General Taylor nominated for the presidency--Thanks of Congress to
Scott, and a gold medal voted--Movement to revive and confer upon
Scott the brevet rank of lieutenant general--Scott's views as to the
annexation of Canada--Candidate for President in 1852 and
defeated--Scott's diplomatic mission to Canada in 1859--Mutterings of
civil war--Letters and notes to President Buchanan--Arrives
in Washington, December 12, 1861--Note to the Secretary of
War--"Wayward sisters" letter--Events preceding inauguration of Mr.
Lincoln--Preparation for the defense of Washington--Scott's
loyalty--Battle of Bull Run--Scott and McClellan--Free navigation of
the Mississippi River--Retirement of General Scott and affecting
incidents connected therewith--Message of President Lincoln--McClellan
on Scott--Mount Vernon--Scott sails for Europe--Anecdote of the day
preceding the battle of Chippewa--The Confederate cruiser
Nashville--Incident between Scott and Grant--Soldiers' Home--Last days
of Scott--His opinion of noncombatants.
General Taylor had been nominated by the Whigs as their candidate for
President, and at the instance of General Scott he [Scott] was put in
command of the Eastern Department and the former the Western
Department. This was considered a compliment to General Taylor. March
9, 1848, the following joint resolution, unanimously passed by
Congress, was approved by the President:
"1. That the thanks of Congress be and they are hereby presented to
Winfield Scott, major general commanding in chief the army in Mexico,
and through him to the officers and men of the regular and volunteer
corps under him, for their uniform gallantry and good conduct,
conspicuously displayed at the siege and capture of the city of Vera
Cruz and castle of San Juan de Ulloa, March 29, 1847; and in the
successive battles of Cerro Gordo, April 18th; Contreras, San Antonio,
and Churubusco, August 19th and 20th; and for the victories achieved
in front of the City of Mexico, September 8th, 11th, 12th, and 13th,
and the capture of the metropolis, September 14, 1847, in which the
Mexican troops, greatly superior in numbers and with every advantage
of position, were in every conflict signally defeated by the American
arms.
"2. That the President of the United States be and he is hereby
requested to cause to be struck a gold medal with devices emblematical
of the series of brilliant victories achieved by the army, and
presented to Major-General Winfield Scott, as a testimony of the high
sense entertained by Congress of his valor, skill, and judicious
conduct in the memorable campaign of 1847.
"3. That the President of the United States be requested to cause the
foregoing resolutions to be communicated to Major-General Scott in
such terms as he may deem best calculated to give effect to the
objects thereof."
On February 24, 1849, a joint resolution was offered in the United
States Senate to confer upon General Scott the brevet rank of
lieutenant general, which went only to its second reading, an
objection being interposed to a third reading and passage of the
resolution. On July 29, 1850, Mr. Jere Clemens, of Alabama, submitted
a resolution instructing the Committee on Military Affairs to inquire
into the expediency of conferring by law the brevet rank of lieutenant
general on Major-General Scott, "with such additional pay and
allowances as might be deemed proper, in consideration of the
distinguished services rendered to the republic by that officer during
the late war with Mexico." The resolution was eight days after
referred to the Committee on Military Affairs.
On September 30, 1850, Senator Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi,
Chairman of the Military Committee, reported a resolution requesting
the President to refer to a board of officers, to be designated by
him, the following questions:
"Is it expedient or necessary to provide for additional grades of
commissioned officers in the army of the United States; and, if so,
what grades, in addition to the present organization, should be
created?"
Mr. Davis's opposition to conferring the brevet rank of lieutenant
general upon General Scott was well known at the time. In pursuance of
this request by the Senate, the following officers were appointed on
the board: Generals Jesup, president, Wool, Gibson, Totten, Talcott,
Hitchcock, and Colonel Crane. The unanimous report was:
"Under the first inquiry referred to it, the board is of opinion that
it is expedient to create by law for the army the additional grade of
lieutenant general, and that when, in the opinion of the President and
Senate, it shall be deemed proper to acknowledge eminent services of
officers of the army, and in the mode already provided for in
subordinate grades, it is expedient and proper that the grade of
lieutenant general may be conferred by brevet."
