CHAPTER XV

THE PEACE OF RIGHTEOUSNESS

There can be no nobler cause for which to work than the peace of

righteousness; and high honor is due those serene and lofty souls who

with wisdom and courage, with high idealism tempered by sane facing

of the actual facts of life, have striven to bring nearer the day when

armed strife between nation and nation, between class and class, between

man and man shall end throughout the world. Because all this is true, it

is also true that there are no men more ignoble or more foolish, no men

whose actions are fraught with greater possibility of mischief to their

country and to mankind, than those who exalt unrighteous peace as better

than righteous war. The men who have stood highest in our history, as in

the history of all countries, are those who scorned injustice, who were

incapable of oppressing the weak, or of permitting their country, with

their consent, to oppress the weak, but who did not hesitate to draw

the sword when to leave it undrawn meant inability to arrest triumphant

wrong.

All this is so obvious that it ought not to be necessary to repeat it.

Yet every man in active affairs, who also reads about the past, grows

by bitter experience to realize that there are plenty of men, not only

among those who mean ill, but among those who mean well, who are ready

enough to praise what was done in the past, and yet are incapable of

profiting by it when faced by the needs of the present. During our

generation this seems to have been peculiarly the case among the men who

have become obsessed with the idea of obtaining universal peace by some

cheap patent panacea.

There has been a real and substantial growth in the feeling for

international responsibility and justice among the great civilized

nations during the past threescore or fourscore years. There has been a

real growth of recognition of the fact that moral turpitude is involved

in the wronging of one nation by another, and that in most cases war is

an evil method of settling international difficulties. But as yet

there has been only a rudimentary beginning of the development of

international tribunals of justice, and there has been no development at

all of any international police power. Now, as I have already said,

the whole fabric of municipal law, of law within each nation, rests

ultimately upon the judge and the policeman; and the complete absence

of the policeman, and the almost complete absence of the judge, in

international affairs, prevents there being as yet any real homology

between municipal and international law.

Moreover, the questions which sometimes involve nations in war are

far more difficult and complex than any questions that affect merely

individuals. Almost every great nation has inherited certain questions,

either with other nations or with sections of its own people, which it

is quite impossible, in the present state of civilization, to decide

as matters between private individuals can be decided. During the last

century at least half of the wars that have been fought have been

civil and not foreign wars. There are big and powerful nations which

habitually commit, either upon other nations or upon sections of their

own people, wrongs so outrageous as to justify even the most peaceful

persons in going to war. There are also weak nations so utterly

incompetent either to protect the rights of foreigners against their own

citizens, or to protect their own citizens against foreigners, that it

becomes a matter of sheer duty for some outside power to interfere in

connection with them. As yet in neither case is there any efficient

method of getting international action; and if joint action by several

powers is secured, the result is usually considerably worse than if only

one Power interfered. The worst infamies of modern times--such affairs

as the massacres of the Armenians by the Turks, for instance--have been

perpetrated in a time of nominally profound international peace, when

there has been a concert of big Powers to prevent the breaking of this

peace, although only by breaking it could the outrages be stopped. Be it

remembered that the peoples who suffered by these hideous massacres,

who saw their women violated and their children tortured, were actually

enjoying all the benefits of "disarmament." Otherwise they would not

have been massacred; for if the Jews in Russia and the Armenians in

Turkey had been armed, and had been efficient in the use of their arms,

no mob would have meddled with them.

Yet amiable but fatuous persons, with all these facts before their eyes,

pass resolutions demanding universal arbitration for everything, and the

disarmament of the free civilized powers and their abandonment of their

armed forces; or else they write well-meaning, solemn little books, or

pamphlets or editorials, and articles in magazines or newspapers, to

show that it is "an illusion" to believe that war ever pays, because it

is expensive. This is precisely like arguing that we should disband the

police and devote our sole attention to persuading criminals that it

is "an illusion" to suppose that burglary, highway robbery and white

slavery are profitable. It is almost useless to attempt to argue with

these well-intentioned persons, because they are suffering under an

obsession and are not open to reason. They go wrong at the outset, for

they lay all the emphasis on peace and none at all on righteousness.

They are not all of them physically timid men; but they are usually men

of soft life; and they rarely possess a high sense of honor or a keen

patriotism. They rarely try to prevent their fellow countrymen from

insulting or wronging the people of other nations; but they always

ardently advocate that we, in our turn, shall tamely submit to wrong

and insult from other nations. As Americans their folly is peculiarly

scandalous, because if the principles they now uphold are right, it

means that it would have been better that Americans should never have

achieved their independence, and better that, in 1861, they should have

peacefully submitted to seeing their country split into half a dozen

jangling confederacies and slavery made perpetual. If unwilling to learn

from their own history, let those who think that it is an "illusion" to

believe that a war ever benefits a nation look at the difference between

China and Japan. China has neither a fleet nor an efficient army. It is

a huge civilized empire, one of the most populous on the globe; and it

has been the helpless prey of outsiders because it does not possess the

power to fight. Japan stands on a footing of equality with European

and American nations because it does possess this power. China now sees

Japan, Russia, Germany, England and France in possession of fragments of

her empire, and has twice within the lifetime of the present generation

seen her capital in the hands of allied invaders, because she in very

fact realizes the ideals of the persons who wish the United States

to disarm, and then trust that our helplessness will secure us a

contemptuous immunity from attack by outside nations.

The chief trouble comes from the entire inability of these worthy

people to understand that they are demanding things that are mutually

incompatible when they demand peace at any price, and also justice and

righteousness. I remember one representative of their number, who used

to write little sonnets on behalf of the Mahdi and the Sudanese, these

sonnets setting forth the need that the Sudan should be both independent

and peaceful. As a matter of fact, the Sudan valued independence only

because it desired to war against all Christians and to carry on an

unlimited slave trade. It was "independent" under the Mahdi for a dozen

years, and during those dozen years the bigotry, tyranny, and cruel

religious intolerance were such as flourished in the seventh century,

and in spite of systematic slave raids the population decreased by

nearly two-thirds, and practically all the children died. Peace came,

well-being came, freedom from rape and murder and torture and highway

robbery, and every brutal gratification of lust and greed came, only

when the Sudan lost its independence and passed under English rule. Yet

this well-meaning little sonneteer sincerely felt that his verses were

issued in the cause of humanity. Looking back from the vantage point of

a score of years, probably every one will agree that he was an absurd

person. But he was not one whit more absurd than most of the more

prominent persons who advocate disarmament by the United States, the

cessation of up-building the navy, and the promise to agree to arbitrate

all matters, including those affecting our national interests and honor,

with all foreign nations.

These persons would do no harm if they affected only themselves. Many

of them are, in the ordinary relations of life, good citizens. They are

exactly like the other good citizens who believe that enforced universal

vegetarianism or anti-vaccination is the panacea for all ills. But in

their particular case they are able to do harm because they affect our

relations with foreign powers, so that other men pay the debt which they

themselves have really incurred. It is the foolish, peace-at-any-price

persons who try to persuade our people to make unwise and improper

treaties, or to stop building up the navy. But if trouble comes and the

treaties are repudiated, or there is a demand for armed intervention,

it is not these people who will pay anything; they will stay at home in

safety, and leave brave men to pay in blood, and honest men to pay in

shame, for their folly.

The trouble is that our policy is apt to go in zigzags, because

different sections of our people exercise at different times unequal

pressure on our government. One class of our citizens clamors for

treaties impossible of fulfilment, and improper to fulfil; another class

has no objection to the passage of these treaties so long as there is no

concrete case to which they apply, but instantly oppose a veto on their

application when any concrete case does actually arise. One of our

cardinal doctrines is freedom of speech, which means freedom of speech

about foreigners as well as about ourselves; and, inasmuch as we

exercise this right with complete absence of restraint, we cannot expect

other nations to hold us harmless unless in the last resort we are

able to make our own words good by our deeds. One class of our citizens

indulges in gushing promises to do everything for foreigners, another

class offensively and improperly reviles them; and it is hard to say

which class more thoroughly misrepresents the sober, self-respecting

judgment of the American people as a whole. The only safe rule is to

promise little, and faithfully to keep every promise; to "speak softly

and carry a big stick."

A prime need for our nation, as of course for every other nation, is

to make up its mind definitely what it wishes, and not to try to pursue

paths of conduct incompatible one with the other. If this nation is

content to be the China of the New World, then and then only can it

afford to do away with the navy and the army. If it is content to

abandon Hawaii and the Panama Canal, to cease to talk of the Monroe

Doctrine, and to admit the right of any European or Asiatic power to

dictate what immigrants shall be sent to and received in America,

and whether or not they shall be allowed to become citizens and hold

land--why, of course, if America is content to have nothing to say

on any of these matters and to keep silent in the presence of armed

outsiders, then it can abandon its navy and agree to arbitrate all

questions of all kinds with every foreign power. In such event it can

afford to pass its spare time in one continuous round of universal

peace celebrations, and of smug self-satisfaction in having earned the

derision of all the virile peoples of mankind. Those who advocate such

a policy do not occupy a lofty position. But at least their position is

understandable.

It is entirely inexcusable, however, to try to combine the unready hand

with the unbridled tongue. It is folly to permit freedom of speech about

foreigners as well as ourselves--and the peace-at-any-price persons are

much too feeble a folk to try to interfere with freedom of speech--and

yet to try to shirk the consequences of freedom of speech. It is folly

to try to abolish our navy, and at the same time to insist that we have

a right to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, that we have a right to control

the Panama Canal which we ourselves dug, that we have a right to retain

Hawaii and prevent foreign nations from taking Cuba, and a right to

determine what immigrants, Asiatic or European, shall come to our

shores, and the terms on which they shall be naturalized and shall

hold land and exercise other privileges. We are a rich people, and

an unmilitary people. In international affairs we are a short-sighted

people. But I know my countrymen. Down at bottom their temper is such

that they will not permanently tolerate injustice done to them. In the

long run they will no more permit affronts to their National honor than

injuries to their national interest. Such being the case, they will do

well to remember that the surest of all ways to invite disaster is to be

opulent, aggressive and unarmed.

Throughout the seven and a half years that I was President, I pursued

without faltering one consistent foreign policy, a policy of genuine

international good will and of consideration for the rights of others,

and at the same time of steady preparedness. The weakest nations knew

that they, no less than the strongest, were safe from insult and injury

at our hands; and the strong and the weak alike also knew that we

possessed both the will and the ability to guard ourselves from wrong or

insult at the hands of any one.

It was under my administration that the Hague Court was saved from

becoming an empty farce. It had been established by joint international

agreement, but no Power had been willing to resort to it. Those

establishing it had grown to realize that it was in danger of becoming a

mere paper court, so that it would never really come into being at all.

