difference between slaves

raised for the market in Virginia--whence they were exported and sold--and

those kidnapped for the same object on the Guinea coast. The physical

suffering of a land journey might be less than that of a long sea-voyage,

but the anguish of separation between mother and child was the same in all

cases. The chains which clanked on the limbs of the wretched creatures,

driven from the auction block along the road which passed beneath the

national capitol, and the fetters of the captured fugitive were no softer

or lighter than those forged for the cargo of the slave-ships. Yet the man

who so magnificently denounced the one in 1820, found no cause to repeat

the denunciation in 1850, when only domestic traffic was in question. The

memorial of 1819 and the oration of 1820 place the African slave-trade and

the domestic branch of the business on precisely the same ground of infamy

and cruelty. In 1850 Mr. Webster seems to have discovered that there was a

wide gulf fixed between them, for the latter wholly failed to excite the

stern condemnation poured forth by the memorialist of 1819 and the orator

of 1820. The Fugitive Slave Law, more inhuman than either of the forms of

traffic, was defended in 1850 on good constitutional grounds; but the

eloquent invective of the early days against an evil which constitutions

might necessitate but could not alter or justify, does not go hand in hand

with the legal argument.

The next occasion after the Missouri Compromise, on which slavery made its

influence strongly felt at Washington, was when Mr. Adams's scheme of the

Panama mission aroused such bitter and unexpected resistance in Congress.

Mr. Webster defended the policy of the President with great ability, but he

confined himself to the international and constitutional questions which it

involved, and did not discuss the underlying motive and true source of the

opposition. The debate on Foote's resolution in 1830, in the wide range

which it took, of course included slavery, and Mr. Hayne had a good deal to

say on that subject, which lay at the bottom of the tariff agitation, as it

did at that of every Southern movement of any real importance. In his

reply, Mr. Webster said that he had made no attack upon this sensitive

institution, that he had simply stated that the Northwest had been greatly

benefited by the exclusion of slavery, and that it would have been better

for Kentucky if she had come within the scope of the ordinance of 1787. The

weight of his remarks was directed to showing that the complaint of

Northern attacks on slavery as existing in the Southern States, or of

Northern schemes to compel the abolition of slavery, was utterly groundless

and fallacious. At the same time he pointed out the way in which slavery

was continually used to unite the South against the North.

"This feeling," he said, "always carefully kept alive, and

maintained at too intense a heat to admit discrimination or

reflection, is a lever of great power in our political machine.

There is not and never has been a disposition in the North to

interfere with these interests of the South. Such interference has

never been supposed to be within the power of government; nor has

it been in any way attempted. The slavery of the South has always

been regarded as a matter of domestic policy left with the States

themselves, and with which the Federal government had nothing to

do. Certainly, sir, I am and ever have been of that opinion. The

gentleman, indeed, argues that slavery, in the abstract, is no

evil. Most assuredly, I need not say I differ with him altogether

and most widely on that point. I regard domestic slavery as one of

the greatest evils, both moral and political."

His position is here clearly defined. He admits fully that slavery within

the States cannot be interfered with by the general government, under the

Constitution. But he also insists that it is a great evil, and the obvious

conclusion is, that its extension, over which the government does have

control, must and should be checked. This is the attitude of the memorial

and the oration. Nothing has yet changed. There is less fervor in the

denunciation of slavery, but that may be fairly attributed to circumstances

which made the maintenance of the general government and the enforcement of

the revenue laws the main points in issue.

In 1836 the anti-slavery movement, destined to grow to such vast

proportions, began to show itself in the Senate. The first contest came on

the reception of petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District of

Columbia. Mr. Calhoun moved that these petitions should not be received,

but his motion was rejected by a large majority. The question then came on

the petitions themselves, and, by a vote of thirty-four to six, their

prayer was rejected, Mr. Webster voting with the minority because he

disapproved this method of disposing of the matter. Soon after, Mr. Webster

presented three similar petitions, two from Massachusetts and one from

Michigan, and moved their reference to a committee of inquiry. He stated

that, while the government had no power whatever over slavery in the

States, it had complete control over slavery in the District, which was a

totally distinct affair. He urged a respectful treatment of the petitions,

and defended the right of petition and the motives and characters of the

petitioners. He spoke briefly, and, except when he was charged with placing

himself at the head of the petitioners, coldly, and did not touch on the

merits of the question, either as to the abolition of slavery in the

District or as to slavery itself.

The Southerners, especially the extremists and the nullifiers, were always

more ready than any one else to strain the powers of the central government

to the last point, and use them most tyrannically and illegally in their

own interest and in that of their pet institution. The session of 1836

furnished a striking example of this characteristic quality. Mr. Calhoun

at that time introduced his monstrous bill to control the United States

mails in the interests of slavery, by authorizing postmasters to seize and

suppress all anti-slavery documents. Against this measure Mr. Webster spoke

and voted, resting his opposition on general grounds, and sustaining it by

a strong and effective argument. In the following year, on his way to the

North, after the inauguration of Mr. Van Buren, a great public reception

was given to him in New York, and on that occasion he made the speech in

Niblo's Garden, where he defined the Whig principles, arraigned so

powerfully the policy of Jackson, and laid the foundation for the triumphs

of the Harrison campaign. In the course of that speech he referred to

Texas, and strongly expressed his belief that it should remain independent

and should not be annexed. This led him to touch upon slavery. He said:--

"I frankly avow my entire unwillingness to do anything that shall

extend the slavery of the African race on this continent, or add

other slave-holding States to the Union. When I say that I regard

slavery in itself as a great moral, social, and political evil, I

only use the language which has been adopted by distinguished men,

themselves citizens of slave-holding States. I shall do nothing,

therefore, to favor or encourage its further extension. We have

slavery already amongst us. The Constitution found it in the Union,

it recognized it, and gave it solemn guaranties. To the full

extent of the guaranties we are all bound in honor, in justice, and

by the Constitution.... But when we come to speak of admitting new

States, the subject assumes an entirely different aspect.... In my

opinion, the people of the United States will not consent to bring

into the Union a new, vastly extensive, and slave-holding country,

large enough for half a dozen or a dozen States. In my opinion,

they ought not to consent to it.... On the general question of

slavery a great portion of the community is already strongly

excited. The subject has not only attracted attention as a question

of politics, but it has struck a far deeper-toned chord. It has

arrested the religious feeling of the country; it has taken strong

hold on the consciences of men. He is a rash man, indeed, and

little conversant with human nature, and especially has he a very

erroneous estimate of the character of the people of this country,

who supposes that a feeling of this kind is to be trifled with or

despised. It will assuredly cause itself to be respected. It may be

reasoned with, it may be made willing--I believe it is entirely

willing--to fulfil all existing engagements and all existing

duties, to uphold and defend the Constitution as it is established,

with whatever regrets about some provisions which it does actually

contain. But to coerce it into silence, to endeavor to restrain its

free expression, to seek to compress and confine it, warm as it is

and more heated as such endeavors would inevitably render

it,--should this be attempted, I know nothing, even in the

Constitution or in the Union itself, which would not be endangered

by the explosion which might follow."

Thus Mr. Webster spoke on slavery and upon the agitation against it, in

1837. The tone was the same as in 1820, and there was the same ring of

dignified courage and unyielding opposition to the extension and

perpetuation of a crying evil.

In the session of Congress preceding the speech at Niblo's Garden, numerous

petitions for the abolition of slavery in the District had been offered.

Mr. Webster reiterated his views as to the proper disposition to be made of

them; but announced that he had no intention of expressing an opinion as to

the merits of the question. Objections were made to the reception of the

petitions, the question was stated on the reception, and the whole matter

was laid on the table. The Senate, under the lead of Calhoun, was trying to

shut the door against the petitioners, and stifle the right of petition;

and there was no John Quincy Adams among them to do desperate battle

against this infamous scheme.