Several efforts were subsequently made to pass joint resolutions
similar in purport to those quoted and referred to, but it was not
until 1852 that the joint resolution was passed creating the brevet
rank of lieutenant general, and General Scott succeeded to that
dignity in the army. The law did not in terms carry with it the pay
and emoluments of the brevet rank, and Mr. Davis, who had become
Secretary of War under President Pierce, referred the question to the
Attorney-General, Mr. Caleb Cushing; but before that officer rendered
an opinion Congress inserted a declaratory provision in the military
appropriation bill, which, becoming a law, gave the pay proper and all
that went with it to a veteran who had by his services well earned it.
General Scott was thenceforward until he died the second officer of
the American army (General Washington being the first) who held the
office of lieutenant general.
After the inauguration of General Taylor as President, General Scott,
between whom and the President there was no very good feeling,
continued his headquarters in New York; but when President Fillmore
succeeded, in 1850, he removed to Washington, and continued to reside
in the latter city until the accession of President Pierce, when, by
General Scott's request, there was another change back to New York,
where until 1861--with the exception of ten months of hard duty--he
remained and maintained headquarters of the army.
In 1849 there were evidences of discontent which almost assumed the
attitude of threats in the Canadas growing out of political agitation,
and General Scott was interrogated on the question of the advisability
of annexation by John C. Hamilton, Esq., of New York. General Scott
replied from West Point, June 29, 1849, in which he expressed the
opinion that the news from the British Parliament would increase the
discontent of the Canadas, and that those discontents might in a few
years lead to a separation of the Canadas, New Brunswick, etc., from
England. He thought that, instead of those provinces forming
themselves into an independent nation, they would seek a connection
with our Union, and that thereby the interests of both sides would be
promoted, the provinces coming into the Union on equal terms with the
States. This would secure the free navigation of the St. Lawrence
River, which would be of immense importance to at least one third of
our population, and of great value to the remainder. Although opposed
to incorporating with us any district densely populated with the
_Mexican_ race, he would be most happy to fraternize with our Northern
and Northeastern neighbors.
In 1852 General Scott became a candidate a second time for the
presidency, having been nominated by the Whig Convention that met at
Baltimore in June of that year, his competitors being Mr. Webster, and
Mr. Fillmore, who succeeded President Taylor. William A. Graham, Mr.
Fillmore's Secretary of the Navy, was put on the ticket for
Vice-President. General Franklin Pierce and William R. King, a Senator
from Alabama, were respectively put forward for President and
Vice-President by the Democrats. The campaign was a heated one. The
Democratic orators, however, on all occasions accorded to the Whig
candidate that meed of praise for his gallantry as an army officer and
commander to which his services to the country had entitled him, and
accorded with the universal sentiment that his services to the
country had been of inestimable benefit and shed ineffaceable luster
on the American arms in the wars since 1800; but still, being in all
essentials but a military man, it was contended he was not fit to be
intrusted with the exalted office of President. These speakers had
doubtless never read, or had forgotten, the orders published by
General Scott upon his capturing the City of Mexico, which show a
wonderful insight into civil as well as military command. It was left
to the lower portion of the opposition to indulge in caricature, and
garbled and distorted paragraphs in reports and published letters,
such as a "hasty plate of soup" already mentioned, and his reference
to "a fire in the rear," which had reference to the weak sympathy and
support he had experienced from the Administration during the war with
Mexico. The Democratic candidate was overwhelmingly elected, only four
States--Massachusetts, Vermont, Kentucky, and Tennessee--casting their
votes for Scott. In his autobiography General Scott thanks God for his
political defeats. It detracted none from his reputation that the
people chose some one else for the chief Executive.
The expedition set on foot in 1857 to bring the hostile Mormons to
terms met with General Scott's censure, and he made no concealment of
his belief that it was a scheme got up for the benefit of army
contractors, whose peculations would involve the country in great
expense. It is true the cost in hardship and privation to the army, as
well as the money involved, was very great, but the results were very
beneficial. During the late civil war the inhabitants of Utah had it
in their power to greatly embarrass the Federal Government, but they
did not, as a people, commit one disloyal act. At the time of the
expedition they had put themselves in such defiance of the Federal
Government that it was necessary that strong measures should be
resorted to, and the result was as has been stated.
In 1859 General Scott was again called upon to exercise his powers as
a diplomat. Commissioners were at that time engaged in running the
boundary line between the British possessions and the United States.