M. d'Estournelles de Constant had been especially alive to this danger.

By correspondence and in personal interviews he impressed upon me the

need not only of making advances by actually applying arbitration--not

merely promising by treaty to apply it--to questions that were up

for settlement, but of using the Hague tribunal for this purpose. I

cordially sympathized with these views. On the recommendation of John

Hay, I succeeded in getting an agreement with Mexico to lay a matter in

dispute between the two republics before the Hague Court. This was

the first case ever brought before the Hague Court. It was followed by

numerous others; and it definitely established that court as the great

international peace tribunal. By mutual agreement with Great Britain,

through the decision of a joint commission, of which the American

members were Senators Lodge and Turner, and Secretary Root, we were able

peacefully to settle the Alaska Boundary question, the only question

remaining between ourselves and the British Empire which it was not

possible to settle by friendly arbitration; this therefore represented

the removal of the last obstacle to absolute agreement between the two

peoples. We were of substantial service in bringing to a satisfactory

conclusion the negotiations at Algeciras concerning Morocco. We

concluded with Great Britain, and with most of the other great nations,

arbitration treaties specifically agreeing to arbitrate all matters,

and especially the interpretation of treaties, save only as regards

questions affecting territorial integrity, national honor and vital

national interest. We made with Great Britain a treaty guaranteeing the

free use of the Panama Canal on equal terms to the ships of all nations,

while reserving to ourselves the right to police and fortify the canal,

and therefore to control it in time of war. Under this treaty we are

in honor bound to arbitrate the question of canal tolls for coastwise

traffic between the Western and Eastern coasts of the United States. I

believe that the American position as regards this matter is right; but

I also believe that under the arbitration treaty we are in honor

bound to submit the matter to arbitration in view of Great Britain's

contention--although I hold it to be an unwise contention--that our

position is unsound. I emphatically disbelieve in making universal

arbitration treaties which neither the makers nor any one else would for

a moment dream of keeping. I no less emphatically insist that it is our

duty to keep the limited and sensible arbitration treaties which we have

already made. The importance of a promise lies not in making it, but in

keeping it; and the poorest of all positions for a nation to occupy in

such a matter is readiness to make impossible promises at the same time

that there is failure to keep promises which have been made, which can

be kept, and which it is discreditable to break.

During the early part of the year 1905, the strain on the civilized

world caused by the Russo-Japanese War became serious. The losses of

life and of treasure were frightful. From all the sources of information

at hand, I grew most strongly to believe that a further continuation

of the struggle would be a very bad thing for Japan, and an even worse

thing for Russia. Japan was already suffering terribly from the drain

upon her men, and especially upon her resources, and had nothing further

to gain from continuance of the struggle; its continuance meant to her

more loss than gain, even if she were victorious. Russia, in spite of

her gigantic strength, was, in my judgment, apt to lose even more than

she had already lost if the struggle continued. I deemed it probable

that she would no more be able successfully to defend Eastern Siberia

and Northern Manchuria than she had been able to defend Southern

Manchuria and Korea. If the war went on, I thought it, on the whole,

likely that Russia would be driven west of Lake Baikal. But it was very

far from certain. There is no certainty in such a war. Japan might have

met defeat, and defeat to her would have spelt overwhelming disaster;

and even if she had continued to win, what she thus won would have been

of no value to her, and the cost in blood and money would have left her

drained white. I believed, therefore, that the time had come when it

was greatly to the interest of both combatants to have peace, and when

therefore it was possible to get both to agree to peace.

I first satisfied myself that each side wished me to act, but that,

naturally and properly, each side was exceedingly anxious that the other

should not believe that the action was taken on its initiative. I then

sent an identical note to the two powers proposing that they should

meet, through their representatives, to see if peace could not be made

directly between them, and offered to act as an intermediary in bringing

about such a meeting, but not for any other purpose. Each assented to my

proposal in principle. There was difficulty in getting them to agree

on a common meeting place; but each finally abandoned its original

contention in the matter, and the representatives of the two nations

finally met at Portsmouth, in New Hampshire. I previously received the

two delegations at Oyster Bay on the U. S. S. Mayflower, which, together

with another naval vessel, I put at their disposal, on behalf of the

United States Government, to take them from Oyster Bay to Portsmouth.

As is customary--but both unwise and undesirable--in such cases,

each side advanced claims which the other could not grant. The chief

difficulty came because of Japan's demand for a money indemnity. I felt

that it would be better for Russia to pay some indemnity than to go on

with the war, for there was little chance, in my judgment, of the war

turning out favorably for Russia, and the revolutionary movement already

under way bade fair to overthrow the negotiations entirely. I advised

the Russian Government to this effect, at the same time urging them to

abandon their pretensions on certain other points, notably concerning

the southern half of Saghalien, which the Japanese had taken. I also,

however, and equally strongly, advised the Japanese that in my judgment

it would be the gravest mistake on their part to insist on continuing

the war for the sake of a money indemnity; for Russia was absolutely

firm in refusing to give them an indemnity, and the longer the war

continued the less able she would be to pay. I pointed out that there

was no possible analogy between their case and that of Germany in the

war with France, which they were fond of quoting. The Germans held Paris

and half of France, and gave up much territory in lieu of the indemnity,

whereas the Japanese were still many thousand miles from Moscow, and had

no territory whatever which they wished to give up. I also pointed out

that in my judgment whereas the Japanese had enjoyed the sympathy of

most of the civilized powers at the outset of and during the continuance

of the war, they would forfeit it if they turned the war into one merely

for getting money--and, moreover, they would almost certainly fail to

get the money, and would simply find themselves at the end of a year,

even if things prospered with them, in possession of territory they

did not want, having spent enormous additional sums of money, and

lost enormous additional numbers of men, and yet without a penny of

remuneration. The treaty of peace was finally signed.

As is inevitable under such circumstances, each side felt that it ought

to have got better terms; and when the danger was well past each side

felt that it had been over-reached by the other, and that if the war had

gone on it would have gotten more than it actually did get. The Japanese

Government had been wise throughout, except in the matter of announcing

that it would insist on a money indemnity. Neither in national nor in

private affairs is it ordinarily advisable to make a bluff which cannot

be put through--personally, I never believe in doing it under any

circumstances. The Japanese people had been misled by this bluff of

their Government; and the unwisdom of the Government's action in the

matter was shown by the great resentment the treaty aroused in

Japan, although it was so beneficial to Japan. There were various mob

outbreaks, especially in the Japanese cities; the police were roughly

handled, and several Christian churches were burned, as reported to me

by the American Minister. In both Russia and Japan I believe that the

net result as regards myself was a feeling of injury, and of dislike

of me, among the people at large. I had expected this; I regarded it as

entirely natural; and I did not resent it in the least. The Governments

of both nations behaved toward me not only with correct and entire

propriety, but with much courtesy and the fullest acknowledgment of the

good effect of what I had done; and in Japan, at least, I believe that

the leading men sincerely felt that I had been their friend. I had

certainly tried my best to be the friend not only of the Japanese people

but of the Russian people, and I believe that what I did was for the

best interests of both and of the world at large.

During the course of the negotiations I tried to enlist the aid of the

Governments of one nation which was friendly to Russia, and of another

nation which was friendly to Japan, in helping bring about peace. I

got no aid from either. I did, however, receive aid from the Emperor

of Germany. His Ambassador at St. Petersburg was the one Ambassador

who helped the American Ambassador, Mr. Meyer, at delicate and doubtful

points of the negotiations. Mr. Meyer, who was, with the exception of

Mr. White, the most useful diplomat in the American service, rendered

literally invaluable aid by insisting upon himself seeing the Czar at

critical periods of the transaction, when it was no longer possible for

me to act successfully through the representatives of the Czar, who were

often at cross purposes with one another.

As a result of the Portsmouth peace, I was given the Nobel Peace Prize.

This consisted of a medal, which I kept, and a sum of $40,000, which I

turned over as a foundation of industrial peace to a board of trustees

which included Oscar Straus, Seth Low and John Mitchell. In the present

state of the world's development industrial peace is even more essential

than international peace; and it was fitting and appropriate to devote

the peace prize to such a purpose. In 1910, while in Europe, one of my

most pleasant experiences was my visit to Norway, where I addressed the

Nobel Committee, and set forth in full the principles upon which I

had acted, not only in this particular case but throughout my

administration.

I received another gift which I deeply appreciated, an original copy

of Sully's "Memoires" of "Henry le Grand," sent me with the following

inscription (I translate it roughly):

PARIS, January, 1906.

"The undersigned members of the French Parliamentary Group of

International Arbitration and Conciliation have decided to tender

President Roosevelt a token of their high esteem and their sympathetic

recognition of the persistent and decisive initiative he has taken

towards gradually substituting friendly and judicial for violent methods

in case of conflict between Nations.

"They believe that the action of President Roosevelt, which has realized

the most generous hopes to be found in history, should be classed as a

continuance of similar illustrious attempts of former times, notably

the project for international concord known under the name of the 'Great

Design of Henry IV' in the memoirs of his Prime Minister, the Duke de

Sully. In consequence they have sought out a copy of the first edition

of these memoirs, and they take pleasure in offering it to him, with the

request that he will keep it among his family papers."

The signatures include those of Emile Loubet, A. Carnot, d'Estournelles

de Constant, Aristide Briand, Sully Prudhomme, Jean Jaures, A.

Fallieres, R. Poincare, and two or three hundred others.

Of course what I had done in connection with the Portsmouth peace

was misunderstood by some good and sincere people. Just as after the

settlement of the coal strike, there were persons who thereupon thought

that it was in my power, and was my duty, to settle all other strikes,

so after the peace of Portsmouth there were other persons--not only

Americans, by the way,--who thought it my duty forthwith to make myself

a kind of international Meddlesome Mattie and interfere for peace

and justice promiscuously over the world. Others, with a delightful

non-sequitur, jumped to the conclusion that inasmuch as I had helped to

bring about a beneficent and necessary peace I must of necessity have

changed my mind about war being ever necessary. A couple of days after

peace was concluded I wrote to a friend: "Don't you be misled by the

fact that just at the moment men are speaking well of me. They will

speak ill soon enough. As Loeb remarked to me to-day, some time soon I

shall have to spank some little international brigand, and then all the

well-meaning idiots will turn and shriek that this is inconsistent

with what I did at the Peace Conference, whereas in reality it will be

exactly in line with it."

To one of my political opponents, Mr. Schurz, who wrote me

congratulating me upon the outcome at Portsmouth, and suggesting that

the time was opportune for a move towards disarmament, I answered in a

letter setting forth views which I thought sound then, and think sound

now. The letter ran as follows:

OYSTER BAY, N. Y., September 8, 1905.

My dear Mr. Schurz: I thank you for your congratulations. As to what you

say about disarmament--which I suppose is the rough equivalent of "the

gradual diminution of the oppressive burdens imposed upon the world by

armed peace"--I am not clear either as to what can be done or what ought

to be done. If I had been known as one of the conventional type of peace

advocates I could have done nothing whatever in bringing about peace

now, I would be powerless in the future to accomplish anything, and

I would not have been able to help confer the boons upon Cuba, the

Philippines, Porto Rico and Panama, brought about by our action therein.

If the Japanese had not armed during the last twenty years, this would

indeed be a sorrowful century for Japan. If this country had not fought

the Spanish War; if we had failed to take the action we did about

Panama; all mankind would have been the loser. While the Turks were

butchering the Armenians the European powers kept the peace and thereby

added a burden of infamy to the Nineteenth Century, for in keeping that

peace a greater number of lives were lost than in any European war since

the days of Napoleon, and these lives were those of women and children

as well as of men; while the moral degradation, the brutality inflicted

and endured, the aggregate of hideous wrong done, surpassed that of any

war of which we have record in modern times. Until people get it firmly

fixed in their minds that peace is valuable chiefly as a means to

righteousness, and that it can only be considered as an end when it also

coincides with righteousness, we can do only a limited amount to advance

its coming on this earth. There is of course no analogy at present

between international law and private or municipal law, because there

is no sanction of force for the former, while there is for the latter.

Inside our own nation the law-abiding man does not have to arm himself

against the lawless simply because there is some armed force--the

police, the sheriff's posse, the national guard, the regulars--which

can be called out to enforce the laws. At present there is no similar

international force to call on, and I do not as yet see how it could

at present be created. Hitherto peace has often come only because some

strong and on the whole just power has by armed force, or the threat of

armed force, put a stop to disorder. In a very interesting French book

the other day I was reading how the Mediterranean was freed from pirates

only by the "pax Britannica," established by England's naval force. The

hopeless and hideous bloodshed and wickedness of Algiers and Turkestan

was stopped, and could only be stopped, when civilized nations in the

shape of Russia and France took possession of them. The same was true

of Burma and the Malay States, as well as Egypt, with regard to England.