In the following year came more petitions, and Mr. Calhoun now attempted to

stop the agitation in another fashion. He introduced a resolution to the

effect that these petitions were a direct and dangerous attack on the

"institution" of the slave-holding States. This Mr. Clay improved in a

substitute, which stated that any act or measure of Congress looking to the

abolition of slavery in the District would be a violation of the faith

implied in the cession by Virginia and Maryland,--a just cause of alarm to

the South, and having a direct tendency to disturb and endanger the Union.

Mr. Webster wrote to a friend that this was an attempt to make a new

Constitution, and that the proceedings of the Senate, when they passed the

resolutions, drew a line which could never be obliterated. Mr. Webster also

spoke briefly against the resolutions, confining himself strictly to

demonstrating the absurdity of Mr. Clay's doctrine of "plighted faith." He

disclaimed carefully, and even anxiously, any intention of expressing an

opinion on the merits of the question; although he mentioned one or two

reasonable arguments against abolition. The resolutions were adopted by a

large majority, Mr. Webster voting against them on the grounds set forth in

his speech. Whether the approaching presidential election had any

connection with his careful avoidance of everything except the

constitutional point, which contrasted so strongly with his recent

utterances at Niblo's Garden, it is, of course, impossible to determine.

John Quincy Adams, who had no love for Mr. Webster, and who was then in the

midst of his desperate struggle for the right of petition, says, in his

diary, in March, 1838, speaking of the delegation from Massachusetts:--

"Their policy is dalliance with the South; and they care no more

for the right of petition than is absolutely necessary to satisfy

the feeling of their constituents. They are jealous of Cushing,

who, they think, is playing a double game. They are envious of my

position as the supporter of the right of petition; and they

truckle to the South to court their favor for Webster. He is now

himself tampering with the South on the slavery and the Texas

question."

This harsh judgment may or may not be correct, but it shows very plainly

that Mr. Webster's caution in dealing with these topics was noticed and

criticised at this period. The annexation of Texas, moreover, which he had

so warmly opposed, seemed to him, at this juncture, and not without reason,

to be less threatening, owing to the course of events in the young

republic. Mr. Adams did not, however, stand alone in thinking that Mr.

Webster, at this time, was lukewarm on the subject. In 1839 Mr. Giddings

says "that it was impossible for any man, who submitted so quietly to the

dictation of slavery as Mr. Webster, to command that influence which was

necessary to constitute a successful politician." How much Mr. Webster's

attitude had weakened, just at this period, is shown better by his own

action than by anything Mr. Giddings could say. The ship Enterprise,

engaged in the domestic slave-trade from Virginia to New Orleans, had been

driven into Port Hamilton, and the slaves had escaped. Great Britain

refused compensation. Thereupon, early in 1840, Mr. Calhoun introduced

resolutions declaratory of international law on this point, and setting

forth that England had no right to interfere with, or to permit, the

escape of slaves from vessels driven into her ports. The resolutions were

idle, because they could effect nothing, and mischievous because they

represented that the sentiment of the Senate was in favor of protecting the

slave-trade. Upon these resolutions, absurd in character and barbarous in

principle, Mr. Webster did not even vote. There is a strange contrast here

between the splendid denunciation of the Plymouth oration and this utter

lack of opinion, upon resolutions designed to create a sentiment favorable

to the protection of slave-ships engaged in the domestic traffic. Soon

afterwards, when Mr. Webster was Secretary of State, he advanced much the

same doctrine in the discussion of the Creole case, and his letter was

approved by Calhoun. There may be merit in the legal argument, but the

character of the cargo, which it was sought to protect, put it beyond the

reach of law. We have no need to go farther than the Plymouth oration to

find the true character of the trade in human beings as carried on upon the

high seas.

After leaving the cabinet, and resuming his law practice, Mr. Webster, of

course, continued to watch with attention the progress of events. The

formation of the Liberty party, in the summer of 1843, appeared to him a

very grave circumstance. He had always understood the force of the

anti-slavery movement at the North, and it was with much anxiety that he

now saw it take definite shape, and assume extreme grounds of opposition.

This feeling of anxiety was heightened when he discovered, in the following

winter, while in attendance upon the Supreme Court at Washington, the

intention of the administration to bring about the annexation of Texas, and

spring the scheme suddenly upon the country. This policy, with its

consequence of an enormous extension of slave territory, Mr. Webster had

always vigorously and consistently opposed, and he was now thoroughly

alarmed. He saw what an effect the annexation would produce upon the

anti-slavery movement, and he dreaded the results. He therefore procured

the introduction of a resolution in Congress against annexation; wrote some

articles in the newspapers against it himself; stirred up his friends in

Washington and New York to do the same, and endeavored to start public

meetings in Massachusetts. His friends in Boston and elsewhere, and the

Whigs generally, were disposed to think his alarm ill-founded. They were

absorbed in the coming presidential election, and were too ready to do Mr.

Webster the injustice of supposing that his views upon the probability of

annexation sprang from jealousy of Mr. Clay. The suspicion was unfounded

and unfair. Mr. Webster was wholly right and perfectly sincere. He did a

good deal in an attempt to rouse the North. The only criticism to be made

is that he did not do more. One public meeting would have been enough, if

he had spoken frankly, declared that he knew, no matter how, that

annexation was contemplated, and had then denounced it as he did at Niblo's

Garden. "One blast upon his bugle-horn were worth a thousand men." Such a

speech would have been listened to throughout the length and breadth of the

land; but perhaps it was too much to expect this of him in view of his

delicate relations with Mr. Clay. At a later period, in the course of the

campaign, he denounced annexation and the increase of slave territory, but

unfortunately it was then too late. The Whigs had preserved silence on the

subject at their convention, and it was difficult to deal with it without

reflecting on their candidate. Mr. Webster vindicated his own position and

his own wisdom, but the mischief could not then be averted. The annexation

of Texas after the rejection of the treaty in 1844 was carried through,

nearly a year later, by a mixture of trickery and audacity in the last

hours of the Tyler administration.

Four days after the consummation of this project Mr. Webster took his seat

in the Senate, and on March 11 wrote to his son that, "while we feel as we

ought about the annexation of Texas, we ought to keep in view the true

grounds of objection to that measure. Those grounds are,--want of

constitutional power,--danger of too great an extent of territory, and

opposition to the increase of slavery and slave representation. It was

properly considered, also, as a measure tending to produce war." He then

goes on to argue that Mexico had no good cause for war; but it is evident

that he already dreaded just that result. When Congress assembled again, in

the following December, the first matter to engage their attention was the

admission of Texas as a State of the Union. It was impossible to prevent

the passage of the resolution, but Mr. Webster stated his objections to the

measure. His speech was brief and very mild in tone, if compared with the

language which he had frequently used in regard to the annexation. He

expressed his opposition to this method of obtaining new territory by

resolution instead of treaty, and to acquisition of territory as foreign to

the true spirit of the Republic, and as endangering the Constitution and

the Union by increasing the already existing inequality of representation,

and extending the area of slavery. He dwelt on the inviolability of slavery

in the States, and did not touch upon the evils of the system itself.

By the following spring the policy of Mr. Polk had culminated, intrigue had

done its perfect work, hostilities had been brought on with Mexico, and in

May Congress was invited to declare a war which the administration had

taken care should already exist. Mr. Webster was absent at this time, and

did not vote on the declaration of war; and when he returned he confined

himself to discussing the war measures, and to urging the cessation of

hostilities, and the renewal of efforts to obtain peace.