Differences sprang up as to which of the two countries the San Juan
Island in Puget Sound belonged to. This question should have been
referred to the two Governments for amicable settlement. General
Harvey, an impetuous officer then in command of the United States
forces in that country, took forcible possession of the island,
endangering the friendly relations between the two countries. The
situation was critical, but President Buchanan requested General Scott
to go to the scene of operations and settle the matter without
conflict, if possible. The general had recently been crippled from a
fall, but, suffering as he was, he sailed September 20, 1859, from New
York in the Star of the West for Panama, and thence to his
destination. The British governor was at Victoria. The few friendly
notes that passed between General Scott and the governor restored the
island to its former condition, the joint possession of both parties,
and thus averting what might have led to great and serious
complications.
Nothing of particular public importance attracted the attention of the
general until the mutterings of civil war gave utterance to sound.
That he knew the feeling and determination of the Southern people
better than those in high authority is shown by his suggestions to
prevent, if possible, the secession of the Southern States. He was a
native of Virginia, and every effort was made by persuasion to induce
him to link his fortunes with his State, but without avail. Even his
old friends--the friends of his early youth and manhood, to say
nothing of those of maturer years--brought to bear upon him every
argument to swerve him, but to no purpose. He remained true to the
Government he had served and that had honored him, and if his
suggestion had been carried out, the war would not perhaps have
attained the proportions it did.
On October 29, 1860, General Scott addressed the following note to the
President [Buchanan]: "The excitement that threatens secession is
caused by the near approach of a Republican's election to the
presidency. From a sense of propriety as a soldier, I have taken no
part in the pending canvass, and, as always heretofore, mean to stay
away from the polls. My sympathies, however, are with the Bell and
Everett ticket. With Mr. Lincoln I have no communication whatever,
direct or indirect, and have no recollection of ever having seen his
person; but can not believe any unconstitutional violence or breach of
law is to be apprehended from his administration of the Federal
Government.
"From a knowledge of our Southern population, it is my solemn
conviction that there is some danger of an early act of secession,
viz.: The seizure of some or all of the following posts: Forts Jackson
and St. Philip, on the Mississippi below New Orleans, both without
garrisons; Fort Morgan, below Mobile, without garrison; Forts Pickens
and McKee, Pensacola Harbor, with an insufficient garrison for one;
Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, without a garrison; Forts Moultrie and
Sumter, Charleston Harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison
and the latter without any; and Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, without a
sufficient garrison. In my opinion, all these works should be
immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any one of
them by surprise or _coup de main_ ridiculous.
"With the army faithful to its allegiance and the navy probably
equally so, and a Federal Executive for the next twelve months of
firmness and moderation, which the whole country has a right to
expect--_moderation_ being an element of power not less than
_firmness_--there is good reason to hope that the danger of secession
may be made to pass away without one conflict of arms, one execution,
or one arrest for treason. In the meantime it is suggested that
exports might be left perfectly free, and, to avoid conflicts, all
duties on imports be collected outside of the cities in forts or ships
of war."
Again, October 31st, the general suggested to the Secretary of War
that a circular should be sent at once to such of those forts as had
garrisons to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults;
but no notice seems to have been taken of the judicious and wise
suggestion.
On December 12th General Scott arrived in Washington. He had been
confined to his bed for a long time and was physically very much
depleted. He again personally urged upon the Secretary of War the
views expressed in his note from West Point of October 29th as to
strengthening the forts in Charleston Harbor, Pensacola, Mobile, and
the Mississippi River below New Orleans. The Secretary did not concur
in these views. Finally General Scott called on the President, on
December 15th, in company with the Secretary, and urged upon the chief
Executive the importance of re-enforcing the forts mentioned; but no
action was taken. After the Secretary of War [Floyd] had resigned his
position in the Cabinet he was given a reception in Richmond, which
called out the remark from the Examiner, of that city, that if the
plan invented by General Scott to stop secession had been carried out,
and the arsenals and forts put in the condition he wanted them to be,
"the Southern Confederacy would not now exist."
