Anyhow, we could have believed, in the time of the Free Silver fight,

that the Democratic party was democratic with a small d. In Mr. Wilson

it was transfigured, his friends would say into a higher and his foes

into a hazier thing. And the Republican reaction against him, even where

it has been healthy, has also been hazy. In fact, it has been not so

much the victory of a political party as a relapse into repose after

certain political passions; and in that sense there is a truth in the

strange phrase about normalcy; in the sense that there is nothing more

normal than going to sleep. But an even larger truth is this; it is most

likely that America is no longer concentrated on these faction fights at

all, but is considering certain large problems upon which those factions

hardly troubled to take sides. They are too large even to be classified

as foreign policy distinct from domestic policy. They are so large as to

be inside as well as outside the state. From an English standpoint the

most obvious example is the Irish; for the Irish problem is not a

British problem, but also an American problem. And this is true even of

the great external enigma of Japan. The Japanese question may be a part

of foreign policy for America, but it is a part of domestic policy for

California. And the same is true of that other intense and intelligent

Eastern people, the genius and limitations of which have troubled the

world so much longer. What the Japs are in California, the Jews are in

America. That is, they are a piece of foreign policy that has become

imbedded in domestic policy; something which is found inside but still

has to be regarded from the outside. On these great international

matters I doubt if Americans got much guidance from their party system;

especially as most of these questions have grown very recently and

rapidly to enormous size. Men are left free to judge of them with fresh

minds. And that is the truth in the statement that the Washington

Conference has opened the gates of a new world.

On the relations to England and Ireland I will not attempt to dwell

adequately here. I have already noted that my first interview was with

an Irishman, and my first impression from that interview a vivid sense

of the importance of Ireland in Anglo-American relations; and I have

said something of the Irish problem, prematurely and out of its proper

order, under the stress of that sense of urgency. Here I will only add

two remarks about the two countries respectively. A great many British

journalists have recently imagined that they were pouring oil upon the

troubled waters, when they were rather pouring out oil to smooth the

downward path; and to turn the broad road to destruction into a

butter-slide. They seem to have no notion of what to do, except to say

what they imagine the very stupidest of their readers would be pleased

to hear, and conceal whatever the most intelligent of their readers

would probably like to know. They therefore informed the public that

'the majority of Americans' had abandoned all sympathy with Ireland,

because of its alleged sympathy with Germany; and that this majority of

Americans was now ardently in sympathy with its English brothers across

the sea. Now to begin with, such critics have no notion of what they are

saying when they talk about the majority of Americans. To anybody who

has happened to look in, let us say, on the city of Omaha, Nebraska, the

remark will have something enormous and overwhelming about it. It is

like saying that the majority of the inhabitants of China would agree

with the Chinese Ambassador in a preference for dining at the Savoy

rather than the Ritz. There are millions and millions of people living

in those great central plains of the North American Continent of whom

it would be nearer the truth to say that they have never heard of

England, or of Ireland either, than to say that their first emotional

movement is a desire to come to the rescue of either of them. It is

perfectly true that the more monomaniac sort of Sinn Feiner might

sometimes irritate this innocent and isolated American spirit by being

pro-Irish. It is equally true that a traditional Bostonian or Virginian

might irritate it by being pro-English. The only difference is that

large numbers of pure Irishmen are scattered in those far places, and

large numbers of pure Englishmen are not. But it is truest of all to say

that neither England nor Ireland so much as crosses the mind of most of

them once in six months. Painting up large notices of 'Watch Us Grow,'

making money by farming with machinery, together with an occasional

hold-up with six-shooters and photographs of a beautiful murderess or

divorcée, fill up the round of their good and happy lives, and fleet the

time carelessly as in the golden age.

But putting aside all this vast and distant democracy, which is the real

'majority of Americans,' and confining ourselves to that older culture

on the eastern coast which the critics probably had in mind, we shall

find the case more comforting but not to be covered with cheap and false

comfort. Now it is perfectly true that any Englishman coming to this

eastern coast, as I did, finds himself not only most warmly welcomed as

a guest, but most cordially complimented as an Englishman. Men recall

with pride the branches of their family that belong to England or the

English counties where they were rooted; and there are enthusiasms for

English literature and history which are as spontaneous as patriotism

itself. Something of this may be put down to a certain promptitude and

flexibility in all American kindness, which is never sufficiently stodgy

to be called good nature. The Englishman does sometimes wonder whether

if he had been a Russian, his hosts would not have remembered remote

Russian aunts and uncles and disinterred a Muscovite great-grandmother;

or whether if he had come from Iceland, they would not have known as

much about Icelandic sagas and been as sympathetic about the absence of

Icelandic snakes. But with a fair review of the proportions of the case

he will dismiss this conjecture, and come to the conclusion that a

number of educated Americans are very warmly and sincerely sympathetic

with England.