The next session--that of the winter of 1846-47--was occupied, of course,

almost entirely with the affairs of the war. In these measures Mr. Webster

took scarcely any part; but toward the close of the session, when the terms

on which the war should be concluded were brought up, he again came

forward. February 1, 1847, Mr. Wilmot of Pennsylvania introduced the famous

proviso, which bears his name, as an amendment to the bill appropriating

three millions of dollars for extraordinary expenses. By this proviso

slavery was to be excluded from all territory thereafter acquired or

annexed by the United States. A fortnight later Mr. Webster, who was

opposed to the acquisition of more territory on any terms, introduced two

resolutions in the Senate, declaring that the war ought not to be

prosecuted for the acquisition of territory, and that Mexico should be

informed that we did not aim at seizing her domain. A similar resolution

was offered by Mr. Berrien of Georgia, and defeated by a party vote. On

this occasion Mr. Webster spoke with great force and in a tone of solemn

warning against the whole policy of territorial aggrandizement. He

denounced all that had been done in this direction, and attacked with

telling force the Northern democracy, which, while it opposed slavery and

favored the Wilmot Proviso, was yet ready to admit new territory, even

without the proviso. His attitude at this time, in opposition to any

further acquisition of territory on any terms, was strong and determined,

but his policy was a terrible confession of weakness. It amounted to saying

that we must not acquire territory because we had not sufficient courage to

keep slavery out of it. The Whigs were in a minority, however, and Mr.

Webster could effect nothing. When the Wilmot Proviso came before the

Senate Mr. Webster voted for it, but it was defeated, and the way was clear

for Mr. Polk and the South to bring in as much territory as they could get,

free of all conditions which could interfere with the extension of slavery.

In September, 1847, after speaking and voting as has just been described in

the previous session of Congress, Mr. Webster addressed the Whig convention

at Springfield on the subject of the Wilmot Proviso. What he then said is

of great importance in any comparison which may be made between his earlier

views and those which he afterwards put forward, in March, 1850, on the

same subject. The passage is as follows:--

"We hear much just now of a panacea for the dangers and evils of

slavery and slave annexation, which they call the 'Wilmot Proviso.'

That certainly is a just sentiment, but it is not a sentiment to

found any new party upon. It is not a sentiment on which

Massachusetts Whigs differ. There is not a man in this hall who

holds to it more firmly than I do, nor one who adheres to it more

than another.

"I feel some little interest in this matter, sir. Did I not commit

myself in 1837 to the whole doctrine, fully, entirely? And I must

be permitted to say that I cannot quite consent that more recent

discoverers should claim the merit, and take out a patent.

"I deny the priority of their invention. Allow me to say, sir, it

is not their thunder.

"There is no one who can complain of the North for resisting the

increase of slave representation, because it gives power to the

minority in a manner inconsistent with the principles of our

government. What is past must stand; what is established must

stand; and with the same firmness with which I shall resist every

plan to augment the slave representation, or to bring the

Constitution into hazard by attempting to extend our dominions,

shall I contend to allow existing rights to remain.

"Sir, I can only say that, in my judgment, we are to use the first,

the last, and every occasion which occurs, in maintaining our

sentiments against the extension of the slave-power."

In the following winter Mr. Webster continued his policy of opposition to

all acquisitions of territory. Although the cloud of domestic sorrow was

already upon him, he spoke against the legislative powers involved in the

"Ten Regiment" Bill, and on the 23d of March, after the ratification of the

treaty of peace, which carried with it large cessions of territory, he

delivered a long and elaborate speech on the "Objects of the Mexican War."

The weight of his speech was directed against the acquisition of

territory, on account of its effect on the Constitution, and the increased

inequality of representation which it involved. He referred to the plan of

cutting up Texas so as to obtain ten senators, as "borough mongering" on a

grand scale, a course which he proposed to resist to the last; and he

concluded by denouncing the whole project as one calculated to turn the

Constitution into a curse rather than a blessing. "I resist it to-day and

always," he said. "Whoever falters or whoever flies, I continue the

contest."

In June General Taylor was nominated, and soon after Mr. Webster left

Washington, although Congress was still in session. He returned in August,

in time to take part in the settlement of the Oregon question. The South,

with customary shrewdness, was endeavoring to use the territorial

organization of Oregon as a lever to help them in their struggle to gain

control of the new conquests. A bill came up from the House with no

provision in regard to slavery, and Mr. Douglas carried an amendment to it,

declaring the Missouri Compromise to be in full force in Oregon. The House

disagreed, and, on the question of receding, Mr. Webster took occasion to

speak on the subject of slavery in the territories. He was disgusted with

the nomination of Taylor and with the cowardly silence of the Whigs on the

question of the extension of slavery. In this frame of mind he made one of

the strongest and best speeches he ever delivered on this topic. He denied

that slavery was an "institution;" he denied that the local right to hold

slaves implied the right of the owner to carry them with him and keep them

in slavery on free soil; he stated in the strongest possible manner the

right of Congress to control slavery or to prohibit it in the territories;

and he concluded with a sweeping declaration of his opposition to any

extension of slavery or any increase of slave representation. The Oregon

bill finally passed under the pressure of the "Free-Soil" nominations, with

a clause inserted in the House, embodying substantially the principles of

the Wilmot Proviso.

When Congress adjourned, Mr. Webster returned to Marshfield, where he made

the speech on the nomination of General Taylor. It was a crisis in his

life. At that moment he could have parted with the Whigs and put himself at

the head of the constitutional anti-slavery party. The Free-Soilers had

taken the very ground against the extension of slavery which he had so long

occupied. He could have gone consistently, he could have separated from the

Whigs on a great question of principle, and such a course would have been

no stronger evidence of personal disappointment than was afforded by the

declaration that the nomination of Taylor was one not fit to be made. Mr.

Webster said that he fully concurred in the main object of the Buffalo

Convention, that he was as good a Free-Soiler as any of them, but that the

Free-Soil party presented nothing new or valuable, and he did not believe

in Mr. Van Buren. He then said it was not true that General Taylor was

nominated by the South, as charged by the Free-Soilers; but he did not

confess, what was equally true, that Taylor was nominated through fear of

the South, as was shown by his election by Southern votes. Mr. Webster's

conclusion was, that it was safer to trust a slave-holder, a man without

known political opinions, and a party which had not the courage of its

convictions, than to run the risk of the election of another Democrat. Mr.

Webster's place at that moment was at the head of a new party based on the

principles which he had himself formulated against the extension of

slavery. Such a change might have destroyed his chances for the presidency,

if he had any, but it would have given him one of the greatest places in

American history and made him the leader in the new period. He lost his

opportunity. He did not change his party, but he soon after accepted the

other alternative and changed his opinions.

His course once taken, he made the best of it, and delivered a speech in

Faneuil Hall, in which it is painful to see the effort to push aside

slavery and bring forward the tariff and the sub-treasury. He scoffed at

this absorption in "one idea," and strove to thrust it away. It was the

cry of "peace, peace," when there was no peace, and when Daniel Webster

knew there could be none until the momentous question had been met and

settled. Like the great composer who heard in the first notes of his

symphony "the hand of Fate knocking at the door," the great New England

statesman heard the same warning in the hoarse murmur against slavery, but

he shut his ears to the dread sound and passed on.

When Mr. Webster returned to Washington, after the election of General

Taylor, the strife had already begun over our Mexican conquests. The South

had got the territory, and the next point was to fasten slavery upon it.

