On the 26th, the Duke of WELLINGTON marched the main body of his Army
to Vermand and its vicinity.
Major General Sir JOHN BYNG, who was now in command of the First Corps,
having heard, on passing that village, that the Duke himself was there,
immediately waited upon his Grace for any Orders he might wish to give
him.
The Duke, on seeing him, said, "You are the very person I wish to
see--I want you to take Peronne. You may as well take with you a
Brigade of Guards, and a Dutch-Belgian Brigade. I shall be there almost
as soon as yourself."
BYNG having given the necessary Orders for MAITLAND's Brigade, and a
Dutch-Belgian Brigade of CHASSÉ's Division attached to his Corps, to
proceed on this duty; the former was immediately put in motion.
The Duke, on reaching Peronne just as these troops arrived there,
summoned the garrison, and then proceeded, in person, to reconnoitre
that Fortress: and perceiving the possibility of taking it by storm,
gave Orders to prepare for an assault. His Grace then directed the
attack to be made upon the Hornwork which covers the suburb on the left
of the Somme. Lieutenant Colonel Lord SALTOUN immediately led on the
Light Troops of MAITLAND's Brigade, stormed, and carried the outwork,
with but little loss; on observing which, the Duke, being satisfied
the place would prove an easy capture, returned to Vermand.
Some pieces of Dutch artillery were now brought into the Hornwork, and
a cannonade was opened upon the town; but the fire kept up on both
sides was trifling, and of short duration: for BYNG having sent forward
his Acting Assistant Quartermaster General, Lieutenant Colonel the
Hon. J. STANHOPE, with a white flag, the Civil Authorities interfered,
and urged the garrison to capitulate; whereupon the Maiden Fortress of
Peronne surrendered on the condition that its defenders should lay down
their arms, and be allowed to repair to their homes.
BYNG, on returning to Vermand, to report the capture of the Fortress to
the Duke, met the Dutch-Belgian Brigade, which had been ordered to move
to Peronne at the same time as the Guards, about half way towards that
place!
COLVILLE'S Division rejoined the main body of the Army from Cambray;
which place was handed over to the troops of the King of FRANCE, under
the Duke of BERRY.
The Reserve moved on to Bellicourt and Belle Englise.
Upon returning in the night to his Head Quarters at Vermand, the Duke
of WELLINGTON found a note from Prince BLÜCHER, forwarding to him the
letter from the French Commissioners before referred to, and to which
his Grace immediately replied as follows:--
"Head Quarters, 26th June 1815.--10 P.M.
"As Field Marshal the Duke of WELLINGTON has only at this moment
returned to his Quarters, he has only now received from Marshal
Prince BLÜCHER the letter of their Excellencies, and which their
Excellencies had sent to the Prussian Outposts.
"When the Field Marshal last heard from the Head Quarters of the
Allied Sovereigns, the 21st instant, their Majesties were at
Heidelberg, and they must still be in that direction. It must be
obvious to their Excellencies that the Field Marshal can neither
prevent nor aid their Excellencies in reaching their Majesties; but
if he has it in his power, or if their Excellencies think proper to
pass through the countries in which the troops are under his command,
the Field Marshal begs they will let him know in what manner he can
facilitate their journey.
"The Field Marshal was not aware that any Officer commanding an
Advanced Post had agreed verbally, or in any other manner, to a
Suspension of Hostilities.
"Since the 15th instant, when NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE, at the head of the
French Armies, invaded the dominions of the King of the Netherlands,
and attacked the Prussian Army; the Field Marshal has considered his
Sovereign, and those Powers whose Armies he commands, in a state
of war with the Government of France; and he does not consider the
Abdication of NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE of his usurped authority, under
all the circumstances which have preceded and attended that measure,
as the attainment of the object held out in the Declarations and
Treaties of the Allies, which should induce them to lay down their
arms.
"The Field Marshal cannot consent therefore to any Suspension of
Hostilities, however desirous he is of preventing the further
effusion of blood.
"As the only object on which their Excellencies desired to converse
with the Field Marshal was the proposed Suspension of Hostilities:
they will, probably, after the perusal of his sentiments and
intentions, as above declared, consider any interview with him an
useless waste of time; but, if their Excellencies should still do him
the honour to desire to have an interview with him, the Field Marshal
will be ready to meet them at the time and place they shall appoint.
"The Field Marshal begs their Excellencies will receive the assurance
of his high consideration.
"WELLINGTON."
* * * * *
From the moment that Prince BLÜCHER had become aware of the retirement
of the French troops from Laon upon Soissons, he was most anxious to
secure the passage across the Oise at Compiegne, Verberie, Pont St
Maxence, and Creil.
In the middle of the night of the 25th, he therefore sent an Order for
the Advanced Guard of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ to proceed on
the following day, from Fargnières, by forced march, as far as the
first named place. In the afternoon of the 26th, it reached Noyon,
where it halted for a rest, having marched five leagues; and having
nearly an equal distance before it to Compiegne. The twelve pounder
Battery and the four ten pounder Howitzers which had been attached to
this Advanced Guard (the Third Brigade under Major General JAGOW) were,
by ZIETEN's Order, left under the protection of a Battalion, to be
employed with the First Brigade, which was directed to make an attempt
upon the Fortress of La Fère. The Advanced Guard after having sent on a
Squadron of the 1st Silesian Hussars, under Major HERTEL, to Compiegne,
with Orders to push forward a Detachment thence upon the road to
Soissons, resumed its march in the evening.
It was still in movement about midnight, when Major General JAGOW
received a communication from the front that Major HERTEL had, with
his Squadron, entered Compiegne at eight o'clock in the evening; and
had learned from the Mayor that a French Corps was on the march from
Soissons to that town, in which it had already bespoken ten thousand
rations. JAGOW immediately communicated this important circumstance to
ZIETEN, and ordered his troops, after another short but indispensable
halt, to continue their toilsome march.
On the morning of this day, the First Brigade of ZIETEN's _Corps
d'Armée_ completed the investment of La Fère. The troops that had been
previously detached to this point by General JAGOW were moved off to
follow this Officer's Brigade on the road to Compiegne. Notwithstanding
the vigorous bombardment which the Prussians maintained against the
Fortress until noon, and by which several buildings were set on fire,
they failed to induce the garrison to surrender.
As it was not intended, however, to attempt any more serious attack:
the Brigade, after leaving the Fusilier Battalion of the 12th Regiment
and a Squadron of the Brandenburg Uhlans to watch the Fortress,
followed the _Corps d'Armée_, which had marched to Noyon; but it did
not even reach Chauny, scarcely seven miles from La Fère.
ZIETEN, on arriving at Chauny at eight o'clock in the evening, with the
remainder of his Corps--the Second and Fourth Brigades, the Reserve
Artillery, and a Reserve Cavalry Brigade--considered his troops too
much fatigued to fulfil BLÜCHER's intentions that they should march as
far as Noyon; and he therefore ordered them to bivouack at Chauny.
The Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ marched from the vicinity of
Homblières to that of Guiscard; partly by Jussy, and partly by St
Quentin and Ham. It was only the Eleventh Brigade, with the greater
portion of the Reserve Cavalry and Artillery, that took the latter
road. These troops on reaching the fortified town of Ham, found it
occupied by the Enemy; who seemed prepared to oppose their passing
through the place. General HOBE, who commanded them, summoned the
Commander of the Garrison to open the Gates and allow the troops to
march through; and on perceiving that this summons was disobeyed, he
tried the effect of a few cannon shot, which quickly procured a free
passage for his force. No further notice was taken, and no further use
was made, by the Prussians of this otherwise insignificant place.
A Detachment of the Reserve Cavalry of this Corps was sent to Chauny,
from which it pushed forward a small party along the road towards
Soissons, which the latter pursued until on arriving at about a league
beyond Coucy, it came upon an Enemy's Outpost, consisting of a
Regiment of Dragoons and a Battalion of Infantry.
The Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ was also required to make a forced march
on this day--namely, from Essigny le Grand as far as Lassigny, and
its Advanced Guard was to reach Gournay, and thence push forward
Detachments to Clermont, Creil, and Pont St Maxence, for the purpose of
securing and examining the Bridges across the Oise, and of preparing
all that was requisite for effecting a passage for the troops. BÜLOW,
in his Brigade Orders, drew the attention of his troops to the
necessity which had arisen for those forced marches on the part of the
Prussian Army with a view to obtain a decisive result.
The Advanced Guard started at four o'clock in the morning from Jussy,
and proceeded by Lassigny to Gournay, situated upon the road from
Peronne to Pont St Maxence; but the Detachments which it sent thence
towards Clermont, Creil, Pont St Maxence, and Verberie, did not reach
those places until the following day. The Reserve Artillery of the
Fourth Corps commenced its march at five o'clock in the morning,
following the Advanced Guard, and reached Ressons late in the evening;
where it bivouacked, as did also, subsequently, the main body of the
Corps, after a march of about twenty five miles.
* * * * *
Whilst the Prussians were thus, on the 26th, hastening towards
Compiegne; the French General, Count D'ERLON, was, on this very day,
also marching upon that point from Soissons, with the remains of his
_Corps d'Armée_--about four thousand men--having succeeded, through
his urgent representations of the expediency of such a movement, in
obtaining GROUCHY's assent to its execution.
The troops of the Third and Fourth French _Corps d'Armée_ moved this
day from Rheims towards Soissons, a distance which they could not,
however, accomplish in one day's march.
* * * * *
The positions of the respective Armies on the evening of the 26th were
as follows:--
Of the Anglo-Allied Army, the Advanced Guard (VIVIAN's Hussar
Brigade) was at Mattignies, near the Somme, having its Picquets on
that river.
The Second Division, the Nassau troops, and the British Cavalry, were
encamped near Beauvois and Lanchy.
The First and Third Divisions, the Dutch-Belgian Infantry attached to
the First Corps, and the Dutch-Belgian Cavalry, were encamped near
Caulaincourt and Martin de Des Près.
The Fourth Division was encamped at Gouay.
The First British Brigade of Guards was at Peronne.
The Reserve, consisting of the Fifth and Sixth Divisions, the
Brunswick troops, and the Reserve Artillery was encamped near
Nourois, Magny, and Belle Englise.
The Pontoon Train was at Estrées.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Vermand.
The Second and Fourth Brigades of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_
were at Chauny, not far from which was also the First Brigade. The
Third Brigade, forming the Advanced Guard, was on the march to
Compiegne.
The Third Corps was at Guiscard.
The Fourth Corps was at Ressons.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Genvry, near Noyon.
The French troops under D'ERLON were not far from Compiegne, on
the road from Soissons. Those of the Third and Fourth Corps, under
VANDAMME, were at some point between Rheims and Soissons.
GROUCHY's Head Quarters were at Soissons.
* * * * *
It was half past four o'clock in the morning of the 27th, when the
Advanced Guard of the Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ (the Third Brigade),
after a forced march of about twenty five miles, reached Compiegne.
General JAGOW immediately posted his troops, in the most advantageous
manner, in and about the town, so as to be prepared to meet any attack
that the Enemy might make; and detached three Squadrons of the 1st
Silesian Hussars upon the Soissons road, and the remaining Squadron
upon the Paris road, in observation.
About five o'clock, by which time he had scarcely completed his
arrangements, information reached him from the Hussars on the Soissons
road that the Enemy was advancing. This was, as before remarked,
Count D'ERLON, with the remains of his _Corps d'Armée_; from which
circumstance it will be seen that if ZIETEN's Advanced Guard had
arrived but a single half hour later, the French would have anticipated
the Prussians in securing the Bridge of Compiegne.
From along the edge of the extensive Wood which adjoins this town, a
fire was quickly opened by the French Skirmishers against the Prussian
Picquets. Very shortly afterwards a Column of Infantry appeared
advancing from their rear. A Half Battery of Prussian Horse Artillery,
which had been posted on the Soissons road, in front of the Gate on
that side of the town, having allowed the Column to approach within a
suitable range, directed a fire upon it with such vigour and precision,
that in a few moments more the mass rushed for shelter into the Wood.
Four French guns were now brought forward, and these replied to the
Prussian Artillery; during which the Enemy moved through the Wood
to his left. The Prussians concluded from this movement that he
contemplated abandoning the attack in this quarter, for the purpose
of assailing the lower and weaker side of the town, by the Crespy and
Paris roads: but on renewing his advance, he soon showed that he was
only masking his retreat; whereupon the 1st Silesian Hussars advanced
along the road to Soissons in pursuit.
By the result of this affair, which lasted an hour and a half but was
limited to a cannonade and mutual _tiraillade_, the French were foiled
in their attempt to cover their retreat by securing Compiegne, and
checking the advance of the Prussians along the Oise.
The Third Prussian Brigade, however, which had continually formed
the Advanced Guard of the First _Corps d'Armée_ since the Battle of
Waterloo, was too much exhausted by its efforts during the previous day
and night, to attempt seriously to molest the Enemy during his retreat;
a circumstance of which the latter failed not to take advantage. ZIETEN
decided upon relieving these troops from the duties of an Advanced
Guard by the Second Brigade; which, however, had not yet come up: and
hence the French gained some valuable time.
The main body of ZIETEN's Corps did not reach Compiegne until mid day.
BLÜCHER, who had already arrived there, ordered that the Advanced
Guard (now consisting of the Second Brigade) and the Reserve Cavalry,
preceded by one hundred Riflemen, should march through the Wood towards
Villers Cotterets, followed by the main body of the Corps; it having
been his intention to throw these troops upon the Enemy's line of
retreat, in the event of the Advanced Guard falling in with French
troops at or near that point.
This Order, however, was not strictly followed by ZIETEN, who marched
the main body of his Corps, including the Reserve Cavalry, and the
Reserve Artillery, through the Wood of Compiegne to Gillicourt,
detaching only his Second Brigade, reinforced by the Brandenburg
Dragoons and five pieces of Horse Artillery, towards Villers Cotterets.
The 1st Silesian Hussars were pushed forward upon the road from
Compiegne to Soissons, to cover the Left Flank during this movement.