Peace has come only as the sequel to the armed interference of a

civilized power which, relatively to its opponent, was a just and

beneficent power. If England had disarmed to the point of being unable

to conquer the Sudan and protect Egypt, so that the Mahdists had

established their supremacy in northeastern Africa, the result would

have been a horrible and bloody calamity to mankind. It was only the

growth of the European powers in military efficiency that freed eastern

Europe from the dreadful scourge of the Tartar and partially freed it

from the dreadful scourge of the Turk. Unjust war is dreadful; a just

war may be the highest duty. To have the best nations, the free and

civilized nations, disarm and leave the despotisms and barbarisms

with great military force, would be a calamity compared to which the

calamities caused by all the wars of the nineteenth century would be

trivial. Yet it is not easy to see how we can by international agreement

state exactly which power ceases to be free and civilized and which

comes near the line of barbarism or despotism. For example, I suppose

it would be very difficult to get Russia and Japan to come to a common

agreement on this point; and there are at least some citizens of other

nations, not to speak of their governments, whom it would also be hard

to get together.

This does not in the least mean that it is hopeless to make the effort.

It may be that some scheme will be developed. America, fortunately,

can cordially assist in such an effort, for no one in his senses would

suggest our disarmament; and though we should continue to perfect our

small navy and our minute army, I do not think it necessary to increase

the number of our ships--at any rate as things look now--nor the number

of our soldiers. Of course our navy must be kept up to the highest

point of efficiency, and the replacing of old and worthless vessels by

first-class new ones may involve an increase in the personnel; but not

enough to interfere with our action along the lines you have suggested.

But before I would know how to advocate such action, save in some such

way as commending it to the attention of The Hague Tribunal, I would

have to have a feasible and rational plan of action presented.

It seems to me that a general stop in the increase of the war navies

of the world _might_ be a good thing; but I would not like to speak too

positively offhand. Of course it is only in continental Europe that the

armies are too large; and before advocating action as regards them I

should have to weigh matters carefully--including by the way such a

matter as the Turkish army. At any rate nothing useful can be done

unless with the clear recognition that we object to putting peace second

to righteousness.

Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

HON. CARL SCHURZ, Bolton Landing, Lake George, N. Y.

In my own judgment the most important service that I rendered to

peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the world. I had become

convinced that for many reasons it was essential that we should have

it clearly understood, by our own people especially, but also by other

peoples, that the Pacific was as much our home waters as the Atlantic,

and that our fleet could and would at will pass from one to the other of

the two great oceans. It seemed to me evident that such a voyage would

greatly benefit the navy itself; would arouse popular interest in and

enthusiasm for the navy; and would make foreign nations accept as a

matter of course that our fleet should from time to time be gathered in

the Pacific, just as from time to time it was gathered in the Atlantic,

and that its presence in one ocean was no more to be accepted as a mark

of hostility to any Asiatic power than its presence in the Atlantic

was to be accepted as a mark of hostility to any European power. I

determined on the move without consulting the Cabinet, precisely as

I took Panama without consulting the Cabinet. A council of war never

fights, and in a crisis the duty of a leader is to lead and not to take

refuge behind the generally timid wisdom of a multitude of councillors.

At that time, as I happen to know, neither the English nor the German

authorities believed it possible to take a fleet of great battleships

round the world. They did not believe that their own fleets could

perform the feat, and still less did they believe that the American

fleet could. I made up my mind that it was time to have a show down in

the matter; because if it was really true that our fleet could not get

from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it was much better to know it and be

able to shape our policy in view of the knowledge. Many persons publicly

and privately protested against the move on the ground that Japan would

accept it as a threat. To this I answered nothing in public. In private

I said that I did not believe Japan would so regard it because Japan

knew my sincere friendship and admiration for her and realized that we

could not as a Nation have any intention of attacking her; and that if

there were any such feeling on the part of Japan as was alleged that

very fact rendered it imperative that that fleet should go. When in the

spring of 1910 I was in Europe I was interested to find that high naval

authorities in both Germany and Italy had expected that war would come

at the time of the voyage. They asked me if I had not been afraid of it,

and if I had not expected that hostilities would begin at least by the

time that the fleet reached the Straits of Magellan? I answered that I

did not expect it; that I believed that Japan would feel as friendly in

the matter as we did; but that if my expectations had proved mistaken,

it would have been proof positive that we were going to be attacked

anyhow, and that in such event it would have been an enormous gain to

have had the three months' preliminary preparation which enabled the

fleet to start perfectly equipped. In a personal interview before they

left I had explained to the officers in command that I believed the trip

would be one of absolute peace, but that they were to take exactly the

same precautions against sudden attack of any kind as if we were at war

with all the nations of the earth; and that no excuse of any kind would

be accepted if there were a sudden attack of any kind and we were taken

unawares.

My prime purpose was to impress the American people; and this purpose

was fully achieved. The cruise did make a very deep impression abroad;

boasting about what we have done does not impress foreign nations at

all, except unfavorably, but positive achievement does; and the two

American achievements that really impressed foreign peoples during the

first dozen years of this century were the digging of the Panama Canal

and the cruise of the battle fleet round the world. But the impression

made on our own people was of far greater consequence. No single

thing in the history of the new United States Navy has done as much to

stimulate popular interest and belief in it as the world cruise. This

effect was forecast in a well-informed and friendly English periodical,

the London _Spectator_. Writing in October, 1907, a month before the

fleet sailed from Hampton Roads, the _Spectator said_:

"All over America the people will follow the movements of the fleet;

they will learn something of the intricate details of the coaling

and commissariat work under warlike conditions; and in a word

their attention will be aroused. Next time Mr. Roosevelt or his

representatives appeal to the country for new battleships they will do

so to people whose minds have been influenced one way or the other. The

naval programme will not have stood still. We are sure that, apart from

increasing the efficiency of the existing fleet, this is the aim which

Mr. Roosevelt has in mind. He has a policy which projects itself far

into the future, but it is an entire misreading of it to suppose that it

is aimed narrowly and definitely at any single Power."

I first directed the fleet, of sixteen battleships, to go round through

the Straits of Magellan to San Francisco. From thence I ordered them to

New Zealand and Australia, then to the Philippines, China and Japan,

and home through Suez--they stopped in the Mediterranean to help the

sufferers from the earthquake at Messina, by the way, and did this work

as effectively as they had done all their other work. Admiral Evans

commanded the fleet to San Francisco; there Admiral Sperry took it;

Admirals Thomas, Wainwright and Schroeder rendered distinguished service

under Evans and Sperry. The coaling and other preparations were made in

such excellent shape by the Department that there was never a hitch, not

so much as the delay of an hour, in keeping every appointment made.

All the repairs were made without difficulty, the ship concerned

merely falling out of column for a few hours, and when the job was done

steaming at speed until she regained her position. Not a ship was left

in any port; and there was hardly a desertion. As soon as it was known

that the voyage was to be undertaken men crowded to enlist, just as

freely from the Mississippi Valley as from the seaboard, and for the

first time since the Spanish War the ships put to sea overmanned--and by

as stalwart a set of men-of-war's men as ever looked through a porthole,

game for a fight or a frolic, but withal so self-respecting and with

such a sense of responsibility that in all the ports in which they

landed their conduct was exemplary. The fleet practiced incessantly

during the voyage, both with the guns and in battle tactics, and came

home a much more efficient fighting instrument than when it started

sixteen months before.

The best men of command rank in our own service were confident that the

fleet would go round in safety, in spite of the incredulity of foreign

critics. Even they, however, did not believe that it was wise to send

the torpedo craft around. I accordingly acquiesced in their views, as it

did not occur to me to consult the lieutenants. But shortly before the

fleet started, I went in the Government yacht Mayflower to inspect the

target practice off Provincetown. I was accompanied by two torpedo

boat destroyers, in charge of a couple of naval lieutenants, thorough

gamecocks; and I had the two lieutenants aboard to dine one evening.

Towards the end of the dinner they could not refrain from asking if the

torpedo flotilla was to go round with the big ships. I told them no,

that the admirals and captains did not believe that the torpedo boats

could stand it, and believed that the officers and crews aboard the

cockle shells would be worn out by the constant pitching and bouncing

and the everlasting need to make repairs. My two guests chorused an

eager assurance that the boats could stand it. They assured me that

the enlisted men were even more anxious to go than were the officers,

mentioning that on one of their boats the terms of enlistment of most

of the crew were out, and the men were waiting to see whether or not to

reenlist, as they did not care to do so unless the boats were to go on

the cruise. I answered that I was only too glad to accept the word of

the men who were to do the job, and that they should certainly go; and

within half an hour I sent out the order for the flotilla to be got

ready. It went round in fine shape, not a boat being laid up. I felt

that the feat reflected even more credit upon the navy than did the

circumnavigation of the big ships, and I wrote the flotilla commander

the following letter:

May 18, 1908.

My dear Captain Cone:

A great deal of attention has been paid to the feat of our battleship

fleet in encircling South America and getting to San Francisco; and it

would be hard too highly to compliment the officers and enlisted men of

that fleet for what they have done. Yet if I should draw any distinction

at all it would be in favor of you and your associates who have taken

out the torpedo flotilla. Yours was an even more notable feat, and every

officer and every enlisted man in the torpedo boat flotilla has the

right to feel that he has rendered distinguished service to the United

States navy and therefore to the people of the United States; and I wish

I could thank each of them personally. Will you have this letter read by

the commanding officer of each torpedo boat to his officers and crew?

Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HUTCH. I. CONE, U. S. N., Commanding Second Torpedo

Flotilla, Care Postmaster, San Francisco, Cal.

There were various amusing features connected with the trip. Most of

the wealthy people and "leaders of opinion" in the Eastern cities

were panic-struck at the proposal to take the fleet away from Atlantic

waters. The great New York dailies issued frantic appeals to Congress

to stop the fleet from going. The head of the Senate Committee on Naval

Affairs announced that the fleet should not and could not go because

Congress would refuse to appropriate the money--he being from an Eastern

seaboard State. However, I announced in response that I had enough money

to take the fleet around to the Pacific anyhow, that the fleet would

certainly go, and that if Congress did not choose to appropriate enough

money to get the fleet back, why, it would stay in the Pacific. There

was no further difficulty about the money.

It was not originally my intention that the fleet should visit

Australia, but the Australian Government sent a most cordial invitation,

which I gladly accepted; for I have, as every American ought to have, a

hearty admiration for, and fellow feeling with, Australia, and I believe

that America should be ready to stand back of Australia in any serious

emergency. The reception accorded the fleet in Australia was wonderful,

and it showed the fundamental community of feeling between ourselves and

the great commonwealth of the South Seas. The considerate, generous, and

open-handed hospitality with which the entire Australian people treated

our officers and men could not have been surpassed had they been our

own countrymen. The fleet first visited Sydney, which has a singularly

beautiful harbor. The day after the arrival one of our captains noticed

a member of his crew trying to go to sleep on a bench in the park.

He had fixed above his head a large paper with some lines evidently

designed to forestall any questions from friendly would-be hosts: "I am

delighted with the Australian people. I think your harbor the finest in

the world. I am very tired and would like to go to sleep."

