From the moment when human flight was lifted from the rut of experiment
to the field of practical application, many theories, interesting and
illuminating, concerning the utility of the Fourth Arm as a military
unit were advanced. The general consensus of expert opinion was that
the flying machine would be useful to glean information concerning the
movements of an enemy, rather than as a weapon of offence.
The war is substantiating this argument very completely. Although
bomb-dropping is practised somewhat extensively, the results achieved
are rather moral than material in their effects. Here and there
startling successes have been recorded especially upon the British side,
but these triumphs are outnumbered by the failures in this direction,
and merely serve to emphasise the views of the theorists.
The argument was also advanced that, in this particular work, the
aeroplane would prove more valuable than the dirigible, but actual
campaigning has proved conclusively that the dirigible and the
heavier-than-air machines have their respective fields of utility in the
capacity of scouts. In fact in the very earliest days of the war,
the British airships, though small and slow in movement, proved more
serviceable for this duty than their dynamic consorts. This result
was probably due to the fact that military strategy and tactics were
somewhat nonplussed by the appearance of this new factor. At the time
it was an entirely unknown quantity. It is true that aircraft had been
employed in the Balkan and the Italo-Ottoman campaigns, but upon such a
limited scale as to afford no comprehensive idea of their military value
and possibilities.
The belligerents, therefore, were caught somewhat at a disadvantage,
and an appreciable period of time elapsed before the significance of
the aerial force could be appreciated, while means of counter acting
or nullifying its influences had to be evolved simultaneously,
and according to the exigencies of the moment. At all events, the
protagonists were somewhat loth to utilise the dirigible upon an
elaborate scale or in an aggressive manner. It was employed more after
the fashion of a captive balloon, being sent aloft from a point well
behind the front lines of the force to which it was attached, and
well out of the range of hostile guns. Its manoeuvres were somewhat
circumscribed, and were carried out at a safe distance from the enemy,
dependence being placed upon the advantages of an elevated position for
the gathering of information.
But as the campaign progressed, the airships became more daring. Their
ability to soar to a great height offered them complete protection
against gun-fire, and accordingly sallies over the hostile lines were
carried out. But even here a certain hesitancy became manifest. This
was perfectly excusable, for the simple reason that the dirigible, above
all, is a fair-weather craft, and disasters, which had overtaken these
vessels time after time, rendered prudence imperative. Moreover, but
little was known of the range and destructiveness of anti-aircraft guns.
In the duty of reconnoitring the dirigible possesses one great advantage
over its heavier-than-air rival. It can remain virtually stationary in
the air, the propellers revolving at just sufficient speed to off-set
the wind and tendencies to drift. In other words, it has the power of
hovering over a position, thereby enabling the observers to complete
their task carefully and with deliberation.
On the other hand, the means of enabling an aeroplane to hover still
remain to be discovered. It must travel at a certain speed through the
air to maintain its dynamic equilibrium, and this speed is often too
high to enable the airman to complete his reconnaissance with sufficient
accuracy to be of value to the forces below. All that the aeroplane can
do is to circle above a certain position until the observer is satisfied
with the data he has collected.
But hovering on the part of the dirigible is not without conspicuous
drawbacks. The work of observation cannot be conducted with any degree
of accuracy at an excessive altitude. Experience has proved that the
range of the latest types of anti-aircraft weapons is in excess of
anticipations. The result is that the airship is useless when hovering
beyond the zone of fire. The atmospheric haze, even in the clearest
weather, obstructs the observer's vision. The caprices of this obstacle
are extraordinary, as anyone who has indulged in ballooning knows fully
well. On a clear summer's day I have been able to see the ground beneath
with perfect distinctness from a height of 4,500 feet, yet when the
craft had ascended a further two or three hundred feet, the panorama was
blurred. A film of haze lies between the balloon and the ground beneath.
And the character of this haze is continually changing, so that the
aerial observer's task is rendered additionally difficult. Its effects
are particularly notice able when one attempts to photograph the view
unfolded below. Plate after plate may be exposed and nothing will be
revealed. Yet at a slightly lower altitude the plates may be exposed and
perfectly sharp and well-defined images will be obtained.