The Reserve Cavalry, in front of the Column of the main body, reached
Gillicourt just as the Enemy (under Count D'ERLON) had crossed the
Defile formed by a tributary stream of the Oise in which that place is
situated. The 1st West Prussian Dragoons and the Brandenburg Uhlans,
together with a Horse Battery, went on in pursuit; and the Third
Brigade was ordered to follow the latter in support. The Fourth Brigade
was directed to maintain the Defile of Gillicourt.
The Enemy's Rear Guard was overtaken on this side of Crespy by the two
Regiments of Cavalry, which threw it back in disorder upon that town.
The French quickly retired from the place; whereupon the Third Brigade,
with a Cavalry Brigade, bivouacked there, throwing out parties of
Dragoons in the direction of the Enemy's retreat.
The Fourth Brigade, the other Cavalry Brigade, and the Reserve
Artillery, bivouacked at Gillicourt. The Second Brigade, with the
additional force attached to it, as before mentioned, reached Longpré,
not far from Villers Cotterets, in the middle of the night. The long
march which the troops of the First _Corps d'Armée_ made this day
from Noyon, and the probability of their coming into collision with
the Enemy on the following day, rendered a few hours' rest absolutely
necessary.
Separated from one another as ZIETEN's Brigades thus were, a strong
Support was essentially requisite; and this was supplied in good
time by the Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ which marched on this day
from Guiscard to Compiegne. Prince BLÜCHER directed its Commander,
THIELEMANN, to detach strongly towards Soissons; for the purpose of
observing the Enemy, and of molesting him should he be retiring. The
Cavalry thus detached presenting the means of covering ZIETEN's Left
Flank; the 1st Silesian Hussars, which had been previously posted on
the Soissons road, were directed to rejoin their own Corps. The Third
Corps bivouacked on the left bank of the Oise, with the exception of
the Twelfth Brigade which remained on the right bank at Venette.
On the same day, the Fourth Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, forming the
Right Column, marched from Ressons and its vicinity, with Orders to
cross the Oise lower down the stream, at Verberie, Pont St Maxence, or
Creil. BÜLOW formed his Advanced Guard with the 3rd Neumark Landwehr,
a Battalion of the 1st Silesian Landwehr, the 8th Hussars, the 1st
Pomeranian Landwehr Cavalry, and half the Horse Battery No. 12, and
desired General SYDOW, who commanded the Advanced Guard, to move off
with a Detachment, at the first break of day, and secure the Bridge
over the Oise at Creil.
This General, aware of the importance of attaining the object in view,
proceeded himself, at the head of a Squadron of the 8th Hussars, and
of one hundred Infantry, the latter being transported in carts, and
reached Creil with his small Detachment just as the French were on the
point of entering the place. The latter were immediately attacked and
repulsed: and the Prussian Infantry occupied the Bridge; which, on
the arrival of the Advanced Guard, was given over to the 1st Silesian
Landwehr, whilst the remainder of the troops, after a short halt,
commenced their march upon Senlis.
Another striking instance was thus again afforded of the vast
importance of a correct calculation of time in military operations. The
Prussians, on this morning, reached the Bridge of Compiegne, only half
an hour before the French approached it; and had they arrived at Creil
but a few minutes later, they would have found the French in possession
of the Bridge at this point.
Major BLANKENBURG was detached in advance, with the 1st Pomeranian
Landwehr Cavalry, from Creil towards Senlis. They had but just reached
this town, and had begun to bivouack on the great market place; when,
towards nine o'clock in the evening, KELLERMANN, with the First
_Cuirassier_ Brigade of French Cavalry, approached on the opposite
side, and made a dash at the very spot occupied by the Prussians. Major
BLANKENBURG had barely time to mount; nevertheless, with such of his
men as were accoutred and prepared, he attacked the French horsemen,
and drove them back to the Gates of the town. The latter, however,
collecting their strength, renewed their attack, overpowered the
Prussians; and forced them to retire along the road to Pont St Maxence.
KELLERMANN's Brigade then resumed its march along the prescribed line
of retreat. In the mean time, his Second _Cuirassier_ Brigade, and
D'ERLON's French _Corps d'Armée_, were retiring along the same road
towards Senlis.
Upon this point also General SYDOW was moving from Creil, with the
Advanced Guard of the Fourth Prussian Corps; following, as it was
supposed, the detached 1st Pomeranian Landwehr Cavalry. On reaching
Senlis at ten o'clock in the evening, with the head of the Column,
consisting of the 8th Hussars and the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Neumark
Landwehr, and finding the place unoccupied, he took possession of it.
The French troops had already approached close to the town, from the
side of Crespy. The Prussian Infantry were immediately posted in the
houses nearest to the Gate: and as soon as the Enemy's Cavalry came
fully within the effective range of musketry, they suddenly opened upon
the latter a sharp fire; which compelled it to go about.
The head of D'ERLON's Corps now came up; but was forced, along with
the Cavalry, to take another direction. SYDOW, having collected the
whole of the Advanced Guard, followed the French some little distance;
and bivouacked, about midnight, somewhat in advance of Senlis. The
latter, however, reached, next morning, the road leading through
Gonesse to Paris.
During the operation of the Advanced Guard of the Fourth Prussian
_Corps d'Armée_, another Detachment of the latter was sent to occupy
Pont St Maxence and Verberie. The French having partially destroyed
the Bridge at the former point, the 2nd Pomeranian Landwehr Cavalry
were ferried to the opposite bank of the river, and Detachments were
immediately pushed on to Verberie and Senlis. The Fourteenth Brigade
followed the Cavalry, and was passed over the river in a similar
manner; after which it occupied the Heights on both sides of the great
Paris road. These troops bivouacked for the night on their position;
whilst the main body of the Corps, on reaching Pont St Maxence,
remained on the right bank of the river. The greatest activity was used
in repairing the Bridge sufficiently for the passage of Artillery.
In this manner BLÜCHER had effectually secured the line of the
Oise; and, by pushing forward his Advanced Troops as far as Villers
Cotterets, had closed so much upon the Flank of the retiring Enemy,
that he had every reasonable expectation of succeeding in cutting off
the line of retreat of the latter upon the capital.
* * * * *
GROUCHY, on discovering that the Detachments he had thrown out to
gain the passages of the Oise, on his left, had been thwarted by the
rapidity of the Prussian movement, and had been compelled to fall
back, now employed them in covering his retreat by means of partial
combats. Hence arose the engagements at Compiegne, Crespy, and Senlis;
but such was the feebleness of the French resistance, and so frequent
were the desertions of the soldiers, who threw away their arms, and
fled to their homes, that it was evident the reorganisation of the
Army, and the reanimation of its former spirit, were far from having
been thoroughly effected. It has been said that a cry of alarm spread
through its ranks of, "Our retreat is cut off!" as soon as it was known
that the Prussians were upon its Right Flank. At all events it appears
tolerably certain that the Army was not in that state which would have
warranted GROUCHY in risking any serious stand against the Prussians.
To succeed in reaching the capital by means of forced marches; and to
secure his troops, as far as practicable, from molestation, was all
that he could hope to accomplish.
* * * * *
On the 27th, the main body of the Anglo-Allied Army, crossing the Somme
at Willecourt, marched through Nesle upon Roye.
The Fourth Division marched through Peronne, towards Roye.
