THE STRUGGLE WITH JACKSON AND THE RISE OF THE WHIG PARTY.
In the year preceding the delivery of his great speech Mr. Webster had lost
his brother Ezekiel by sudden death, and he had married for his second wife
Miss Leroy of New York. The former event was a terrible grief to him, and
taken in conjunction with the latter seemed to make a complete break with
the past, and with its struggles and privations, its joys and successes.
The slender girl whom he had married in Salisbury church and the beloved
brother were both gone, and with them went those years of youth in which,--
"He had sighed deep, laughed free,
Starved, feasted, despaired, been happy."
One cannot come to this dividing line in Mr. Webster's life without regret.
There was enough of brilliant achievement and substantial success in what
had gone before to satisfy any man, and it had been honest, simple, and
unaffected. A wider fame and a greater name lay before him, but with them
came also ugly scandals, bitter personal attacks, an ambition which warped
his nature, and finally a terrible mistake. One feels inclined to say of
these later years, with the Roman lover:--
"Shut them in
With their triumphs and their glories and the rest,
Love is best."
The home changed first, and then the public career. The reply which, as
John Quincy Adams said, "utterly demolished the fabric of Hayne's speech
and left scarcely a wreck to be seen," went straight home to the people of
the North. It gave eloquent expression to the strong but undefined feeling
in the popular mind. It found its way into every house and was read
everywhere; it took its place in the school books, to be repeated by shrill
boy voices, and became part of the literature and of the intellectual life
of the country. In those solemn sentences men read the description of what
the United States had come to be under the Constitution, and what American
nationality meant in 1830. The leaders of the young war party in 1812 were
the first to arouse the national sentiment, but no one struck the chord
with such a master hand as Mr. Webster, or drew forth such long and deep
vibrations. There is no single utterance in our history which has done so
much by mere force of words to strengthen the love of nationality and
implant it deeply in the popular heart, as the reply to Hayne.
Before the delivery of that speech Mr. Webster was a distinguished
statesman, but the day after he awoke to a national fame which made all his
other triumphs pale. Such fame brought with it, of course, as it always
does in this country, talk of the presidency. The reply to Hayne made Mr.
Webster a presidential candidate, and from that moment he was never free
from the gnawing, haunting ambition to win the grand prize of American
public life. There was a new force in his career, and in all the years to
come the influence of that force must be reckoned and remembered.
Mr. Webster was anxious that the party of opposition to General Jackson,
which then passed by the name of National Republicans, should be in some
way strengthened, solidified, and placed on a broad platform of distinct
principles. He saw with great regret the ruin which was threatened by the
anti-masonic schism, and it would seem that he was not indisposed to take
advantage of this to stop the nomination of Mr. Clay, who was peculiarly
objectionable to the opponents of masonry. He earnestly desired the
nomination himself, but even his own friends in the party told him that
this was out of the question, and he acquiesced in their decision. Mr.
Clay's personal popularity, moreover, among the National Republicans was,
in truth, invincible, and he was unanimously nominated by the convention at
Baltimore. The action of the anti-masonic element in the country doomed
Clay to defeat, which he was likely enough to encounter in any event; but
the consolidation of the party so ardently desired by Mr. Webster was
brought about by acts of the administration, which completely overcame any
intestine divisions among its opponents.
The session of 1831-1832, when the country was preparing for the coming
presidential election, marks the beginning of the fierce struggle with
Andrew Jackson which was to give birth to a new and powerful organization
known in our history as the Whig party, and destined, after years of
conflict, to bring overwhelming defeat to the "Jacksonian democracy." There
is no occasion here to enter into a history of the famous bank controversy.
Established in 1816, the bank of the United States, after a period of
difficulties, had become a powerful and valuable financial organization. In
1832 it applied for a continuance of its charter, which then had three
years still to run. Mr. Webster did not enter into the personal contest
which had already begun, but in a speech of great ability advocated a
renewal of the charter, showing, as he always did on such themes, a
knowledge and a grasp of the principles and intricacies of public finance
unequalled in our history except by Hamilton. In a second speech he made a
most effective and powerful argument against a proposition to give the
States authority to tax the bank, defending the doctrines laid down by
Chief Justice Marshall in McCullough vs. Maryland, and denying the power of
Congress to give the States the right of such taxation, because by so doing
they violated the Constitution. The amendment was defeated, and the bill
for the continuance of the charter passed both Houses by large majorities.
Jackson returned the bill with a veto. He had the audacity to rest his veto
upon the ground that the bill was unconstitutional, and that it was the
duty of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of every measure
without feeling in the least bound by the opinion of Congress or of the
Supreme Court. His ignorance was so crass that he failed to perceive the
distinction between a new bill and one to continue an existing law, while
his vanity and his self-assumption were so colossal that he did not
hesitate to assert that he had the right and the power to declare an
existing law, passed by Congress, approved by Madison, and held to be
constitutional by an express decision of the Supreme Court, to be invalid,
because he thought fit to say so. To overthrow such doctrines was not
difficult, but Mr. Webster refuted them with a completeness and force which
were irresistible. At the same time he avoided personal attack in the
dignified way which was characteristic of him, despite the extraordinary
temptation to indulge in invective and telling sarcasm to which Jackson by
his ignorance and presumption had so exposed himself. The bill was lost,
the great conflict with the bank was begun, and the Whig party was founded.