Seeing that the photographic eye is keener and more searching than the
human organ of sight, it is obvious that this haze constitutes a very
formidable obstacle. German military observers, who have accompanied
the Zeppelins and Parsevals on numerous aerial journeys under varying
conditions of weather, have repeatedly drawn attention to this factor
and its caprices, and have not hesitated to venture the opinion that it
would interfere seriously with military aerial reconnaissances, and also
that it would tend to render such work extremely hazardous at times.
When these conditions prevail the dirigible must carry out its work upon
the broad lines of the aeroplane. It must descend to the level where a
clear view of the ground may be obtained, and in the interests of safety
it has to keep on the move. To attempt to hover within 4,000 feet of
the ground is to court certain disaster, inasmuch as the vessel offers
a magnificent and steady target which the average gunner, equipped with
the latest sighting devices and the most recent types of guns, scarcely
could fail to hit.
But the airman in the aeroplane is able to descend to a comparatively
low level in safety. The speed and mobility of his machine constitute
his protection. He can vary his altitude, perhaps only thirty or forty
feet, with ease and rapidity, and this erratic movement is more than
sufficient to perplex the marksmen below, although the airman is
endangered if a rafale is fired in such a manner as to cover a wide
zone.
Although the aeroplane may travel rapidly it is not too fleet for a keen
observer who is skilled in his peculiar task. He may only gather a
rough idea of the disposition of troops, their movements, the lines
of communication, and other details which are indispensable to his
commander, but in the main the intelligence will be fairly accurate.
Undulating flight enables him to determine speedily the altitude at
which he is able to obtain the clearest views of the country beneath.
Moreover, owing to his speed he is able to complete his task in far less
time than his colleague operating in the dirigible, the result being
that the information placed at the disposal of his superior officers is
more to the moment, and accordingly of greater value.
Reconnoitring by aeroplane may be divided into two broad categories,
which, though correlated to a certain degree, are distinctive, because
each constitutes a specific phase in military operations. They are known
respectively as "tactical" and "strategical" movements. The first is
somewhat limited in its scope as compared with the latter, and
has invariably to be carried out rapidly, whereas the strategical
reconnaissance may occupy several hours.
The tactical reconnaissance concerns the corps or divisional commander
to which the warplane is attached, and consequently its task is confined
to the observation of the line immediately facing the particular corps
or division. The aviator does not necessarily penetrate beyond the lines
of the enemy, but, as a rule limits his flight to some distance from
his outermost defences. The airman must possess a quick eye, because
his especial duty is to note the disposition of the troops immediately
facing him, the placing of the artillery, and any local movements of the
forces that may be in progress. Consequently the aviator engaged on
this service may be absent from his lines for only a few minutes,
comparatively speaking; the intelligence he acquires must be speedily
communicated to the force to which he is attached, because it may
influence a local movement.
The strategical reconnaissance, on the other hand, affects the whole
plan of campaign. The aviators told off for this duty are attached to
the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, and the work has to be carried out
upon a far more comprehensive and elaborate scale, while the airmen
are called upon to penetrate well into the hostile territory to a point
thirty, forty, or more miles beyond the outposts.
The procedure is to instruct the flier either to carry out his
observations of the territory generally, or to report at length upon a
specified stretch of country. In the latter event he may fly to and
fro over the area in question until he has acquired all the data it is
possible to collect. His work not only comprises the general disposition
of troops, defences, placing of artillery, points where reserves are
being held, high-roads, railways, base camps, and so forth, but he is
also instructed to bring back as correct an idea as possible of what
the enemy proposes to do, so that his Commander-in-Chief may adjust
his moves accordingly. In order to perform this task with the requisite
degree of thoroughness it is often necessary for the airman to remain in
the air for several hours continuously, not returning, in fact, until he
has completed the allotted duty.
The airman engaged in strategical aerial reconnaissance must possess,
above all things, what is known as a "military" eye concerning the
country he traverses. He must form tolerably correct estimates of the
forces beneath and their character. He must possess the ability to
read a map rapidly as he moves through the air and to note upon it all
information which is likely to be of service to the General Staff.
The ability to prepare military sketches rapidly and intelligibly is
a valuable attribute, and skill in aerial photography is a decidedly
useful acquisition.
