Blücher's dispositions for the grand Flank movement of his Army towards
the Field on which WELLINGTON had announced to him his intention
of accepting Battle from NAPOLEON, provided he might calculate on
the Marshal's assistance, were fully described in Chapter VIII.
Reconnoitring parties and Patrols had been pushed forward, early in the
day, to feel for the Left of the Anglo-Allied Army, the communication
with which was successfully established. It then became desirable to
explore the ground that lay more to the Right Front of the Prussians,
in the direction of the Right Flank of the main French Army, in
order to ascertain the nature of any precautionary measures adopted
by NAPOLEON to impede the junction of the Allied Commanders. Major
LÜTZOW, of the Staff, was sent upon this duty, with a Detachment of the
2nd Silesian Hussars; and on reaching the Wood of Paris, he not only
found this unoccupied, but discovered that no steps whatever had been
taken by the French to cover and secure their Right Flank. A Prussian
Troop of Hussars advanced beyond the Wood of Paris, to a point near
Frischermont, whence it had a good view of both the French and Allied
dispositions and movements; and where it was not even menaced by the
approach of any hostile party.
As Major LÜTZOW, fully alive to the importance of speedily occupying
the Wood of Paris, was returning to communicate the above intelligence
to the Prince, he met General GROLMAN, the Quartermaster General of
the Army, to whom he immediately represented how matters stood: when
this Officer directly pushed forward the Silesian Hussars and two
Battalions of Infantry from BÜLOW's Advanced Guard, to take possession
of the Wood; these troops having fortunately just crossed the Defile
of St Lambert. GROLMAN at the same time sent a message to the Prince,
suggesting that the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Brigades should be ordered
to follow the Advanced Guard as soon as they should be collected on the
French side of the Defile.
Great as had been the difficulties hitherto encountered along the
Prussian line of march, the passage of the Defile of St Lambert seemed
to present an almost insurmountable obstacle. The rain which had set in
during the afternoon of the 17th, and had continued without cessation
the entire night, had transformed the valley of the Lasne into a
perfect swamp. The miry and watery state of the roads between Wavre and
St Lambert had caused so many stoppages and breaks in the Columns that
they were frequently lengthened out for miles.
BLÜCHER showed himself on every point of the line of march, encouraging
his exhausted soldiers, and inciting them to renewed efforts. The
troops, after a short halt to collect their scattered ranks, entered
the Defile. As the ground yielded to their pressure, both Cavalry and
Infantry became dispirited; and when the Artillery were fairly checked
by the guns sinking axle deep, and the men, already worn down by
fatigue, were required to work them out, their murmurs broke forth in
exclamations of--"We _cannot_ get on."
"But we _must_ get on," was old BLÜCHER's reply; "I have given my word
to WELLINGTON, and you will surely not make me break it: only exert
yourselves a few hours longer, children, and certain victory is ours."
This appeal from their venerated Chief was not made in vain: it served
to revive the drooping energies of the wearied, and to stimulate still
further to successful exertion the more robust and able bodied.
At length, after considerable delay and constant difficulty, the
passage of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Brigades, as also of the Reserve
of both Cavalry and Artillery, was accomplished; and by four o'clock
these troops had ascended the opposite slope of the valley, and reached
the plateau of the ridge which, constituting the narrow interval
between the Lasne and the Smohain, with a rapid fall on either side
towards those streams, presented a comparatively dry and firm soil
favourable for the further operations of the Prussian forces in this
direction.
As the troops reached the Wood of Paris, they were disposed, with a
considerable front, and in a close compact order, on each side of the
road leading from Lasne towards Planchenoit. The Artillery kept the
road itself; and the Cavalry was drawn up in rear of the Wood, ready to
follow the Infantry.
The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Brigades were expected to join in a short
time; and PIRCH's Corps was following along the same line. It had been
BLÜCHER's intention to await the arrival of these troops, and then
to debouch with the assembled force; but having watched the progress
of the Battle, he became apprehensive, on perceiving the tremendous
cannonade, and the renewed attack after four o'clock, that the Enemy
might direct a still greater force against WELLINGTON's Line, and
succeed in breaking the latter before he commenced the attack on his
side of the Field. He could clearly distinguish NAPOLEON's Reserves,
in rear of La Belle Alliance, evidently prepared for being launched
against the Anglo-Allied Line, which had already sustained the most
desperate attacks. The frequent and pressing communications he had
received from the Duke also showed how anxiously the latter relied on
his support. These considerations satisfied the Prince, that the moment
had arrived in which his appearance on the Field would be productive of
consequences the most favourable to the views of his Ally, and the most
influential on the development of their combined exertions; and he now
gave the Order for the attack to commence, even with the small amount
of force then at his disposal, as also for the hastening of the march
of the troops still in the rear.
* * * * *
It was half past four o'clock when the Fifteenth and Sixteenth
Brigades debouched from the Wood of Paris; the former on the right,
the latter on the left; and each in the usual Brigade formation for
advance peculiar to Prussian tactics. The direction of the attack was
perpendicular to the Right Flank of the French Army; and consequently,
also, to the Charleroi road, which constituted the French main line of
operation.