Two Battalions of the Dutch-Belgian Brigade at Peronne were ordered to
remain in occupation of that place: the remainder of the Brigade, and
the Brigade of Guards at Peronne, marched through Nesle to the village
of Crescy, and joined the First Corps.
The Fifth Division, the Brunswick Cavalry, and the Reserve Brigade of
Howitzers, moved upon Ham.
The Sixth Division, the Brunswick Infantry, and the Reserve Artillery,
encamped between the villages of Douilly and Villers.
Notwithstanding the precautions which the Duke of WELLINGTON had taken
to ensure the orderly conduct of his troops, and to conciliate in
their favour the good disposition of the inhabitants along the line of
march, it being his anxious desire that they should be considered as
being on a friendly footing, and as acting on behalf of the legitimate
Sovereign, there was one portion of his Army which committed the
greatest excesses: these were the Dutch-Belgian troops, who set his
Orders on this head completely at defiance. They pillaged wherever they
went, not even excepting the Head Quarters, the house which he himself
occupied: they forced the safeguards, and rescued, at the point of the
bayonet, the prisoners from the _Gensd'armerie_ which the Duke had
formed for the Police of the Army.
Two of the Officers had just rendered themselves conspicuous by
participating in, and actually encouraging, these disorders, which had
arisen to such a height as to arouse his Grace's just indignation and
severe censure. He desired the General Officer then in command of that
part of the Army to put in full force his General Order of the 26th of
June, to cause a Roll Call of Companies to be made every hour, and to
see that every Officer and soldier was present. He also directed him to
place the two Officers before alluded to in arrest, and to send them to
the Hague, to be disposed of by the King of the Netherlands; to whom
he forwarded a copy of the letter containing these instructions. This
letter, which strongly evidenced the feelings of annoyance, under which
the Duke wrote it, concluding with the following cutting reproof:--_Je
ne veux pas commander de tels Officiers. Je suis assez longtemps Soldat
pour savoir que les Pillards, et ceux qui les encouragent, ne valent
rien devant l'Ennemi; et je n'en veux pas_.
The following were the positions of the respective Armies on the
evening of the 27th:--
The First Prussian. _Corps d'Armée_ had its main body at Gillicourt;
its Second Brigade at Longpré, about half a league from Villers
Cotterets; and its Third Brigade at Crespy.
The main body of the Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ was at Compiegne;
it had strong Detachments in the direction of Soissons.
The main body of the Fourth Prussian Corps was at Pont St Maxence;
it had its Advanced Guard at Senlis, and Detachments at Creil and
Verberie.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Compiegne.
Of the Anglo-Allied Army, the Second Division, the Nassau troops, and
the British and Hanoverian Cavalry, were in the vicinity of Roye.
The Third Division, one Brigade of the First Division, the
Dutch-Belgian Infantry attached to the First Corps, and the
Dutch-Belgian Cavalry, were encamped near the villages of Crescy,
Billencourt, and Bereuil.
The Fourth Division was at the village of Puzeaux, on the road to
Roye.
The Brigade of Guards was at Crescy.
The Fifth Division and the Brunswick Cavalry were at Ham.
The Sixth Division, the Brunswick Infantry, and the Reserve
Artillery, were between the villages of Douilly and Villers.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Nesle.
The remains of the First and Second French _Corps d'Armée_,
Detachments from which had this day been defeated at Compiegne,
Crespy, Creil, and Senlis, were in full retreat, partly upon the
Senlis, and partly upon the Soissons, road.
The Imperial Guard and the Sixth Corps were at Villers Cotterets.
The Third and Fourth Corps were at Soissons.
GROUCHY's Head Quarters were at Villers Cotterets.
* * * * *
General PIRCH II. having learned, upon his arrival at one o'clock of
the morning of the 28th, with the Advanced Guard of the First Prussian
_Corps d'Armée_, at Longpré, near Villers Cotterets, that the latter
place was not occupied by the Enemy in any force, determined to capture
the place forthwith by a surprise. The troops detached to the front
on this service (the Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment and the
Brandenburg Dragoons), favoured by the darkness (which as yet was
scarcely relieved by the approaching dawn), as also by the Wood through
which they advanced, fell upon a Detachment that was moving by a by
road through the Wood, consisting of a French Horse Battery of fourteen
guns, twenty ammunition waggons, and an escort of one hundred and fifty
men. The whole vicinity of Villers Cotterets was, in fact, filled
with French troops; thus dispersed, that they might sooner obtain
refreshment after the long march, and be prepared to start again at two
o'clock in the morning. Thus they were all in motion at the time of
this capture.
General PIRCH now pushed on to Villers Cotterets, where the Prussians
made many prisoners. GROUCHY himself narrowly escaped being taken as he
was mounting his horse and hastening out of the opposite side of the
town. On reaching the Windmill Height upon the road to Nanteuil, he
succeeded in collecting together and forming his troops. PIRCH, after
detaching Cavalry in pursuit of the Enemy, as also towards Longpré to
cover his Right, and towards Soissons to protect his Left, took up a
defensive position. He deployed his Infantry, with the Foot Battery,
upon the Height at the Garden of the Château, posted two Battalions
at the point of a Wood that jutted out on his right; and was still
occupied in making his arrangements, when a Cavalry Detachment, on
the Soissons road, sent in word that a hostile Corps was to be seen
approaching from Soissons. Another report was received immediately
afterwards, that the Enemy showed much Cavalry on that side, and was
already detaching two Regiments of the latter Arm towards the Prussian
Left Flank; as also another Cavalry force, along with from twenty to
twenty five pieces of artillery against the Right Flank.
In the mean time, the French Marshal had collected about nine thousand
men on the Height before mentioned, near the road to Nanteuil; one
third of whom had already constituted the Rear Guard, and the remainder
was composed of troops that had halted during the night in the
vicinity, as at Vauciennes, Coyolles, and Pisseleux. With these troops,
GROUCHY showed every disposition to accept an engagement.
General PIRCH II., finding himself thus critically situated between
two separate and overpowering hostile forces, prepared to effect his
retreat.
This was facilitated in a peculiar manner. The troops of VANDAMME's
Corps, perceiving the Prussians thus posted on the high road to Paris,
and imagining their force to be greater than it really was, fell into
the greatest disorder, and with loud cries of "Into the woods on the
left, towards La Ferté Milon--we are cut off from Paris!" they all
rushed in that direction; with the exception of two thousand men and
some guns conducted by VANDAMME himself by the way of Pisseleux,
leaving Villers Cotterets on their right, and masking the movement
by a vigorous attack upon this place. The 6th Prussian Regiment was
driven back by the Enemy's superior numbers; and PIRCH, after having
kept up a brisk cannonade, gradually withdrew the Regiment from Villers
Cotterets, for the purpose of moving upon Crespy, the direction
previously laid down for him, with a view to the concentration of the
Corps.