On December 28th he wrote a note to the Secretary expressing the hope:
1. That orders may not be given for the evacuation of Fort Sumter
[this was after Major Anderson had withdrawn his forces from Fort
Moultrie and concentrated at Sumter]. 2. That one hundred and fifty
recruits may be instantly sent from Governor's Island to re-enforce
that garrison, with ample supplies of ammunition and subsistence,
including fresh vegetables, as potatoes, onions, turnips, etc. 3. That
one or two armed vessels be sent to support the said fort. In the same
communication he calls the Secretary's attention to Forts Jefferson
(Tortugas) and Taylor (Key West). On December 30th he addressed the
President and asked permission, "without reference to the War
Department, and otherwise as secretly as possible, to send two hundred
and fifty recruits from New York Harbor to re-enforce Fort Sumter,
together with some extra muskets or rifles, ammunition, and
subsistence," and asked that a sloop of war and cutter might be
ordered for the same purpose as early as the next day. The documents
show that from General Scott's first note, referred to and quoted
herein, down to the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, he was persistent in
his efforts to have the Southern forts, or as many of them as the
means at hand would permit, re-enforced and garrisoned against
surprise and capture; but little heed was paid to his importunities.
On the day before the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln General Scott
addressed William H. Seward, who, it was known, would become Secretary
of State in Lincoln's Cabinet, what is called the "Wayward sisters"
letter, and which is quoted in full:
"WASHINGTON, _March 3, 1861_.
"DEAR SIR: Hoping that in a day or two the new President
will have happily passed through all personal dangers and find
himself installed an honored successor of the great Washington, with
you as the chief of his Cabinet, I beg leave to repeat in writing
what I have before said to you orally, this supplement to my printed
'Views' (dated in October last) on the highly disordered condition
of our (so late) happy and glorious Union.
"To meet the extraordinary exigencies of the times, it seems to me
that I am guilty of no arrogance in limiting the President's field
of selection to one of the four plans of procedure subjoined:
"I. Throw off the old and assume the new designation, the Union
party; adopt the conciliatory measures proposed by Mr. Crittenden or
the Peace Convention, and my life upon it, we shall have no new case
of secession; but, on the contrary, an early return of many, if not
of all, the States which have already broken off from the Union.
Without some equally benign measure the remaining slaveholding
States will probably join the Montgomery Confederacy in less than
sixty days, when this city, being included in a foreign country,
would require a permanent garrison of at least thirty-five thousand
troops to protect the Government within it.
"II. Collect the duties on foreign goods outside the ports of which
the Government has lost the command, or close such ports by act of
Congress and blockade them.
"III. Conquer the seceded States by invading armies. No doubt this
might be done in two or three years by a young and able general--a
Wolfe, a Desaix, a Hoche--with three hundred thousand disciplined
men, estimating a third for garrisons and the loss of a yet greater
number by skirmishes, sieges, battles, and Southern fevers. The
destruction of life and property on the other side would be
frightful, however perfect the moral discipline of the invaders.
"The conquest completed at the enormous waste of human life to the
North and Northwest, with at least $250,000,000 added thereto, and
_cui bono_? Fifteen devastated provinces! not to be brought into
harmony with their conquerors, but to be held for generations by
heavy garrisons at an expense quadruple the net duties or taxes,
which it would be possible to extort from them, followed by a
protector or emperor.
"IV. Say to the seceded States: 'Wayward sisters, depart in peace.'
"In haste, I remain very truly yours,
"WINFIELD SCOTT."
The two months preceding the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln were fraught
with great responsibility to General Scott. He had moved his
headquarters to Washington, as he thought, temporarily; but from the
threatening aspect of the political troubles it soon became apparent
that his stay there would be, if not permanent, prolonged a greater
length of time than was at first expected. As March 4th approached,
rumors thick and fast filled the atmosphere of attempts to resist Mr.
Lincoln's taking the oath. It was said that bodies of men were
drilling in Maryland, Virginia, and even in the District of Columbia,
for that purpose. There is no doubt men were being put through
military exercise within a few miles of the capital, which was known
at the War Department; but if the object was violence of any kind it
never developed. Great apprehension was felt, and not without reason,
for the general's daily mail contained letters--mostly anonymous, a
few signed doubtless with fictitious names--threatening him and Mr.