In order to cover the Left Flank, Colonel HILLER, commanding the
Sixteenth Brigade, detached both the 3rd Battalions of the 15th
Regiment and the 1st Silesian Landwehr, under Major KELLER, to keep a
look out in that direction as far as the rivulet of the Lasne; beyond
which, Major FALKENHAUSEN was scouring the country with one hundred
Horsemen of the 3rd Regiment of Silesian Landwehr Cavalry.
General LOSTHIN, commanding the Fifteenth Brigade, detached three
Battalions towards Frischermont and Smohain, to cover the Right
Flank. They were the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Regiment, and the 3rd
Battalion of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr, followed by the 1st Battalion
of the former Regiment.
DOMON's Cavalry continued drawn up _en potence_, and was at a
considerable distance from the Prussian Advance, when BLÜCHER ordered a
cannonade to open upon it; more with a view to make known his arrival
to the Anglo-Allied Army, and to induce the French to withhold the
employment of a still greater force against the latter, than from any
motive affecting his own immediate operations at the moment.
DOMON now sent forward a Regiment of _Chasseurs à Cheval_ to attack the
Prussian Column, whilst he followed with his whole Line. Hereupon the
2nd Silesian Hussars and the 2nd Neumark Landwehr Cavalry moved through
the intervals of the Infantry, and formed up in front; the Hussars to
the left, and the Landwehr to the right. They then advanced, followed
by the 3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry in support, and drove back the
French _Chasseurs_; but becoming menaced in flank, and observing
DOMON's whole Line advancing, they were, in their turn, compelled to
retire. This movement was covered by the Horse Battery No. 11; and
more particularly by Captain SCHMIDT's Foot Battery of the Fifteenth
Brigade, which drew up to oppose the pursuit of the French Cavalry. The
vigorous fire which continued to be maintained by both these Batteries,
combined with the advance of the Prussian Infantry Columns, induced
DOMON to decline following up his attack at the moment.
The three Battalions already mentioned as having been detached to
the right, had, by this time, reached Smohain. Their advance in that
direction had been conducted with so much caution, that they debouched
from the south-eastern inclosures of the Village most unexpectedly for
both the Allied troops in that vicinity, and the Infantry forming
the extreme Right of the French Front Line. The Prussians continued
to advance; crossed the principal fence which separated them from the
French extreme Right, and drew up in Line almost at right angles with
the direction of the Enemy's front--two Battalions in Line, with the
third in support. It was half past five o'clock when this took place.
The French at once advanced against them; whereupon the Prussians
retired, and after regaining the hedges in the valley, lined the latter
as Skirmishers, and maintained a vigorous and successful _tiraillade_
with their opponents.
In the mean time NAPOLEON, judging from the boldness of the Prussian
Advance, that considerable support was at hand; and apprehensive, no
doubt, of the evil consequence likely to arise from that Advance, if
not promptly and effectually checked, had ordered the Sixth Corps,
under Count LOBAU, to move forthwith to the right from its reserve
station in rear of La Belle Alliance; and, in conjunction with DOMON's
Cavalry, to take up a position favourable for repelling the attack by
which he was menaced on that side of the Field.
BLÜCHER, observing this disposition, the execution of which was
effected with great rapidity and in good order, proceeded to give a
broader and more imposing front to his own troops. He extended his
Right Flank to the wooded Heights of Frischermont, and rested his Left
upon a ravine descending to the Lasne, close to the Wood of Virère. The
Reserve Cavalry, under Prince WILLIAM of Prussia, was put in motion,
in two Columns, towards the Left Flank; on which it was subsequently
formed up.
When LOBAU's Corps moved off to the right, the Regiments of the Old and
Middle Guard advanced and took up the position, in reserve, which it
had occupied on the Heights in rear of La Belle Alliance.
As LOBAU's Corps advanced and passed DOMON's Cavalry, the latter was
disposed as a Support. Having crossed the valley which, commencing from
the ridge above Planchenoit, on the north side of the Village, descends
towards Smohain, he opened a brisk fire from his guns upon BÜLOW's
Line. A spirited cannonade ensued, in the course of which the Prussian
Foot Battery No. 14 had three guns disabled.
It was not long, however, before the remaining Brigades of BÜLOW's
Corps, the Thirteenth and Fourteenth, came up. Their Batteries hastened
to the front, and materially increased the force of the Prussian fire.
BLÜCHER, who had now the whole of BÜLOW's Corps at his disposal, was
bent upon following up his original intention of directing his attack
against the Enemy's Rear. With this view he made the Sixteenth Brigade
take ground to its left, and brought up the Fourteenth Brigade in its
rear, as a Support; whilst at the same time he supplied the place of
the former in the Line by posting the Thirteenth Brigade on the left
of the Fifteenth. General HACKE, who commanded the Thirteenth Brigade,
detached the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the Second Neumark Landwehr
to the right, in support of the troops in Smohain. A portion of this
Detachment occupied Frischermont, thus obtaining an _appui_ for the
Prussian Right Flank, and securing the communication with the Prince
of SAXE WEIMAR's Brigade, posted along the inclosures in front of the
extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied Army. This Flank was also covered by
the West Prussian Uhlans and the 2nd Neumark Landwehr Cavalry, that
had been detached from the Reserve Cavalry of the Fourth Corps under
Prince WILLIAM of Prussia; which was following, as a Support, the Left
Wing of BÜLOW's Line, now advancing in the direction of Planchenoit.