The North was resolved to prevent the further spread of slavery, but was by

no means so determined or so clear in its views as its opponent. President

Polk urged in his message that Congress should not legislate on the

question of slavery in the territories, but that if they did, the right of

slave-holders to carry their slaves with them to the new lands should be

recognized, and that the best arrangement was to extend the line of the

Missouri Compromise to the Pacific. For the originator and promoter of the

Mexican war this was a very natural solution, and was a fit conclusion to

one of the worst presidential careers this country has ever seen. The plan

had only one defect. It would not work. One scheme after another was

brought before the Senate, only to fail. Finally, Mr. Webster introduced

his own, which was merely to authorize military government and the

maintenance of existing laws in the Mexican cessions, and a consequent

postponement of the question. The proposition was reasonable and sensible,

but it fared little better than the others. The Southerners found, as they

always did sooner or later, that facts were against them. The people of New

Mexico petitioned for a territorial government and for the exclusion of

slavery. Mr. Calhoun pronounced this action "insolent." Slavery was not

only to be permitted, but the United States government was to be made to

force it upon the people of the territories. Finally, a resolution was

offered "to extend the Constitution" to the territories,--one of those

utterly vague propositions in which the South delighted to hide

well-defined schemes for extending, not the Constitution, but

slave-holding, to fresh fields and virgin soil. This gave rise to a sharp

debate between Mr. Webster and Mr. Calhoun as to whether the Constitution

extended to the territories or not. Mr. Webster upheld the latter view, and

the discussion is chiefly interesting from the fact that Mr. Webster got

the better of Mr. Calhoun in the argument, and as an example of the

latter's excessive ingenuity in sustaining and defending a more than

doubtful proposition. The result of the whole business was, that nothing

was done, except to extend the revenue laws of the United States to New

Mexico and California.

Before Congress again assembled, one of the subjects of their debates had

taken its fortunes into its own hands. California, rapidly peopled by the

discoveries of gold, had held a convention and adopted a frame of

government with a clause prohibiting slavery. When Congress met, the

Senators and Representatives of California were in Washington with their

free Constitution in their hands, demanding the admission of their State

into the Union.

New Mexico was involved in a dispute with Texas as to boundaries, and if

the claim of Texas was sanctioned, two thirds of the disputed territory

would come within the scope of the annexation resolutions, and be

slave-holding States. Then there was the further question whether the

Wilmot Proviso should be applied to New Mexico on her organization as a

territory.

The President, acting under the influence of Mr. Seward, advised that

California should be admitted, and the question of slavery in the other

territories be decided when they should apply for admission. Feeling was

running very high in Washington, and there was a bitter and protracted

struggle of three weeks, before the House succeeded in choosing a Speaker.

The State Legislatures on both sides took up the burning question, and

debated and resolved one way or the other with great excitement. The

Southern members held meetings, and talked about secession and about

withdrawing from Congress. The air was full of murmurs of dissolution and

intestine strife. The situation was grave and even threatening.

In this state of affairs Mr. Clay, now an old man, and with but a short

term of life before him, resolved to try once more to solve the problem and

tide over the dangers by a grand compromise. The main features of his plan

were: the admission of California with her free Constitution; the

organization of territorial governments in the Mexican conquests without

any reference to slavery; the adjustment of the Texan boundary; a guaranty

of the existence of slavery in the District of Columbia until Maryland

should consent to its abolition; the prohibition of the slave-trade in the

District; provision for the more effectual enforcement of the Fugitive

Slave Law, and a declaration that Congress had no power over the

slave-trade between the slave-holding States. As the admission of

California was certain, the proposition to bring about the prohibition of

the slave-trade in the District was the only concession to the North.

Everything else was in the interest of the South; but then that was always

the manner in which compromises with slavery were made. They could be

effected in no other way.

This outline Mr. Clay submitted to Mr. Webster January 21, 1850, and Mr.

Webster gave it his full approval, subject, of course, to further and more

careful consideration. February 5 Mr. Clay introduced his plan in the

Senate, and supported it in an eloquent speech. On the 13th the President

submitted the Constitution of California, and Mr. Foote moved to refer it,

together with all matters relating to slavery, to a select committee. It

now became noised about that Mr. Webster intended to address the Senate on

the pending measures, and on the 7th of March he delivered the memorable

speech which has always been known by its date.

It may be premised that in a literary and rhetorical point of view the

speech of the 7th of March was a fine one. The greater part of it is taken

up with argument and statement, and is very quiet in tone. But the famous

passage beginning "peaceable secession," which came straight from the

heart, and the peroration also, have the glowing eloquence which shone with

so much splendor all through the reply to Hayne. The speech can be readily

analyzed. With extreme calmness of language Mr. Webster discussed the whole

history of slavery in ancient and modern times, and under the Constitution

of the United States. His attitude is so judicial and historical, that if

it is clear he disapproved of the system, it is not equally evident that he

condemned it. He reviewed the history of the annexation of Texas, defended

his own consistency, belittled the Wilmot Proviso, admitted substantially

the boundary claims of Texas, and declared that the character of every

part of the country, so far as slavery or freedom was concerned, was now

settled, either by law or nature, and that he should resist the insertion

of the Wilmot Proviso in regard to New Mexico, because it would be merely a

wanton taunt and reproach to the South. He then spoke of the change of

feeling and opinion both at the North and the South in regard to slavery,

and passed next to the question of mutual grievances. He depicted at length

the grievances of the South, including the tone of the Northern press, the

anti-slavery resolutions of the Legislature, the utterances of the

abolitionists, and the resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law. The last,

which he thought the only substantial and legally remediable complaint, he

dwelt on at great length, and severely condemned the refusal of certain

States to comply with this provision of the Constitution. Then came the

grievances of the North against the South, which were dealt with very

briefly. In fact, the Northern grievances, according to Mr. Webster,

consisted of the tone of the Southern press and of Southern speeches which,

it must be confessed, were at times a little violent and somewhat

offensive. The short paragraph reciting the unconstitutional and

high-handed action of the South in regard to free negroes employed as

seamen on Northern vessels, and the outrageous treatment of Mr. Hoar at

Charleston in connection with this matter, was not delivered, Mr. Giddings

says, but was inserted afterwards and before publication, at the suggestion

of a friend. After this came the fine burst about secession, and a

declaration of faith that the Southern convention called at Nashville would

prove patriotic and conciliatory. The speech concluded with a strong appeal

in behalf of nationality and union.

Mr. Curtis correctly says that a great majority of Mr. Webster's

constituents, if not of the whole North, disapproved this speech. He might

have added that that majority has steadily increased. The popular verdict

has been given against the 7th of March speech, and that verdict has passed

into history. Nothing can now be said or written which will alter the fact

that the people of this country who maintained and saved the Union have

passed judgment upon Mr. Webster and condemned what he said on the 7th of

March, 1850, as wrong in principle and mistaken in policy. This opinion is

not universal,--no opinion is,--but it is held by the great body of mankind

who know or care anything about the subject, and it cannot be changed or

substantially modified, because subsequent events have fixed its place and

worth irrevocably. It is only necessary, therefore, to examine very briefly

the grounds of this adverse judgment, and the pleas put in against it by

Mr. Webster and by his most devoted partisans.

From the sketch which has been given of Mr. Webster's course on the slavery

question, we see that in 1819 and 1820 he denounced in the strongest terms

slavery and every form of slave-trade; that while he fully admitted that

Congress had no power to touch slavery in the States, he asserted that it

was their right and their paramount duty absolutely to stop any further

extension of slave territory. In 1820 he was opposed to any compromise on

this question. Ten years later he stood out to the last, unaffected by

defeat, against the principle of compromise which sacrificed the rights and

the dignity of the general government to the resistance and threatened

secession of a State.

After the reply to Hayne in 1830, Mr. Webster became a standing candidate

for the presidency, or for the Whig nomination to that office. From that

time forth, the sharp denunciation of slavery and traffic in slaves

disappears, although there is no indication that he ever altered his

original opinion on these points; but he never ceased, sometimes mildly,

sometimes in the most vigorous and sweeping manner, to attack and oppose

the extension of slavery to new regions, and the increase of slave

territory. If, then, in the 7th of March speech, he was inconsistent with

his past, such inconsistency must appear, if at all, in his general tone in

regard to slavery, in his views as to the policy of compromise, and in his

attitude toward the extension of slavery, the really crucial question of

the time.