Another event of a different character, which had occurred not long before,
helped to widen the breach and to embitter the contest between the parties
of the administration and of the opposition. When in 1829 Mr. McLane had
received his instructions as Minister to England, he had been directed by
Mr. Van Buren to reopen negotiations on the subject of the West Indian
trade, and in so doing the Secretary of State had reflected on the previous
administration, and had said that the party in power would not support the
pretensions of its predecessors. Such language was, of course, at variance
with all traditions, was wholly improper, and was mean and contemptible in
dealing with a foreign nation. In 1831 Mr. Van Buren was nominated as
Minister to England, and came up for confirmation in the Senate some time
after he had actually departed on his mission. Mr. Webster opposed the
confirmation in an eloquent speech full of just pride in his country and of
vigorous indignation against the slight which Mr. Van Buren had put upon
her by his instructions to Mr. McLane. He pronounced a splendid "rebuke
upon the first instance in which an American minister had been sent abroad
as the representative of his party and not as the representative of his
country." The opposition was successful, and Mr. Van Buren's nomination
was rejected. It is no doubt true that the rejection was a political
mistake, and that, as was commonly said at the time, it created sympathy
for Mr. Van Buren and insured his succession to the presidency. Yet no one
would now think as well of Mr. Webster if, to avoid awakening popular
sympathy and party enthusiasm in behalf of Mr. Van Buren, he had silently
voted for that gentleman's confirmation. To do so was to approve the
despicable tone adopted in the instructions to McLane. As a patriotic
American, above all as a man of intense national feelings, Mr. Webster
could not have done otherwise than resist with all the force of his
eloquence the confirmation of a man who had made such an undignified and
unworthy exhibition of partisanship. Politically he may have been wrong,
but morally he was wholly right, and his rebuke stands in our history as a
reproach which Mr. Van Buren's subsequent success can neither mitigate nor
impair.
There was another measure, however, which had a far different effect from
those which tended to build up the opposition to Jackson and his followers.
A movement was begun by Mr. Clay looking to a revision and reduction of the
tariff, which finally resulted in a bill reducing duties on many articles
to a revenue standard, and leaving those on cotton and woollen goods and
iron unchanged. In the debates which occurred during the passage of this
bill Mr. Webster took but little part, but they caused a furious outbreak
on the part of the South Carolinians led by Hayne, and ended in the
confirmation of the protective policy. When Mr. Webster spoke at the New
York dinner in 1831, he gave his hearers to understand very clearly that
the nullification agitation was not at an end, and after the passage of the
new tariff bill he saw close at hand the danger which he had predicted.
In November, 1832, South Carolina in convention passed her famous ordinance
nullifying the revenue laws of the United States, and her Legislature,
which assembled soon after, enacted laws to carry out the ordinance, and
gave an open defiance to the Federal government. The country was filled
with excitement. It was known that Mr. Calhoun, having published a letter
in defence of nullification, had resigned the vice-presidency, accepted the
senatorship of South Carolina, and was coming to the capital to advocate
his favorite doctrine. But the South Carolinians had made one trifling
blunder. They had overlooked the President. Jackson was a Southerner and a
Democrat, but he was also the head of the nation, and determined to
maintain its integrity. On December 10, before Congress assembled, he
issued his famous proclamation in which he took up rigorously the position
adopted by Mr. Webster in his reply to Hayne, and gave the South
Carolinians to understand that he would not endure treason, but would
enforce constitutional laws even though he should be compelled to use
bayonets to do it. The Legislature of the recalcitrant State replied in an
offensive manner which only served to make Jackson angry. He, too, began to
say some pretty violent things, and, as he generally meant what he said,
the gallant leaders of nullification and other worthy people grew very
uneasy. There can be no doubt that the outlook was very threatening, and
the nullifiers were extremely likely to be the first to suffer from the
effects of the impending storm.
Mr. Webster was in New Jersey, on his way to Washington, when he first
received the proclamation, and at Philadelphia he met Mr. Clay, and from a
friend of that gentleman received a copy of a bill which was to do away
with the tariff by gradual reductions, prevent the imposition of any
further duties, and which at the same time declared against protection and
in favor of a tariff for revenue only. This headlong plunge into concession
and compromise was not at all to Mr. Webster's taste. He was opposed to the
scheme for economical reasons, but still more on the far higher ground that
there was open resistance to laws of undoubted constitutionality, and until
that resistance was crushed under foot any talk of compromise was a blow at
the national dignity and the national existence which ought not to be
tolerated for an instant. His own course was plain. He proposed to sustain
the administration, and when the national honor should be vindicated and
all unconstitutional resistance ended, then would come the time for
concessions. Jackson was not slow in giving Mr. Webster something to
support. At the opening of the session a message was sent to Congress
asking that provision might be made to enable the President to enforce the
laws by means of the land and naval forces if necessary. The message was
referred to a committee, who at once reported the celebrated "Force Bill,"
which embodied the principles of the message and had the entire approval of
the President. But Jackson's party broke, despite the attitude of their
chief, for many of them were from the South and could not bring themselves
to the point of accepting the "Force Bill." The moment was critical, and
the administration turned to Mr. Webster and took him into their councils.