The most noteworthy incident of the cruise was the reception given to

our fleet in Japan. In courtesy and good breeding, the Japanese can

certainly teach much to the nations of the Western world. I had been

very sure that the people of Japan would understand aright what the

cruise meant, and would accept the visit of our fleet as the signal

honor which it was meant to be, a proof of the high regard and

friendship I felt, and which I was certain the American people felt,

for the great Island Empire. The event even surpassed my expectations. I

cannot too strongly express my appreciation of the generous courtesy the

Japanese showed the officers and crews of our fleet; and I may add

that every man of them came back a friend and admirer of the Japanese.

Admiral Sperry wrote me a letter of much interest, dealing not only with

the reception in Tokyo but with the work of our men at sea; I herewith

give it almost in full:

28 October, 1908.

Dear Mr. Roosevelt:

My official report of the visit to Japan goes forward in this mail, but

there are certain aspects of the affair so successfully concluded which

cannot well be included in the report.

You are perhaps aware that Mr. Denison of the Japanese Foreign Office

was one of my colleagues at The Hague, for whom I have a very

high regard. Desiring to avoid every possibility of trouble or

misunderstanding, I wrote to him last June explaining fully the

character of our men, which they have so well lived up to, the

desirability of ample landing places, guides, rest houses and places for

changing money in order that there might be no delay in getting the men

away from the docks on the excursions in which they delight. Very few of

them go into a drinking place, except to get a resting place not to be

found elsewhere, paying for it by taking a drink.

I also explained our system of landing with liberty men an unarmed

patrol, properly officered, to quietly take in charge and send off

to their ships any men who showed the slightest trace of disorderly

conduct. This letter he showed to the Minister of the Navy, who highly

approved of all our arrangements, including the patrol, of which I

feared they might be jealous. Mr. Denison's reply reached me in Manila,

with a memorandum from the Minister of the Navy which removed all

doubts. Three temporary piers were built for our boat landings, each

300 feet long, brilliantly lighted and decorated. The sleeping

accommodations did not permit two or three thousand sailors to remain on

shore, but the ample landings permitted them to be handled night and day

with perfect order and safety.

At the landings and railroad station in Yokohama there were rest

houses or booths, reputable money changers and as many as a thousand

English-speaking Japanese college students acted as volunteer guides,

besides Japanese sailors and petty officers detailed for the purpose.

In Tokyo there were a great many excellent refreshment places, where the

men got excellent meals and could rest, smoke, and write letters, and

in none of these places would they allow the men to pay anything, though

they were more than ready to do so. The arrangements were marvelously

perfect.

As soon as your telegram of October 18, giving the address to be made to

the Emperor, was received, I gave copies of it to our Ambassador to

be sent to the Foreign Office. It seems that the Emperor had already

prepared a very cordial address to be forwarded through me to you, after

delivery at the audience, but your telegram reversed the situation and

his reply was prepared. I am convinced that your kind and courteous

initiative on this occasion helped cause the pleasant feeling which was

so obvious in the Emperor's bearing at the luncheon which followed the

audience. X., who is reticent and conservative, told me that not only

the Emperor but all the Ministers were profoundly gratified by the

course of events. I am confident that not even the most trifling

incident has taken place which could in any way mar the general

satisfaction, and our Ambassador has expressed to me his great

satisfaction with all that has taken place.

Owing to heavy weather encountered on the passage up from Manila the

fleet was obliged to take about 3500 tons of coal.

The Yankton remained behind to keep up communication for a few days, and

yesterday she transmitted the Emperor's telegram to you, which was sent

in reply to your message through our Ambassador after the sailing of the

fleet. It must be profoundly gratifying to you to have the mission

on which you sent the fleet terminate so happily, and I am profoundly

thankful that, owing to the confidence which you displayed in giving

me this command, my active career draws to a close with such honorable

distinction.

As for the effect of the cruise upon the training, discipline and

effectiveness of the fleet, the good cannot be exaggerated. It is a war

game in every detail. The wireless communication has been maintained

with an efficiency hitherto unheard of. Between Honolulu and Auckland,

3850 miles, we were out of communication with a cable station for only

one night, whereas three [non-American] men-of-war trying recently to

maintain a chain of only 1250 miles, between Auckland and Sydney, were

only able to do so for a few hours.

The officers and men as soon as we put to sea turn to their gunnery and

tactical work far more eagerly than they go to functions. Every morning

certain ships leave the column and move off seven or eight thousand

yards as targets for range measuring fire control and battery practice

for the others, and at night certain ships do the same thing for

night battery practice. I am sorry to say that this practice is

unsatisfactory, and in some points misleading, owing to the fact

that the ships are painted white. At Portland, in 1903, I saw Admiral

Barker's white battleships under the searchlights of the army at a

distance of 14,000 yards, seven sea miles, without glasses, while the

Hartford, a black ship, was never discovered at all, though she passed

within a mile and a half. I have for years, while a member of the

General Board, advocated painting the ships war color at all times, and

by this mail I am asking the Department to make the necessary change in

the Regulations and paint the ships properly. I do not know that any one

now dissents from my view. Admiral Wainwright strongly concurs, and

the War College Conference recommended it year after year without a

dissenting voice.

In the afternoons the fleet has two or three hours' practice at battle

maneuvers, which excite as keen interest as gunnery exercises.

The competition in coal economy goes on automatically and reacts in a

hundred ways. It has reduced the waste in the use of electric light and

water, and certain chief engineers are said to keep men ranging over the

ships all night turning out every light not in actual and immediate use.

Perhaps the most important effect is the keen hunt for defects in

the machinery causing waste of power. The Yankton by resetting valves

increased her speed from 10 to 11 1/2 knots on the same expenditure.

All this has been done, but the field is widening, the work has only

begun.

* * * * *

C. S. SPERRY.

When I left the Presidency I finished seven and a half years of

administration, during which not one shot had been fired against a

foreign foe. We were at absolute peace, and there was no nation in the

world with whom a war cloud threatened, no nation in the world whom we

had wronged, or from whom we had anything to fear. The cruise of the

battle fleet was not the least of the causes which ensured so peaceful

an outlook.

When the fleet returned after its sixteen months' voyage around the

world I went down to Hampton Roads to greet it. The day was Washington's

Birthday, February 22, 1907. Literally on the minute the homing

battlecraft came into view. On the flagship of the Admiral I spoke to

the officers and enlisted men, as follows:

"Admiral Sperry, Officers and Men of the Battle Fleet:

"Over a year has passed since you steamed out of this harbor, and over

the world's rim, and this morning the hearts of all who saw you thrilled

with pride as the hulls of the mighty warships lifted above the horizon.

You have been in the Northern and the Southern Hemispheres; four times

you have crossed the line; you have steamed through all the great

oceans; you have touched the coast of every continent. Ever your general

course has been westward; and now you come back to the port from

which you set sail. This is the first battle fleet that has ever

circumnavigated the globe. Those who perform the feat again can but

follow in your footsteps.

"The little torpedo flotilla went with you around South America, through

the Straits of Magellan, to our own Pacific Coast. The armored cruiser

squadron met you, and left you again, when you were half way round the

world. You have falsified every prediction of the prophets of failure.

In all your long cruise not an accident worthy of mention has happened

to a single battleship, nor yet to the cruisers or torpedo boats. You

left this coast in a high state of battle efficiency, and you return

with your efficiency increased; better prepared than when you left, not

only in personnel but even in material. During your world cruise you

have taken your regular gunnery practice, and skilled though you were

before with the guns, you have grown more skilful still; and through

practice you have improved in battle tactics, though here there is more

room for improvement than in your gunnery. Incidentally, I suppose I

need hardly say that one measure of your fitness must be your clear

recognition of the need always steadily to strive to render yourselves

more fit; if you ever grow to think that you are fit enough, you can

make up your minds that from that moment you will begin to go backward.

"As a war-machine, the fleet comes back in better shape than it went

out. In addition, you, the officers and men of this formidable fighting

force, have shown yourselves the best of all possible ambassadors and

heralds of peace. Wherever you have landed you have borne yourselves

so as to make us at home proud of being your countrymen. You have shown

that the best type of fighting man of the sea knows how to appear to

the utmost possible advantage when his business is to behave himself on

shore, and to make a good impression in a foreign land. We are proud of

all the ships and all the men in this whole fleet, and we welcome you

home to the country whose good repute among nations has been raised by

what you have done."

APPENDIX A

THE TRUSTS, THE PEOPLE, AND THE SQUARE DEAL

[Written when Mr. Taft's administration brought suit to dissolve the

steel corporation, one of the grounds for the suit being the acquisition

by the Corporation of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company; this action

was taken, with my acquiescence, while I was President, and while Mr.

Taft was a member of my cabinet; at the time he never protested against,

and as far as I knew approved of my action in this case, as in the

Harvester Trust case, and all similar cases.]

The suit against the Steel Trust by the Government has brought vividly

before our people the need of reducing to order our chaotic Government

policy as regards business. As President, in Messages to Congress I

repeatedly called the attention of that body and of the public to the

inadequacy of the Anti-Trust Law by itself to meet business conditions

and secure justice to the people, and to the further fact that it might,

if left unsupplemented by additional legislation, work mischief, with no

compensating advantage; and I urged as strongly as I knew how that

the policy followed with relation to railways in connection with the

Inter-State Commerce Law should be followed by the National Government

as regards all great business concerns; and therefore that, as a

first step, the powers of the Bureau of Corporations should be greatly

enlarged, or else that there should be created a Governmental board or

commission, with powers somewhat similar to those of the Inter-State

Commerce Commission, but covering the whole field of inter-State

business, exclusive of transportation (which should, by law, be kept

wholly separate from ordinary industrial business, all common ownership

of the industry and the railway being forbidden). In the end I have

always believed that it would also be necessary to give the National

Government complete power over the organization and capitalization of

all business concerns engaged in inter-State commerce.

A member of my Cabinet with whom, even more than with the various

Attorneys-General, I went over every detail of the trust situation, was

the one time Secretary of the Interior, Mr. James R. Garfield. He writes

me as follows concerning the suit against the Steel Corporation:

"Nothing appeared before the House Committee that made me believe we

were deceived by Judge Gary.

"This, I think, is a case that shows clearly the difference between

destructive litigation and constructive legislation. I have not yet seen

a full copy of the Government's petition, but our papers give nothing

that indicates any kind of unfair or dishonest competition such as

existed in both the Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases. As I understand it,

the competitors of the Steel Company have steadily increased in strength

during the last six or seven years. Furthermore, the per cent of the

business done by the Steel Corporation has decreased during that time.

As you will remember, at our first conference with Judge Gary, the Judge

stated that it was the desire and purpose of the Company to conform

to what the Government wished, it being the purpose of the Company

absolutely to obey the law both in spirit and letter. Throughout the

time that I had charge of the investigation, and while we were in

Washington, I do not know of a single instance where the Steel Company

refused any information requested; but, on the contrary, aided in every

possible way our investigation.

"The position now taken by the Government is absolutely destructive

of legitimate business, because they outline no rule of conduct for

business of any magnitude. It is absurd to say that the courts can

lay down such rules. The most the courts can do is to find as legal or

illegal the particular transactions brought before them. Hence, after

years of tedious litigation there would be no clear-cut rule for future

action. This method of procedure is dealing with the device, not the

result, and drives business to the elaboration of clever devices, each

of which must be tested in the courts.

"I have yet to find a better method of dealing with the anti-trust

situation than that suggested by the bill which we agreed upon in the

last days of your Administration. That bill should be used as a basis

for legislation, and there could be incorporated upon it whatever may

be determined wise regarding the direct control and supervision of

the National Government, either through a commission similar to the

Inter-State Commerce Commission or otherwise."