What I began to feel, with a certain creeping chill, was that they were

only too sympathetic with England. The word sympathetic has sometimes

rather a double sense. The impression I received was that all these

chivalrous Southerners and men mellow with Bostonian memories were

_rallying_ to England. They were on the defensive; and it was poor old

England that they were defending. Their attitude implied that somebody

or something was leaving her undefended, or finding her indefensible.

The burden of that hearty chorus was that England was not so black as

she was painted; it seemed clear that somewhere or other she was being

painted pretty black. But there was something else that made me

uncomfortable; it was not only the sense of being somewhat boisterously

forgiven; it was also something involving questions of power as well as

morality. Then it seemed to me that a new sensation turned me hot and

cold; and I felt something I have never before felt in a foreign land.

Never had my father or my grandfather known that sensation; never during

the great and complex and perhaps perilous expansion of our power and

commerce in the last hundred years had an Englishman heard exactly that

note in a human voice. England was being _pitied_. I, as an Englishman,

was not only being pardoned but pitied. My country was beginning to be

an object of compassion, like Poland or Spain. My first emotion, full of

the mood and movement of a hundred years, was one of furious anger. But

the anger has given place to anxiety; and the anxiety is not yet at an

end.

It is not my business here to expound my view of English politics, still

less of European politics or the politics of the world; but to put down

a few impressions of American travel. On many points of European

politics the impression will be purely negative; I am sure that most

Americans have no notion of the position of France or the position of

Poland. But if English readers want the truth, I am sure this is the

truth about their notion of the position of England. They are wondering,

or those who are watching are wondering, whether the term of her success

is come and she is going down the dark road after Prussia. Many are

sorry if this is so; some are glad if it is so; but all are seriously

considering the probability of its being so. And herein lay especially

the horrible folly of our Black-and-Tan terrorism over the Irish people.

I have noted that the newspapers told us that America had been chilled

in its Irish sympathies by Irish detachment during the war. It is the

painful truth that any advantage we might have had from this we

ourselves immediately proceeded to destroy. Ireland _might_ have put

herself wrong with America by her attitude about Belgium, if England had

not instantly proceeded to put herself more wrong by her attitude

towards Ireland. It is quite true that two blacks do not make a white;

but you cannot send a black to reproach people with tolerating

blackness; and this is quite as true when one is a Black Brunswicker and

the other a Black-and-Tan. It is true that since then England has made

surprisingly sweeping concessions; concessions so large as to increase

the amazement that the refusal should have been so long. But

unfortunately the combination of the two rather clinches the conception

of our decline. If the concession had come before the terror, it would

have looked like an attempt to emancipate, and would probably have

succeeded. Coming so abruptly after the terror, it looked only like an

attempt to tyrannise, and an attempt that failed. It was partly an

inheritance from a stupid tradition, which tried to combine what it

called firmness with what it called conciliation; as if when we made up

our minds to soothe a man with a five-pound note, we always took care to

undo our own action by giving him a kick as well. The English politician

has often done that; though there is nothing to be said of such a fool,

except that he has wasted a fiver. But in this case he gave the kick

first, received a kicking in return, and _then_ gave up the money; and

it was hard for the bystanders to say anything except that he had been

badly beaten. The combination and sequence of events seems almost as if

it were arranged to suggest the dark and ominous parallel. The first

action looked only too like the invasion of Belgium, and the second like

the evacuation of Belgium. So that vast and silent crowd in the West

looked at the British Empire, as men look at a great tower that has

begun to lean. Thus it was that while I found real pleasure, I could not

find unrelieved consolation in the sincere compliments paid to my

country by so many cultivated Americans; their memories of homely

corners of historic counties from which their fathers came, of the

cathedral that dwarfs the town, or the inn at the turning of the road.

There was something in their voices and the look in their eyes which

from the first disturbed me. So I have heard good Englishmen, who died

afterwards the death of soldiers, cry aloud in 1914, 'It seems

impossible, of those jolly Bavarians!' or, 'I will never believe it,

when I think of the time I had at Heidelberg!'

But there are other things besides the parallel of Prussia or the

problem of Ireland. The American press is much freer than our own; the

American public is much more familiar with the discussion of corruption

than our own; and it is much more conscious of the corruption of our

politics than we are. Almost any man in America may speak of the Marconi

Case; many a man in England does not even know what it means. Many

imagine that it had something to do with the propriety of politicians

speculating on the Stock Exchange. So that it means a great deal to

Americans to say that one figure in that drama is ruling India and

another is ruling Palestine. And this brings me to another problem,

which is also dealt with much more openly in America than in England. I

mention it here only because it is a perfect model of the

misunderstandings in the modern world. If any one asks for an example

of exactly how the important part of every story is left out, and even

the part that is reported is not understood, he could hardly have a

stronger case than the story of Henry Ford of Detroit.