The Artillery along the Prussian Line had by this time assumed a
formidable appearance, the following Batteries of the Corps having
come successively into action,--the twelve pounder Batteries Nos. 3
and 5, the six pounder Batteries Nos. 2, 13, 14, and 21, and the Horse
Batteries Nos. 11 and 12--comprising altogether sixty four guns.
The ground over which BÜLOW's Corps was now in the act of advancing,
was highly favourable for the development of a force destined to attack
the Flank of an Army, the Front of which was so completely _aux prises_
with the Enemy as was that of the French at this moment. Nearly at
all points it commanded the position occupied by the French Right _en
potence_; the Line was remarkably well _appui'd_ on the Flanks; and its
Front was parallel with the Enemy's main line of operation.
* * * * *
The force which LOBAU had at his disposal was greatly inferior to that
of the Corps he was sent to oppose. The former amounted to fifteen
Battalions, twenty one Squadrons, and forty two guns--the latter
(exclusive of the six Battalions and eight Squadrons detached to the
right) consisted of thirty Battalions, twenty seven Squadrons, and
sixty four guns. He could not present a Front sufficiently extensive
and compact that would secure him from being turned in either Flank.
Hence, when he perceived that the principal force in this well planned
attack was advancing from the Prussian Left, in the direction of
Planchenoit, which then lay in his right rear, unoccupied by any French
troops; he felt the necessity of retiring towards the Charleroi road,
which he did by withdrawing his Brigades _en échiquier_.
It was not long before several round shot from the Prussian Batteries
reached the Charleroi road; some of them falling both in front and rear
of La Belle Alliance, where NAPOLEON was then stationed. It was evident
to the latter that, unless reinforcements were despatched in support of
LOBAU, his Right Flank, already so seriously menaced, would speedily
be turned. His trusty Guard with which, in former Campaigns, he had
so frequently succeeded in stemming the current that had suddenly set
in against him from some previously hidden source and threatened to
overwhelm him, constituted the sole Reserve at his disposal. Engaged
during so many hours in carrying on a desperate attack along his whole
Front, without having as yet secured one single point of vantage
ground; he clearly foresaw that without some vigorous effort, by aid of
a powerful Reserve, no ray of victory would ever gleam upon his arms on
that side of the Field. But now that he was also engaged in defensive
operations along his Right, against another Enemy, by whom even his
Rear and the main line of his retreat became endangered; the necessity
of employing a portion of this Reserve in a direction different from
that which he had contemplated, was alike obvious and urgent.
The appearance of BÜLOW's Left bearing down upon Planchenoit, turning
LOBAU's Right; and the powerful Batteries along the Prussian Front
admirably disposed in accordance with the favourable nature of the
ground, over which the whole Line was gradually approaching; distinctly
indicated the immediate possession of that Village in force, as the
true and only measure that could be adopted for averting the impending
danger. The two Divisions of the Young Guard, posted on the plateau on
the right of the _chaussée_ close to Rosomme, and consisting of four
Battalions of _Voltigeurs_, and four Battalions of _Tirailleurs_, were
the nearest at hand for the occupation of Planchenoit; and NAPOLEON
accordingly desired General DUHESME instantly to march thither with
that force, accompanied by twenty four pieces of cannon of the Guard,
and place himself on the right of LOBAU's Corps.
It was about this time (six o'clock) that NAPOLEON replied to NEY's
demand for fresh Infantry, _Ou voulez vous que j'en prenne? Voulez
vous que j'en fasse?_ an expression, the force of which is rendered
sufficiently obvious by the critical circumstances of his position.
* * * * *
It was also at this period that BLÜCHER received intelligence that
THIELEMANN was attacked by a superior force at Wavre, and that it was
doubtful whether he would be able to maintain his ground. But the
determination of the Prince to carry out his present plan of attack
was fixed and irrevocable. He saw clearly that it was on the Field
where he himself stood that the fate of the Campaign must be decided;
and that by giving the fullest effect in his power to the combined
operation which he had preconcerted with WELLINGTON, and which was
already developing itself with so fair a prospect of success, he was
pursuing the right and only course by which the main Army of NAPOLEON
could be overthrown--a course founded upon the leading principle of all
strategy, that of bringing the greatest mass to bear upon the decisive
point. He immediately gave Orders that THIELEMANN should be directed
to hold out as well as he could, and to dispute every inch of ground
with his opponents. At the same time, he desired BÜLOW to continue
pressing forward with his Left, and to gain possession of the Village
of Planchenoit.
Colonel HILLER, who commanded the Sixth Brigade, formed the latter
into three Columns of Attack. Two Battalions of the 15th Regiment,
under Major WITTIG, marched on the right against the Village; two
Battalions of the 1st Silesian Landwehr, under Major FISCHER, in
the centre; and two Battalions of the 2nd Silesian Landwehr, under
Lieutenant Colonel BLANDOWSKY, formed the Left Column. The Fourteenth
Brigade followed as a Reserve, sending forward the 1st Battalions of
the 11th Regiment and 1st Pomeranian Landwehr as a Support to the
Columns of Attack.