Before taking up the matter in its large aspect, I wish to say one word

as to one feature of the Government suit against the Steel Corporation.

One of the grounds for the suit is the acquisition by the Steel

Corporation of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company; and it has been

alleged, on the authority of the Government officials engaged in

carrying on the suit, that as regards this transaction I was misled by

the representatives of the Steel Corporation, and that the facts were

not accurately or truthfully laid before me. This statement is not

correct. I believed at the time that the facts in the case were as

represented to me on behalf of the Steel Corporation, and my further

knowledge has convinced me that this was true. I believed at the time

that the representatives of the Steel Corporation told me the truth as

to the change that would be worked in the percentage of the business

which the proposed acquisition would give the Steel Corporation, and

further inquiry has convinced me that they did so. I was not misled. The

representatives of the Steel Corporation told me the truth as to what

the effect of the action at that time would be, and any statement that I

was misled or that the representatives of the Steel Corporation did

not thus tell me the truth as to the facts of the case is itself not in

accordance with the truth. In _The Outlook_ of August 19 last I gave

in full the statement I had made to the Investigating Committee of the

House of Representatives on this matter. That statement is accurate, and

I reaffirm everything I therein said, not only as to what occurred, but

also as to my belief in the wisdom and propriety of my action--indeed,

the action not merely was wise and proper, but it would have been a

calamity from every standpoint had I failed to take it. On page 137 of

the printed report of the testimony before the Committee will be found

Judge Gary's account of the meeting between himself and Mr. Frick and

Mr. Root and myself. This account states the facts accurately. It has

been alleged that the purchase by the Steel Corporation of the property

of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company gave the Steel Corporation

practically a monopoly of the Southern iron ores--that is, of the iron

ores south of the Potomac and the Ohio. My information, which I

have every reason to believe is accurate and not successfully to be

challenged, is that, of these Southern iron ores the Steel Corporation

has, including the property gained from the Tennessee Coal and Iron

Company, less than 20 per cent--perhaps not over 16 per cent. This is

a very much smaller percentage than the percentage it holds of the Lake

Superior ores, which even after the surrender of the Hill lease will

be slightly over 50 per cent. According to my view, therefore,

and unless--which I do not believe possible--these figures can be

successfully challenged, the acquisition of the Tennessee Coal and Iron

Company's ores in no way changed the situation as regards making the

Steel Corporation a monopoly.[*] The showing as to the percentage of

production of all kinds of steel ingots and steel castings in the

United States by the Steel Corporation and by all other manufacturers

respectively makes an even stronger case. It makes the case even

stronger than I put it in my testimony before the Investigating

Committee, for I was scrupulously careful to make statements that erred,

if at all, against my own position. It appears from the figures of

production that in 1901 the Steel Corporation had to its credit nearly

66 per cent of the total production as against a little over 34 per cent

by all other steel manufacturers. The percentage then shrank steadily,

until in 1906, the year before the acquisition of the Tennessee Coal and

Iron properties, the percentage was a little under 58 per cent. In spite

of the acquisition of these properties, the following year, 1907, the

total percentage shrank slightly, and this shrinking has continued until

in 1910 the total percentage of the Steel Corporation is but a little

over 54 per cent, and the percentage by all other steel manufacturers

but a fraction less than 46 per cent. Of the 54 3_10 per cent produced

by the Steel Corporation 1 9_10 per cent is produced by the former

Tennessee Coal and Iron Company. In other words, these figures show that

the acquisition of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company did not in the

slightest degree change the situation, and that during the ten

years which include the acquisition of these properties by the Steel

Corporation the percentage of total output of steel manufacturers in

this country by the Steel Corporation has shrunk from nearly 66 per cent

to but a trifle over 54 per cent. I do not believe that these figures

can be successfully controverted, and if not successfully controverted

they show clearly not only that the acquisition of the Tennessee

Coal and Iron properties wrought no change in the status of the Steel

Corporation, but that the Steel Corporation during the decade has

steadily lost, instead of gained, in monopolistic character.

[*] My own belief is that our Nation should long ago have

adopted the policy of merely leasing for a term of years

mineral-bearing land; but it is the fault of us ourselves,

of the people, not of the Steel Corporation, that this

policy has not been adopted.

So much for the facts in this particular case. Now for the general

subject. When my Administration took office, I found, not only that

there had been little real enforcement of the Anti-Trust Law and but

little more effective enforcement of the Inter-State Commerce Law,

but also that the decisions were so chaotic and the laws themselves so

vaguely drawn, or at least interpreted in such widely varying fashions,

that the biggest business men tended to treat both laws as dead letters.

The series of actions by which we succeeded in making the Inter-State

Commerce Law an efficient and most useful instrument in regulating the

transportation of the country and exacting justice from the big railways

without doing them injustice--while, indeed, on the contrary, securing

them against injustice--need not here be related. The Anti-Trust Law it

was also necessary to enforce as it had never hitherto been enforced;

both because it was on the statute-books and because it was imperative

to teach the masters of the biggest corporations in the land that they

were not, and would not be permitted to regard themselves as, above

the law. Moreover, where the combination has really been guilty of

misconduct the law serves a useful purpose, and in such cases as those

of the Standard Oil and Tobacco Trusts, if effectively enforced, the law

confers a real and great good.

Suits were brought against the most powerful corporations in the land,

which we were convinced had clearly and beyond question violated the

Anti-Trust Law. These suits were brought with great care, and only where

we felt so sure of our facts that we could be fairly certain that

there was a likelihood of success. As a matter of fact, in most of the

important suits we were successful. It was imperative that these suits

should be brought, and very real good was achieved by bringing them, for

it was only these suits that made the great masters of corporate capital

in America fully realize that they were the servants and not the masters

of the people, that they were subject to the law, and that they would

not be permitted to be a law unto themselves; and the corporations

against which we proceeded had sinned, not merely by being big (which

we did not regard as in itself a sin), but by being guilty of unfair

practices towards their competitors, and by procuring fair advantages

from the railways. But the resulting situation has made it evident that

the Anti-Trust Law is not adequate to meet the situation that has grown

up because of modern business conditions and the accompanying tremendous

increase in the business use of vast quantities of corporate wealth. As

I have said, this was already evident to my mind when I was President,

and in communications to Congress I repeatedly stated the facts. But

when I made these communications there were still plenty of people

who did not believe that we would succeed in the suits that had

been instituted against the Standard Oil, the Tobacco, and other

corporations, and it was impossible to get the public as a whole to

realize what the situation was. Sincere zealots who believed that

all combinations could be destroyed and the old-time conditions of

unregulated competition restored, insincere politicians who knew better

but made believe that they thought whatever their constituents

wished them to think, crafty reactionaries who wished to see on the

statute-books laws which they believed unenforceable, and the almost

solid "Wall Street crowd" or representatives of "big business" who at

that time opposed with equal violence both wise and necessary and unwise

and improper regulation of business-all fought against the adoption of a

sane, effective, and far-reaching policy.

It is a vitally necessary thing to have the persons in control of big

trusts of the character of the Standard Oil Trust and Tobacco Trust

taught that they are under the law, just as it was a necessary thing to

have the Sugar Trust taught the same lesson in drastic fashion by Mr.

Henry L. Stimson when he was United States District Attorney in the

city of New York. But to attempt to meet the whole problem not by

administrative governmental action but by a succession of lawsuits is

hopeless from the standpoint of working out a permanently satisfactory

solution. Moreover, the results sought to be achieved are achieved only

in extremely insufficient and fragmentary measure by breaking up all big

corporations, whether they have behaved well or ill, into a number of

little corporations which it is perfectly certain will be largely, and

perhaps altogether, under the same control. Such action is harsh and

mischievous if the corporation is guilty of nothing except its size; and

where, as in the case of the Standard Oil, and especially the Tobacco,

trusts, the corporation has been guilty of immoral and anti-social

practices, there is need for far more drastic and thoroughgoing action

than any that has been taken, under the recent decree of the Supreme

Court. In the case of the Tobacco Trust, for instance, the settlement in

the Circuit Court, in which the representatives of the Government

seem inclined to concur, practically leaves all of the companies still

substantially under the control of the twenty-nine original defendants.

Such a result is lamentable from the standpoint of justice. The decision

of the Circuit Court, if allowed to stand, means that the Tobacco Trust

has merely been obliged to change its clothes, that none of the real

offenders have received any real punishment, while, as the New York

Times, a pro-trust paper, says, the tobacco concerns, in their new

clothes, are in positions of "ease and luxury," and "immune from

prosecution under the law."

Surely, miscarriage of justice is not too strong a term to apply to such

a result when considered in connection with what the Supreme Court said

of this Trust. That great Court in its decision used language which,

in spite of its habitual and severe self-restraint in stigmatizing

wrong-doing, yet unhesitatingly condemns the Tobacco Trust for moral

turpitude, saying that the case shows an "ever present manifestation

. . . of conscious wrong-doing" by the Trust, whose history is "replete

with the doing of acts which it was the obvious purpose of the statute

to forbid, . . . demonstrative of the existence from the beginning of a

purpose to acquire dominion and control of the tobacco trade, not by the

mere exertion of the ordinary right to contract and to trade, but by

methods devised in order to monopolize the trade by driving competitors

out of business, which were ruthlessly carried out upon the assumption

that to work upon the fears or play upon the cupidity of competitors

would make success possible." The letters from and to various officials

of the Trust, which were put in evidence, show a literally astounding

and horrifying indulgence by the Trust in wicked and depraved business

methods--such as the "endeavor to cause a strike in their [a rival

business firm's] factory," or the "shutting off the market" of an

independent tobacco firm by "taking the necessary steps to give them a

warm reception," or forcing importers into a price agreement by causing

and continuing "a demoralization of the business for such length of time

as may be deemed desirable" (I quote from the letters). A Trust guilty

of such conduct should be absolutely disbanded, and the only way to

prevent the repetition of such conduct is by strict Government

supervision, and not merely by lawsuits.

The Anti-Trust Law cannot meet the whole situation, nor can any

modification of the principle of the Anti-Trust Law avail to meet

the whole situation. The fact is that many of the men who have called

themselves Progressives, and who certainly believe that they are

Progressives, represent in reality in this matter not progress at

all but a kind of sincere rural toryism. These men believe that it is

possible by strengthening the Anti-Trust Law to restore business to

the competitive conditions of the middle of the last century. Any such

effort is foredoomed to end in failure, and, if successful, would

be mischievous to the last degree. Business cannot be successfully

conducted in accordance with the practices and theories of sixty years

ago unless we abolish steam, electricity, big cities, and, in short, not

only all modern business and modern industrial conditions, but all the

modern conditions of our civilization. The effort to restore competition

as it was sixty years ago, and to trust for justice solely to this

proposed restoration of competition, is just as foolish as if we should

go back to the flintlocks of Washington's Continentals as a

substitute for modern weapons of precision. The effort to prohibit all

combinations, good or bad, is bound to fail, and ought to fail; when

made, it merely means that some of the worst combinations are not

checked and that honest business is checked. Our purpose should be, not

to strangle business as an incident of strangling combinations, but to

regulate big corporations in thoroughgoing and effective fashion, so as

to help legitimate business as an incident to thoroughly and completely

safeguarding the interests of the people as a whole. Against all such

increase of Government regulation the argument is raised that it

would amount to a form of Socialism. This argument is familiar; it is

precisely the same as that which was raised against the creation of

the Inter-State Commerce Commission, and of all the different utilities

commissions in the different States, as I myself saw, thirty years

ago, when I was a legislator at Albany, and these questions came up

in connection with our State Government. Nor can action be effectively

taken by any one State. Congress alone has power under the Constitution

effectively and thoroughly and at all points to deal with inter-State

commerce, and where Congress, as it should do, provides laws that

will give the Nation full jurisdiction over the whole field, then that

jurisdiction becomes, of necessity, exclusive--although until Congress

does act affirmatively and thoroughly it is idle to expect that the

States will or ought to rest content with non-action on the part of both

Federal and State authorities. This statement, by the way, applies also

to the question of "usurpation" by any one branch of our Government

of the rights of another branch. It is contended that in these recent

decisions the Supreme Court legislated; so it did; and it had to;

because Congress had signally failed to do its duty by legislating.