As GROUCHY was moving by the Soissons road towards Nanteuil, PIRCH was
desirous of proceeding in a parallel direction, through Longpré; but
he was subsequently induced, on consideration of the Defiles in that
direction, and which he did not deem it prudent to pass so near to the
Enemy, to prefer retiring along the Compiegne road, as far as where it
is joined by the one leading from Viviers; and where, for the covering
of the Left Flank and Rear, a Squadron of the Brandenburg Dragoons had
already been posted. From this point he struck into the road leading
by Buts, and reached, towards mid day, Frenois la Rivière, where he
gave his troops a few hours' rest; and then proceeded by Crespy to
Nanteuil, which place he reached about nine o'clock in the evening,
having marched twenty one leagues within the last thirty eight hours,
during six of which he had also been engaged with the Enemy. He had
succeeded in creating confusion in one portion of the retiring French
force, and in impeding the retreat of that which was with GROUCHY
himself sufficiently long to enable ZIETEN to anticipate the latter in
his arrival at Nanteuil.
It has already been explained, when describing the proceedings of the
27th, how much separated the Brigades of the First Prussian CORPS
D'ARMÉE were from one another. The First was still on the march from
La Fère (it rejoined on the afternoon of this day); the Second, with
the Brandenburg Dragoons, was near Villers Cotterets; the Third, with a
Cavalry Brigade, was at Crespy; and the Fourth, with the other Cavalry
Brigade was at Gillicourt. Hence ZIETEN was desirous, on the morning
of the 28th, to concentrate his Corps at Crespy; leaving only a strong
Cavalry Detachment at Villers Cotterets. But whilst despatching the
Order to PIRCH to move upon Crespy; he received a report from this
General, that he had fallen upon the French troops retreating through
Villers Cotterets, and was upon the point of being driven back by
superior numbers.
ZIETEN, considering that the Prussian troops at Crespy, the nearest to
Villers Cotterets, were nearly three leagues distant from the latter
point, decided upon not attempting to give any direct support to PIRCH;
but to advance with the Third Brigade, together with the Reserve
Cavalry and Artillery, towards Levignon, on the great Paris road,
between Villers Cotterets and Nanteuil, and, if possible, occupy that
point before the French could reach it. He found the latter in the act
of marching through the village; and immediately ordered a Howitzer
Battery to be drawn up, which commenced throwing shells into the place.
He also ordered the 1st West Prussian Dragoons, and the 1st Silesian
Hussars, with a Horse Battery, to attack the Enemy.
The French, however, retired in such haste, that they were not
overtaken until about midway between Levignon and Nanteuil; when they
halted their Rear Guard, which made front against the Prussians. They
comprised the Second _Corps d'Armée_, under REILLE, who had with him
several Regiments of Cavalry, and continued their march; supporting,
however, the Rear Guard. On coming up with the latter, two Squadrons
of the 2nd West Prussian Dragoons charged; but they were repulsed,
and attacked in flank by a French Regiment of Lancers. The Enemy now
advanced, with the hope of completely routing the Prussian Cavalry.
This attempt failed in consequence of a most successful attack by the
1st Silesian Hussars; by which the French were put to flight, and two
of their guns captured. The Horse Battery drew up, at the same time, on
the left of the high road, and, by its effective fire, committed great
havoc amidst the flying Enemy; who was pursued by the Prussian Cavalry
even beyond Nanteuil.
During the movement upon Levignon, General HOBE came up with a Cavalry
Brigade from the Third _Corps d'Armée_. It advanced by the right, along
the road from Crespy to Nanteuil, with the design of intercepting a
portion of the Enemy's retreating Columns; but the French, in the mean
time, fled in such haste, that only a few prisoners were made.
Notwithstanding the pressure thus made upon the French line of retreat,
Count REILLE succeeded in uniting the remains of his _Corps d'Armée_
with those of Count D'ERLON's Corps which had escaped through Crespy
and by the left of Senlis.
The French Imperial Guards, and the Sixth _Corps d'Armée_, which were
under the more immediate orders of GROUCHY, and had formed the Column
that retired through Villers Cotterets in the morning, reached Levignon
after ZIETEN had passed through it in pursuit of REILLE's troops to
Nanteuil; and becoming acquainted with the danger of their proceeding
further on that road, they turned off to their left, to make their
retreat through Assy, Meaux, Claye, and Vincennes.
General VANDAMME, who, with the Third and Fourth French _Corps
d'Armée_, was most in the rear, and had withdrawn from the high road at
Villers Cotterets on perceiving the Prussian Brigade in possession of
that place, took the direction of La Ferté Milon, Meaux, crossing the
Marne at L'Agny, to Paris.
BÜLOW, who had been directed to move the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ from
Pont St Maxence to Marly la Ville, on the 28th, deemed it advisable to
augment his Advanced Guard; and therefore added to it the Fourteenth
Brigade and the Reserve Cavalry, and placed the whole under the command
of Prince WILLIAM of Prussia. In the afternoon Prince WILLIAM fell upon
Detachments of D'ERLON's, and also upon REILLE's _Corps d'Armée_,
which latter was retreating from Nanteuil. He immediately attacked the
Enemy, dispersed a great number of his troops, and took more than two
thousand prisoners. It was evening before the Advanced Guard reached
Gonesse, where it bivouacked. Detachments were pushed on to the front
as far as Le Bourget and Stains, which points were occupied by the
Enemy. The main body of the Corps arrived at Marly la Ville in the
evening, and halted there for the night.
THIELEMANN, having been directed to proceed with the Third _Corps
d'Armée_ from Compiegne to Senlis, should its support not be required
by the First Corps, marched his Infantry and Artillery upon Crespy,
and sent the Reserve Cavalry by Verberie; but on hearing that the
First Corps was engaged with the Enemy, he drew in his Cavalry towards
Crespy, from Verberie, as soon as it arrived there. The First Cavalry
Brigade, with six pieces of Horse Artillery, was pushed on from Crespy,
along the road to Nanteuil; where it joined the Reserve Cavalry of
the First _Corps d'Armée_, but not in time to take any active part in
the engagement at that place. The Second Cavalry Brigade was detached
towards Villers Cotterets. The main body of the Third _Corps d'Armée_
bivouacked for the night at Crespy and its vicinity.
Prince BLÜCHER deemed it advisable to send, on this day, a strong
Detachment of Cavalry, consisting of the Queen's Dragoons, under
Lieutenant Colonel KAMECKE, beyond the Left of the First Prussian
Corps, towards the Marne, for the purpose of gaining intelligence of
the Enemy's movements in that direction. Lieutenant Colonel KAMECKE
was instructed to act discretionally; and to proceed, subsequently, by
Meaux, or Château Thierry, and endeavour to open a communication with
the Advance of the Bavarian Army.
Thus it will be seen that, on the 28th, the Prussian Army succeeded in
cutting off the line of retreat of the French troops by the Soissons
high road, compelling the greater portion of them to seek, along cross
roads, the line of the Marne, by Meaux and L'Agny. It had, since it
crossed the Oise, created great disorder and confusion in the French
ranks, captured sixteen pieces of cannon, and made, altogether, four
thousand prisoners. The Prussians now occupied both the high roads
leading from Senlis and Soissons, and had their Advanced Posts (those
of the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_) within five miles of Paris.