In the mean time the troops of the Young Guard had occupied
Planchenoit, and made their dispositions for its defence. As the
Skirmishers that preceded the Prussian Columns approached the eastern
inclosures of the Village, they were received with a most destructive
fire by the French _Tirailleurs_. Some pieces of Artillery were also
brought to bear directly upon the Columns; which, nevertheless,
advanced with great bravery and steadiness, captured a howitzer and
two guns, and gained possession of the Churchyard. The occupation of
this spot, which is naturally strong, being inclosed within a low
stone wall, strengthened nearly all round by a steep outer bank, and
commanding by its elevated position a very considerable portion of the
Village, appeared to offer great security to the Prussian troops; but
the Young Guard, evidently prepared for this contingency, flew to the
surrounding houses and gardens, whence they opened a concentrated fire
upon the possessors of the Churchyard. To this the latter replied with
great spirit; and as the distance by which the hostile parties were
separated was extremely limited, numbers fell in rapid succession on
both sides. At length the French Supports having come up and joined in
this contest, and one of the Columns having shown itself in rear of
the Prussians; the latter were compelled to abandon the advantages they
had acquired, and to withdraw altogether from the Village.
They were followed by some of LOBAU's Cavalry; which, however, having
fallen into the line of fire of the Prussian Battery, No. 2, was forced
to retire.
The Prussian troops that had been driven out of Planchenoit immediately
rallied and reformed. The 2nd Battalions of the 11th Regiment and 1st
Pomeranian Landwehr now joined their respective 1st Battalions, which
had previously acted in support of the attacking Columns, and advanced
to a second assault, followed by the 15th Regiment.
NAPOLEON, perceiving the determination of the Prussian Commander to
persevere in his attack upon Planchenoit, as also his dispositions for
completely turning the French Right, ordered General MORAND, Colonel
in Chief of the _Chasseurs à pied_ of the Old Guard, to march to the
Village with a Battalion from each of the 2nd Regiments of Grenadiers
and _Chasseurs_. These Battalions reached the scene of action just
as the Prussians had re-entered the Village; and taking the lead in
the contest, succeeded in driving them out of the place, pursuing
them as far as their main position on the opposite Heights. Here the
French Skirmishers penetrated amongst the Prussian Batteries; but were
overthrown and cut up by the 4th Squadron of the 2nd Silesian Hussars.
The French Cavalry now showed a disposition to advance; and it was not
long before a Regiment of Lancers, which took the lead, was attacked
and defeated by the 8th Prussian Hussars. In following up the pursuit,
however, after their charge, the Hussars were suddenly involved in
the fire from a Battalion of French Infantry, and were forced to fall
back. On the other hand, a Regiment of French _Chasseurs à Cheval_ was
driven off in a similar manner by a Prussian Battalion.
By the advance of the Sixteenth and Fourteenth Brigades against
Planchenoit, a vacant space had been created in the Prussian Line
between those troops and the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Brigades, which
still maintained their ground with great gallantry, in the open Field
on the right. This vacant space was now covered by the main body of
the Reserve Cavalry of BÜLOW's Corps, commanded by Prince WILLIAM of
Prussia; which by its perfect steadiness and good countenance, not only
induced the Enemy to confine himself to the defensive, but advanced in
support of the Prussian Infantry, even in the midst of the opposing
musketry fire, and here occupied the place which, had the Line been
complete, would have been held by Infantry. On this occasion, the loss
of the Prussian Cavalry was considerable. The Brigadiers, Colonel Count
SCHWERIN, and Lieutenant Colonel WATZDORF, were killed. The latter
although previously wounded, would not quit the Field; and was soon
afterwards struck by a shot which deprived the Prussian Army of a very
distinguished Officer.
NAPOLEON, observing preparatory dispositions for a renewal of
the attack on Planchenoit by BÜLOW, who was only waiting for the
co-operation and support of PIRCH's Corps which was now rapidly
approaching, deemed it advisable to send a further reinforcement to
the troops in the Village. This consisted of the 1st Battalion of the
2nd Regiment of the _Chasseurs_ of the Guard, under General PELET; to
whom he represented the great importance of maintaining possession of
Planchenoit. At the same time, Orders were sent to the 1st Battalion of
the 1st Regiment of the _Chasseurs_ of the Guard, which was with the
Emperor's baggage at Caillou, to march to the Wood of Chantelet, for
the purpose of covering the right of Planchenoit, and securing the
Village from being turned.
The situation of NAPOLEON had become critical in the extreme. The
Prussian attack seemed to be checked for the moment; and the occupation
of Planchenoit in sufficient force held out the prospect of a
protracted, if not a successful, struggle in that quarter, should the
attack be renewed. Still it must have appeared sufficiently evident
to the Emperor that BLÜCHER was but awaiting either the arrival of an
additional portion of his Army, or the favourable moment when he might
combine his attack with a simultaneous one by WELLINGTON. Should the
Prussian General succeed in defeating the troops comprising the French
Right _en potence_, NAPOLEON's line of retreat by the Charleroi road
would be completely intercepted, and his main Front Line being thus
taken in Flank and Rear, would become an easy prey to the Anglo-Allied
Army. He might yet attempt a skilful retreat upon Nivelles; but with
an Army so exhausted by its repeated and ineffectual attacks upon
WELLINGTON's unshaken Line, this would have been a hazardous operation.