As to the first point, there can be no doubt that there is a vast

difference between the tone of the Plymouth oration and the Boston memorial

toward slavery and the slave-trade, and that of the 7th of March speech in

regard to the same subjects. For many years Mr. Webster had had but little

to say against slavery as a system, but in the 7th of March speech, in

reviewing the history of slavery, he treats the matter in such a very calm

manner, that he not only makes the best case possible for the South, but

his tone is almost apologetic when speaking in their behalf. To the

grievances of the South he devotes more than five pages of his speech, to

those of the North less than two. As to the infamy of making the national

capital a great slave-mart, he has nothing to say--although it was a matter

which figured as one of the elements in Mr. Clay's scheme.

But what most shocked the North in this connection were his utterances in

regard to the Fugitive Slave Law. There can be no doubt that under the

Constitution the South had a perfect right to claim the extradition of

fugitive slaves. The legal argument in support of that right was excellent,

but the Northern people could not feel that it was necessary for Daniel

Webster to make it. The Fugitive Slave Law was in absolute conflict with

the awakened conscience and moral sentiment of the North. To strengthen

that law, and urge its enforcement, was a sure way to make the resistance

to it still more violent and intolerant. Constitutions and laws will

prevail over much, and allegiance to them is a high duty, but when they

come into conflict with a deep-rooted moral sentiment, and with the

principles of liberty and humanity, they must be modified, or else they

will be broken to pieces. That this should have been the case in 1850 was

no doubt to be regretted, but it was none the less a fact. To insist upon

the constitutional duty of returning fugitive slaves, to upbraid the North

with their opposition, and to urge upon them and upon the country the

strict enforcement of the extradition law, was certain to embitter and

intensify the opposition to it. The statesmanlike course was to recognize

the ground of Northern resistance, to show the South that a too violent

insistence upon their constitutional rights would be fatal, and to endeavor

to obtain such concessions as would allay excited feelings. Mr. Webster's

strong argument in favor of the Fugitive Slave Law pleased the South, of

course; but it irritated and angered the North. It promoted the very

struggle which it proposed to allay, for it admitted the existence of only

one side to the question. The consciences of men cannot be coerced; and

when Mr. Webster undertook to do it he dashed himself against the rocks.

People did not stop to distinguish between a legal argument and a defence

of the merits of catching runaway slaves. To refer to the original law of

1793 was idle. Public opinion had changed in half a century; and what had

seemed reasonable at the close of the eighteenth century was monstrous in

the middle of the nineteenth.

All this Mr. Webster declined to recognize. He upheld without diminution or

modification the constitutional duty of sending escaping slaves back to

bondage; and from the legal soundness of this position there is no escape.

The trouble was that he had no word to say against the cruelty and

barbarity of the system. To insist upon the necessity of submitting to the

hard and repulsive duty imposed by the Constitution was one thing. To urge

submission without a word of sorrow or regret was another. The North felt,

and felt rightly, that while Mr. Webster could not avoid admitting the

force of the constitutional provisions about fugitive slaves, and was

obliged to bow to their behest, yet to defend them without reservation, to

attack those who opposed them, and to urge the rigid enforcement of a

Fugitive Slave Law, was not in consonance with his past, his conscience,

and his duty to his constituents. The constitutionality of a Fugitive Slave

Law may be urged and admitted over and over again, but this could not make

the North believe that advocacy of slave-catching was a task suited to

Daniel Webster. The simple fact was that he did not treat the general

question of slavery as he always had treated it. Instead of denouncing and

deploring it, and striking at it whenever the Constitution permitted, he

apologized for its existence, and urged the enforcement of its most

obnoxious laws. This was not his attitude in 1820; this was not what the

people of the North expected of him in 1850.

In regard to the policy of compromise there is a much stronger contrast

between Mr. Webster's attitude in 1850 and his earlier course than in the

case of his views on the general subject of slavery. In 1819, although not

in public life, Mr. Webster, as is clear from the tone of the Boston

memorial, was opposed to any compromise involving an extension of slavery.

In 1832-33 he was the most conspicuous and unyielding enemy of the

principle of compromise in the country. He then took the ground that the

time had come to test the strength of the Constitution and the Union, and

that any concession would have a fatally weakening effect. In 1850 he

supported a compromise which was so one-sided that it hardly deserves the

name. The defence offered by his friends on this subject--and it is the

strongest point they have been able to make--is that these sacrifices, or

compromises, were necessary to save the Union, and that--although they did

not prevent ultimate secession--they caused a delay of ten years, which

enabled the North to gather sufficient strength to carry the civil war to a

successful conclusion. It is not difficult to show historically that the

policy of compromise between the national principle and unlawful opposition

to that principle was an entire mistake from the very outset, and that if

illegal and partisan State resistance had always been put down with a firm

hand, civil war might have been avoided. Nothing strengthened the general

government more than the well-judged and well-timed display of force by

which Washington and Hamilton crushed the Whiskey Rebellion, or than the

happy accident of peace in 1814, which brought the separatist movement in

New England to a sudden end. After that period Mr. Clay's policy of

compromise prevailed, and the result was that the separatist movement was

identified with the maintenance of slavery, and steadily gathered strength.

In 1819 the South threatened and blustered in order to prevent the complete

prohibition of slavery in the Louisiana purchase. In 1832 South Carolina

passed the nullification ordinance because she suffered by the operation of

a protective tariff. In 1850 a great advance had been made in their

pretensions. Secession was threatened because the South feared that the

Mexican conquests would not be devoted to the service of slavery. Nothing

had been done, nothing was proposed even, prejudicial to Southern

interests; but the inherent weakness of slavery, and the mild conciliatory

attitude of Northern statesmen, incited the South to make imperious demands

for favors, and seek for positive gains. They succeeded in 1850, and in

1860 they had reached the point at which they were ready to plunge the

country into the horrors of civil war solely because they lost an

election. They believed, first, that the North would yield everything for

the sake of union, and secondly, that if there was a limit to their

capacity for surrender in this direction, yet a people capable of so much

submission in the past would never fight to maintain the Union. The South

made a terrible mistake, and was severely punished for it; but the

compromises of 1820, 1833, and 1850 furnished some excuse for the wild idea

that the North would not and could not fight. Whether a strict adherence to

the strong, fearless policy of Hamilton, which was adopted by Jackson and

advocated by Webster in 1832-33, would have prevented civil war, must, of

course, remain matter of conjecture. It is at least certain that in that

way alone could war have been avoided, and that the Clay policy of

compromise made war inevitable by encouraging slave-holders to believe that

they could always obtain anything they wanted by a sufficient show of

violence.

It is urged, however, that the policy of compromise having been adopted, a

change in 1850 would have simply precipitated the sectional conflict. In

judging Mr. Webster, the practical question, of course, is as to the best

method of dealing with matters as they actually were and not as they might

have been had a different course been pursued in 1820 and 1832. The

partisans of Mr. Webster have always taken the ground that in 1850 the

choice was between compromise and secession; that the events of 1861 showed

that the South, in 1850, was not talking for mere effect; that the

maintenance of the Union was the paramount consideration of a patriotic

statesman; and that the only practicable and proper course was to

compromise. Admitting fully that Mr. Webster's first and highest duty was

to preserve the Union, it is perfectly clear now, when all these events

have passed into history, that he took the surest way to make civil war

inevitable, and that the position of 1832 should not have been abandoned.

In the first place, the choice was not confined to compromise or secession.

The President, the official head of the Whig party, had recommended the

admission of California, as the only matter actually requiring immediate

settlement, and that the other questions growing out of the new territories

should be dealt with as they arose. Mr. Curtis, Mr. Webster's biographer,

says this was an impracticable plan, because peace could not be kept

between New Mexico and Texas, and because there was great excitement about

the slavery question throughout the country. These seem very insufficient

reasons, and only the first has any practical bearing on the matter.

General Taylor said: Admit California, for that is an immediate and

pressing duty, and I will see to it that peace is preserved on the Texan

boundary. Zachary Taylor may not have been a great statesman, but he was a

brave and skilful soldier, and an honest man, resolved to maintain the

Union, even if he had to shoot a few Texans to do it. His policy was bold

and manly, and the fact that it was said to have been inspired by Mr.