The sound of their cannon was already heard in the capital, where the
greatest consternation prevailed amongst the citizens; whose fears had
been previously excited by the most exaggerated reports brought in by
fugitives from the retreating Army. The fortified works that had been
thrown up on the north side, appeared sufficient to check the progress
of the Allied Armies, and to secure Paris from a _coup de main_;
but time was essential for the organisation of the defence, for the
recovery of the exhausted remains of the Army of the North expected
to arrive on the morrow, and for the collection of every available
defensive means. It was only by the assumption of a sufficiently
respectable, if not an imposing, attitude, that they could hope to
succeed in negotiating for the preservation of the capital and the
establishment of their own prescribed form of government--perhaps, by
some extraordinary effort, to disconcert the plans of their Enemies,
and obtain a triumph under the walls of Paris.
Actuated by these considerations, the Provisional Government was
desirous of inducing the victorious Commanders of the Allied Armies to
enter into negotiations. Another Commission was appointed, the members
of which were Messrs ANDREOSSY, VALENCE, BOISSY D'ANGLAS, FLANGERGUES,
and LA BENARDIÈRE. They were directed to proceed to the Head Quarters
of the Allied Field Marshals, again to solicit a Suspension of
Hostilities and to negotiate an Armistice.
During these proceedings in Paris, a renewed application had been
received by Prince BLÜCHER, on the 27th, and by the Duke of WELLINGTON
on the 28th, from the first named Commissioners, for a Suspension of
Hostilities; as also a request that a passport and assurances of safety
might be accorded to NAPOLEON and his family, to enable them to pass
to the United States of America: the Provisional Government having
previously succeeded, through the medium of representations made to the
ex-Emperor by some of his friends, in persuading the latter to consent
to this step.
Prince BLÜCHER declined taking any notice of the application,
conceiving his former verbal reply quite sufficient. The Duke of
WELLINGTON referred the Commissioners to his note of the 26th on the
proposed Suspension of Hostilities; and stated that, with regard to the
passport for NAPOLEON, he had no authority from his Government, or from
the Allies, to give any answer to such demand.
* * * * *
The Anglo-Allied Army advanced this day from Nesle, so as to bring its
Right in rear of St Just, and its Left in rear of La Taulle, where the
high road from Compiegne joins the high road from Roye to Paris.
The Second Corps, under Lord HILL, as also the British and Hanoverian
Cavalry, marched by Montdidier to Petit Crevecoeur.
The First Corps, under Sir JOHN BYNG, marched upon Couchy.
The Reserve, under Sir JAMES KEMPT, marched upon Roye.
* * * * *
The following were the positions of the respective Armies on the
evening of the 28th:--
The Fourth Prussian _Corps d'Armée_, which was the nearest to Paris,
was posted at Marly la Ville; having Detachments pushed forward close
to Le Bourget and Stains.
The First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ stood in rear of Nanteuil; having
its Advanced Guard at Le Plessis, Belleville, and Dammartin.
The Third _Corps d'Armée_ was at Crespy and in its vicinity.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Senlis.
The Anglo-Allied Army had its Right behind St Just and its Left
behind La Taulle.
Its Reserve was at Roye.
The Advanced Guard (VIVIAN's Hussar Brigade) was at Antheuil.
The Second and Fourth Divisions, the Nassau troops, and the
Hanoverian Cavalry, were encamped at Petit Crevecoeur, on the road to
St Just.
The British Cavalry was encamped near La Taulle and Ressons.
The First and Third Divisions, and the Dutch-Belgian troops, were
encamped near Couchy.
The Fifth and Sixth Divisions, the Brunswick troops, and Reserve
Artillery, were encamped near Roye.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Orville.
The remains of the First and Second French _Corps d'Armée_, after
forming a junction at Gonesse, where the high roads from Nanteuil
and Senlis unite, reached the suburbs of Paris. The Imperial Guard
and the Sixth Corps, immediately under GROUCHY, were in full retreat
from Meaux by Claie and Vincennes. The Third and Fourth Corps, under
VANDAMME, having crossed the Marne at Meaux, were retreating by Lagny
and Vincennes.
* * * * *
BLÜCHER having issued Orders, during the night of the 28th, for the
continuation of the advance upon Paris; the Advanced Guard of the
Fourth Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ moved, on the morning of the 29th, from
Gonesse to Le Bourget, which place it found abandoned by the Enemy;
who, however, was strongly posted at St Denis, towards which point
therefore, some Battalions were pushed forward in observation. The
Enemy having been driven out of Stains, this Post was occupied by two
Fusilier Battalions and a Regiment of Cavalry, under Lieutenant Colonel
SCHILL, for the purpose of securing the Right Flank of the Corps. La
Cour Neuve, between St Denis and Le Bourget, was also occupied. The
main body of the Corps broke up from Marly la Ville at seven o'clock in
the morning; and on reaching Le Bourget, bivouacked in its vicinity.
The Advanced Guard of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ pushed on, at
daybreak, from Dammartin to Blanc Mesnil; whence, immediately on its
arrival, it sent Detachments beyond the Wood of Bondy, to reconnoitre
the Enemy's preparations of defence. The main body of this Corps took
up a position, having its Right resting on Blanc Mesnil, and its Left
on Aulnay. It sent out Infantry Detachments towards Livry, and along
the Ourcq Canal, towards Bondy and Pantin; and Cavalry parties towards
Grande Drancey and Banbigny. ZIETEN also occupied Nonneville with the
7th Regiment of Infantry; and the 6th Uhlans furnished Outposts at the
Ourcq Canal, communicating with those of the Fourth Corps.
The Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ marched from Crespy as far as
Dammartin, in the vicinity of which it was bivouacked.
The Reserve Cavalry was sent forward as far as Tremblay, in direct
support of the First _Corps d'Armée_.
* * * * *
The First and Second French _Corps d'Armée_ had reached the suburbs
of Paris on the Gonesse road, during the night; and held possession
of Le Bourget until the morning of the 29th. The Imperial Guard and
the Sixth Corps, as also the reinforcements that had arrived from the
interior, were, during the forenoon of the 29th, on the high road by
Claie and Pantin, under the command of GROUCHY; and were directed to
occupy several defensive points on that side. The Third and Fourth
_Corps d'Armée_, under VANDAMME, reached Paris at noon on the 29th,
by the Lagny road: they passed through the capital, and occupied the
Heights of Montrouge on the south side.
* * * * *
The Anglo-Allied Army arrived, on the 29th, at different points on the
road between Gournay and Pont St Maxence.
The Advanced Guard, consisting of VIVIAN's Light Cavalry Brigade,
supported by that of ARENTSSCHILDT, crossed the Oise at Pont St
Maxence, and reached Senlis.
The British Cavalry moved from La Taulle to Pont St Maxence.
The Second Corps, under Lord HILL, moved from Petit Crevecoeur to
Clermont.
The First Corps, under Sir JOHN BYNG, moved from its camp near Couchy,
by Estrée St Denis, along the high road to St Martin Longeau.
The Reserve, under Sir JAMES KEMPT, moved from its camp near Roye, to
Gournay, on the road to Pont St Maxence.
* * * * *
The following were the positions of the respective Armies on the
evening of the 29th:--
The First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ had its Advanced Guard and Reserve
Cavalry at Aulnay and Savegny; with Detachments of the latter at
Serran, Livry, Bondy, and Baubigny. The Fusilier Battalion of the 7th
Regiment stood at Nonneville. The 6th Uhlans and the 1st Silesian
Hussars, with two Horse Batteries, were posted along the Ourcq
Canal. The Corps itself rested its Right on Blanc Mesnil, and its
Left on Aulnay.