It is, moreover, very questionable whether the idea of retreat ever
entered into his views; for a retreat, after such sacrifices had been
made, harassed and interrupted as it undoubtedly would be by the two
hostile Armies which had succeeded in effecting a junction, must
prove no less disastrous than a signal defeat, and equally involve
the downfall of his military and political power. Hence his desperate
resolve to peril the fate of his brave Army and of his resuscitated
Empire upon another and a final struggle for victory over WELLINGTON;
whose troops had, with such truly heroic courage and such inflexible
endurance, successfully withstood the most furious attacks which
he had repeatedly launched against them during the whole day. By
a victory alone, no matter how dearly purchased, could he hope to
keep alive the national enthusiasm which he had again awakened: but
which would assuredly relapse into irrecoverable apathy, should the
_prestige_ of returning glory be torn from the idol of the military
portion of his subjects, and the Empire become again exposed to be
overrun by those foreign legions that had once more taken up arms with
a firm resolve finally to crush a power, the existence of which was
incompatible with the security and independence of the States of Europe.
As the prospect of the consequences of failure thus flashed across his
mind; NAPOLEON, like a desperate gambler, driven to his last stake,
determined to risk his all upon another venture. The meditated blow was
to be struck against his bold antagonist, WELLINGTON; whose Line was to
be attacked along its entire Front by a simultaneous effort, while its
Right and Centre were to be forced at all hazards.
He immediately ordered General Count DRUOT to collect all his
Battalions of the Guard that were still in reserve, in front of La
Belle Alliance. These were accordingly moved forward from their
position near the house of DE COSTER; and the two Battalions of the
1st Regiment of Grenadiers, which had previously been stationed on
the Height in rear of La Belle Alliance, were now destined to form a
Reserve to the attacking Columns.
D'ERLON and REILLE were at the same time ordered to advance the
whole of the remaining disposable force against the Enemy, with a
view to second the main attack. The Centre of the Anglo-Allied Line,
immediately in rear of La Haye Sainte, was not to be allowed a moment's
respite from the attacks which continued to be made against it by the
troops occupying, and debouching from, that Farm. These were also to
carry the Centre by assault, as soon as the Guard should reach the
Height.
WELLINGTON, who seemed to have acquired a thorough insight into his
opponent's designs, having satisfied himself that his position was
destined shortly to be again assailed by a formidable force, became
anxious for the arrival of the Prussian troops expected on his extreme
Left. He desired his Aide de Camp, Lieutenant Colonel FREMANTLE, to
proceed immediately in that direction, to hasten the advance of any
Corps he might fall in with, and to represent to its Commander that if
he would supply him with the means of strengthening those points along
his Line which had been so seriously weakened by repeated attacks, he
entertained no doubt of not only maintaining his ground, but of also
gaining the victory.
Although the Duke was fully aware that BÜLOW's Corps was in active
operation against the extreme Right of the French Army, the ground upon
which that operation was mainly carried on was too remote from his own
immediate sphere of action to admit of his calculating upon support
from it, beyond that of a diversion of the Enemy's forces; and it was
only from the high ground on which the extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied
Line rested, that a general view could be obtained of the Prussian
movements. As regards, however, the Village of Planchenoit itself, the
spire of the church was all that could be seen even from the point
alluded to; so that it was scarcely possible to distinguish which was
the successful party in that quarter. NAPOLEON might (as he really did)
present an efficient check to the Prussian attack, and at the same
time retain sufficient force wherewith he might make another vigorous
assault upon the Anglo-Allied Army.
When, therefore, the Duke beheld his Line so fearfully reduced in
numbers, which he had no means of replacing, and which the indomitable
courage of his British and German troops alone had hitherto been able
to supply, it is not surprising that he should have manifested some
little impatience for the arrival of that portion of the Prussian
forces which was to co-operate more immediately with his own Army. The
latter, with the exception of the Dutch-Belgian troops, which still
continued in reserve, for it was useless to place them where they would
be exposed to the brunt of the battle shock, presented but a mere
wreck of that proud array which it had displayed in the morning. But,
if the vain confidence of strength had departed, the more noble pride
of unflinching bravery still remained unshaken. Exposed, however, as
they had been for so many hours to a tremendous cannonade, which only
ceased at times but to give place to attacks of Cavalry and musketry;
their exemplary passive forbearance seemed, in some instances, to be
approaching its utmost limits. Frequent messages reached the Duke from
Commanding Officers, soliciting reinforcements and support since their
Corps were reduced to skeletons; but the only reply they received was,
that no reinforcements could be granted, and that they must hold their
ground to the last man. Occasionally too, as he rode along the Line, a
murmur would reach his ear, indicative of impatience to be led against
the Enemy. This would draw from him some encouraging appeal, such as
"Wait a little longer, my lads; and your wishes shall be gratified."
In all three Arms of the Service the losses had been awfully severe.