Seward, a leader in the only Northern party which had any real principle to

fight for, does not seem such a monstrous idea as it did in 1850 or does

still to those who sustain Mr. Webster's action. That General Taylor's

policy was not so wild and impracticable as Mr. Webster's friends would

have us think, is shown by the fact that Mr. Benton, Democrat and

Southerner as he was, but imbued with the vigor of the Jackson school,

believed that each question should be taken up by itself and settled on its

own merits. A policy which seemed wise to three such different men as

Taylor, Seward, and Benton, could hardly have been so utterly impracticable

and visionary as Mr. Webster's partisans would like the world to believe.

It was in fact one of the cases which that extremely practical statesman

Nicolo Machiavelli had in mind when he wrote that, "Dangers that are seen

afar off are easily prevented; but protracting till they are near at hand,

the remedies grow unseasonable and the malady incurable."

It may be readily admitted that there was a great and perilous political

crisis in 1850, as Mr. Webster said. In certain quarters, in the excitement

of party strife, there was a tendency to deride Mr. Webster as a

"Union-saver," and to take the ground that there had been no real danger of

secession. This, as we can see now very plainly, was an unfounded idea.

When Congress met, the danger of secession was very real, although perhaps

not very near. The South, although they intended to secede as a last

resort, had no idea that they should be brought to that point. Menaces of

disunion, ominous meetings and conventions, they probably calculated, would

effect their purpose and obtain for them what they wanted, and subsequent

events proved that they were perfectly right in this opinion. On February

14 Mr. Webster wrote to Mr. Harvey:--

"I do not partake in any degree in those apprehensions which you

say some of our friends entertain of the dissolution of the Union

or the breaking up of the government. I am mortified, it is true,

at the violent tone assumed here by many persons, because such

violence in debate only leads to irritation, and is, moreover,

discreditable to the government and the country. But there is no

serious danger, be assured, and so assure our friends."

The next day he wrote to Mr. Furness, a leader of the anti-slavery party,

expressing his abhorrence of slavery as an institution, his unwillingness

to break up the existing political system to secure its abolition, and his

belief that the whole matter must be left with Divine Providence. It is

clear from this letter that he had dismissed any thought of assuming an

aggressive attitude toward slavery, but there is nothing to indicate that

he thought the Union could be saved from wreck only by substantial

concessions to the South. Between the date of the letter to Harvey and

March 7, Mr. Curtis says that the aspect of affairs had materially changed,

and that the Union was in serious peril. There is nothing to show that Mr.

Webster thought so, or that he had altered the opinion which he had

expressed on February 14. In fact, Mr. Curtis's view is the exact reverse

of the true state of affairs. If there was any real and immediate danger to

the Union, it existed on February 14, and ceased immediately afterwards, on

February 16, as Dr. Von Holst correctly says, when the House of

Representatives laid on the table the resolution of Mr. Root of Ohio,

prohibiting the extension of slavery to the territories. By that vote, the

victory was won by the slave-power, and the peril of speedy disunion

vanished. Nothing remained but to determine how much the South would get

from their victory, and how hard a bargain they could drive. The admission

of California was no more of a concession than a resolution not to

introduce slavery in Massachusetts would have been. All the rest of the

compromise plan, with the single exception of the prohibition of the

slave-trade in the District of Columbia, was made up of concessions to the

Southern and slave-holding interest. That Henry Clay should have

originated and advocated this scheme was perfectly natural. However wrong

or mistaken, this had been his steady and unbroken policy from the outset,

as the best method of preserving the Union and advancing the cause of

nationality. Mr. Clay was consistent and sincere, and, however much he may

have erred in his general theory, he never swerved from it. But with Mr.

Webster the case was totally different. He had opposed the principle of

compromise from the beginning, and in 1833, when concession was more

reasonable than in 1850, he had offered the most strenuous and unbending

resistance. Now he advocated a compromise which was in reality little less

than a complete surrender on the part of the North. On the general question

of compromise he was, of course, grossly inconsistent, and the history of

the time, as it appears in the cold light of the present day, shows plainly

that, while he was brave and true and wise in 1833, in 1850 he was not only

inconsistent, but that he erred deeply in policy and statesmanship. It has

also been urged in behalf of Mr. Webster that he went no farther than the

Republicans in 1860 in the way of concession, and that as in 1860 so in

1850, anything was permissible which served to gain time. In the first

place, the _tu quoque_ argument proves nothing and has no weight. In the

second place, the situations in 1850 and in 1860 were very different.

There were at the former period, in reference to slavery, four parties in

the country--the Democrats, the Free-Soilers, the Abolitionists, and the

Whigs. The three first had fixed and widely-varying opinions; the last was

trying to live without opinions, and soon died. The pro-slavery Democrats

were logical and practical; the Abolitionists were equally logical but

thoroughly impracticable and unconstitutional, avowed nullifiers and

secessionists; the Free-Soilers were illogical, constitutional, and

perfectly practical. As Republicans, the Free-Soilers proved the

correctness and good sense of their position by bringing the great majority

of the Northern people to their support. But at the same time their

position was a difficult one, for while they were an anti-slavery party and

had set on foot constitutional opposition to the extension of slavery,

their fidelity to the Constitution compelled them to admit the legality of

the Fugitive Slave Law and of slavery in the States. They aimed, of course,

first to check the extension of slavery and then to efface it by gradual

restriction and full compensation to slave-holders. When they had carried

the country in 1860, they found themselves face to face with a breaking

Union and an impending war. That many of them were seriously frightened,

and, to avoid war and dissolution, would have made great concessions,

cannot be questioned; but their controlling motive was to hold things

together by any means, no matter how desperate, until they could get

possession of the government. This was the only possible and the only wise

policy, but that it involved them in some contradictions in that winter of

excitement and confusion is beyond doubt. History will judge the men and

events of 1860 according to the circumstances of the time, but nothing that

happened then has any bearing on Mr. Webster's conduct. He must be judged

according to the circumstances of 1850, and the first and most obvious fact

is, that he was not fighting merely to gain time and obtain control of the

general government. The crisis was grave and serious in the extreme, but

neither war nor secession were imminent or immediate, nor did Mr. Webster

ever assert that they were. He thought war and secession might come, and it

was against this possibility and probability that he sought to provide. He

wished to solve the great problem, to remove the source of danger, to set

the menacing agitation at rest. He aimed at an enduring and definite

settlement, and that was the purpose of the 7th of March speech. His

reasons--and of course they were clear and weighty in his own

mind--proceeded from the belief that this wretched compromise measure

offered a wise, judicious, and permanent settlement of questions which, in

their constant recurrence, threatened more and more the stability of the

Union. History has shown how wofully mistaken he was in this opinion.

The last point to be considered in connection with the 7th of March speech

is the ground then taken by Mr. Webster with reference to the extension of

slavery. To this question the speech was chiefly directed, and it is the

portion which has aroused the most heated discussion. What Mr. Webster's

views had always been on the subject of slavery extension every one knew

then and knows now. He had been the steady and uncompromising opponent of

the Southern policy, and in season and out of season, sometimes vehemently

sometimes gently, but always with firmness and clearness, he had declared

against it. The only question is, whether he departed from these

often-expressed opinions on the 7th of March. In the speech itself he

declared that he had not abated one jot in his views in this respect, and

he argued at great length to prove his consistency, which, if it were to be

easily seen of men, certainly needed neither defence nor explanation. The

crucial point was, whether, in organizing the new territories, the

principle of the Wilmot Proviso should be adopted as part of the measure.