When I was in Detroit I had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Ford, and it

really was a pleasure. He is a man quite capable of views which I think

silly to the point of insanity; but he is not the vulgar benevolent

boss. It must be admitted that he is a millionaire; but he cannot really

be convicted of being a philanthropist. He is not a man who merely wants

to run people; it is rather his views that run him, and perhaps run away

with him. He has a distinguished and sensitive face; he really invented

things himself, unlike most men who profit by inventions; he is

something of an artist and not a little of a fighter. A man of that type

is always capable of being wildly wrong, especially in the sectarian

atmosphere of America; and Mr. Ford has been wrong before and may be

wrong now. He is chiefly known in England for a project which I think

very preposterous; that of the Peace Ship, which came to Europe during

the war. But he is not known in England at all in connection with a much

more important campaign, which he has conducted much more recently and

with much more success; a campaign against the Jews like one of the

Anti-Semitic campaigns of the Continent. Now any one who knows anything

of America knows exactly what the Peace Ship would be like. It was a

national combination of imagination and ignorance, which has at least

some of the beauty of innocence. Men living in those huge, hedgeless

inland plains know nothing about frontiers or the tragedy of a fight for

freedom; they know nothing of alarum and armaments or the peril of a

high civilisation poised like a precious statue within reach of a mailed

fist. They are accustomed to a cosmopolitan citizenship, in which men of

all bloods mingle and in which men of all creeds are counted equal.

Their highest moral boast is humanitarianism; their highest mental boast

is enlightenment. In a word, they are the very last men in the world who

would seem likely to pride themselves on a prejudice against the Jews.

They have no religion in particular, except a sincere sentiment which

they would call 'true Christianity,' and which specially forbids an

attack on the Jews. They have a patriotism which prides itself on

assimilating all types, including the Jews. Mr. Ford is a pure product

of this pacific world, as was sufficiently proved by his pacifism. If a

man of that sort has discovered that there is a Jewish problem, it is

because there is a Jewish problem. It is certainly not because there is

an Anti-Jewish prejudice. For if there had been any amount of such

racial and religious prejudice, he would have been about the very last

sort of man to have it. His particular part of the world would have been

the very last place to produce it. We may well laugh at the Peace Ship,

and its wild course and inevitable shipwreck; but remember that its very

wildness was an attempt to sail as far as possible from the castle of

Front-de-Boeuf. Everything that made him Anti-War should have

prevented him from being Anti-Semite. We may mock him for being mad on

peace; but we cannot say that he was so mad on peace that he made war on

Israel.

It happened that, when I was in America, I had just published some

studies on Palestine; and I was besieged by Rabbis lamenting my

'prejudice.' I pointed out that they would have got hold of the wrong

word, even if they had not got hold of the wrong man. As a point of

personal autobiography, I do not happen to be a man who dislikes Jews;

though I believe that some men do. I have had Jews among my most

intimate and faithful friends since my boyhood, and I hope to have them

till I die. But even if I did have a dislike of Jews, it would be

illogical to call that dislike a prejudice. Prejudice is a very lucid

Latin word meaning the bias which a man has before he considers a case.

I might be said to be prejudiced against a Hairy Ainu because of his

name, for I have never been on terms of such intimacy with him as to

correct my preconceptions. But if after moving about in the modern world

and meeting Jews, knowing Jews, doing business with Jews, and reading

and hearing about Jews, I came to the conclusion that I did not like

Jews, my conclusion certainly would not be a prejudice. It would simply

be an opinion; and one I should be perfectly entitled to hold; though as

a matter of fact I do not hold it. No extravagance of hatred merely

following on _experience_ of Jews can properly be called a prejudice.

Now the point is that this new American Anti-Semitism springs from

experience and nothing but experience. There is no prejudice for it to

spring from. Or rather the prejudice is all the other way. All the

traditions of that democracy, and very creditable traditions too, are in

favour of toleration and a sort of idealistic indifference. The

sympathies in which these nineteenth-century people were reared were all

against Front-de-Boeuf and in favour of Rebecca. They inherited a

prejudice against Anti-Semitism; a prejudice of Anti-Anti-Semitism.

These people of the plains have found the Jewish problem exactly as they

might have struck oil; because it is _there_, and not even because they

were looking for it. Their view of the problem, like their use of the

oil, is not always satisfactory; and with parts of it I entirely

disagree. But the point is that the thing which I call a problem, and

others call a prejudice, has now appeared in broad daylight in a new

country where there is no priestcraft, no feudalism, no ancient

superstition to explain it. It has appeared because it _is_ a problem;

and those are the best friends of the Jews, including many of the Jews

themselves, who are trying to find a solution. That is the meaning of

the incident of Mr. Henry Ford of Detroit; and you will hardly hear an

intelligible word about it in England.