Such men must be of considerable stamina, inasmuch as great demands
are made upon their powers of endurance. Being aloft for several hours
imposes a severe tax upon the nervous system, while it must also be
borne in mind that all sorts and conditions of weather are likely to
be encountered, more particularly during the winter. Hail, rain, and
blizzards may be experienced in turn, while the extreme cold which often
prevails in the higher altitudes during the winter season is a
fearful enemy to combat. Often an airman upon his return from such a
reconnaissance has been discovered to be so numbed and dazed as a result
of the prolonged exposure, that considerable time has elapsed before
he has been sufficiently restored to set forth the results of his
observations in a coherent, intelligible manner for the benefit of the
General Staff. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the
most skilful and experienced aviators are generally reserved for this
particular work. In addition to the natural accidents to which the
strategical aerial observer is exposed, the dangers arising from hostile
gun-fire must not be overlooked. He is manoeuvring the whole time
over the enemy's firing zone, where anti-aircraft weapons are disposed
strategically, and where every effort is made by artillery to bring him
down, or compel him to repair to such a height as to render observation
with any degree of accuracy well-nigh impossible.
The methods practised by the German aerial scout vary widely, and are
governed in no small measure by the intrepidity and skill of the airman
himself. One practice is to proceed alone upon long flights over the
enemy's lines, penetrating just as far into hostile territory as the
pilot considers advisable, and keeping, of course, within the limits of
the radius of action of the machine, as represented by the fuel supply,
the while carefully taking mental stock of all that he observes below.
It is a kind of roving commission without any definite aim in view
beyond the collection of general intelligence.
This work, while productive and valuable to a certain degree, is
attended with grave danger, as the German airmen have repeatedly found
to their cost. Success is influenced very materially by the accuracy
of the airman's judgment. A slight miscalculation of the velocity
and direction of the wind, or failure to detect any variations in the
climatic conditions, is sufficient to prove his undoing. German airmen
who essayed journeys of discovery in this manner, often failed to regain
their lines because they ventured too far, misjudged the speed of the
wind which was following them on the outward run, and ultimately were
forced to earth owing to the exhaustion of the fuel supply during the
homeward trip; the increased task imposed upon the motor, which had to
battle hard to make headway, caused the fuel consumption per mile to
exceed calculations.
Then the venturesome airman cannot neglect another factor which is
adverse to his success. Hostile airmen lie in wait, and a fleet of
aeroplanes is kept ready for instant service. They permit the invader
to penetrate well into their territory and then ascend behind him to
cut off his retreat. True, the invader has the advantage of being on the
wing, while the ether is wide and deep, without any defined channels
of communication. But nine times out of ten the adventurous scout is
trapped. His chances of escape are slender, because his antagonists
dispose themselves strategically in the air. The invader outpaces one,
but in so doing comes within range of another. He is so harassed that he
either has to give fight, or, finding his retreat hopelessly cut off,
he makes a determined dash, trusting to his high speed to carry him
to safety. In these driving tactics the French and British airmen have
proved themselves adepts, more particularly the latter, as the chase
appeals to their sporting instincts. There is nothing so exhilarating as
a quarry who displays a determination to run the gauntlet.
The roving Teuton scout was considerably in evidence in the early days
of the war, but two or three weeks' experience emphasised the sad fact
that, in aerial strategy, he was hopelessly outmatched by his opponents.
His advantage of speed was nullified by the superior tactical and
strategical acumen of his antagonists, the result being that the German
airman, who has merely been trained along certain lines, who is in
many cases nothing more than a cog-wheel in a machine, and who is
proverbially slow-witted, has concluded that he is no match for the
airmen of the Allies. He found from bitter experience that nothing
afforded the Anglo-French military aviators such keen delight as to lie
in wait for a "rover," and then to swoop into the air to round him up.
The proportion of these individual scouts who were either brought down,
or only just succeeded in reaching safety within their own lines, and
who were able to exhibit serious wounds as evidence of the severity of
the aerial tussle, or the narrowness of the escape, has unnerved the
Teuton airmen as a body to a very considerable extent. Often, even when
an aeroplane descended within the German lines, it was found that the
roving airman had paid the penalty for his rashness with his life, so
that his journey had proved in vain, because all the intelligence he
had gained had died with him, or, if committed to paper, was so
unintelligible as to prove useless.
It was the success of the British airmen in this particular field
of duty which was responsible for the momentous declaration in
Field-Marshal Sir John French's famous despatch:--"The British Flying
Corps has succeeded in establishing an individual ascendancy, which is
as serviceable to us as it is damaging to the enemy.... The enemy have
been less enterprising in their flights. Something in the direction of
the mastery of the air has already been gained."