On February 8 Mr. Webster rose, and, after explaining in a fashion which no
one was likely to forget, that this was wholly an administration measure,
he announced his intention, as an independent senator, of giving it his
hearty and inflexible support. The combination thus effected was
overwhelming. Mr. Calhoun was now thoroughly alarmed, and we can well
imagine that the threats of hanging, in which it was rumored that the
President had indulged, began to have a good deal of practical significance
to a gentleman who, as Secretary of War, had been familiar with the
circumstances attending the deaths of Arbuthnot and Ambrister. At all
events, Mr. Calhoun lost no time in having an interview with Mr. Clay, and
the result was, that the latter, on February 11, announced that he should,
on the following day, introduce a tariff bill, a measure of the same sort
having already been started in the House. The bill as introduced did not
involve such a complete surrender as that which Mr. Webster had seen in
Philadelphia, but it necessitated most extensive modifications and gave all
that South Carolina could reasonably demand. Mr. Clay advocated it in a
brilliant speech, resting his defence on the ground that this was the only
way to preserve the tariff, and that it was founded on the great
constitutional doctrine of compromise. Mr. Webster opposed the bill
briefly, and then introduced a series of resolutions combating the proposed
measure on economical principles and on those of justice, and especially
assailing the readiness to abandon the rightful powers of Congress and
yield them up to any form of resistance. Before, however, he could speak in
support of his resolutions, the "Force Bill" came up, and Mr. Calhoun made
his celebrated argument in support of nullification. This Mr. Webster was
obliged to answer, and he replied with the great speech known in his works
as "The Constitution not a compact between sovereign States." In a general
way the same criticism is applicable to this debate as to that with Hayne,
but there were some important differences. Mr. Calhoun's argument was
superior to that of his follower. It was dry and hard, but it was a
splendid specimen of close and ingenious reasoning, and, as was to be
expected, the originator and master surpassed the imitator and pupil. Mr.
Webster's speech, on the other hand, in respect to eloquence, was decidedly
inferior to the masterpiece of 1830. Mr. Curtis says, "Perhaps there is no
speech ever made by Mr. Webster that is so close in its reasoning, so
compact, and so powerful." To the first two qualities we can readily
assent, but that it was equally powerful may be doubted. So long as Mr.
Webster confined himself to defending the Constitution as it actually was
and as what it had come to mean in point of fact, he was invincible. Just
in proportion as he left this ground and attempted to argue on historical
premises that it was a fundamental law, he weakened his position, for the
historical facts were against him. In the reply to Hayne he touched but
slightly on the historical, legal, and theoretical aspects of the case, and
he was overwhelming. In the reply to Calhoun he devoted his strength
chiefly to these topics, and, meeting his keen antagonist on the latter's
own chosen ground, he put himself at a disadvantage. In the actual present
and in the steady course of development, the facts were wholly with Mr.
Webster. Whatever the people of the United States understood the
Constitution to mean in 1789, there can be no question that a majority in
1833 regarded it as a fundamental law, and not as a compact--an opinion
which has now become universal. But it was quite another thing to argue
that what the Constitution had come to mean was what it meant when it was
adopted. The identity of meaning at these two periods was the proposition
which Mr. Webster undertook to maintain, and he upheld it as well and as
plausibly as the nature of the case admitted. His reasoning was close and
vigorous; but he could not destroy the theory of the Constitution as held
by leaders and people in 1789, or reconcile the Virginia and Kentucky
resolutions or the Hartford Convention with the fundamental-law doctrines.
Nevertheless, it would be an error to suppose that because the facts of
history were against Mr. Webster in these particulars, this able,
ingenious, and elaborate argument was thrown away. It was a fitting
supplement and complement to the reply to Hayne. It reiterated the national
principles, and furnished those whom the statement and demonstration of an
existing fact could not satisfy, with an immense magazine of lucid
reasoning and plausible and effective arguments. The reply to Hayne gave
magnificent expression to the popular feeling, while that to Calhoun
supplied the arguments which, after years of discussion, converted that
feeling into a fixed opinion, and made it strong enough to carry the North
through four years of civil war. But in his final speech in this debate Mr.
Webster came back to his original ground, and said, in conclusion, "Shall
we have a general government? Shall we continue the union of States under a
_government_ instead of a league? This vital and all-important question the
people will decide." The vital question went to the great popular jury, and
they cast aside all historical premises and deductions, all legal
subtleties and refinements, and gave their verdict on the existing facts.
The world knows what that verdict was, and will never forget that it was
largely due to the splendid eloquence of Daniel Webster when he defended
the cause of nationality against the slave-holding separatists of South
Carolina.