For the Supreme Court to nullify an act of the Legislature as

unconstitutional except on the clearest grounds is usurpation; to

interpret such an act in an obviously wrong sense is usurpation; but

where the legislative body persistently leaves open a field which it

is absolutely imperative, from the public standpoint, to fill, then no

possible blame attaches to the official or officials who step in because

they have to, and who then do the needed work in the interest of the

people. The blame in such cases lies with the body which has been

derelict, and not with the body which reluctantly makes good the

dereliction.

A quarter of a century ago, Senator Cushman K. Davis, a statesman who

amply deserved the title of statesman, a man of the highest courage, of

the sternest adherence to the principles laid down by an exacting sense

of duty, an unflinching believer in democracy, who was as little to be

cowed by a mob as by a plutocrat, and moreover a man who possessed the

priceless gift of imagination, a gift as important to a statesman as to

a historian, in an address delivered at the annual commencement of

the University of Michigan on July 1, 1886, spoke as follows of

corporations:

"Feudalism, with its domains, its untaxed lords, their retainers,

its exemptions and privileges, made war upon the aspiring spirit of

humanity, and fell with all its grandeurs. Its spirit walks the earth

and haunts the institutions of to-day, in the great corporations, with

the control of the National highways, their occupation of great domains,

their power to tax, their cynical contempt for the law, their sorcery

to debase most gifted men to the capacity of splendid slaves, their

pollution of the ermine of the judge and the robe of the Senator, their

aggregation in one man of wealth so enormous as to make Croesus seem a

pauper, their picked, paid, and skilled retainers who are summoned by

the message of electricity and appear upon the wings of steam. If we

look into the origin of feudalism and of the modern corporations--those

Dromios of history--we find that the former originated in a strict

paternalism, which is scouted by modern economists, and that the latter

has grown from an unrestrained freedom of action, aggression, and

development, which they commend as the very ideal of political wisdom.

_Laissez-faire_, says the professor, when it often means bind and gag

that the strongest may work his will. It is a plea for the survival of

the fittest--for the strongest male to take possession of the herd by

a process of extermination. If we examine this battle cry of political

polemics, we find that it is based upon the conception of the divine

right of property, and the preoccupation by older or more favored or

more alert or richer men or nations, of territory, of the forces of

nature, of machinery, of all the functions of what we call civilization.

Some of these men, who are really great, follow these conceptions to

their conclusions with dauntless intrepidity."

When Senator Davis spoke, few men of great power had the sympathy and

the vision necessary to perceive the menace contained in the growth of

corporations; and the men who did see the evil were struggling blindly

to get rid of it, not by frankly meeting the new situation with new

methods, but by insisting upon the entirely futile effort to abolish

what modern conditions had rendered absolutely inevitable. Senator Davis

was under no such illusion. He realized keenly that it was absolutely

impossible to go back to an outworn social status, and that we must

abandon definitely the _laissez-faire_ theory of political economy, and

fearlessly champion a system of increased Governmental control,

paying no heed to the cries of the worthy people who denounce this as

Socialistic. He saw that, in order to meet the inevitable increase in

the power of corporations produced by modern industrial conditions,

it would be necessary to increase in like fashion the activity of the

sovereign power which alone could control such corporations. As has

been aptly said, the only way to meet a billion-dollar corporation is by

invoking the protection of a hundred-billion-dollar government; in other

words, of the National Government, for no State Government is strong

enough both to do justice to corporations and to exact justice from

them. Said Senator Davis in this admirable address, which should be

reprinted and distributed broadcast:

"The liberty of the individual has been annihilated by the logical

process constructed to maintain it. We have come to a political

deification of Mammon. _Laissez-faire_ is not utterly blameworthy. It

begat modern democracy, and made the modern republic possible. There

can be no doubt of that. But there it reached its limit of political

benefaction, and began to incline toward the point where extremes meet.

. . . To every assertion that the people in their collective capacity of

a government ought to exert their indefeasible right of self-defense, it

is said you touch the sacred rights of property."

The Senator then goes on to say that we now have to deal with an

oligarchy of wealth, and that the Government must develop power

sufficient enough to enable it to do the task.

Few will dispute the fact that the present situation is not

satisfactory, and cannot be put on a permanently satisfactory basis

unless we put an end to the period of groping and declare for a fixed

policy, a policy which shall clearly define and punish wrong-doing,

which shall put a stop to the iniquities done in the name of business,

but which shall do strict equity to business. We demand that big

business give the people a square deal; in return we must insist that

when any one engaged in big business honestly endeavors to do right

he shall himself be given a square deal; and the first, and most

elementary, kind of square deal is to give him in advance full

information as to just what he can, and what he cannot, legally and

properly do. It is absurd, and much worse than absurd, to treat the

deliberate lawbreaker as on an exact par with the man eager to obey the

law, whose only desire is to find out from some competent Governmental

authority what the law is, and then to live up to it. Moreover, it is

absurd to treat the size of a corporation as in itself a crime. As

Judge Hook says in his opinion in the Standard Oil Case: "Magnitude

of business does not alone constitute a monopoly . . . the genius and

industry of man when kept to ethical standards still have full play,

and what he achieves is his . . . success and magnitude of business, the

rewards of fair and honorable endeavor [are not forbidden] . . . [the

public welfare is threatened only when success is attained] by

wrongful or unlawful methods." Size may, and in my opinion does, make a

corporation fraught with potential menace to the community; and may, and

in my opinion should, therefore make it incumbent upon the community to

exercise through its administrative (not merely through its judicial)

officers a strict supervision over that corporation in order to see

that it does not go wrong; but the size in itself does not signify

wrong-doing, and should not be held to signify wrong-doing.

Not only should any huge corporation which has gained its position

by unfair methods, and by interference with the rights of others, by

demoralizing and corrupt practices, in short, by sheer baseness and

wrong-doing, be broken up, but it should be made the business of some

administrative governmental body, by constant supervision, to see that

it does not come together again, save under such strict control as shall

insure the community against all repetition of the bad conduct--and it

should never be permitted thus to assemble its parts as long as these

parts are under the control of the original offenders, for actual

experience has shown that these men are, from the standpoint of the

people at large, unfit to be trusted with the power implied in the

management of a large corporation. But nothing of importance is

gained by breaking up a huge inter-State and international industrial

organization _which has not offended otherwise than by its size_, into

a number of small concerns without any attempt to regulate the way in

which those concerns as a whole shall do business. Nothing is gained by

depriving the American Nation of good weapons wherewith to fight in the

great field of international industrial competition. Those who would

seek to restore the days of unlimited and uncontrolled competition, and

who believe that a panacea for our industrial and economic ills is to

be found in the mere breaking up of all big corporations, simply because

they are big, are attempting not only the impossible, but what, if

possible, would be undesirable. They are acting as we should act if

we tried to dam the Mississippi, to stop its flow outright. The effort

would be certain to result in failure and disaster; we would have

attempted the impossible, and so would have achieved nothing, or worse

than nothing. But by building levees along the Mississippi, not seeking

to dam the stream, but to control it, we are able to achieve our object

and to confer inestimable good in the course of so doing.

This Nation should definitely adopt the policy of attacking, not

the mere fact of combination, but the evils and wrong-doing which so

frequently accompany combination. The fact that a combination is very

big is ample reason for exercising a close and jealous supervision over

it, because its size renders it potent for mischief; but it should not

be punished unless it actually does the mischief; it should merely be

so supervised and controlled as to guarantee us, the people, against

its doing mischief. We should not strive for a policy of unregulated

competition and of the destruction of all big corporations, that is, of

all the most efficient business industries in the land. Nor should

we persevere in the hopeless experiment of trying to regulate these

industries by means only of lawsuits, each lasting several years, and of

uncertain result. We should enter upon a course of supervision, control,

and regulation of these great corporations--a regulation which we should

not fear, if necessary, to bring to the point of control of monopoly

prices, just as in exceptional cases railway rates are now regulated.

Either the Bureau of Corporations should be authorized, or some other

governmental body similar to the Inter-State Commerce Commission should

be created, to exercise this supervision, this authoritative control.

When once immoral business practices have been eliminated by such

control, competition will thereby be again revived as a healthy factor,

although not as formerly an all-sufficient factor, in keeping the

general business situation sound. Wherever immoral business practices

still obtain--as they obtained in the cases of the Standard Oil Trust

and Tobacco Trust--the Anti-Trust Law can be invoked; and wherever such

a prosecution is successful, and the courts declare a corporation

to possess a monopolistic character, then that corporation should be

completely dissolved, and the parts ought never to be again assembled

save on whatever terms and under whatever conditions may be imposed by

the governmental body in which is vested the regulatory power. Methods

can readily be devised by which corporations sincerely desiring to

act fairly and honestly can on their own initiative come under this

thoroughgoing administrative control by the Government and thereby be

free from the working of the Anti-Trust Law. But the law will remain

to be invoked against wrongdoers; and under such conditions it could be

invoked far more vigorously and successfully than at present.

It is not necessary in an article like this to attempt to work out

such a plan in detail. It can assuredly be worked out. Moreover, in my

opinion, substantially some such plan must be worked out or business

chaos will continue. Wrongdoing such as was perpetrated by the Standard

Oil Trust, and especially by the Tobacco Trust, should not only be

punished, but if possible punished in the persons of the chief authors

and beneficiaries of the wrong, far more severely than at present. But

punishment should not be the only, or indeed the main, end in view. Our

aim should be a policy of construction and not one of destruction. Our

aim should not be to punish the men who have made a big corporation

successful merely because they have made it big and successful, but

to exercise such thoroughgoing supervision and control over them as

to insure their business skill being exercised in the interest of the

public and not against the public interest. Ultimately, I believe that

this control should undoubtedly indirectly or directly extend to dealing

with all questions connected with their treatment of their employees,

including the wages, the hours of labor, and the like. Not only is the

proper treatment of a corporation, from the standpoint of the managers,

shareholders, and employees, compatible with securing from that

corporation the best standard of public service, but when the effort

is wisely made it results in benefit both to the corporation and to the

public. The success of Wisconsin in dealing with the corporations within

her borders, so as both to do them justice and to exact justice in

return from them toward the public, has been signal; and this Nation

should adopt a progressive policy in substance akin to the progressive

policy not merely formulated in theory but reduced to actual practice

with such striking success in Wisconsin.