The methods of the British airmen are in vivid contrast to the
practice of the venturesome Teuton aerial rovers described above. While
individual flights are undertaken they are not of unknown duration or
mileage. The man is given a definite duty to perform and he ascends
merely to fulfil it, returning with the information at the earliest
possible moment. It is aerial scouting with a method. The intelligence
is required and obtained for a specific purpose, to govern a
contemplated move in the grim game of war.
Even then the flight is often undertaken by two or more airmen for the
purpose of checking and counterchecking information gained, or to ensure
such data being brought back to headquarters, since it is quite possible
that one of the party may fall a victim to hostile fire. By operating
upon these lines there is very little likelihood of the mission
proving a complete failure. Even when raids upon certain places such as
Dusseldorf, Friedrichshafen or Cuxhaven are planned, complete dependence
is not placed on one individual. The machine is accompanied, so that
the possibility of the appointed task being consummated is transformed
almost into a certainty.
The French flying men work upon broadly similar lines. Their fleet is
divided into small squadrons each numbering four, six, or more machines,
according to the nature of the contemplated task. Each airman is given
an area of territory which is to be reconnoitred thoroughly. In this way
perhaps one hundred or more miles of the enemy's front are searched for
information at one and the same time. The units of the squadron start
out, each taking the appointed direction according to the preconceived
plan, and each steering by the aid of compass and map. They are urged to
complete the work with all speed and to return to a secret rendezvous.
Later the air is alive with the whirring of motors. The machines are
coming back and all converging to one point. They vol-plane to the earth
and gracefully settle down within a short distance of each other at the
rendezvous. The pilots collect and each relates the intelligence he has
gained. The data are collated and in this manner the General Staff is
able to learn exactly what is transpiring over a long stretch of the
hostile lines, and a considerable distance to the rear of his advance
works. Possibly five hundred square miles have been reconnoitred in
this manner. Troops have been massed here, lines of communication extend
somewhere else, while convoys are moving at a third place. But all has
been observed, and the commanding officer is in a position to re-arrange
his forces accordingly. It is a remarkable example of method in military
tactics and strategy, and conveys a striking idea of the degree to which
aerial operations have been organised.
After due deliberation it is decided that the convoys shall be raided,
or that massed troops shall be thrown into confusion, if not dispersed.
The squadron is ordered to prepare for another aerial journey. The roads
along which the convoys are moving are indicated upon the map, or the
position of the massed troops in bivouac is similarly shown. The airmen
load their machines with a full charge of bombs. When all is ready the
leader ascends, followed in rapid succession by the other units, and
they whirr through the air in single file. It now becomes a grim game of
follow-my-leader.
The leader detects the convoy, swoops down, suddenly launches his
missiles, and re-ascends. He does not deviate a foot from his path to
observe the effects of his discharge, as the succeeding aeroplane is
close behind him. If the leader has missed then the next airman may
correct his error. One after another the machines repeat the manoeuvre,
in precisely the same manner as the units of a battleship squadron
emulate the leading vessel when attacking the foe. The tactical
evolutions have been laid down, and there is rigid adherence thereto,
because only thereby may success be achieved. When the last war-plane
has completed its work, the leader swings round and repeats the dash
upon the foe. A hail of bullets may scream around the men in the air,
but one and all follow faithfully in the leader's trail. One or more
machines may fail in the attack, and may even meet with disaster, but
nothing interferes with the movements of the squadron as a whole. It is
the homogeneity of the attacking fleet which tells, and which undermines
the moral of the enemy, even if it does not wreak decisive material
devastation. The work accomplished to the best of their ability, the
airmen speed back to their lines in the same formation.
At first sight reconnoitring from aloft may appear a simple operation,
but a little reflection will reveal the difficulties and arduousness of
the work. The observer, whether he be specially deputed, or whether
the work be placed in the hand of the pilot himself--in this event the
operation is rendered additionally trying, as he also has to attend to
his machine must keep his eyes glued to the ground beneath and at the
same time be able to read the configuration of the panorama revealed to
him. He must also keep in touch with his map and compass, so as to be
positive of his position and direction. He must be a first-class judge
of distances and heights.
When flying rapidly at a height of 4,000 feet or more, the country below
appears as a perfect plane, or flat stretch, although as a matter of
fact it may be extremely undulating. Consequently, it is by no means a
simple matter to distinguish eminences and depressions, or to determine
the respective and relative heights of hills.