While this great debate was in progress, and Mr. Webster and the faithful
adherents of Jackson were pushing the "Force Bill" to a vote, Mr. Clay was
making every effort to carry the compromise tariff. In spite of his
exertions, the Force Bill passed on February 20, but close behind came the
tariff, which Mr. Webster opposed, on its final passage, in a vigorous
speech. There is no need to enter into his economical objections, but he
made his strongest stand against the policy of sacrificing great interests
to soothe South Carolina. Mr. Clay replied, but did not then press a vote,
for, with that dexterous management which he had exhibited in 1820 and was
again to display in 1850, he had succeeded in getting his tariff bill
carried rapidly through the House, in order to obviate the objection that
all money bills must originate in the lower branch. The House bill passed
the Senate, Mr. Webster voting against it, and became law. There was no
further need of the Force Bill. Clay, Calhoun, even the daring Jackson
ultimately, were very glad to accept the easy escape offered by a
compromise. South Carolina had in reality prevailed, although Mr. Clay had
saved protection in a modified form. Her threats of nullification had
brought the United States government to terms, and the doctrines of Calhoun
went home to the people of the South with the glory of substantial victory
about them, to breed and foster separatism and secession, and prepare the
way for armed conflict with the nobler spirit of nationality which Mr.
Webster had roused in the North.
Speaking of Mr. Webster at this period, Mr. Benton says:--
"He was the colossal figure on the political stage during that
eventful time, and his labors, splendid in their day, survive for
the benefit of distant posterity."... "It was a splendid era in his
life, both for his intellect and his patriotism. No longer the
advocate of classes or interests, he appeared as the great
defender of the Union, of the Constitution, of the country, and of
the administration to which he was opposed. Released from the bonds
of party and the narrow confines of class and corporation advocacy,
his colossal intellect expanded to its full proportions in the
field of patriotism, luminous with the fires of genius, and
commanding the homage not of party but of country. His magnificent
harangues touched Jackson in his deepest-seated and ruling feeling,
love of country, and brought forth the response which always came
from him when the country was in peril and a defender presented
himself. He threw out the right hand of fellowship, treated Mr.
Webster with marked distinction, commended him with public praise,
and placed him on the roll of patriots. And the public mind took
the belief that they were to act together in future, and that a
cabinet appointment or a high mission would be the reward of his
patriotic service. It was a crisis in the life of Mr. Webster. He
stood in public opposition to Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun. With Mr.
Clay he had a public outbreak in the Senate. He was cordial with
Jackson. The mass of his party stood by him on the proclamation. He
was at a point from which a new departure might be taken: one at
which he could not stand still; from which there must be either
advance or recoil. It was a case in which _will_ more than
_intellect_ was to rule. He was above Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun in
intellect, below them in will: and he was soon seen cooperating
with them (Mr. Clay in the lead) in the great measure condemning
President Jackson."
This is of course the view of a Jacksonian leader, but it is none the less
full of keen analysis and comprehension of Mr. Webster, and in some
respects embodies very well the conditions of the situation. Mr. Benton
naturally did not see that an alliance with Jackson was utterly impossible
for Mr. Webster, whose proper course was therefore much less simple than it
appeared to the Senator from Missouri. There was in reality no common
ground possible between Webster and Jackson except defence of the national
integrity. Mr. Webster was a great orator, a splendid advocate, a trained
statesman and economist, a remarkable constitutional lawyer, and a man of
immense dignity, not headstrong in temper and without peculiar force of
will. Jackson, on the other hand, was a rude soldier, unlettered,
intractable, arbitrary, with a violent temper and a most despotic will. Two
men more utterly incompatible it would have been difficult to find, and
nothing could have been more wildly fantastic than to suppose an alliance
between them, or to imagine that Mr. Webster could ever have done anything
but oppose utterly those mad gyrations of personal government which the
President called his "policy."
Yet at the same time it is perfectly true that just after the passage of
the tariff bill Mr. Webster was at a great crisis in his life. He could not
act with Jackson. That way was shut to him by nature, if by nothing else.
But he could have maintained his position as the independent and unbending
defender of nationality and as the foe of compromise. He might then have
brought Mr. Clay to his side, and remained himself the undisputed head of
the Whig party. The coalition between Clay and Calhoun was a hollow,
ill-omened thing, certain to go violently to pieces, as, in fact, it did,
within a few years, and then Mr. Clay, if he had held out so long, would
have been helpless without Mr. Webster. But such a course required a very
strong will and great tenacity of purpose, and it was on this side that Mr.
Webster was weak, as Mr. Benton points out. Instead of waiting for Mr. Clay
to come to him, Mr. Webster went over to Clay and Calhoun, and formed for a
time the third in that ill-assorted partnership. There was no reason for
his doing so. In fact every good reason was against it. Mr. Clay had come
to Mr. Webster with his compromise, and had been met with the reply "that
it would be yielding great principles to faction; and that the time had
come to test the strength of the Constitution and the government." This was
a brave, manly answer, but Mr. Clay, nationalist as he was, had straightway
deserted his friend and ally, and gone over to the separatists for support.
Then a sharp contest had occurred between Mr. Webster and Mr. Clay in the
debate on the tariff; and when it was all over, the latter wrote with frank
vanity and a slight tinge of contempt: "Mr. Webster and I came in
conflict, and I have the satisfaction to tell you that he gained nothing.
My friends flatter me with my having completely triumphed. There is no
permanent breach between us. I think he begins already to repent his
course." Mr. Clay was intensely national, but his theory of preserving the
Union was by continual compromise, or, in other words, by constant yielding
to the aggressive South. Mr. Webster's plan was to maintain a firm
attitude, enforce absolute submission to all constitutional laws, and prove
that agitation against the Union could lead only to defeat. This policy
would not have resulted in rebellion, but, if it had, the hanging of
Calhoun and a few like him, and the military government of South Carolina,
by the hero of New Orleans, would have taught slave-holders such a lesson
that we should probably have been spared four years of civil war. Peaceful
submission, however, would have been the sure outcome of Mr. Webster's
policy. But a compromise appealed as it always does to the timid,
balance-of-power party. Mr. Clay prevailed, and the manufacturers of New
England, as well as elsewhere, finding that he had secured for them the
benefit of time and of the chapter of accidents, rapidly came over to his
support. The pressure was too much for Mr. Webster. Mr. Clay thought that
if Mr. Webster "had to go over the work of the last few weeks he would have
been for the compromise, which commands the approbation of a great
majority." Whether Mr. Webster repented his opposition to the compromise no
one can say, but the change of opinion in New England, the general assent
of the Whig party, and the dazzling temptations of presidential candidacy
prevailed with him. He fell in behind Mr. Clay, and remained there in a
party sense and as a party man for the rest of his life.
The terrible prize of the presidency was indeed again before his eyes. Mr.
Clay's overthrow at the previous election had removed him, for the time
being at least, from the list of candidates, and thus freed Mr. Webster
from his most dangerous rival. In the summer of 1833 Mr. Webster made a
tour through the Western States, and was received everywhere with
enthusiasm, and hailed as the great expounder and defender of the
Constitution. The following winter he stood forward as the preëminent
champion of the Bank against the President. Everything seemed to point to
him as the natural candidate of the opposition. The Legislature of
Massachusetts nominated him for the presidency, and he himself deeply
desired the office, for the fever now burned strongly within him. But the
movement came to nothing. The anti-masonic schism still distracted the
opposition. The Kentucky leaders were jealous of Mr. Webster, and thought
him "no such man" as their idol Henry Clay. They admitted his greatness and
his high traits of character, but they thought his ambition mixed with too
much self-love. Governor Letcher wrote to Mr. Crittenden in 1836 that Clay
was more elevated, disinterested and patriotic than Webster, and that the
verdict of the country had had a good effect on the latter. Despite the
interest and enthusiasm which Mr. Webster aroused in the West, he had no
real hold upon that section or upon the masses of the people and the
Western Whigs turned to Harrison. There was no hope in 1836 for Mr.
Webster, or, for that matter, for his party either. He received the
electoral vote of faithful Massachusetts, and that was all. As it was then,
so it had been at the previous election, and so it was to continue to be at
the end of every presidential term. There never was a moment when Mr.
Webster had any real prospect of attaining to the presidency. Unfortunately
he never could realize this. He would have been more than human, perhaps,
if he had done so. The tempting bait hung always before his eyes. The prize
seemed to be always just coming within his reach, and was really never near
it. But the longing had entered his soul. He could not rid himself of the
idea of this final culmination to his success; and it warped his feelings
and actions, injured his career, and embittered his last years.
This notice of the presidential election of 1836 has somewhat anticipated
the course of events. Soon after the tariff compromise had been effected,
Mr. Webster renewed his relations with Mr. Clay, and, consequently, with
Mr. Calhoun, and their redoutable antagonist in the President's chair soon
gave them enough to do. The most immediate obstacle to Mr. Webster's
alliance with General Jackson was the latter's attitude in regard to the
bank. Mr. Webster had become satisfied that the bank was, on the whole, a
useful and even necessary institution. No one was better fitted than he to
decide on such a question, and few persons would now be found to differ
from his judgment on this point. In a general way he may be said to have
adopted the Hamiltonian doctrine in regard to the expediency and
constitutionality of a national bank. There were intimations in the spring
of 1833 that the President, not content with preventing the re-charter of
the bank, was planning to strike it down, and practically deprive it of
even the three years of life which still remained to it by law. The scheme
was perfected during the summer, and, after changing his Secretary of the
Treasury until he got one who would obey, President Jackson dealt his great
blow. On September 26 Mr. Taney signed the order removing the deposits of
the government from the Bank of the United States. The result was an
immediate contraction of loans, commercial distress, and great confusion.
The President had thrown down the gage, and the leaders of the opposition
were not slow to take it up. Mr. Clay opened the battle by introducing two
resolutions,--one condemning the action of the President as
unconstitutional, the other attacking the policy of removal, and a long and
bitter debate ensued. A month later, Mr. Webster came forward with
resolutions from Boston against the course of the President. He presented
the resolutions in a powerful and effective speech, depicting the
deplorable condition of business, and the injury caused to the country by
the removal of the deposits. He rejected the idea of leaving the currency
to the control of the President, or of doing away entirely with paper, and
advocated the re-charter of the present bank, or the creation of a new one;
and, until the time for that should arrive, the return of the deposits,
with its consequent relief to business and a restoration of stability and
of confidence for the time being at least. He soon found that the
administration had determined that no law should be passed, and that the
doctrine that Congress had no power to establish a bank should be upheld.
He also discovered that the constitutional pundit in the White House, who
was so opposed to a single national bank, had created, by his own fiat, a
large number of small national banks in the guise of state banks, to which
the public deposits were committed, and the collection of the public
revenues intrusted. Such an arbitrary policy, at once so ignorant,
illogical, and dangerous, aroused Mr. Webster thoroughly, and he entered
immediately upon an active campaign against the President. Between the
presentation of the Boston resolutions and the close of the session he
spoke on the bank, and the subjects necessarily connected with it, no less
than sixty-four times. He dealt entirely with financial topics,--chiefly
those relating to the currency, and with the constitutional questions
raised by the extension of the executive authority. This long series of
speeches is one of the most remarkable exhibitions of intellectual power
ever made by Mr. Webster, or indeed by any public man in our history. In
discussing one subject in all its bearings, involving of necessity a
certain amount of repetition, he not only displayed an extraordinary grasp
of complicated financial problems and a wide knowledge of their scientific
meaning and history, but he showed an astonishing fertility in argument,
coupled with great variety and clearness of statement and cogency of
reasoning. With the exception of Hamilton, Mr. Webster is the only
statesman in our history who was capable of such a performance on such a
subject, when a thorough knowledge had to be united with all the resources
of debate and all the arts of the highest eloquence.
The most important speech of all was that delivered in answer to Jackson's
"Protest," sent in as a reply to Mr. Clay's resolutions which had been
sustained by Mr. Webster as chairman of the Committee on Finance. The
"Protest" asserted, in brief, that the Legislature could not order a
subordinate officer to perform certain duties free from the control of the
President; that the President had the right to put his own conception of
the law into execution; and, if the subordinate officer refused to obey,
then to remove such officer; and that the Senate had therefore no right to
censure his removal of the Secretary of the Treasury, in order to reach the
government deposits. To this doctrine Mr. Webster replied with great
elaboration and ability. The question was a very nice one. There could be
no doubt of the President's power of removal, and it was necessary to show
that this power did not extend to the point of depriving Congress of the
right to confer by law specified and independent powers upon an inferior
officer, or of regulating the tenure of office. To establish this
proposition, in such a way as to take it out of the thick and heated
atmosphere of personal controversy, and put it in a shape to carry
conviction to the popular understanding, was a delicate and difficult task,
requiring, in the highest degree, lucidity and ingenuity of argument. It is
not too high praise to say that Mr. Webster succeeded entirely. The real
contest was for the possession of that debatable ground which lies between
the defined limits of the executive and legislative departments. The
struggle consolidated and gave coherence to the Whig party as representing
the opposition to executive encroachments. At the time Jackson, by his
imperious will and marvellous personal popularity, prevailed and obtained
the acceptance of his doctrines. But the conflict has gone on, and the
balance of advantage now rests with the Legislature. This tendency is quite
as dangerous as that of which Jackson was the exponent, if not more so. The
executive department has been crippled; and the influence and power of
Congress, and especially of the Senate, have become far greater than they
should be, under the system of proportion and balance embodied in the
Constitution. Despite Jackson's victory there is, to-day, far more danger
of undue encroachments on the part of the Senate than on that of the
President.
At the next session the principal subject of discussion was the trouble
with France. Irritated at the neglect of the French government to provide
funds for the payment of their debt to us, Jackson sent in a message
severely criticising them, and recommending the passage of a law
authorizing reprisals on French property. The President and his immediate
followers were eager for war, Calhoun and his faction regarded the whole
question as only matter for "an action of assumpsit," while Mr. Webster and
Mr. Clay desired to avoid hostilities, but wished the country to maintain a
firm and dignified attitude. Under the lead of Mr. Clay, the recommendation
of reprisals was rejected, and under that of Mr. Webster a clause smuggled
into the Fortification Bill to give the President three millions to spend
as he liked was struck out and the bill was subsequently lost. This affair,
which brought us to the verge of war with France, soon blew over, however,
and caused only a temporary ripple, although Mr. Webster's attack on the
Fortification Bill left a sting behind.
In this same session Mr. Webster made an exhaustive speech on the question
of executive patronage and the President's power of appointment and
removal. He now went much farther than in his answer to the "Protest,"
asserting not only the right of Congress to fix the tenure of office, but
also that the power of removal, like the power of appointment, was in the
President and Senate jointly. The speech contained much that was valuable,
but in its main doctrine was radically unsound. The construction of 1789,
which decided that the power of removal belonged to the President alone,
was clearly right, and Mr. Webster failed to overthrow it. His theory,
embodied in a bill which provided that the President should state to the
Senate, when he appointed to a vacancy caused by removal, his reasons for
such removal, was thoroughly mischievous. It was more dangerous than
Jackson's doctrine, for it tended to take the power of patronage still more
from a single and responsible person and vest it in a large and therefore
wholly irresponsible body which has always been too much inclined to
degenerate into an office-broking oligarchy, and thus degrade its high and
important functions. Mr. Webster argued his proposition with his usual
force and perspicuity, but the speech is strongly partisan and exhibits the
disposition of an advocate to fit the Constitution to his particular case,
instead of dealing with it on general and fundamental principles.
The session closed with a resolution offered by Mr. Benton to expunge the
resolutions of censure upon the President, which was overwhelmingly
defeated, and was then laid upon the table, on the motion of Mr. Webster.
He also took the first step to prevent the impending financial disaster
growing out of the President's course toward the bank, by carrying a bill
to stop the payment of treasury warrants by the deposit banks in current
banknotes, and to compel their payment in gold and silver. The rejection of
Benton's resolutions served to embitter the already intense conflict
between the President and his antagonists, and Mr. Webster's bill, while it
showed the wisdom of the opposition, was powerless to remedy the mischief
which was afoot.
In this same year (1835) the independence of Texas was achieved, and in the
session of 1835-36 the slavery agitation began its march, which was only to
terminate on the field of battle and in the midst of contending armies.
Mr. Webster's action at this time in regard to this great question, which
was destined to have such an effect upon his career, can be more fitly
narrated when we come to consider his whole course in regard to slavery in
connection with the "7th of March" speech. The other matters of this
session demand but a brief notice. The President animadverted in his
message upon the loss of the Fortification Bill, due to the defeat of the
three million clause. Mr. Webster defended himself most conclusively and
effectively, and before the session closed the difficulties with France
were practically settled. He also gave great attention to the ever-pressing
financial question, trying to mitigate the evils which the rapid
accumulation of the public funds was threatening to produce. He felt that
he was powerless, that nothing indeed could be done to avert the
approaching disaster; but he struggled to modify its effects and delay its
progress.
Complications increased rapidly during the summer. The famous "Specie
Circular," issued by the Secretary of the Treasury without authority of
law, weakened all banks which did not hold the government deposits, forced
them to contract their loans, and completed the derangement of domestic
exchange. This grave condition of affairs confronted Congress when it
assembled in December, 1836. A resolution was introduced to rescind the
Specie Circular, and Mr. Webster spoke at length in the debate, defining
the constitutional duties of the government toward the regulation of the
currency, and discussing in a masterly manner the intricate questions of
domestic exchanges and the excessive circulation of bank notes. On another
occasion he reiterated his belief that a national bank was the true remedy
for existing ills, but that only hard experience could convince the country
of its necessity.
At this session the resolution to expunge the vote of censure of 1833 was
again brought forward by Mr. Benton. The Senate had at last come under the
sway of the President, and it was clear that the resolution would pass.
This precious scheme belongs to the same category of absurdities as the
placing Oliver Cromwell's skull on Temple Bar, and throwing Robert Blake's
body on a dung-hill by Charles Stuart and his friends. It was not such a
mean and cowardly performance as that of the heroes of the Restoration, but
it was far more "childish-foolish." The miserable and ludicrous nature of
such a proceeding disgusted Mr. Webster beyond measure. Before the vote was
taken he made a brief speech that is a perfect model of dignified and
severe protest against a silly outrage upon the Constitution and upon the
rights of senators, which he was totally unable to prevent. The original
censure is part of history. No "black lines" can take it out. The expunging
resolution, which Mr. Curtis justly calls "fantastic and theatrical," is
also part of history, and carries with it the ineffaceable stigma affixed
by Mr. Webster's indignant protest.
Before the close of the session Mr. Webster made up his mind to resign his
seat in the Senate. He had private interests which demanded his attention,
and he wished to travel both in the United States and in Europe. He may
well have thought, also, that he could add nothing to his fame by remaining
longer in the Senate. But besides the natural craving for rest, it is quite
possible that he believed that a withdrawal from active and official
participation in politics was the best preparation for a successful
candidacy for the presidency in 1840. This certainly was in his mind in the
following year (1838), when the rumor was abroad that he was again
contemplating retirement from the Senate; and it is highly probable that
the same motive was at bottom the controlling one in 1837. But whatever the
cause of his wish to resign, the opposition of his friends everywhere, and
of the Legislature of Massachusetts, formally and strongly expressed, led
him to forego his purpose. He consented to hold his seat for the present,
at least, and in the summer of 1837 made an extended tour through the West,
where he was received as before with the greatest admiration and
enthusiasm.