To sum up, then. It is practically impossible, and, if possible,

it would be mischievous and undesirable, to try to break up all

combinations merely because they are large and successful, and to put

the business of the country back into the middle of the eighteenth

century conditions of intense and unregulated competition between

small and weak business concerns. Such an effort represents not

progressiveness but an unintelligent though doubtless entirely

well-meaning toryism. Moreover, the effort to administer a law merely

by lawsuits and court decisions is bound to end in signal failure, and

meanwhile to be attended with delays and uncertainties, and to put a

premium upon legal sharp practice. Such an effort does not adequately

punish the guilty, and yet works great harm to the innocent. Moreover,

it entirely fails to give the publicity which is one of the best

by-products of the system of control by administrative officials;

publicity, which is not only good in itself, but furnishes the data

for whatever further action may be necessary. We need to formulate

immediately and definitely a policy which, in dealing with big

corporations that behave themselves and which contain no menace save

what is necessarily potential in any corporation which is of great size

and very well managed, shall aim not at their destruction but at their

regulation and supervision, so that the Government shall control them

in such fashion as amply to safeguard the interests of the whole public,

including producers, consumers, and wage-workers. This control should,

if necessary, be pushed in extreme cases to the point of exercising

control over monopoly prices, as rates on railways are now controlled;

although this is not a power that should be used when it is possible to

avoid it. The law should be clear, unambiguous, certain, so that honest

men may not find that unwittingly they have violated it. In short, our

aim should be, not to destroy, but effectively and in thoroughgoing

fashion to regulate and control, in the public interest, the great

instrumentalities of modern business, which it is destructive of the

general welfare of the community to destroy, and which nevertheless it

is vitally necessary to that general welfare to regulate and control.

Competition will remain as a very important factor when once we have

destroyed the unfair business methods, the criminal interference with

the rights of others, which alone enabled certain swollen combinations

to crush out their competitors--and, incidentally, the "conservatives"

will do well to remember that these unfair and iniquitous methods by

great masters of corporate capital have done more to cause popular

discontent with the propertied classes than all the orations of all the

Socialist orators in the country put together.

I have spoken above of Senator Davis's admirable address delivered a

quarter of a century ago. Senator Davis's one-time partner, Frank B.

Kellogg, the Government counsel who did so much to win success for the

Government in its prosecutions of the trusts, has recently delivered

before the Palimpsest Club of Omaha an excellent address on the subject;

Mr. Prouty, of the Inter-State Commerce Commission, has recently, in

his speech before the Congregational Club of Brooklyn, dealt with

the subject from the constructive side; and in the proceedings of the

American Bar Association for 1904 there is an admirable paper on

the need of thoroughgoing Federal control over corporations doing an

inter-State business, by Professor Horace L. Wilgus, of the University

of Michigan. The National Government exercises control over inter-State

commerce railways, and it can in similar fashion, through an appropriate

governmental body, exercise control over all industrial organizations

engaged in inter-State commerce. This control should be exercised, not

by the courts, but by an administrative bureau or board such as the

Bureau of Corporations or the Inter-State Commerce Commission; for

the courts cannot with advantage permanently perform executive and

administrative functions.

APPENDIX B

THE CONTROL OF CORPORATIONS AND "THE NEW FREEDOM"

In his book "The New Freedom," and in the magazine articles of which

it is composed, which appeared just after he had been inaugurated as

President, Mr. Woodrow Wilson made an entirely unprovoked attack upon

me and upon the Progressive party in connection with what he asserts

the policy of that party to be concerning the trusts, and as regards my

attitude while President about the trusts.

I am reluctant to say anything whatever about President Wilson at the

outset of his Administration unless I can speak of him with praise.

I have scrupulously refrained from saying or doing one thing

since election that could put the slightest obstacle, even of

misinterpretation, in his path. It is to the interest of the country

that he should succeed in his office. I cordially wish him success, and

I shall cordially support any policy of his that I believe to be in the

interests of the people of the United States. But when Mr. Wilson, after

being elected President, within the first fortnight after he has been

inaugurated into that high office, permits himself to be betrayed into

a public misstatement of what I have said, and what I stand for, then he

forces me to correct his statements.

Mr. Wilson opens his article by saying that the Progressive "doctrine is

that monopoly is inevitable, and that the only course open to the people

of the United States is to submit to it." This statement is without one

particle of foundation in fact. I challenge him to point out a sentence

in the Progressive platform or in any speech of mine which bears him

out. I can point him out any number which flatly contradict him. We have

never made any such statement as he alleges about monopolies. We have

said: "The corporation is an essential part of modern business. The

concentration of modern business, in some degree, is both inevitable and

necessary for National and international business efficiency." Does Mr.

Wilson deny this? Let him answer yes or no, directly. It is easy for

a politician detected in a misstatement to take refuge in evasive

rhetorical hyperbole. But Mr. Wilson is President of the United States,

and as such he is bound to candid utterance on every subject of public

interest which he himself has broached. If he disagrees with us, let him

be frank and consistent, and recommend to Congress that all corporations

be made illegal. Mr. Wilson's whole attack is largely based on a deft

but far from ingenuous confounding of what we have said of monopoly,

which we propose so far as possible to abolish, and what we have said of

big corporations, which we propose to regulate; Mr. Wilson's own vaguely

set forth proposals being to attempt the destruction of both in ways

that would harm neither. In our platform we use the word "monopoly" but

once, and then we speak of it as an abuse of power, coupling it with

stock-watering, unfair competition and unfair privileges. Does Mr.

Wilson deny this? If he does, then where else will he assert that we

speak of monopoly as he says we do? He certainly owes the people of the

United States a plain answer to the question. In my speech of acceptance

I said: "We favor strengthening the Sherman Law by prohibiting

agreements to divide territory or limit output; refusing to sell to

customers who buy from business rivals; to sell below cost in certain

areas while maintaining higher prices in other places; using the power

of transportation to aid or injure special business concerns; and all

other unfair trade practices." The platform pledges us to "guard and

keep open equally to all, the highways of American commerce." This is

the exact negation of monopoly. Unless Mr. Wilson is prepared to show

the contrary, surely he is bound in honor to admit frankly that he has

been betrayed into a misrepresentation, and to correct it.

Mr. Wilson says that for sixteen years the National Administration has

"been virtually under the regulation of the trusts," and that the big

business men "have already captured the Government." Such a statement as

this might perhaps be pardoned as mere rhetoric in a candidate seeking

office--although it is the kind of statement that never under any

circumstances have I permitted myself to make, whether on the stump or

off the stump, about any opponent, unless I was prepared to back it up

with explicit facts. But there is an added seriousness to the charge

when it is made deliberately and in cold blood by a man who is at the

time President. In this volume I have set forth my relations with the

trusts. I challenge Mr. Wilson to controvert anything I have said, or to

name any trusts or any big business men who regulated, or in any

shape or way controlled, or captured, the Government during my term

as President. He must furnish specifications if his words are taken at

their face value--and I venture to say in advance that the absurdity

of such a charge is patent to all my fellow-citizens, not excepting Mr.

Wilson.

Mr. Wilson says that the new party was founded "under the leadership of

Mr. Roosevelt, with the conspicuous aid--I mention him with no satirical

intention, but merely to set the facts down accurately--of Mr. George W.

Perkins, organizer of the Steel Trust." Whether Mr. Wilson's intention

was satirical or not is of no concern; but I call his attention to the

fact that he has conspicuously and strikingly failed "to set the facts

down accurately." Mr. Perkins was not the organizer of the Steel Trust,

and when it was organized he had no connection with it or with the

Morgan people. This is well known, and it has again and again been

testified to before Congressional committees controlled by Mr. Wilson's

friends who were endeavoring to find out something against Mr. Perkins.

If Mr. Wilson does not know that my statement is correct, he ought to

know it, and he is not to be excused for making such a misstatement as

he has made when he has not a particle of evidence in support of it.

Mr. Perkins was from the beginning in the Harvester Trust but, when Mr.

Wilson points out this fact, why does he not add that he was the only

man in that trust who supported me, and that the President of the trust

ardently supported Mr. Wilson himself? It is disingenuous to endeavor to

conceal these facts, and to mislead ordinary citizens about them. Under

the administrations of both Mr. Taft and Mr. Wilson, Mr. Perkins has

been singled out for special attack, obviously not because he belonged

to the Harvester and Steel Trusts, but because he alone among the

prominent men of the two corporations, fearlessly supported the only

party which afforded any real hope of checking the evil of the trusts.

Mr. Wilson states that the Progressives have "a programme perfectly

agreeable to monopolies."

The plain and unmistakable inference to be drawn from this and other

similar statements in his article, and the inference which he obviously

desired to have drawn, is that the big corporations approved the

Progressive plan and supported the Progressive candidate. If President

Wilson does not know perfectly well that this is not the case, he is

the only intelligent person in the United States who is thus ignorant.

Everybody knows that the overwhelming majority of the heads of the big

corporations supported him or Mr. Taft. It is equally well known that of

the corporations he mentions, the Steel and the Harvester Trusts, there

was but one man who took any part in the Progressive campaign, and that

almost all the others, some thirty in number, were against us, and some

of them, including the President of the Harvester Trust, openly and

enthusiastically for Mr. Wilson himself. If he reads the newspapers

at all, he must know that practically every man representing the

great financial interests of the country, and without exception every

newspaper controlled by Wall Street or State Street, actively supported

either him or Mr. Taft, and showed perfect willingness to accept either

if only they could prevent the Progressive party from coming into power

and from putting its platform into effect.

Mr. Wilson says of the trust plank in that platform that it "did not

anywhere condemn monopoly except in words." Exactly of what else could a

platform consist? Does Mr. Wilson expect us to use algebraic signs? This

criticism is much as if he said the Constitution or the Declaration of

Independence contained nothing but words. The Progressive platform did

contain words, and the words were admirably designed to express thought

and meaning and purpose. Mr. Wilson says that I long ago "classified

trusts for us as good and bad," and said that I was "afraid only of the

bad ones." Mr. Wilson would do well to quote exactly what my language

was, and where it was used, for I am at a loss to know what statement

of mine it is to which he refers. But if he means that I say that

corporations can do well, and that corporations can also do ill, he is

stating my position correctly. I hold that a corporation does ill if it

seeks profit in restricting production and then by extorting high prices

from the community by reason of the scarcity of the product; through

adulterating, lyingly advertising, or over-driving the help; or

replacing men workers with children; or by rebates; or in any illegal

or improper manner driving competitors out of its way; or seeking to

achieve monopoly by illegal or unethical treatment of its competitors,

or in any shape or way offending against the moral law either in

connection with the public or with its employees or with its rivals. Any

corporation which seeks its profit in such fashion is acting badly.

It is, in fact, a conspiracy against the public welfare which the

Government should use all its powers to suppress. If, on the other hand,

a corporation seeks profit solely by increasing its products through

eliminating waste, improving its processes, utilizing its by-products,

installing better machines, raising wages in the effort to secure more

efficient help, introducing the principle of cooperation and mutual

benefit, dealing fairly with labor unions, setting its face against

the underpayment of women and the employment of children; in a

word, treating the public fairly and its rivals fairly: then such a

corporation is behaving well. It is an instrumentality of civilization

operating to promote abundance by cheapening the cost of living so as to

improve conditions everywhere throughout the whole community. Does Mr.

Wilson controvert either of these statements? If so, let him answer

directly. It is a matter of capital importance to the country that his

position in this respect be stated directly, not by indirect suggestion.