Lincoln with assassination if the latter should attempt to be
inaugurated. Some idea of the difficulty may be gathered when it is
known that the militia of the District was but poorly equipped either
in officers or otherwise to cope successfully with the situation
should an outbreak or invasion of armed men from Maryland or Virginia
be attempted. The military force of the District showed large _on
paper_, but the actual force consisted of two or three companies
tolerably well drilled. In this emergency Captain (afterward
Brigadier-General) Charles P. Stone, a graduate from West Point,
offered his services, which were accepted, and about January 1, 1861,
he was mustered into the United States service as colonel and
inspector general of the militia of the District of Columbia, and
assigned to the command of the District, with authority to organize
volunteers. Some members of the companies already in existence left
the ranks, but Colonel Stone soon succeeded in organizing a small
compact force with those that remained loyal, and a number of
recruits, which did good service. In addition to these, a light
battery, under Captain John B. Magruder, First Artillery; Captain
(afterward General) William Farquhar, Barry's Battery of the Second
Artillery; and a battery made up at West Point and commanded by
Captain (afterward General) Charles Griffin, arrived. With these, some
infantry ordered from distant points, and the District militia, which
had been very much increased in numbers, General Scott had about three
thousand men under his command for the defense of Washington, the
preservation of order, and to guard the approaches to the city. It is
but due to the citizens of Washington to state that, when trouble was
apprehended and an intimation went out that there was a possibility of
trouble, they came in great numbers to offer their services in defense
of their city and the Government. Companies were organized, and
persons in all positions and callings, from the highest in social life
to the humblest resident, were not backward in asserting their
allegiance and giving proof of it by entering the ranks. By marching
and maneuvering the men on the streets frequently they made the
impression that a greater force was present than really was.
Many efforts were made to induce General Scott to resign, but he never
once wavered in his devotion to the Union. On one occasion Judge
Robertson, a small, thin, but venerable-looking man, who had filled
the office of chancellor in Virginia and was a man of high character
and standing, came to Washington with two other Virginia gentlemen to
offer Scott the command of the Army of Virginia if he would abandon
the United States service and go with his State. The general listened
in silence as Robertson feelingly recalled the days when they were
schoolboys together, and then spoke of the warm attachment
Virginians always cherished for their State, and of their boasted
allegiance to it above all other political ties. But when he began to
unfold his offer of a commission, General Scott stopped him,
exclaiming: "Friend Robertson, go no further. It is best that we part
here before you compel me to resent a mortal insult!" It is needless
to say that this ended the interview, and Judge Robertson and his
companions departed, looking and doubtless feeling very much
discomfited. No man stood higher in the esteem of the people of
Virginia than Judge Robertson, and it is not probable that he and his
friends would have taken it upon themselves to make the offer they did
upon a contingency. If, however, they had any authority to act on the
part of the Commonwealth of Virginia, no act of the Convention to that
effect can be discovered.
Hon. Stephen A. Douglas, a Senator from Illinois and one of the
unsuccessful candidates for the presidency in 1860, made a speech in
Ohio early in 1861, in which, in alluding to a question that had been
asked, or rather suggested, as to General Scott's loyalty to the
Government, said: "Why, it is almost profanity to ask such a question.
I saw him only last Saturday. He was at his desk, pen in hand,
writing his orders for the defense and safety of the American
capital."
On April 30, 1861, Alexander Henry, Horace Binney, William M.
Meredith, a former Secretary of the Treasury, and others of
Philadelphia, addressed a letter to General Scott, in which they said:
"At a time like this, when Americans distinguished by the favor of
their country, intrenched in power, and otherwise high in influence
and station, civil and military, are renouncing their allegiance to
the flag they have sworn to support, it is an inexpressible source of
consolation and pride to us to know that the general in chief of the
army remains like an impregnable fortress at the post of duty and
glory, and that he will continue to the last to uphold that flag, and
defend it, if necessary, with his sword, even if his native State
should assail it."
The Charleston (South Carolina) Mercury of April 22, 1861, contained
the following statement: "A positive announcement was made at
Montgomery, Ala." (then the capital of the Southern Confederacy),
"that General Scott had resigned his position in the army of the
United States and tendered his sword to his native State--Virginia. At
Mobile one hundred guns were fired in honor of his resignation." This
shows in some measure the high estimation in which General Scott's
influence was held throughout the South.