This famous proviso Mr. Webster had declared in 1847 to represent exactly

his own views. He had then denied that the idea was the invention of any

one man, and scouted the notion that on this doctrine there could be any

difference of opinion among Whigs. On March 7 he announced that he would

not have the proviso attached to the territorial bills, and should oppose

any effort in that direction. The reasons he gave for this apparent change

were, that nature had forbidden slavery in the newly-conquered regions, and

that the proviso, under such circumstances, would be a useless taunt and

wanton insult to the South. The famous sentence in which he said that he

"would not take pains uselessly to reaffirm an ordinance of nature, nor to

reënact the will of God," was nothing but specious and brilliant rhetoric.

It was perfectly easy to employ slaves in California, if the people had not

prohibited it, and in New Mexico as well, even if there were no cotton nor

sugar nor rice plantations in either, and but little arable land in the

latter. There was a classic form of slave-labor possible in those

countries. Any school-boy could have reminded Mr. Webster of

"Seius whose eight hundred slaves

Sicken in Ilva's mines."

Mining was one of the oldest uses to which slave-labor had been applied,

and it still flourished in Siberia as the occupation of serfs and

criminals. Mr. Webster, of course, was not ignorant of this very obvious

fact; and that nature, therefore, instead of forbidding slave-labor in the

Mexican conquests, opened to it a new and almost unlimited field in a

region which is to-day one of the greatest mining countries in the world.

Still less could he have failed to know that this form of employment for

slaves was eagerly desired by the South; that the slave-holders fully

recognized their opportunity, announced their intention of taking

advantage of it, and were particularly indignant at the action of

California because it had closed to them this inviting field. Mr. Clingman

of North Carolina, on January 22, when engaged in threatening war in order

to bring the North to terms, had said, in the House of Representatives:

"But for the anti-slavery agitation our Southern slave-holders would have

carried their negroes into the mines of California in such numbers that I

have no doubt but that the majority there would have made it a

slave-holding State."[1] At a later period Mr. Mason of Virginia declared,

in the Senate, that he knew of no law of nature which excluded slavery from

California. "On the contrary," he said, "if California had been organized

with a territorial form of government only, the people of the Southern

States would have gone there freely, and have taken their slaves there in

great numbers. They would have done so because the value of the labor of

that class would have been augmented to them many hundred fold."[2] These

were the views of practical men and experienced slave-owners who

represented the opinions of their constituents, and who believed that

domestic slavery could be employed to advantage anywhere. Moreover, the

Southern leaders openly avowed their opposition to securing any region to

free labor exclusively, no matter what the ordinances of nature might be.

In 1848, it must be remembered in this connection, Mr. Webster not only

urged the limitation of slave area, and sustained the power of Congress to

regulate this matter in the territories, but he did not resist the final

embodiment of the principle of the Wilmot Proviso in the bill for the

organization of Oregon, where the introduction of slavery was infinitely

more unlikely than in New Mexico. Cotton, sugar, and rice were excluded,

perhaps, by nature from the Mexican conquests, but slavery was not. It was

worse than idle to allege that a law of nature forbade slaves in a country

where mines gaped to receive them. The facts are all as plain as possible,

and there is no escape from the conclusion that in opposing the Wilmot

Proviso, in 1850, Mr. Webster abandoned his principles as to the extension

of slavery. He practically stood forth as the champion of the Southern

policy of letting the new territories alone, which could only result in

placing them in the grasp of slavery. The consistency which he labored so

hard to prove in his speech was hopelessly shattered, and no ingenuity,

either then or since, can restore it.

[Footnote 1: _Congressional Globe_, 31st Congress, 1st Session, p. 203.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid., Appendix, p. 510.]

A dispassionate examination of Mr. Webster's previous course on slavery,

and a careful comparison of it with the ground taken in the 7th of March

speech, shows that he softened his utterances in regard to slavery as a

system, and that he changed radically on the policy of compromise and on

the question of extending the area of slavery. There is a confused story

that in the winter of 1847-48 he had given the anti-slavery leaders to

understand that he proposed to come out on their ground in regard to

Mexico, and to sustain Corwin in his attack on the Democratic policy, but

that he failed to do so. The evidence on this point is entirely

insufficient to make it of importance, but there can be no doubt that in

the winter of 1850 Mr. Webster talked with Mr. Giddings, and led him, and

the other Free-Soil leaders, to believe that he was meditating a strong

anti-slavery speech. This fact was clearly shown in the recent newspaper

controversy which grew out of the celebration of the centennial anniversary

of Webster's birth. It is a little difficult to understand why this

incident should have roused such bitter resentment among Mr. Webster's

surviving partisans. To suppose that Mr. Webster made the 7th of March

speech after long deliberation, without having a moment's hesitation in the

matter, is to credit him with a shameless disregard of principle and

consistency, of which it is impossible to believe him guilty. He

undoubtedly hesitated, and considered deeply whether he should assume the

attitude of 1833, and stand out unrelentingly against the encroachments of

slavery. He talked with Mr. Clay on one side. He talked with Mr. Giddings,

and other Free-Soilers, on the other. With the latter the wish was no

doubt father to the thought, and they may well have imagined that Mr.

Webster had determined to go with them, when he was still in doubt and

merely trying the various positions. There is no need, however, to linger

over matters of this sort. The change made by Mr. Webster can be learned

best by careful study of his own utterances, and of his whole career. Yet,

at the same time, the greatest trouble lies not in the shifting and

inconsistency revealed by an examination of the specific points which have

just been discussed, but in the speech as a whole. In that speech Mr.

Webster failed quite as much by omissions as by the opinions which he

actually announced. He was silent when he should have spoken, and he spoke

when he should have held his peace. The speech, if exactly defined, is, in

reality, a powerful effort, not for compromise or for the Fugitive Slave

Law, or any other one thing, but to arrest the whole anti-slavery movement,

and in that way put an end to the dangers which threatened the Union and

restore lasting harmony between the jarring sections. It was a mad project.

Mr. Webster might as well have attempted to stay the incoming tide at

Marshfield with a rampart of sand as to seek to check the anti-slavery

movement by a speech. Nevertheless, he produced a great effect. His mind

once made up, he spared nothing to win the cast. He gathered all his

forces; his great intellect, his splendid eloquence, his fame which had

become one of the treasured possessions of his country,--all were given to

the work. The blow fell with terrible force, and here, at last, we come to

the real mischief which was wrought. The 7th of March speech demoralized

New England and the whole North. The abolitionists showed by bitter anger

the pain, disappointment, and dismay which this speech brought. The

Free-Soil party quivered and sank for the moment beneath the shock. The

whole anti-slavery movement recoiled. The conservative reaction which Mr.

Webster endeavored to produce came and triumphed. Chiefly by his exertions

the compromise policy was accepted and sustained by the country. The

conservative elements everywhere rallied to his support, and by his ability

and eloquence it seemed as if he had prevailed and brought the people over

to his opinions. It was a wonderful tribute to his power and influence, but

the triumph was hollow and short-lived. He had attempted to compass an

impossibility. Nothing could kill the principles of human liberty, not even

a speech by Daniel Webster, backed by all his intellect and knowledge, his

eloquence and his renown. The anti-slavery movement was checked for the

time, and pro-slavery democracy, the only other positive political force,

reigned supreme. But amid the falling ruins of the Whig party, and the

evanescent success of the Native Americans, the party of human rights

revived; and when it rose again, taught by the trials and misfortunes of

1850, it rose with a strength which Mr. Webster had never dreamed of, and,

in 1856, polled nearly a million and a half of votes for Fremont. The rise

and final triumph of the Republican party was the condemnation of the 7th

of March speech and of the policy which put the government of the country

in the hands of Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan. When the war came,

inspiration was not found in the 7th of March speech. In that dark hour,

men remembered the Daniel Webster who replied to Hayne, and turned away

from the man who had sought for peace by advocating the great compromise of

Henry Clay.