The Third _Corps d'Armée_ was at Dammartin and in its vicinity. Its
Reserve Cavalry stood at Tremblay, in support of ZIETEN.
The Fourth Corps had its Advanced Guard between Le Bourget and St
Denis, which it invested. Lieutenant Colonel VON SCHILL, with the 1st
Silesian Landwehr Cavalry and two Battalions of Infantry, was posted
at Stains. The Corps itself was at Le Bourget.
Prince BLÜCHER's Head Quarters were at Gonesse.
The Advanced Guard of the Anglo-Allied Army was at Senlis.
The British Cavalry was at Pont St Maxence.
The Second and Fourth Divisions, the Nassau troops, and ESTORFF's
Light Cavalry, were at Clermont.
The First and Third Divisions, and the Dutch-Belgian troops, were at
St Martin Longeau.
The Fifth and Sixth Divisions, the Brunswick troops, and the Reserve
Artillery, were at Gournay.
The Pontoon Train and Hawser Bridges were at Estrée St Denis.
The Duke of WELLINGTON's Head Quarters were at Le Plessis Longeau.
The French troops comprising the Army of the North had entered the
capital.
* * * * *
The French force in the capital, after the arrival of the Army that
had been defeated in Belgium, consisted as follows:--The troops under
GROUCHY including the Depôts that had come up from the district
of the Loire and from other parts of the interior, amounted to 60
or 70,000 men. They were reinforced, also, by a very considerable
amount of Field Artillery. One portion of these troops was posted
at Montmartre, at St Denis, and in rear of the Ourcq Canal: the
remainder, under VANDAMME, occupied the Heights of Montrouge, on the
opposite side, with the exception of the Cavalry, which lay in the
Wood of Boulogne. The National Guards amounted to about 30,000 men:
their disposition, however, was very doubtful; and, in general, they
were considered as but little disposed to offer any resistance to
the Allied Armies. There was another description of force called the
Federal _Tirailleurs_, raised in the suburbs, and consisting chiefly
of Veterans: they amounted to 17,000 men. Hence, setting aside the
National Guard, there remained, for the defence of Paris, a disposable
force of about 80 or 90,000 men, besides a numerous Artillery. Marshal
DAVOUST, Prince of ECKMÜHL, was appointed to the chief command of the
French Army, and his Head Quarters were fixed at La Villette.
The measures which had been adopted for taking advantage of the local
capabilities of defence which the capital afforded, consisted in the
intrenchments that had been raised around the Heights of Montmartre,
Monfauçon, and Belleville. An advanced line of defence was presented
by the Ourcq Canal; which, proceeding through the Wood of Bondy and
contiguously to the high road from Meaux, has an arm that branches off
from Pantin towards St Denis. This Canal, which was thirty feet wide
but not entirely completed, had been filled with water. Along its inner
bank ran a high dam, forming an excellent parapet, in which embrasures
were cut to admit heavy ordnance; and St Denis, which formed the _point
d'appui_ of this line of defence on the Seine, was strongly fortified.
The ground on the north side of this town, too, had been inundated by
means of the little rivers Rouillon and La Vieille Mer. The Village of
Aubervilliers, which formed an Advanced Post at musket shot distance
from the line, was occupied: and in rear of it the Canal was covered by
a sort of _tête de pont_, which secured the communication between both
banks. The Barriers to the several approaches to Paris were covered
by works with strong batteries. Vincennes had been strengthened, and
covered by the works which defended La Pissotte. A strong _tête de
pont_ was also constructed upon the left bank of the Marne, to cover
the Bridge of Charenton. All ferries and boats upon the Seine and the
Marne were transported to the left bank. The Bridge of Neuilly had
been partially destroyed; and the wooden Bridge at Bessons, over the
Seine, had been burned. Several villages, parks, and gardens, on the
right bank of the Seine and the Marne, were rendered defensible by
the walls being crenelated, the approaches barricaded, and the gates
blocked up. Upon the left bank of the Seine, on the south side of the
capital, preparations for defence were comparatively neglected; they
were limited to the Heights of Montrouge.
For the defence of the principal works, three hundred guns of large
calibre were supplied; and for the manning of these, twenty Companies
of Marine Artillery, which had been brought into the capital. The line
between St Denis and Vincennes was defended by the First, Second, and
Sixth _Corps d'Armée_. The Imperial Guard formed the Reserve, and
was posted at Menil Montant. The Cavalry was stationed in the Bois
de Boulogne. The Third and Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, under VANDAMME,
defended the south side of Paris, and occupied Montrouge.
In the midst of all these preparations, the Provisional Government, the
majority of which, under the influence of FOUCHÉ, was most desirous of
effecting a cessation of hostilities, though acting ostensibly upon
the grounds of a necessity of gaining time for the completion of the
measures of defence, and of securing the capital from an assault, could
not be otherwise than convinced, from the tenor of the replies made
by the Allied Commanders to all its propositions, that the presence
of NAPOLEON in Paris was the chief obstacle to any satisfactory
arrangement. General BECKER had been appointed to attend the latter at
Malmaison, to watch over his safety, to insure him that respect to
which he was so eminently entitled, and to prevent the ill-disposed
from making use of his name for purposes of excitement and tumult.
Symptoms of a rising among the Buonapartists in Paris had been
manifested on the 28th, a circumstance naturally consequent upon the
re-union in the capital of so many Regiments of the Line, as also of
the Imperial Guard; whose excitement, devotion, and enthusiasm, had
NAPOLEON placed himself once more at their head, might have been such
as to have brought them into hostile and fierce collision with the
other great Parties of the State; and thus have led to scenes of the
wildest anarchy and confusion within the walls, whilst the Enemy was
thundering at the gates from without.
Hence every effort was employed to induce the ex-Emperor to quit the
capital. The fact of the arrival of the Prussians in front of St Denis,
and the possibility of an attempt being made to carry him off from
Malmaison, were explained to him with much earnestness. He immediately
referred to the map, and on perceiving the practicability of this
_coup de main_; he adopted precautionary measures of defence. He also
offered to the Government his services in the capacity of General
only; remarking, that he was prepared to march against the Enemy,
and frustrate his bold and hazardous attempt upon the capital. This
proposal was sternly rejected. FOUCHÉ declared that to accede to it
would be to remove every chance of arrangement with the Allied Powers;
to create fresh troubles and disorders throughout the country; and,
though a temporary success might be gained, to bring down eventually
the concentrated force of the immense European armament upon the
devoted capital.
The Commissioners appointed by the Government to communicate its
wishes to NAPOLEON, no longer hesitated in arranging his departure. The
Minister of the Marine, and Count BOULAY, repaired to his residence,
and explained to him that the Duke of WELLINGTON and Prince BLÜCHER had
refused to give him any safeguard or passport; and that he had now only
to take his immediate departure.