Battalions, dwindled to mere handfuls of men, were commanded by either
Captains or Subalterns. A vast number of guns along the whole extent of
the Line had been disabled. The British and German Cavalry Brigades,
with the exception of VIVIAN's and VANDELEUR's on the Left, were
reduced to less than the ordinary strength of Regiments--SOMERSET's
and PONSONBY's Brigades united did not comprise two Squadrons. Many,
it is true, had quitted the ranks to assist the wounded, and to convey
prisoners to the rear; but if amongst these were to be found the weak
and faint hearted, the brave spirits that remained nobly represented
the valour and devotion which, under the guidance of a master hand,
were destined to be crowned with lasting triumph. Familiarised as the
men had become with scenes, in rapid succession, of violent death
under almost every variety of aspect, from the sudden gush of life
to the slow and lingering anguish--from the calm and tranquil sleep
"that knows no waking," to the ghastly writhings of convulsive death
throes--the short and frequent command of "Close up!" as their comrades
fell around them, was as mechanically obeyed as would have been any
common parade order in a Barrack Square.
Such was the situation of the troops against which NAPOLEON was
meditating an assault with all the force he could collect, in the
hope--his last and only hope--of seeing his Eagles soaring in triumph
over those Heights upon which the British Standard continued to wave in
proud defiance.
* * * * *
The Battalions of the Imperial Guard which had been collected in front
of La Belle Alliance, and which were to constitute the leading feature
in the general attack upon the Anglo-Allied Line, consisted of nine
Battalions, exclusive of the two Battalions of the 1st Regiment of
Grenadiers, destined, as previously observed, to remain as a Reserve.
These nine Battalions were formed into Two Columns of Attack. The First
comprised four Battalions of the Middle Guard, namely, the 1st and
2nd Battalions of the 3rd Regiment of Grenadiers, and the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of the 3rd Regiment of _Chasseurs_. It was formed in mass
of Battalions, and destined to advance against the Centre of the Right
Wing of the Anglo-Allied Army.
The Second Column of Attack consisted of the three remaining Battalions
of the Middle Guard--namely, the 1st Battalion of the 4th Regiment
of Grenadiers, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 4th Regiment of
_Chasseurs_--and of two Battalions of the Old Guard, namely, the 1st
and 2nd Battalions of the 1st Regiment of _Chasseurs_. These five
Battalions were moved down into the hollow adjoining the south-eastern
angle of the inclosures of Hougomont, and there formed into a Column in
mass, which was to support the First Column, and to direct its advance
somewhat more to the left.
In rear, and on the right and left, of these Columns, stood the remains
of that splendid Cavalry, with which WELLINGTON's Line had been so
furiously and so perseveringly assailed, occupying the interval that
had been continually augmenting between D'ERLON's and REILLE's Corps.
They formed the last and only Cavalry Reserve remaining at NAPOLEON's
disposal, for following up the attack by the Guard, should the latter
prove successful; or for covering its retreat, in the event of failure.
* * * * *
It was shortly before the Columns of Attack were put in motion that
VIVIAN, whose Hussar Brigade it will be recollected, was posted upon
the extreme Left of the Anglo-Allied Line, was informed by Patrols
which he had detached to look out to his left for the expected arrival
of the Prussians, that the latter were advancing in force along
the road from Ohain. Having satisfied himself as to the fact, and
perceiving their Advanced Cavalry coming on, VIVIAN felt that there
could be no longer any apprehension of the Left of the Army being
turned: and having previously understood from Sir WILLIAM DELANCEY and
other Staff Officers, that fresh Cavalry was much wanted in the Centre;
he proposed to VANDELEUR, who was on his right, and who was his senior
Officer, that the two Brigades should move towards the Centre, where
they might be of service. VANDELEUR declined to act without Orders:
whereupon VIVIAN put his own Brigade in motion, passing along the rear
of VANDELEUR's, and soon after having commenced his march he met Lord
UXBRIDGE; who was much pleased to find that the Duke's wishes had thus
been anticipated, and sent Orders to VANDELEUR to follow, accompanying
the former Brigade himself towards the Centre, passing along the
foot of the slope in rear of the position of the Left Wing of the
Anglo-Allied Line.
The Prussian troops, whose advance had thus induced VIVIAN to quit the
extreme Left, were the Advanced Guard of ZIETEN's Corps: and consisted
of a part of the First Infantry Brigade, namely, the 3rd Battalion 12th
Regiment, the 1st and 2nd Battalions 24th Regiment, the 3rd Battalion
1st Westphalian Landwehr, and the 1st and 3rd Silesian Rifle Companies;
as also of a part of the Reserve Cavalry, namely, the 1st Silesian
Hussars, the Brandenburg Uhlans, the Brandenburg Dragoons, and the 2nd
Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry.
They had already been joined by Lieutenant Colonel FREMANTLE, who
delivered to ZIETEN the Duke's message: in reply to which that General
remarked that he did not feel himself authorised to detach his Corps
in the manner proposed; adding, however, that the great mass of the
Prussian Army was arriving upon the Field.
The remainder of the Reserve Cavalry which was commanded by Lieutenant
General RÖDER, together with the main body of the Corps, were still
considerably in the rear. They were met by Captain JACKSON of the
British Staff Corps, who had been sent to look for them. These troops
did not reach the Field of Battle until after the victory had been
decided.
WELLINGTON, finding that there was no chance of his shattered Line
being strengthened by the arrival, in sufficient time, of a Prussian
force from his left, to support his weak points of defence; and that
he must therefore depend solely on his own resources for the means of
warding off the desperate blow which NAPOLEON was about to strike,
immediately made such dispositions as the circumstances of the moment
appeared to him to demand. The incessant attacks made by the French
Light Troops debouching from La Haye Sainte, from the moment that Farm
fell into their possession, had caused great havoc in the Centre of his
Line, where the want of reinforcement became most apparent. To meet
this deficiency, he ordered the Brunswick Battalions, which stood at
this time in rear of MAITLAND's and ADAM's Brigades--namely, the 2nd
and 3rd Light, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Line, Battalions, to move by
their left into the interval between HALKETT's British, and KRUSE's
Nassau, Brigade.
To occupy the ground thus vacated by the Brunswickers, he put in
motion D'AUBREMÉ's Dutch-Belgian Infantry Brigade from its recently
assumed position in rear of the Nivelles road; whence the other Brigade
of CHASSÉ's Dutch-Belgian Division, under Major General DITMER, was
shortly afterwards ordered to move in the direction of the left of
MAITLAND's British Brigade.
The remains of his Cavalry stood in rear of the Centre; towards which
VIVIAN's and VANDELEUR's Brigades were now moving from the Left, as
previously explained.
Whilst the Imperial Guard was forming for attack, the French troops
in possession of La Haye Sainte and its inclosures, now consisting of
the entire of DONZELOT's Division, from the Left of D'ERLON's Corps,
renewed, with redoubled vigour, their assault upon the Centre of the
Allied Line: the object being evidently either to force that point
previously to the arrival of the Guard on its left, and thus facilitate
the assault to be made by the latter; or to harass it in such a manner
that, should the effort of the Guard prove successful, they would
be enabled completely to overthrow the Allied Centre. The fire from
the Skirmishers that had located themselves between the Farm and the
position, and from those on the Knoll by the Sand Pit on the opposite
side of the high road, had been incessant since the capture of that
Post.
OMPTEDA's Brigade of the King's German Legion, which had hitherto
occupied the hollow way that descends into the _chaussée_, was reduced
to a mere handful of men: the two Squares in which KIELMANSEGGE's
Hanoverian Brigade, the next on the (Allied) Right, had stood its
ground so many hours, were fearfully diminished; KRUSE's Nassau
Brigade, still further to the right, formed in three Contiguous Columns
(two in front and one in rear), began to evince symptoms of hesitation;
and the interval between this and HALKETT's British Brigade had become
much greater than was consistent with the due security of this part
of the Line. So weakened indeed was the latter at this period, that,
to remedy the evil in some degree, it had been deemed advisable, with
a view rather of giving it the appearance of greater strength than
of affording any very active support, to draw close up in its rear,
the skeleton remains of the Scots Greys and of the 3rd Hussars of the
King's German Legion.
On the Allied left of the high road, an unremitting fire was maintained
against their opponents by the 95th and 4th British Regiments in
extended order along the front hedge of the Wavre road, commencing from
the Charleroi _chaussée_, as also from the 40th, 79th, 1st, and 28th
British Regiments, deployed behind the embanked hedge on the rear side
of that road. The 27th British Regiment had been brought up by LAMBERT,
and posted, in Square, in the angle formed by the junction of the above
roads: having one face parallel with, and close to, the _chaussée_,
for the purpose either of throwing a flank fire upon the French troops
on the opposite side, should these succeed, as appeared very probable,
in compelling OMPTEDA's and KIELMANSEGGE's Brigades to retire; or,
of pouring a close, deadly volley upon any Column endeavouring to
penetrate along the high road itself. The Artillery on the Allied
right of the high road, in front of these Brigades, was at this moment
completely disabled. Two British Artillerymen were observed vainly
endeavouring to serve a couple of guns, but were compelled to desist
from the want of all material for loading.
Such was the state of things in the Centre of the Anglo-Allied Army,
when the continued popping fire from the French Skirmishers suddenly
quickened into a fierce _tiraillade_ which threatened to bear down
every thing opposed to it. The bank along the high road, beyond the
Garden of La Haye Sainte, and the mound adjoining it, which latter was
quite close to the Allied position, became all at once thickly crowded
with Skirmishers. Those that lined the banks seemed intent upon keeping
down the fire from the British Regiments of KEMPT's and LAMBERT's
Brigades, along the Wavre road; while those under cover of the little
mound in advance, as if aware of the object of the formation of the
27th British Regiment, and sensible of the necessity of securing their
Right Flank in their meditated forcing of the position, opened such a
close, sharp, fire upon that Regiment that, within the brief space of a
few minutes, it lost more than half of its numbers.
At the same time, taking advantage of the crippled state of the Allied
Artillery in this quarter, the French brought up two guns in advance
of the north-western angle of the Garden of La Haye Sainte, in which
position they were covered from any fire from the opposite side of
the high road by the Skirmishers occupying the bank and the mound.
From these guns a smart fire of grape was opened, and maintained
without intermission, upon the Left Square of KIELMANSEGGE's Brigade
(consisting of the Field Battalions Grubenhagen and York), at the short
distance of one hundred and fifty, and afterwards of scarcely one
hundred, paces. The Square manifested the most exemplary submission and
forbearance, notwithstanding the ravages that continued to be made in
its ranks; not venturing to reply to the fire, by the apprehension of
Cavalry being under the brow of the position, prepared to take instant
advantage of any favourable opportunity for a charge. The Right Square
(consisting of the Field Battalions Bremen and Verden) also suffered
most severely.
Some other guns, which had accompanied the Columns in rear of the
French Skirmishers, were suddenly brought forward, and opened so
destructive a discharge of grape upon this latter Square, that one of
its sides was literally completely blown away; the remainder being
left standing in the form of a triangle. The Commander, and many
other Officers, were wounded. The ammunition was failing rapidly. The
combined fire of grape and musketry continued to increase in violence;
and the Square finally dwindled into a mere clump of men. The French
_Tirailleurs_ continued pressing forward in a very compact line, whilst
the sound of drums beating the _pas de charge_ announced the advance of
the Columns immediately in their rear.
The Prince of ORANGE, perceiving the probability of the Centre of the
Allied Line being forced, unless some great effort were made to check
the Enemy's advance, ordered the 1st and 2nd Nassau Battalions of
KRUSE's Brigade to charge, gallantly placing himself at their head.
His Royal Highness was soon struck by a bullet in the left shoulder;
the attack failed; and the Nassauers were falling back, when the
reinforcement which WELLINGTON had provided for this part of the Line,
consisting of five Battalions of Brunswick Infantry, moved rapidly into
the interval between KRUSE's Nassau, and HALKETT's British, Brigades.
But so unexpectedly did the Brunswickers find themselves placed under a
most destructive fire, and so suddenly were the heads of their Columns
assailed, that they were unable, in the midst of the thick smoke in
which they became involved, to recover from the partial irregularities
by which, under such circumstances, their advance was accompanied,
and to form up in sufficient order, before they came in close contact
with the Enemy: whose vigorous attack compelled them, as also KRUSE's,
KIELMANSEGGE's, and OMPTEDA's Brigades, to fall back about a hundred
paces.
At this critical moment, WELLINGTON hastened to the spot in person, to
avert so alarming a catastrophe as that of having his Centre broken,
at a time, too, when he was preparing to receive a formidable attack,
directed against another point of his Line, situated at but a short
distance on the right of that Centre. He addressed himself to the
Brunswickers; and succeeded, by the electrifying influence of his
voice, gesture, and presence, in rallying the discomfited Columns.
The 3rd Line Battalion, under Major NORMANN, was the first to reform
in good order: it then boldly stood its ground; and, when the Enemy's
Infantry approached, received it with so destructive a fire as
completely to check its further advance.
By dint of example and encouragement on the part of all the Commanding
Officers, the Brigades on the left of the Brunswickers were also
rallied and formed up: upon seeing which, the Duke galloped off to the
right.
Just at this time, VIVIAN's Hussar Brigade drew up immediately in rear
of these troops--relieving the exhausted remains of the Scots Greys
and 3rd Hussars of the King's German Legion--the 10th and 18th British
Hussars in Front, and the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion in
Second, Line. The presence and appearance of this fresh Cavalry tended
very considerably to restore confidence to that part of the Line. The
Brigade had previously, in consequence of a mistake in the transmission
of Orders, been halted on the left of the high road about midway
between the Front Line and the Farm of Mont St Jean; whence, however,
it was speedily brought forward, and posted as above, by Lord UXBRIDGE.
The Prince of ORANGE, ALTEN, and almost all the superior Officers
of the Third Division, had been wounded. But KIELMANSEGGE, who now
commanded in this part of the Field, was fully alive to the critical
circumstances under which the Third Division was placed; and exhibited
great ability, coolness, and determination, by the manner in which
he succeeded in restoring it to order. Still, the persevering and
incessant _tiraillade_ kept up against these troops by the French
was such that the fire thrown out from their shattered and enfeebled
ranks was quite inadequate to repress it. The French Skirmishers again
crowded close up to the Line; maintaining a most rapid and destructive
fire.
The Allied Infantry was once more on the point of giving way. One
Battalion of the Brunswickers was retiring in Close Column, but in
good order; having totally exhausted its ammunition. The Nassauers
were falling back _en masse_ against the horses' heads of the 10th
Hussars; who, keeping their Files closed, prevented further retreat.
VIVIAN and Captain SHAKESPEARE of the 10th (acting as his extra Aide
de Camp), rendered themselves conspicuous at this moment by their
endeavours to halt and encourage the Nassauers. The Hanoverians and
the German Legion on the left, led by KIELMANSEGGE, now resolutely
dashed forward, at the double quick--their drums rolling. The Enemy
fell back. The Brunswickers took up the movement, as then did also
the Nassauers--VIVIAN and his Aide de Camp cheering them on; whilst
the Hussars followed in close support. In this manner, KIELMANSEGGE
succeeded in leading back the shattered remnants of the Division to the
place they had so long and so honourably occupied on the ridge.
VIVIAN's Brigade, by its proximity to these troops, against which so
close and unremitting a fire of musketry was maintained, was placed in
a very trying situation for Cavalry, and suffered much in consequence.
As soon, however, as the Infantry had rallied and resumed their former
position in the Line, VIVIAN withdrew his Brigade under the crest of
the ridge, a distance of not more than thirty yards, to place his men
a little out of fire; and when thus posted, he was better prepared to
make an attack if required.
The fire from the Enemy's Infantry in front of this part of the Line
suddenly slackened; and it was soon manifest that they were falling
back: the change arose out of occurrences on their left, which will be
explained in the next Chapter.