The disapprobation and disappointment which were manifested in the North

after the 7th of March speech could not be overlooked. Men thought and said

that Mr. Webster had spoken in behalf of the South and of slavery. Whatever

his intentions may have been, this was what the speech seemed to mean and

this was its effect, and the North saw it more and more clearly as time

went on. Mr. Webster never indulged in personal attacks, but at the same

time he was too haughty a man ever to engage in an exchange of compliments

in debate. He never was in the habit of saying pleasant things to his

opponents in the Senate merely as a matter of agreeable courtesy. In this

direction, as in its opposite, he usually maintained a cold silence. But

on the 7th of March he elaborately complimented Calhoun, and went out of

his way to flatter Virginia and Mr. Mason personally. This struck close

observers with surprise, but it was the real purpose of the speech which

went home to the people of the North. He had advocated measures which with

slight exceptions were altogether what the South wanted, and the South so

understood it. On the 30th of March Mr. Morehead wrote to Mr. Crittenden

that Mr. Webster's appointment as Secretary of State would now be very

acceptable to the South. No more bitter commentary could have been made.

The people were blinded and dazzled at first, but they gradually awoke and

perceived the error that had been committed.

Mr. Webster, however, needed nothing from outside to inform him as to his

conduct and its results. At the bottom of his heart and in the depths of

his conscience he knew that he had made a dreadful mistake. He did not

flinch. He went on in his new path without apparent faltering. His speech

on the compromise measures went farther than that of the 7th of March. But

if we study his speeches and letters between 1850 and the day of his death,

we can detect changes in them, which show plainly enough that the writer

was not at ease, that he was not master of that real conscience of which he

boasted.

His friends, after the first shock of surprise, rallied to his support,

and he spoke frequently at union meetings, and undertook, by making immense

efforts, to convince the country that the compromise measures were right

and necessary, and that the doctrines of the 7th of March speech ought to

be sustained. In pursuance of this object, during the winter of 1850 and

the summer of the following year, he wrote several public letters on the

compromise measures, and he addressed great meetings on various occasions,

in New England, New York, and as far south as Virginia. We are at once

struck by a marked change in the character and tone of these speeches,

which produced a great effect in establishing the compromise policy. It had

never been Mr. Webster's habit to misrepresent or abuse his opponents. Now

he confounded the extreme separatism of the abolitionists and the

constitutional opposition of the Free-Soil party, and involved all

opponents of slavery in a common condemnation. It was wilful

misrepresentation to talk of the Free-Soilers as if they were identical

with the abolitionists, and no one knew better than Mr. Webster the

distinction between the two, one being ready to secede to get rid of

slavery, the other offering only a constitutional resistance to its

extension. His tone toward his opponents was correspondingly bitter. When

he first arrived in Boston, after his speech, and spoke to the great crowd

in front of the Revere House, he said, "I shall support no agitations

having their foundations in unreal, ghostly abstractions." Slavery had now

become "an unreal, ghostly abstraction," although it must still have

appeared to the negroes something very like a hard fact. There were men in

that crowd, too, who had not forgotten the noble words with which Mr.

Webster in 1837 had defended the character of the opponents of slavery, and

the sound of this new gospel from his lips fell strangely on their ears. So

he goes on from one union meeting to another, and in speech after speech

there is the same bitter tone which had been so foreign to him in all his

previous utterances. The supporters of the anti-slavery movement he

denounces as insane. He reiterates his opposition to slave extension, and

in the same breath argues that the Union must be preserved by giving way to

the South. The feeling is upon him that the old parties are breaking down

under the pressure of this "ghostly abstraction," this agitation which he

tries to prove to the young men of the country and to his fellow-citizens

everywhere is "wholly factitious." The Fugitive Slave Law is not in the

form which he wants, but still he defends it and supports it. The first

fruits of his policy of peace are seen in riots in Boston, and he

personally advises with a Boston lawyer who has undertaken the cases

against the fugitive slaves. It was undoubtedly his duty, as Mr. Curtis

says, to enforce and support the law as the President's adviser, but his

personal attention and interest were not required in slave cases, nor would

they have been given a year before. The Wilmot Proviso, that doctrine which

he claimed as his own in 1847, when it was a sentiment on which Whigs could

not differ, he now calls "a mere abstraction." He struggles to put slavery

aside for the tariff, but it will not down at his bidding, and he himself

cannot leave it alone. Finally he concludes this compromise campaign with a

great speech on laying the foundation of the capitol extension, and makes a

pathetic appeal to the South to maintain the Union. They are not pleasant

to read, these speeches in the Senate and before the people in behalf of

the compromise policy. They are harsh and bitter; they do not ring true.

Daniel Webster knew when he was delivering them that that was not the way

to save the Union, or that, at all events, it was not the right way for him

to do it.

The same peculiarity can be discerned in his letters. The fun and humor

which had hitherto run through his correspondence seems now to fade away as

if blighted. On September 10, 1850, he writes to Mr. Harvey that since

March 7 there has not been an hour in which he has not felt a "crushing

sense of anxiety and responsibility." He couples this with the declaration

that his own part is acted and he is satisfied; but if his anxiety was

solely of a public nature, why did it date from March 7, when, prior to

that time, there was much greater cause for alarm than afterwards. In

everything he said or wrote he continually recurs to the slavery question

and always in a defensive tone, usually with a sneer or a fling at the

abolitionists and anti-slavery party. The spirit of unrest had seized him.

He was disturbed and ill at ease. He never admitted it, even to himself,

but his mind was not at peace, and he could not conceal the fact. Posterity

can see the evidences of it plainly enough, and a man of his intellect and

fame knew that with posterity the final reckoning must be made. No man can

say that Mr. Webster anticipated the unfavorable judgment which his

countrymen have passed upon his conduct, but that in his heart he feared

such a judgment cannot be doubted.

It is impossible to determine with perfect accuracy any man's motives in

what he says or does. They are so complex, they are so often undefined,

even in the mind of the man himself, that no one can pretend to make an

absolutely correct analysis. There have been many theories as to the

motives which led Mr. Webster to make the 7th of March speech. In the heat

of contemporary strife his enemies set it down as a mere bid to secure

Southern support for the presidency, but this is a harsh and narrow view.

The longing for the presidency weakened Mr. Webster as a public man from

the time when it first took possession of him after the reply to Hayne. It

undoubtedly had a weakening effect upon him in the winter of 1850, and had

some influence upon the speech of the 7th of March. But it is unjust to say

that it did more. It certainly was far removed from being a controlling

motive. His friends, on the other hand, declare that he was governed solely

by the highest and most disinterested patriotism, by the truest wisdom.

This explanation, like that of his foes, fails by going too far and being

too simple. His motives were mixed. His chief desire was to preserve and

maintain the Union. He wished to stand forth as the great saviour and

pacificator. On the one side was the South, compact, aggressive, bound

together by slavery, the greatest political force in the country. On the

other was a weak Free-Soil party, and a widely diffused and earnest moral

sentiment without organization or tangible political power. Mr. Webster

concluded that the way to save the Union and the Constitution, and to

achieve the success which he desired, was to go with the heaviest

battalions. He therefore espoused the Southern side, for the compromise was

in the Southern interest, and smote the anti-slavery movement with all his

strength. He reasoned correctly that peace could come only by administering

a severe check to one of the two contending parties. He erred in attempting

to arrest the one which all modern history showed was irresistible. It is

no doubt true, as appears by his cabinet opinion recently printed, that he

stood ready to meet the first overt act on the part of the South with

force. Mr. Webster would not have hesitated to have struck hard at any body

of men or any State which ventured to assail the Union. But he also

believed that the true way to prevent any overt act on the part of the

South was by concession, and that was precisely the object which the

Southern leaders sought to obtain. We may grant all the patriotism and all

the sincere devotion to the cause of the Constitution which is claimed for

him, but nothing can acquit Mr. Webster of error in the methods which he

chose to adopt for the maintenance of peace and the preservation of the

Union. If the 7th of March speech was right, then all that had gone before

was false and wrong. In that speech he broke from his past, from his own

principles and from the principles of New England, and closed his splendid

public career with a terrible mistake.