NAPOLEON at length yielded to what he considered to be his destiny; and
the preparations for travelling having been completed, he entered his
carriage about five o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th, accompanied
by Generals BERTRAND, GOURGAUD, and other devoted friends, and took
the road to Rochefort: whither two Frigates had been ordered for the
embarkation of himself and suite for America.
NAPOLEON narrowly escaped falling into the hands of the Prussians,
whilst at Malmaison. BLÜCHER, hearing that he was living there in
retirement, had despatched Major COLOMB, on the 28th, with the 8th
Hussars and two Battalions of Infantry to secure the Bridge of Chatou,
lower down the Seine, leading directly to the house. Fortunately,
however, for NAPOLEON; the Prince of ECKMÜHL, when he ascertained that
the Prussians were nearing the capital, had desired General BECKER
to cause this Bridge to be destroyed. Hence Major COLOMB was much
disappointed at finding there was no passage at this point, which in
fact was not more than eight hundred yards distant from the Palace in
which NAPOLEON was yet remaining at the time of the arrival of the
Prussians.
On the 29th, the new Commissioners appointed by the French Government
waited upon the Duke of WELLINGTON at Estrée, for the purpose of
negotiating a Suspension of Hostilities. In the course of the
discussion which took place on this occasion, the Duke declared that
he had nothing to add to the communication he had made to the former
Commissioners; that he could not but consider the Abdication as a
deception; and would not feel himself justified in suspending his
operations on such a pretext, which was by no means calculated to
fulfil the object the Allies had in view. He explained that, besides
NAPOLEON, there were his adherents, who were the declared Enemies of
the Allies; and stated that before he could agree to any Suspension he
"must see some steps taken to re-establish a Government in France which
should afford the Allies some chance of peace."
Upon this point his Grace was pressed to give some explanation as to
what would satisfy the Allies.
He replied that he had no authority from his own Government, much less
from the Allies, to enter upon the subject; and that all he could do
was to give them his private opinion, which he should certainly urge
upon the Allies with all the influence he might be supposed to possess,
unless otherwise instructed by his own Government.
This opinion was a remarkable illustration of the sound judgment,
straightforward policy, and unerring foresight which are so
pre-eminently characteristic of the career of this great man.
Subsequent events proved its correctness to the letter. It was in
strict accordance with the design traced out and enforced by the united
diplomacy of Europe. It is best expressed in the Duke's own words:--
"I then told them that I conceived the best security for Europe was
the Restoration of the King, and that the establishment of any other
Government than the King's in France must inevitably lead to new
and endless Wars; that BUONAPARTE and the Army having overturned
the King's Government, the natural and simple measure, after
BUONAPARTE was prisoner or out of the way and the Army defeated, was
to recall the King to his authority: and that it was a much more
dignified proceeding to recall him without Conditions, and to trust
to the energy of their Constitutions for any Reforms they wished
to make either in the Government or the Constitution, than now to
make Conditions with their Sovereign; and that, above all, it was
important that they should recall the King without loss of time, as
it would not then appear that the measure had been forced upon them
by the Allies.
"The Commissioners professed, individually and collectively,
their earnest desire to see the King restored in the manner I had
mentioned, which they said was likewise the desire of the Provisional
Government. ---- ---- was, however, of opinion that the two Chambers
could not be brought to recall the King without Conditions: and he
mentioned, as those upon which they would probably insist, and upon
which it was desirable the King should give way; the responsibility
of the Administration, and the alteration of the Constitution so far
as that the Initiative in making the Laws should be vested in the
Assemblies and not in the King.
"I told them regarding the first point, that I had every reason to
believe that the King had determined to form a Ministry which should
be individually and collectively responsible for all the acts of
the Government; and that I did not doubt that His Majesty would not
oppose himself to the wishes of the French people, if it was desired
that the Initiative in framing the Laws should be invested in the
Assemblies: that, however, I had no authority to speak on this
subject; and recommended to them not to look after little points of
difference, and if they really wished to restore the Government of
their King, to do it at once and without any Conditions.
"In the course of this conversation they stated that the Assemblies
had proclaimed NAPOLEON II. as Emperor only to conciliate the
Officers and Soldiers of the Army; who had come into Paris in such
numbers after the Battle, that they had been apprehensive of a Civil
War in Paris if this measure had not been adopted.
"While we were discussing the Conditions to be proposed to the
King; and the evils and inconveniences which the mode of making the
Laws and the want of Responsibility and Power in the Ministers,
had occasioned; I received from Sir CHARLES STUART, the King's
Declaration of the 28th, countersigned by M. DE TALLEYRAND: which I
immediately communicated to the French Commissioners, and pointed
out to them the King's promise to make the alteration in his
Administration which they had proposed to be made in the Constitution.
"They objected to certain paragraphs in the Declaration referable to
the exclusion of certain persons from the King's presence, to the
intention announced to punish some of those concerned in the plot
which had brought back BUONAPARTE, and to that of calling together
the old Houses of Legislature; Upon which, at their desire, I wrote
to M. DE TALLEYRAND, a letter, of which Sir CHARLES STUART will
probably have sent to England a copy, which I communicated to the
Commissioners before I sent it.
"I then told them I could not talk more upon the Suspension of our
Operations, which they urged in the most earnest manner in order to
give them time to take their measures to recall the King, until I
should see Marshal BLÜCHER; to whose Head Quarters I promised to go
that evening.
"Before I set off, the Commissioners asked me Whether the appointment
of a Regency to conduct the affairs of the Government in the name of
NAPOLEON II. was likely to satisfy the Allies, and would be such an
arrangement as would induce me to stop my operations? I answered,
Certainly not; that I conceived the Allies, after their Declaration,
would never treat with NAPOLEON or any of his Family; that the
appointment of NAPOLEON II. was to be attributed to NAPOLEON I.,
and the acknowledgment of him to the desire to conciliate the Army;
and that I should not stop my operations in consequence of such an
arrangement.
"They then asked me What would be the case if any other Prince of a
Royal House were called to the Throne of France? To which I said It
was impossible for me to answer such loose questions; that, as an
individual, I had made them acquainted with my opinion of what it was
best for them to do, and it rested with them either to follow this
opinion or not.
"One of the Commissioners, before I went away, took occasion to tell
me That he wished I had given a more positive answer to this last
question; and I determined to take another opportunity of doing so
before the Commissioners should report this conversation to Paris.
"I left them at Etrées, and went to the Head Quarters at Le Plessis,
to give the Orders for the movement of the troops in the morning, and
I overtook them again in the night at Louvres. I then told them I had
considered their last question since I had last seen them, and that
I felt no objection to give them my opinion on it as an individual:
That, in my opinion, Europe had no hope of peace if any person
excepting the King were called to the Throne of France; that any
person so called must be considered an Usurper, whatever his rank and
quality; that he must act as an Usurper, and must endeavour to turn
the attention of the country from the defects of his title towards
War and Foreign Conquests; that the Powers of Europe must, in such
a case, guard themselves against this evil, and that I could only
assure them that, unless otherwise ordered by my Government, I would
exert any influence I might possess over the Allied Sovereigns to
induce them to insist upon Securities for the preservation of peace,
besides the Treaty itself, if such an arrangement as they had stated
were adopted.
"The Commissioners replied that they perfectly understood me, and
some of them added--_Et vous avez raison_."