Much of Mr. Wilson's article, although apparently aimed at the

Progressive party, is both so rhetorical and so vague as to need no

answer. He does, however, specifically assert (among other things

equally without warrant in fact) that the Progressive party says that it

is "futile to undertake to prevent monopoly," and only ventures to

ask the trusts to be "kind" and "pitiful"! It is a little difficult

to answer a misrepresentation of the facts so radical--not to say

preposterous--with the respect that one desires to use in speaking of or

to the President of the United States. I challenge President Wilson to

point to one sentence of our platform or of my speeches which affords

the faintest justification for these assertions. Having made this

statement in the course of an unprovoked attack on me, he cannot refuse

to show that it is true. I deem it necessary to emphasize here (but with

perfect respect) that I am asking for a plain statement of fact, not

for a display of rhetoric. I ask him, as is my right under the

circumstances, to quote the exact language which justifies him in

attributing these views to us. If he cannot do this, then a frank

acknowledgment on his part is due to himself and to the people. I quote

from the Progressive platform: "Behind the ostensible Government sits

enthroned an invisible Government, owing no allegiance and acknowledging

no responsibility to the people. To destroy this invisible Government,

to dissolve the unholy alliance between corrupt business and corrupt

politics, is the first task of the statesmanship of the day. . . . This

country belongs to the people. Its resources, its business, its laws,

its institutions, should be utilized, maintained, or altered in whatever

manner will best promote the general interest." This assertion is

explicit. We say directly that "the people" are absolutely to control in

any way they see fit, the "business" of the country. I again challenge

Mr. Wilson to quote any words of the platform that justify the

statements he has made to the contrary. If he cannot do it--and of

course he cannot do it, and he must know that he cannot do it--surely he

will not hesitate to say so frankly.

Mr. Wilson must know that every monopoly in the United States opposes

the Progressive party. If he challenges this statement, I challenge him

in return (as is clearly my right) to name the monopoly that did support

the Progressive party, whether it was the Sugar Trust, the Steel Trust,

the Harvester Trust, the Standard Oil Trust, the Tobacco Trust, or any

other. Every sane man in the country knows well that there is not one

word of justification that can truthfully be adduced for Mr. Wilson's

statement that the Progressive programme was agreeable to the

monopolies. Ours was the only programme to which they objected, and they

supported either Mr. Wilson or Mr. Taft against me, indifferent as to

which of them might be elected so long as I was defeated. Mr. Wilson

says that I got my "idea with regard to the regulation of monopoly from

the gentlemen who form the United States Steel Corporation." Does Mr.

Wilson pretend that Mr. Van Hise and Mr. Croly got their ideas from the

Steel Corporation? Is Mr. Wilson unaware of the elementary fact that

most modern economists believe that unlimited, unregulated competition

is the source of evils which all men now concede must be remedied if

this civilization of ours is to survive? Is he ignorant of the fact that

the Socialist party has long been against unlimited competition? This

statement of Mr. Wilson cannot be characterized properly with any degree

of regard for the office Mr. Wilson holds. Why, the ideas that I

have championed as to controlling and regulating both competition and

combination in the interest of the people, so that the people shall be

masters over both, have been in the air in this country for a quarter of

a century. I was merely the first prominent candidate for President who

took them up. They are the progressive ideas, and progressive business

men must in the end come to them, for I firmly believe that in the

end all wise and honest business men, big and little, will support our

programme. Mr. Wilson in opposing them is the mere apostle of reaction.

He says that I got my "ideas from the gentlemen who form the Steel

Corporation." I did not. But I will point out to him something in

return. It was he himself, and Mr. Taft, who got the votes and the money

of these same gentlemen, and of those in the Harvester Trust.

Mr. Wilson has promised to break up all trusts. He can do so only by

proceeding at law. If he proceeds at law, he can hope for success

only by taking what I have done as a precedent. In fact, what I did as

President is the base of every action now taken or that can be now

taken looking toward the control of corporations, or the suppression

of monopolies. The decisions rendered in various cases brought by my

direction constitute the authority on which Mr. Wilson must base any

action that he may bring to curb monopolistic control. Will Mr. Wilson

deny this, or question it in any way? With what grace can he describe

my Administration as satisfactory to the trusts when he knows that he

cannot redeem a single promise that he has made to war upon the trusts

unless he avails himself of weapons of which the Federal Government had

been deprived before I became President, and which were restored to

it during my Administration and through proceedings which I directed?

Without my action Mr. Wilson could not now undertake or carry on a

single suit against a monopoly, and, moreover, if it had not been for my

action and for the judicial decision in consequence obtained, Congress

would be helpless to pass a single law against monopoly.

Let Mr. Wilson mark that the men who organized and directed the Northern

Securities Company were also the controlling forces in the very Steel

Corporation which Mr. Wilson makes believe to think was supporting me.

I challenge Mr. Wilson to deny this, and yet he well knew that it was

my successful suit against the Northern Securities Company which first

efficiently established the power of the people over the trusts.

After reading Mr. Wilson's book, I am still entirely in the dark as to

what he means by the "New Freedom." Mr. Wilson is an accomplished and

scholarly man, a master of rhetoric, and the sentences in the book are

well-phrased statements, usually inculcating a morality which is sound

although vague and ill defined. There are certain proposals (already

long set forth and practiced by me and by others who have recently

formed the Progressive party) made by Mr. Wilson with which I cordially

agree. There are, however, certain things he has said, even as regards

matters of abstract morality, with which I emphatically disagree.

For example, in arguing for proper business publicity, as to which I

cordially agree with Mr. Wilson, he commits himself to the following

statement:

"You know there is temptation in loneliness and secrecy. Haven't you

experienced it? I have. We are never so proper in our conduct as when

everybody can look and see exactly what we are doing. If you are off in

some distant part of the world and suppose that nobody who lives within

a mile of your home is anywhere around, there are times when you adjourn

your ordinary standards. You say to yourself, 'Well, I'll have a fling

this time; nobody will know anything about it.' If you were on the

Desert of Sahara, you would feel that you might permit yourself--well,

say, some slight latitude of conduct; but if you saw one of your

immediate neighbors coming the other way on a camel, you would behave

yourself until he got out of sight. The most dangerous thing in the

world is to get off where nobody knows you. I advise you to stay around

among the neighbors, and then you may keep out of jail. That is the only

way some of us can keep out of jail."

I emphatically disagree with what seems to be the morality inculcated

in this statement, which is that a man is expected to do and is to be

pardoned for doing all kinds of immoral things if he does them alone

and does not expect to be found out. Surely it is not necessary, in

insisting upon proper publicity, to preach a morality of so basely

material a character.

There is much more that Mr. Wilson says as to which I do not understand

him clearly, and where I condemn what I do understand. In economic

matters the course he advocates as part of the "New Freedom" simply

means the old, old "freedom" of leaving the individual strong man

at liberty, unchecked by common action, to prey on the weak and the

helpless. The "New Freedom" in the abstract seems to be the freedom

of the big to devour the little. In the concrete I may add that Mr.

Wilson's misrepresentations of what I have said seem to indicate that he

regards the new freedom as freedom from all obligation to obey the Ninth

Commandment.

But, after all, my views or the principles of the Progressive party are

of much less importance now than the purposes of Mr. Wilson. These are

wrapped in impenetrable mystery. His speeches and writings serve but

to make them more obscure. If these attempts to refute his

misrepresentation of my attitude towards the trusts should result in

making his own clear, then this discussion will have borne fruits of

substantial value to the country. If Mr. Wilson has any plan of his

own for dealing with the trusts, it is to suppress all great industrial

organizations--presumably on the principle proclaimed by his Secretary

of State four years ago, that every corporation which produced more than

a certain percentage of a given commodity--I think the amount specified

was twenty-five per cent--no matter how valuable its service, should be

suppressed. The simple fact is that such a plan is futile. In operation

it would do far more damage than it could remedy. The Progressive plan

would give the people full control of, and in masterful fashion prevent

all wrongdoing by, the trusts, while utilizing for the public welfare

every industrial energy and ability that operates to swell abundance,

while obeying strictly the moral law and the law of the land. Mr.

Wilson's plan would ultimately benefit the trusts and would permanently

damage nobody but the people. For example, one of the steel corporations

which has been guilty of the worst practices towards its employees is

the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company. Mr. Wilson and Mr. Bryan's plan

would, if successful, merely mean permitting four such companies,

absolutely uncontrolled, to monopolize every big industry in the

country. To talk of such an accomplishment as being "The New Freedom" is

enough to make the term one of contemptuous derision.

President Wilson has made explicit promises, and the Democratic

platform has made explicit promises. Mr. Wilson is now in power, with

a Democratic Congress in both branches. He and the Democratic platform

have promised to destroy the trusts, to reduce the cost of living, and

at the same time to increase the well-being of the farmer and of the

workingman--which of course must mean to increase the profits of

the farmer and the wages of the workingman. He and his party won the

election on this promise. We have a right to expect that they will keep

it. If Mr. Wilson's promises mean anything except the very emptiest

words, he is pledged to accomplish the beneficent purposes he avows by

breaking up all the trusts and combinations and corporations so as to

restore competition precisely as it was fifty years ago. If he does not

mean this, he means nothing. He cannot do anything else under penalty

of showing that his promise and his performance do not square with each

other.

Mr. Wilson says that "the trusts are our masters now, but I for one

do not care to live in a country called free even under kind masters."

Good! The Progressives are opposed to having masters, kind or unkind,

and they do not believe that a "new freedom" which in practice would

mean leaving four Fuel and Iron Companies free to do what they like in

every industry would be of much benefit to the country. The Progressives

have a clear and definite programme by which the people would be the

masters of the trusts instead of the trusts being their masters, as Mr.

Wilson says they are. With practical unanimity the trusts supported the

opponents of this programme, Mr. Taft and Mr. Wilson, and they evidently

dreaded our programme infinitely more than anything that Mr. Wilson

threatened. The people have accepted Mr. Wilson's assurances. Now let

him make his promises good. He is committed, if his words mean anything,

to the promise to break up every trust, every big corporation--perhaps

every small corporation--in the United States--not to go through

the motions of breaking them up, but really to break them up. He is

committed against the policy (of efficient control and mastery of

the big corporations both by law and by administrative action in

cooperation) proposed by the Progressives. Let him keep faith with

the people; let him in good faith try to keep the promises he has thus

repeatedly made. I believe that his promise is futile and cannot be

kept. I believe that any attempt sincerely to keep it and in good faith

to carry it out will end in either nothing at all or in disaster. But my

beliefs are of no consequence. Mr. Wilson is President. It is his acts

that are of consequence. He is bound in honor to the people of the

United States to keep his promise, and to break up, not nominally but in

reality, all big business, all trusts, all combinations of every sort,

kind, and description, and probably all corporations. What he says is

henceforth of little consequence. The important thing is what he

does, and how the results of what he does square with the promises and

prophecies he made when all he had to do was to speak, not to act.

APPENDIX C

THE BLAINE CAMPAIGN

In "The House of Harper," written by J. Henry Harper, the following

passage occurs: "Curtis returned from the convention in company with

young Theodore Roosevelt and they discussed the situation thoroughly on

their trip to New York and came to the conclusion that it would be very

difficult to consistently support Blaine. Roosevelt, however, had a

conference afterward with Senator Lodge and eventually fell in line

behind Blaine. Curtis came to our office and found that we were

unanimously opposed to the support of Blaine, and with a hearty

good-will he trained his editorial guns on the 'Plumed Knight' of

Mulligan letter fame. His work was as effective and deadly as any fight

he ever conducted in the _Weekly_." This statement has no foundation

whatever in fact. I did not return from the convention in company with

Mr. Curtis. He went back to New York from the convention, whereas I

went to my ranch in North Dakota. No such conversation as that ever took

place between me and Mr. Curtis. In my presence, in speaking to a number

of men at the time in Chicago, Mr. Curtis said: "You younger men can,

if you think right, refuse to support Mr. Blaine, but I am too old a

Republican, and have too long been associated with the party, to break

with it now." Not only did I never entertain after the convention, but

I never during the convention or at any other time, entertained the

intention alleged in the quotation in question. I discussed the whole

situation with Mr. Lodge before going to the convention, and we had made

up our minds that if the nomination of Mr. Blaine was fairly made we

would with equal good faith support him.

End of Project Gutenberg's Theodore Roosevelt, by Theodore Roosevelt