If a rough sketch is required, the observer must be rapid in thought,
quick in determination, and facile with his pencil, as the machine, no
matter how it may be slowed down, is moving at a relatively high speed.
He must consult his map and compass frequently, since an airman who
loses his bearings is useless to his commander-in-chief. He must have
an eagle eye, so as to be able to search the country unfolded below, in
order to gather all the information which is likely to be of value to
his superior officers. He must be able to judge accurately the numbers
of troops arrayed beneath him, the lines of the defensive works, to
distinguish the defended from the dummy lines which are thrown up to
baffle him, and to detect instantly the movement of the troops and
the direction, as well as the roads, along which they are proceeding.
Reserves and their complement, artillery, railway-lines, roads, and
bridges, if any, over streams and railways must be noted--in short
he must obtain an eye photograph of the country he observes and grasp
exactly what is happening there. In winter, with the thermometer well
down, a blood-freezing wind blowing, wreaths of clouds drifting below
and obscuring vision for minutes at a time, the rain possibly pelting
down as if presaging a second deluge, the plight of the vigilant human
eye aloft is far from enviable.
Upon the return of the machine to its base, the report must be prepared
without delay. The picture recorded by the eye has to be set down
clearly and intelligibly with the utmost speed. The requisite
indications must be made accurately upon the map. Nothing of importance
must be omitted: the most trivial detail is often of vital importance.
A facile pencil is of inestimable value in such operations. While
aloft the observer does not trust to his memory or his eye picture, but
commits the essential factors to paper in the form of a code, or what
may perhaps be described more accurately as a shorthand pictorial
interpretation of the things he has witnessed. To the man in the street
such a record would be unintelligible, but it is pregnant with meaning,
and when worked out for the guidance of the superior officers is a mass
of invaluable detail.
At times it so happens that the airman has not been able to complete
his duty within the time anticipated by those below. But he has gathered
certain information which he wishes to communicate without coming to
earth. Such data may be dropped from the clouds in the form of maps or
messages. Although wireless telegraphy is available for this purpose,
it suffers from certain drawbacks. If the enemy possesses an equipment
which is within range of that of the air-craft and the force to which
it belongs, communications may be nullified by the enemy throwing out
a continuous stream of useless signals which "jamb" the intelligence of
their opponents.
If a message--written in code--or a map is to be dropped from aloft it
is enclosed within a special metallic cylinder, fitted with a vane tail
to ensure direction of flight when launched, and with a detonating head.
This is dropped overboard. When it strikes the ground the detonator
fires a charge which emits a report without damaging the message
container, and at the same time fires a combustible charge emitting
considerable smoke. The noise attracts anyone in the vicinity of the
spot where the message has fallen, while at the same time the clouds of
smoke guide one to the point and enable the cylinder to be recovered.
This device is extensively used by the German aviators, and has proved
highly serviceable; a similar contrivance is adopted by French airmen.
There is one phase of aerial activity which remains to be demonstrated.
This is the utilisation of aerial craft by the defenders of a besieged
position such as a ring of fortifications or fortified city. The utility
of the Fourth Arm in this province has been the subject of considerable
speculation. Expert opinion maintains that the advantage in this
particular connection would rest with the besiegers. The latter would
be able to ascertain the character of the defences and the defending
gun-force, by means of the aerial scout, who would prove of inestimable
value in directing the fire of the besieging forces.
On the other hand it is maintained that an aerial fleet would be useless
to the beleaguered. In the first place the latter would experience
grave difficulties in ascertaining the positions of the attacking
and fortress-reducing artillery, inasmuch as this could be masked
effectively, and it is thought that the aerial force of the besieged
would be speedily reduced to impotence, since it would be subjected to
an effective concentrated fire from the ring of besieging anti-aircraft
guns and other weapons. In other words, the theory prevails that an
aerial fleet, no matter how efficient, would be rendered ineffective for
the simple reason that it would be the initial object of the besieger's
attack. Possibly the stem test of experience will reveal the fallacy of
these contentions as emphatically as it has disproved others. But there
is one point upon which authorities are unanimous. If the artillery of
the investing forces is exposed and readily distinguishable, the aerial
forces of the beleaguered will bring about its speedy annihilation, as
the defensive artillery will be concentrated upon that of the besiegers.