The ceremonies of the inauguration passed off without incident. There
was no attempt to prevent it, or any show of violence. Apprehension
was shown in every countenance. General Scott rode in front of the
President's carriage with the company of Sappers and Miners from West
Point, commanded by Captain (afterward General) James Chatham Duane,
of the engineers. During the ceremonies the general, in order to be
more free in case of emergency, remained outside the Capitol square
(which was at that time surrounded by a strong iron fence) with the
batteries. The precautions thus taken were, like all of General
Scott's plans, wise, and possibly saved the city from one of those
scenes incident to the French Revolution, and, it may be, saved the
country. At the conclusion of the ceremonies the march back to the
White House was made, and Mr. Lincoln was President of the United
States.
From long association in military and private life a warm personal
friendship had existed between General Scott and General Robert E.
Lee. At the outbreak of the war the latter, then a colonel in the
army, was at his residence, Arlington, near Washington, in Virginia,
on leave of absence. General Scott sent for him, and after an
interview Lee tendered his resignation, which was accepted, and he
entered the service of his own State as major general of State troops,
and subsequently became commanding general of the armies of the
Confederate States.
Soon after this, and when it was apparent that war would come, General
Scott's first care was to provide for the safety of the city, the
Capitol, and public buildings. He caused large quantities of army
supplies, flour, provisions, etc., to be stored in the Capitol
building, and quartered companies in the public buildings with stores
and ammunition. A signal was agreed upon at sound of which the troops
could assemble. These companies were all put under command of regular
officers. There was a company of citizens from different States
organized, and quartered at night at the President's house, under
command of General Cassius M. Clay, of Kentucky. By the action of the
seceded States the war was commenced by firing on the steamer Star of
the West, January 13, 1861, in an effort to re-enforce Fort Sumter,
Charleston Harbor, and subsequently bombarding that fort April 12,
1861. On April 15th the President issued his proclamation calling on
the governors of the States for seventy-five thousand volunteers for
three months. Troops soon began to assemble at the national capital.
The first to arrive was the famous New York Seventh Regiment. There
was also a Massachusetts and Rhode Island regiment present, when, on
April 26th, General Orders No. 4 were issued from Headquarters of the
army at Washington. It was as follows:
"I. From the known assemblage near this city of numerous hostile
bodies of troops, it is evident that an attack upon it may be soon
expected. In such an event, to meet and repel the enemy, it is
necessary that some plan of harmonious co-operation should be adopted
on the part of all the forces, regular and volunteer, present for the
defense of the capital--that is, for the defense of the Government,
the peaceable inhabitants of the city, their property, the public
buildings and public archives.
"II. At the first moment of attack every regiment, battalion,
squadron, and independent company will promptly assemble at its
established rendezvous (in or out of the public buildings), ready for
battle and wait for orders.
"III. The pickets (or advance guards) will stand fast until driven in
by overwhelming forces; but it is expected that those stationed to
defend the bridges, having every advantage of position, will not give
way till actually pushed by the bayonet. Such obstinacy on the part of
pickets so stationed is absolutely necessary, to give time for the
troops in the rear to assemble at their places of rendezvous.
"IV. All advance guards and pickets driven in will fall back slowly,
to delay the advance of the enemy as much as possible, before
repairing to their proper rendezvous.
"V. On the happening of an attack, the troops lodged in the public
buildings and in the navy yard will remain for their defense
respectively, unless specially ordered elsewhere, with the exception
that the Seventh New York Regiment and Massachusetts regiment will
march rapidly toward the President's Square for its defense; and the
Rhode Island regiment (in the Department of the Interior), when full,
will make a diversion by detachment, to assist in the defense of the
General Post-Office Building, if necessary."
From this time on General Scott, old and infirm, suffering from wounds
received in early service and from accidents which befell him in
maturer life, continued, from his bed or couch on which he was
compelled often to recline, to direct the movements and disposition of
the troops and provide for the defense of the city. The pressure for
an onward movement of the army was such that it could not be
withstood. Brigadier-General Irvin McDowell, who had served several
years on General Scott's staff, was assigned to command the forward
movement. He prepared his plans carefully, under the advice and
direction of General Scott, which involved a possible battle. These
plans were frequently gone over with General Scott, and finally
submitted to and approved by the President at the White House, his
Cabinet, General Scott and staffs, and others, of whom General John C.