The talk of prejudice against the Japs is not unlike the talk of

prejudice against the Jews. Only in this case our indifference has

really the excuse of ignorance. We used to lecture the Russians for

oppressing the Jews, before we heard the word Bolshevist and began to

lecture them for being oppressed by the Jews. In the same way we have

long lectured the Californians for oppressing the Japs, without allowing

for the possibility of their foreseeing that the oppression may soon be

the other way. As in the other case, it may be a persecution but it is

not a prejudice. The Californians know more about the Japanese than we

do; and our own colonists when they are placed in the same position

generally say the same thing. I will not attempt to deal adequately here

with the vast international and diplomatic problems which arise with the

name of the new power in the Far East. It is possible that Japan, having

imitated European militarism, may imitate European pacifism. I cannot

honestly pretend to know what the Japanese mean by the one any more than

by the other. But when Englishmen, especially English Liberals like

myself, take a superior and censorious attitude towards Americans and

especially Californians, I am moved to make a final remark. When a

considerable number of Englishmen talk of the grave contending claims of

our friendship with Japan and our friendship with America, when they

finally tend in a sort of summing up to dwell on the superior virtues of

Japan, I may be permitted to make a single comment.

We are perpetually boring the world and each other with talk about the

bonds that bind us to America. We are perpetually crying aloud that

England and America are very much alike, especially England. We are

always insisting that the two are identical in all the things in which

they most obviously differ. We are always saying that both stand for

democracy, when we should not consent to stand their democracy for half

a day. We are always saying that at least we are all Anglo-Saxons, when

we are descended from Romans and Normans and Britons and Danes, and they

are descended from Irishmen and Italians and Slavs and Germans. We tell

a people whose very existence is a revolt against the British Crown that

they are passionately devoted to the British Constitution. We tell a

nation whose whole policy has been isolation and independence that with

us she can bear safely the White Man's Burden of universal empire. We

tell a continent crowded with Irishmen to thank God that the Saxon can

always rule the Celt. We tell a populace whose very virtues are lawless

that together we uphold the Reign of Law. We recognise our own

law-abiding character in people who make laws that neither they nor

anybody else can abide. We congratulate them on clinging to all they

have cast away, and on imitating everything which they came into

existence to insult. And when we have established all these nonsensical

analogies with a nonexistent nation, we wait until there is a crisis in

which we really are at one with America, and then we falter and threaten

to fail her. In a battle where we really are of one blood, the blood of

the great white race throughout the world, when we really have one

language, the fundamental alphabet of Cadmus and the script of Rome,

when we really do represent the same reign of law, the common conscience

of Christendom and the morals of men baptized, when we really have an

implicit faith and honour and type of freedom to summon up our souls as

with trumpets--_then_ many of us begin to weaken and waver and wonder

whether there is not something very nice about little yellow men, whose

heroic stories revolve round polygamy and suicide, and whose heroes wore

two swords and worshipped the ancestors of the Mikado.

_Prohibition in Fact and Fancy_

I went to America with some notion of not discussing Prohibition. But I

soon found that well-to-do Americans were only too delighted to discuss

it over the nuts and wine. They were even willing, if necessary, to

dispense with the nuts. I am far from sneering at this; having a general

philosophy which need not here be expounded, but which may be symbolised

by saying that monkeys can enjoy nuts but only men can enjoy wine. But

if I am to deal with Prohibition, there is no doubt of the first thing

to be said about it. The first thing to be said about it is that it does

not exist. It is to some extent enforced among the poor; at any rate it

was intended to be enforced among the poor; though even among them I

fancy it is much evaded. It is certainly not enforced among the rich;

and I doubt whether it was intended to be. I suspect that this has

always happened whenever this negative notion has taken hold of some

particular province or tribe. Prohibition never prohibits. It never has

in history; not even in Moslem history; and it never will. Mahomet at

least had the argument of a climate and not the interest of a class. But

if a test is needed, consider what part of Moslem culture has passed

permanently into our own modern culture. You will find the one Moslem

poem that has really pierced is a Moslem poem in praise of wine. The

crown of all the victories of the Crescent is that nobody reads the

Koran and everybody reads the Rubaiyat.

Most of us remember with satisfaction an old picture in _Punch_,

representing a festive old gentleman in a state of collapse on the

pavement, and a philanthropic old lady anxiously calling the attention

of a cabman to the calamity. The old lady says, 'I'm sure this poor

gentleman is ill,' and the cabman replies with fervour, 'Ill! I wish I

'ad 'alf 'is complaint.'

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