The distracted condition of the still inchoate Whig party in 1836, and the
extraordinary popularity of Jackson, resulted in the complete victory of
Mr. Van Buren. But the General's chosen successor and political heir found
the great office to which he had been called, and which he so eagerly
desired, anything but a bed of roses. The ruin which Jackson's wild policy
had prepared was close at hand, and three months after the inauguration the
storm burst with full fury. The banks suspended specie payments and
universal bankruptcy reigned throughout the country. Our business interests
were in the violent throes of the worst financial panic which had ever been
known in the United States. The history of Mr. Van Buren's administration,
in its main features, is that of a vain struggle with a hopeless network of
difficulties, and with the misfortune and prostration which grew out of
this wide-spread disaster. It is not necessary here to enter into the
details of these events. Mr. Webster devoted himself in the Senate to
making every effort to mitigate the evils which he had prophesied, and to
prevent their aggravation by further injudicious legislation. His most
important speech was delivered at the special session against the first
sub-treasury bill and Mr. Calhoun's amendment. Mr. Calhoun, who had wept
over the defeat of the bank bill in 1815, was now convinced that all banks
were mistakes, and wished to prevent the acceptance of the notes of specie
paying banks for government dues. Mr. Webster's speech was the fullest and
most elaborate he ever made on the subject of the currency, and the
relations of the government to it. His theme was the duty and right of the
general government under the Constitution to regulate and control the
currency, and his masterly argument was the best that has ever been made,
leaving in fact nothing to be desired.
In the spring of 1839 there was talk of sending Mr. Webster to London as
commissioner to settle the boundary disputes, but it came to nothing, and
in the following summer he went to England in his private capacity
accompanied by his family. The visit was in every way successful. It
brought rest and change as well as pleasure, and was full of interest. Mr.
Webster was very well received, much attention was paid him, and much
admiration shown for him. He commanded all this, not only by his
appearance, his reputation, and his intellectual force, but still more by
the fact that he was thoroughly and genuinely American in thought, feeling,
and manner.
He reached New York on his return at the end of December, and was there met
by the news of General Harrison's nomination by the Whigs. In the previous
year it had seemed as if, with Clay out of the way by the defeat of 1832,
and Harrison by that of 1836, the great prize must fall to Mr. Webster. His
name was brought forward by the Whigs of Massachusetts, but it met with no
response even in New England. It was the old story; Mr. Clay and his
friends were cool, and the masses of the party did not desire Mr. Webster.
The convention turned from the Massachusetts statesman and again nominated
the old Western soldier.
Mr. Webster did not hesitate as to the course he should pursue upon his
return. He had been reëlected to the Senate in January, 1839, and after the
session closed in July, 1840, he threw himself into the campaign in support
of Harrison. The people did not desire Mr. Webster to be their President,
but there was no one whom they so much wished to hear. He was besieged from
all parts of the country with invitations to speak, and he answered
generously to the call thus made upon him.
On his way home from Washington, in March, 1837, more than three years
before, he had made a speech at Niblo's Garden in New York,--the greatest
purely political speech which he ever delivered. He then reviewed and
arraigned with the greatest severity the history of Jackson's
administration, abstaining in his characteristic way from all personal
attack, but showing, as no one else could show, what had been done, and the
results of the policy, which were developing as he had predicted. He also
said that the worst was yet to come. The speech produced a profound
impression. People were still reading it when the worst really came, and
the great panic broke over the country. Mr. Webster had, in fact, struck
the key-note of the coming campaign in the Niblo-Garden speech of 1837. In
the summer of 1840 he spoke in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia, and was almost continually upon the platform. The great feat of
1833-34, when he made sixty-four speeches in the Senate on the bank
question, was now repeated under much more difficult conditions. In the
first instance he was addressing a small and select body of trained
listeners, all more or less familiar with the subject. In 1840 he was
obliged to present these same topics, with all their infinite detail and
inherent dryness, to vast popular audiences, but nevertheless he achieved a
marvellous success. The chief points which he brought out were the
condition of the currency, the need of government regulation, the
responsibility of the Democrats, the miserable condition of the country,
and the exact fulfillment of the prophecies he had made. The argument and
the conclusion were alike irresistible, but Mr. Webster showed, in handling
his subject, not only the variety, richness, and force which he had
displayed in the Senate, but the capacity of presenting it in a way
thoroughly adapted to the popular mind, and yet, at the same time, of
preserving the impressive tone of a dignified statesman, without any
degeneration into mere stump oratory. This wonderful series of speeches
produced the greatest possible effect. They were heard by thousands and
read by tens of thousands. They fell, of course, upon willing ears. The
people, smarting under bankruptcy, poverty, and business depression, were
wild for a change; but nothing did so much to swell the volume of public
resentment against the policy of the ruling party as these speeches of Mr.
Webster, which gave character and form to the whole movement. Jackson had
sown the wind, and his unlucky successor was engaged in the agreeable task
of reaping the proverbial crop. There was a political revolution. The Whigs
swept the country by an immense majority, the great Democratic party was
crushed to the earth, and the ignorant misgovernment of Andrew Jackson
found at last its fit reward. General Harrison, as soon as he was elected,
turned to the two great chiefs of his party to invite them to become the
pillars of his administration. Mr. Clay declined any cabinet office, but
Mr. Webster, after some hesitation, accepted the secretaryship of state. He
resigned his seat in the Senate February 22, 1841, and on March 4 following
took his place in the cabinet, and entered upon a new field of public
service.