Fremont was one. The result of the advance is well known. The Union
troops were driven back in great disorder; confusion reigned in
Washington, and grave apprehensions were felt as to the safety of the
city if the Confederates should follow up their advantage. The battle
of Bull Run was fought July 21, 1861. On the day following a telegram
was sent to General George B. McClellan, then at Beverly, Virginia,
directing him to turn over his command to General William S. Rosecrans
and come to Washington. In the meantime, however, General Scott had
taken measures to gather the straggling officers and men from the
streets and place them in quarters, that discipline might be again
asserted and maintained. Upon the arrival of McClellan the work of
reorganizing the army was intrusted to him, and he was put in command
of the Army of the Potomac. He was not General Scott's first choice
for that command, the latter preferring General Henry W. Halleck, then
on his way from California to Washington, for that responsible
position. When McClellan took command he at once commenced making his
reports directly to the Secretary of War, instead of through the
lieutenant general. This was resented by the commander in chief, who,
September 16, 1861, issued General Orders No. 17 by way of admonition,
in which he said: "It is highly important that junior officers on duty
be not permitted to correspond with the general in chief, or other
commander, on current official business, except through intermediate
commanders; and the same rule applies to correspondence with the
President direct, or with him through the Secretary of War, unless it
be by special invitation or request of the President." This gentle
reminder of his duty to his superior officer did not have the desired
effect, and so, on October 4th, General Scott addressed a letter to
Hon. Simon Cameron, wherein he quotes his General Orders No. 17, in
which he says: "I hailed the arrival here of Major-General McClellan
as an event of happy consequence to the country and to the army.
Indeed, if I did not call for him, I heartily approved of the
suggestion, and gave it the most cordial support. He, however, had
hardly entered upon his new duties when, encouraged to communicate
directly with the President and certain members of the Cabinet, he in
a few days forgot that he had any intermediate commander, and has now
long prided himself in treating me with uniform neglect, running into
disobedience of orders of the smaller matters--neglects, though in
themselves grave military offenses." He complains that General
McClellan, with the General Orders No. 17 fresh in his mind, had
addressed several orders to the President and Secretary of War over
his [Scott's] head. On the same day of the issuance of General Orders
No. 17 General Scott addressed a letter to McClellan directing that
officer to report to the commanding general the position, state, and
number of troops under him by divisions, brigades, and independent
regiments or detachments, which general report should be followed by
reports of new troops as they arrived, with all the material changes
which might take place in the Army of the Potomac. Eighteen days had
elapsed between his letter to McClellan and his communication to the
Secretary of War, and no response had been received. He says:
"Perhaps he will say in respect to the latter that it has been
difficult for him to procure the exact returns of divisions and
brigades. But why not have given me the proximate returns, such as he
so eagerly furnished the President and certain secretaries? Has, then,
a senior no corrective power over a junior officer in case of such
persistent neglect and disobedience?" He remarks that arrest and trial
by court-martial would soon cure the evil, but feared a conflict of
authority over the head of the army would be highly encouraging to the
enemies and depressing to the friends of the Union, and concludes:
"Hence my long forbearance; and continuing, though but nominally, on
duty, I shall try to hold out till the arrival of Major-General
Halleck, when, as his presence will give me increased confidence in
the safety of the Union, and being, as I am, unable to ride in the
saddle, or to walk, by reason of dropsy in my feet and legs and
paralysis in the small of my back, I shall definitely retire from the
command of the army." Thus the crippled, illustrious old hero asserted
his power and authority to command the respect of his subordinates to
the last. Owing, as has been seen, to his physical condition, it was
not possible for General Scott to take active command of the army. In
fact, but comparatively few of the army assembled here had ever seen
him, and they only when they were passing in review.
The defense of Washington and the organization of the army for that
purpose and aggressive movements from that point did not alone command
the attention of General Scott. He was solicitous about the free and
uninterrupted navigation of the Mississippi River, and to prevent
obstructions by the Confederates, or to remove any that might have
been placed on shore or in the water, he addressed a confidential
letter to General McClellan, then commanding in the West, dated May 3,
1861, in which he informed that general that the Government was to
call for twenty-five thousand additional regulars, and sixty thousand
volunteers to serve for two years.
An act of Congress approved March 3, 1861, provided: