It was not until the night of the 16th, after ZIETEN's and PIRCH's
_Corps d'Armée_ had retired to Tilly and Gentinnes, that it was
decided the Prussian Army should retreat upon Wavre. This decision was
communicated in the Orders then transmitted from the Prussian Head
Quarters to the First and Second _Corps d'Armée_ (ZIETEN's and PIRCH's)
directing them to bivouac at Bierge and St Anne, in the vicinity of
Wavre; as also in the Orders forwarded, on the next morning, to the
bivouacs of the Third and Fourth Corps (THIELEMANN's and BÜLOW's), at
Gembloux and Basse Bodecée, directing them to fall back, and bivouac at
La Bavette and Dion le Mont near Wavre.
ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps retired by Mont St Guibert, in rear of which
Defile the latter Corps remained a considerable time as Rear Guard,
while the former marched on to WAVRE, where it arrived about midday,
crossed the Dyle, and took up its position at Bierge. PIRCH followed
the same route, but took post on the right bank of the Dyle, between St
Anne and Aisemont.
With the first glimmering of daylight the troops, which, under the
command of General JAGOW, had continued in full possession of Bry and
its immediate vicinity during the night, began to retire, firstly, in
the direction of Sombref, and thence to Gembloux, which they reached
before the arrival of THIELEMANN's Corps. After the receipt of the
Order pointing out the direction of the retreat, JAGOW conducted these
troops, in the course of the 17th, towards their respective Brigades.
Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, whose Cavalry Brigade with half a Horse
Battery, formed the Rear Guard of the line of retreat of ZIETEN's and
PIRCH's Corps, received Orders to take up a concealed position between
Tilly and Gentinnes, thence to watch the movements of the Enemy; and,
as soon as he found himself pressed by the latter, to fall back upon
the Defile of Mont St Guibert.
THIELEMANN, who, it will be recollected, had received a message from
GNEISENAU, leaving it optional with him to retire by Tilly or Gembloux,
according to circumstances, decided on falling back upon the latter
point; being well aware that the Enemy was in possession of the
Villages of St Amand and Ligny, and of the Field of Battle to within a
very short distance from Sombref.
He had collected together his widely disseminated Brigades, and drawn
in his Advanced Posts; an operation which, executed in the darkness of
the night, retarded his departure so much that it was two o'clock in
the morning before the Reserve Artillery, which formed the head of the
Column, struck into the road which at Point du Jour, leads from the
Namur _chaussée_ to Gembloux. The Rear Guard of this line of retreat,
which consisted of the Ninth Infantry Brigade, under Major General
BORCKE, and the Reserve Cavalry, under General HOBE, and was drawn
up along the Namur road, having in its front the Fleurus _chaussée_,
leading directly towards the Enemy, did not commence its march until
after four o'clock, when the sun had risen. The main body of the Corps
reached Gembloux at six o'clock in the morning.
On approaching this place, THIELEMANN learned that BÜLOW had posted
the Fourth Corps about three miles in rear of Gembloux, upon the old
Roman road; whereupon Major WEYRACH, Aide de Camp to Prince BLÜCHER,
who had continued with THIELEMANN during the night of the 16th, set off
to seek out the Field Marshal, and to report to him the position and
attendant circumstances of the Third and Fourth _Corps d'Armée_. He
soon succeeded in discovering the Prussian Head Quarters at Mélioreux,
and communicated the above important information to Count GNEISENAU.
THIELEMANN gave his own Corps a halt on the other side of the town, in
order that his troops might obtain rest and refreshment.
* * * * *
The Advance of BÜLOW's Corps had reached Basse Bodecée, upon the old
Roman road, at nightfall of the 16th of June. Here that General became
acquainted with the loss of the Battle of Ligny: whereupon he ordered
the Brigades of his Corps to be posted at intervals along this road,
with the exception of the Thirteenth (under Lieutenant General HAKE),
which was directed to bivouac more to the rear, near Hottoment, where
the same road is intersected by that which conducts from Namur to
Louvain.
Both Corps remained for some hours in a state of uncertainty as to the
direction to be taken for forming a junction with the First and Second
Corps. THIELEMANN wrote to BÜLOW that he had received no Orders from
Prince BLÜCHER, but that he presumed the retreat was upon St Trond. He
also stated that he had not been followed by the Enemy, but that he had
heard distant firing on the right, which he concluded was connected
with the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army.
At length, about half past nine o'clock, Prince BLÜCHER's Aide de Camp,
Major WEYRACH, arrived at BÜLOW's Head Quarters, and brought the
Orders for the retreat of the Fourth Corps to Dion le Mont, near Wavre,
by Walhain and Corbaix. The Orders also required that BÜLOW should post
the main body of his Rear Guard (which consisted of the Fourteenth
Brigade) at Vieux Sart; as also that he should send a Detachment,
consisting of one Regiment of Cavalry, two Battalions of Infantry, and
two guns of Horse Artillery, to the Defile of Mont St Guibert, to act,
in the first instance as a Support to Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, who was
at Tilly, and then, upon the latter falling back, to act as Rear Guard
in this direction. Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR was accordingly detached
upon this duty with the 10th Hussars, the Fusilier Battalions of the
11th Regiment of Infantry and 1st Regiment of Pomeranian Landwehr,
together with two guns from the Horse Battery No. 12. The Corps itself
moved directly upon Dion le Mont, and on reaching the Height near that
town, on which is situated the public house of _A tous vents_, took up
a position close to the intersection of the roads leading to Louvain,
Wavre, and Gembloux.
* * * * *
At two o'clock in the afternoon, THIELEMANN commenced his march upon
Wavre; where the Corps arrived late in the evening, and took up its
position at La Bavette, leaving the Ninth Infantry Brigade (General
BORCKE) and the Cavalry Brigade of Colonel Count LOTTUM, on the right
bank of the Dyle. In this position the Corps was now rejoined by
Colonel MARWITZ' Cavalry Brigade, which had retired by Tilly; as also
by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr, and the two Squadrons
of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, which troops had been left at
Dinant. The Squadron of the 7th Uhlans that had been detached to Onoz,
also joined, but having fallen in with a superior force of the Enemy's
Cavalry, had experienced a great loss. The two Squadrons of the 9th
Hussars, belonging to this Corps, had not yet arrived from Ciney.
* * * * *
The Prussian Head Quarters were established, early on the 17th, at
Wavre. The veteran Field Marshal, who was still suffering considerably
in consequence of his fall, was obliged to seek rest the moment he
arrived there, and did not quit his bed during the remainder of the day.
In the course of the forenoon, Lieutenant MASSOW, who had been
despatched with a message to the Duke of WELLINGTON, returned with the
one from his Grace, communicating the intention of the latter to fall
back upon Waterloo and accept a battle there, provided he received
the support of two Prussian Corps. (See page 264.) There was every
disposition to enter into this proposal, but some degree of uncertainty
existed as to whether BÜLOW's Corps would join the Army on the 17th,
as also a certain misgiving respecting the Park of Ammunition of both
ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, which had been directed upon Gembloux,
a circumstance that excited apprehensions as to the possibility of
furnishing the much needed supply of ammunition to these Corps which
were at hand. In this state of uncertainty, no other resolution could
be adopted than that of holding the position in front and in rear of
the Dyle (with the Advanced Guard of the Fourth Corps as far forward
as Mont St Guibert), until the required ammunition should be obtained;
and BLÜCHER deferred replying to WELLINGTON's communication, in the
hope that his Army would very soon be relieved from the unpleasant
circumstances above mentioned.
* * * * *
While the Prussians were thus effecting their retreat in good order,
along the cross roads of that part of the country (high road there was
none), no corresponding activity manifested itself on the part of the
French, whom the morning's dawn found still lying in their bivouac.
Their Vedettes stood within half a mile of the Columns of THIELEMANN's
Rear Guard; the retreat of which, not having commenced until after
sunrise, might have been easily remarked: and had the French detached
but the smallest Patrol, they could not have failed to discover the
direction of that retreat--whether towards Namur or Gembloux.
It was not until after THIELEMANN had retired a sufficient distance
to escape further notice that any disposition for movement occurred
to disturb the perfect quietude of their repose. Then, PAJOL with a
Division of his Light Cavalry Corps, under Lieutenant General Baron
SOULT, consisting of the 1st, 4th, and 5th Hussars, was detached in
pursuit of the Prussians. He struck into the Namur road, and shortly
afterwards Lieutenant General Baron TESTE's Infantry Division of
LOBAU's Corps (the Sixth), followed in support, and took up a position
on the Heights of Mazy.
PAJOL had not proceeded very far when he perceived a Prussian Battery
retiring upon Namur, which he lost no time in capturing and forwarding
to Head Quarters; where the circumstance strengthened the belief that
BLÜCHER had retreated by that road. It was the Prussian Horse Battery
No. 14, belonging to the Second Corps, which, having towards the end
of the Battle expended every shot, had driven off the Field to procure
a fresh supply of ammunition, but had not succeeded in falling in with
the Reserve Ammunition Waggons. The Battery neither returned to its
own Corps, nor did it comply with THIELEMANN's express Order to march
upon Gembloux, but consumed much time in uselessly driving first in
one direction, and then in another. It was accompanied at this moment
by a Squadron of the 7th Prussian Uhlans, which the Third Corps had
neglected to recall from Onoz. The Squadron retired on the approach of
the French Cavalry, and escaped with a loss of 30 men; but all the guns
fell into the hands of the Enemy.
PAJOL, feeling at last some reason to doubt that Namur was a point in
the Prussian retreat, diverged from the high road, and proceeded to St
Denis, where he was joined by TESTE's Division. A Brigade of EXCELMANS'
Cavalry Corps had been detached to offer support to PAJOL, should
the latter require it; but in consequence of certain information,
gained upon the road, it was subsequently directed to proceed towards
Gembloux, on approaching which it discovered traces of the Prussian
retreat.
GROUCHY, who commanded the Right Wing of the French Army in NAPOLEON's
absence, repaired early in the morning to the Emperor's Quarters at
Fleurus, for instructions, according to an Order he had received
to that effect on the previous evening. He was desired to wait and
accompany the Emperor, who was going to visit the Field of Battle. The
latter, however, did not start from Fleurus until between eight and
nine o'clock, and on reaching St Amand, he examined the approaches by
which this Village had been attacked the day before; then, he rode
about the Field, gave directions for the care of the wounded; and, as
he passed in front of different Regiments, that were falling in without
arms on the ground where they were bivouacked, he was received with
loud cheers. He addressed himself to nearly all the Corps, and assured
them of the lively satisfaction he had felt on witnessing their conduct
in the battle. Having dismounted, he conversed freely, and at great
length, with GROUCHY and GÉRARD, on the state of public opinion in
Paris, the different political parties, and on various other subjects
quite unconnected with those military operations upon the successful
issue of which depended the stability of his present power.
That NAPOLEON should have neglected to follow up the advantages which
fortune had thrown in his way on the morning of the 17th of June, is
quite incomprehensible. With the exception of a Prussian Picquet at
Gentinnes, his whole front as far as Gembloux, was perfectly clear of
an Enemy. WELLINGTON was still in position at Quatre Bras, where his
Left had become exposed by the retreat of the Prussians, and in rear
of which point was the Defile of Genappe. There was nothing to prevent
NAPOLEON from marching directly upon that Defile; and supporting, by
a vigorous attack upon the Anglo-Allied Left and Rear, a simultaneous
movement against the Front by the force under NEY. Whither had fled
the mighty spirit which had shone forth with such dazzling brilliancy
in former Wars, and which had never displayed the energy of its powers
of combination, and activity in following up successes, more eminently
than in the Campaign of the previous year? When before did he omit
pressing every advantage to the utmost, or neglect to seize that moment
of time, in which, having defeated one portion of his Enemies, he was
enabled to fall with combined force upon another? His Army was not more
fatigued than was that of WELLINGTON, which had arrived at Quatre Bras
by forced marches. The troops which he subsequently did lead upon that
point, when it was too late, consisting chiefly of the Imperial Guard
and the Sixth Corps, were comparatively fresh. The former had not been
engaged at Ligny until towards the termination of the action, when
they suffered scarcely any loss; the latter, which arrived later, had
remained intact. The idea of forming a junction with NEY, with a view
of attacking WELLINGTON, was certainly entertained; but its execution
was most unaccountably and unnecessarily delayed until its intended
effect could not but fall powerless upon a vigilant Enemy, fully
prepared, by having improved the precious moments of time, thus lost,
to detect the purpose of the movement, and to ward off the intended
blow.
With an Army greatly inferior in numbers to the united forces of
his adversaries, NAPOLEON's prospects of success rested exclusively
upon his utmost skill and address, not only in preventing that union
of force, but also in so planning, arranging, and executing his
combinations, that having succeeded in defeating one opponent with
a superior mass, he might then precipitate himself in like manner
upon another, at the very moment when the latter might be occupied
or engaged with one of his Marshals. This would have exacted of him
the most untiring energy, the application of all his great resources
in strategical science, a lightning-swift decision, and a daring
resolution both in adopting and in executing all his movements. It
was by the exercise of such powerful mental resources as these, that,
unaided by a sufficiently corresponding amount of physical force, he
had conducted the Campaign of 1814; but the spirit by which they were
conceived, and the genius which instinctively seized the means of their
execution, seemed to have abandoned him in this, his last, Campaign:
a faint gleam of the old spirit was visible in its opening movements,
but it was now rather a wildfire, dazzling him for a moment, on the
downward path to his destiny, than the Star which had so often led
him to victory. The last flash of his genius was brief, and, on the
memorable plains of Fleurus, seemed to disappear, and leave him in
utter darkness.
The same fatal inactivity which had marked the French Emperor's
proceedings on the evening of the 15th, and during the morning of
the 16th, again manifested itself upon the 17th of June: and it was
not until nearly noon of this day, upon receiving a report of a
reconnaissance, made in the direction of Quatre Bras, and upon learning
that a considerable body of Prussians had been discovered at Gembloux,
that he made any disposition for the movement of his troops, beyond the
previous detaching of PAJOL's Light Cavalry in pursuit of the Prussians
along the Namur road.
He now ordered the following troops to proceed to occupy a position in
advance of Marbais, across the Namur road, facing Quatre Bras:--
LOBAU's Infantry Corps (the Sixth), with the exception of the Twenty
First Division, under Lieutenant General TESTE, which had already
been detached in support of PAJOL;
MILHAUD's Corps of Heavy Cavalry (_Cuirassiers_), Lieutenant General
Baron SUBERVIE's Light Cavalry Brigade, from PAJOL's Corps;
the Third Light Cavalry Division (belonging to the Third Corps),
under Lieutenant General Baron DOMON; and the Imperial Guard, both
Cavalry and Infantry.
To Marshal GROUCHY he confided the pursuit of the Prussians, and for
this purpose he placed at his disposal as great an extent of force as
his limited means would admit: a force, certainly not sufficient to
enable that Marshal to confront the whole Prussian Army, should the
latter, after having rallied and concentrated its strength, make a
stand against him, but quite so to enable him to watch its movements,
and to manoeuvre so as to maintain his communication with the main
Army, and, if pressed by superior numbers, to effect a junction with
NAPOLEON.
The following were the troops thus detached under GROUCHY:--
+---------------------------------------+--------+-------+---------+----+
| |Infantry|Cavalry|Artillery|Guns|
+---------------------------------------+--------+-------+---------+----+
|Third Corps, General Count VANDAMME | 14,508 | | 936 | 32|
| | | | | |
|Fourth Corps, General Count GÉRARD | 12,589 | 2,366 | 1,538 | 38|
| | | | | |
|Twenty first Division (Sixth Corps), }| | | | |
| Lieutenant General Baron TESTE }| 2,316 | | 161 | 8|
| | | | | |
|Fourth Division (First Cavalry Corps),}| | | | |
| Lieutenant General Count PAJOL }| | 1,234 | 154 | 6|
| | | | | |
|Second Cavalry Corps, Lieutenant }| | | | |
| General Count EXCELMANS }| | 2,817 | 246 | 12|
| +--------+-------+---------+----+
| | 29,413 | 6,417 | 3,035 | 96|
|Deduct loss on 16th, | 3,900 | 800 | 400 | |
| +--------+-------+---------+----+
| Total | 25,513 | 5,617 | 2,635 | 96|
+---------------------------------------+--------+-------+---------+----+
33,765 men and 96 guns.
The Seventh Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General GIRARD
(belonging to the Second Corps) having suffered very severely in the
Battle, was left upon the Field.
NAPOLEON's instructions to GROUCHY were extremely simple and concise:
"Pursue the Prussians, complete their defeat by attacking them as soon
as you come up with them, and never let them out of your sight. I am
going to unite the remainder of this portion of the Army with Marshal
NEY's Corps, to march against the English, and to fight them if they
should hold their ground between this and the Forest of Soignies. You
will communicate with me by the paved road which leads to Quatre Bras."
No particular direction was prescribed, because the Emperor was totally
ignorant of the real line of the Prussian retreat. At the same time
he was strongly impressed with the idea that BLÜCHER had retired upon
Namur and Liege, with a view to occupy the line of the Meuse, whence
he might seriously endanger the Right of the French Army, as also its
main line of operation, should it advance upon Brussels.
GROUCHY did not hesitate to remark to the Emperor, that the Prussians,
having commenced their retreat at ten o'clock the previous night, had
gained several hours' start of the troops with which he was to follow
them; that although the reports received from the Advanced Cavalry
conveyed no positive information as to the direction in which the great
mass of the Prussian Army had effected its retreat, appearances as yet
seemed to justify the supposition that BLÜCHER had fallen back upon
Namur; and that as he would thus have to pursue in a direction contrary
to that which NAPOLEON was himself going to take, with very little
chance of being able to prevent the execution of any dispositions the
Prussians might have resolved upon when quitting the Field of Battle,
he begged to be allowed to follow the Emperor in his projected movement
upon Quatre Bras.
NAPOLEON declined to entertain this proposition, repeated the Order
he had already given to him, adding that it rested with him (GROUCHY)
to discover the route taken by the Prussians, whose defeat he was to
complete by attacking them the moment he came up with them; while he
himself would proceed to fight the English.
* * * * *
The Order was immediately given for the advance of the troops
previously assembled near Marbais, preceded by SUBERVIE's Division of
Light Cavalry, as Advanced Guard. By the time they reached Quatre Bras,
which was about two o'clock, the whole of WELLINGTON's Infantry had
crossed the Genappe, and was retiring along the high road to Brussels,
protected by the Cavalry, which was now pressed by the French, in the
manner described in the preceding Chapter.
The march of the French troops through Bry, in the direction of Quatre
Bras, became known to the Prussians through Lieutenant Colonel SOHR,
who still held his Cavalry Brigade, even at this time, posted in
rear of Tilly. Shortly afterwards, some of the French Cavalry having
approached, he began to retire slowly towards Mont St Guibert, and, as
he frequently formed up, in wait for the Enemy, he did not reach that
point until the evening of the 17th. Here he found Lieutenant Colonel
LEDEBUR, who had arrived with his Detachment, and had received Orders
to maintain the Defile.
* * * * *
Upon the departure of NAPOLEON, GROUCHY ordered VANDAMME and GÉRARD to
get their Corps under arms, and to move them, in the first instance,
to the junction of the Gembloux road with that to Namur; and having
subsequently received intelligence that a considerable body of
Prussians had passed through the former town, he desired that those two
Corps should continue their movement upon that point. In the mean time,
he repaired to the Advanced Posts of EXCELMANS' Dragoons, which were by
this time beyond Gembloux. It was part of this Cavalry which followed
Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, on the left. They merely threw out Skirmishers
against him; and, as night set in, they abandoned the pursuit in this
direction.
The Corps of VANDAMME and GÉRARD did not reach Gembloux until very late
in the evening. The former was posted in advance, the latter, in rear,
of the town; near which also, and on the right bank of the Ormeau,
was stationed the Sixth Light Cavalry Division, under General VALLIN,
who succeeded to the command, upon Lieutenant General MAURIN being
wounded at the Battle of Ligny. The First Brigade of Lieutenant General
CHASTEL's Tenth Cavalry Division, consisting of the 4th and 12th
Dragoons, under General BONNEMAIN, was pushed on to Sart à Wallain,
and the 15th Dragoons (from General VINCENT's Brigade of the Ninth
Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron SOULT), were detached
to Perwès. From both these points, reports were sent into Gembloux that
the Prussians had retired upon Wavre.
PAJOL, with his Light Cavalry and TESTE's Infantry Division, had
returned from St Denis, between Namur and Gembloux, to the original
position occupied by the latter in the morning, at Mazy, in the
immediate vicinity of the Field of Ligny; a movement for which no
satisfactory cause has ever been assigned.
The extent of information obtained by GROUCHY concerning the Prussian
retreat, and the nature of the dispositions which he adopted in
consequence, will be best explained by the following despatch which he
addressed to the Emperor:--
"Gembloux, le 17 Juin, "Gembloux, 17th June,
à dix heures du soir. at ten o'clock in the evening.
"Sire,--J'ai l'honneur de vous "Sire,--I have the honour to report
rendre compte que j'occupe to you that I occupy Gembloux,
Gembloux et que ma Cavalerie est à and that my Cavalry is at
Sauvenières. L'Ennemi, fort d'environ Sauvenières. The Enemy, about thirty
trente mille hommes, continue thousand men strong, continues his
son mouvement de retraite; movement of retreat. We have seized
on lui a saisi ici un parc de 400 here of his, a pen of 400 horned
bêtes à cornes, des magasins et des cattle, magazines and baggage.
bagages.
"Il paraît d'après tous les rapports, "It would appear according to
qu'arrivés à Sauvenières, les all the reports, that, on arrival at
Prussiens se sont divisés en deux Sauvenières, the Prussians divided
Colonnes: l'une a dû prendre la themselves into two Columns: one
route de Wavre, en passant par of which took the road to Wavre,
Sart à Wallain, l'autre Colonne passing by Sart à Wallain; the
paraît s'être dirigée sur Perwès. other Column would appear to have
been directed on Perwès.
"On peut peutêtre en inférer "It may perhaps be inferred from
qu'une portion va joindre WELLINGTON, this that one portion is going to
et que le Centre, qui est l'Armée join WELLINGTON; and that the
de BLÜCHER, se retire sur Liège: Centre, which is the Army of
une autre Colonne avec de BLÜCHER, is retiring on Liege.
l'Artillerie ayant fait son mouvement Another Column with Artillery having
de retraite par Namur, le Général made its retreat by Namur, General
EXCELMANS a Ordre de pousser ce EXCELMANS has the Order to push this
soir six Escadrons sur Sart à Wallain evening six Squadrons on to Sart à
et trois Escadrons sur Perwès. Wallain, and three Squadrons on to
D'après leur rapport, si la masse Perwès. According to their report,
des Prussiens se retire sur Wavre, if the mass of the Prussians is
je la suivrai dans cette direction, retiring on Wavre, I shall follow
afin qu'ils ne puissent pas gagner them in that direction, so as to
Bruxelles, et de les séparer de prevent them from reaching Brussels,
WELLINGTON. and to keep them separated from
WELLINGTON.
"Si, au contraire, mes renseignemens "If, on the contrary, my enquiries
prouvent que la principale prove that the principal Prussian
force Prussienne a marche sur Perwès, force has marched on Perwès, I
je me dirigerai par cette ville shall proceed by that town in
à la poursuite de l'Ennemi. pursuit of the Enemy.
"Les Généraux THIELEMANN et "Generals THIELEMANN and
BORSTEL faisaient partie de BORSTEL formed part of the Army
l'Armée que Votre Majesté a that your Majesty defeated yesterday.
battue hier; ils étaient encore ce They were still here at 10 o'clock
matin à 10 heures ici, et ont this morning, and have announced
annoncé que vingt mille hommes des that twenty thousand of their men
leurs avaient été mis hors de combat. have been disabled. They
Ils ont demande en partant asked, in leaving, the distances of
les distances de Wavre, Perwès Wavre, Perwès, and Hannut.
et Hannut. BLÜCHER a été BLÜCHER has been slightly wounded
blessé légèrement au bras, ce qui in the arm; which, however, has not
ne l'a pas empêché de continuer hindered him from continuing to
à commander après s'être fait command after having his wound
panser. Il n'a point passé par dressed. He has not passed by
Gembloux. Gembloux.
"Je suis avec respect, de "I am with respect,
Votre Majesté, "Sire,
"Sire, le fidèle sujet, "The faithful subject of
"Le Maréchal Comte DE "YOUR MAJESTY,
GROUCHY." "Marshal Count DE GROUCHY."
Although the information conveyed in this despatch was incorrect on
some points, and imperfect on others, inasmuch as it represented that
Prussian Columns had retired upon Namur and Perwès, which was not the
case, and gave no account of the Columns (First and Second Corps) which
had retreated by Tilly and Gentinnes, still it was well calculated to
satisfy NAPOLEON, that at least the spirit of his instructions had been
understood by the Marshal. The latter had stated that he suspected
a portion of the Prussian troops was proceeding to join WELLINGTON,
and that, should he ascertain, through his Cavalry detached to Sart à
Wallain and Perwès, that the great mass of the Prussians was retiring
upon Wavre, it was his intention to pursue them in that direction, "so
as to prevent them from reaching Brussels, and to keep them separated
from WELLINGTON."
Four hours afterwards (that is, at two o'clock on the morning of the
18th) he sent off another despatch to the Emperor, reporting that he
had decided on marching upon either Corbaix or Wavre.
* * * * *
The retreat of the Prussian Army, after its defeat at Ligny on the 16th
of June, was conducted with great skill, and executed in very good
order. By detaining THIELEMANN's Corps upon the Field of Battle until
the morning of the 17th, ample security was afforded to the line of
retreat by Gembloux; and by not withdrawing BÜLOW's Corps from that
town until THIELEMANN drew near to it, the distance between the main
bodies of these two Corps became so limited as to present the ready
means of opposing their combined force to a vigorous pursuit should
such be attempted.
By the evening of the 17th, the entire Prussian Army (with the
exception of the Ninth and Thirteenth Brigades, and the Reserve
Cavalry of the Third Corps, which arrived by six o'clock on the
following morning) had assembled in the immediate vicinity of
Wavre--two Corps on the right, and the remaining two Corps on the left,
bank of the Dyle--in perfect order, and fully prepared to resume the
offensive. Upon the two lines of retreat, the Rear Guards were well
disposed at Vieux Sart and Mont St Guibert; where they continued during
that night, and whence they retired leisurely on the following day.
On the Prussian Left, Patrols were despatched towards the main road
leading from Namur to Louvain. On the Right, a Detachment was sent
from ZIETEN's Corps to Limale, on the left bank of the Dyle, to cover
the Flank, and Patrols were pushed higher up the river, to communicate
with the Post of Mont St Guibert. Major FALKENHAUSEN had been detached,
during the day, to Seroulx for the purpose of reconnoitring the country
in the vicinity of Genappe, and of the high road to Brussels; and he
succeeded in discovering, from the wooded tracts beyond Seroulx, the
advance of the French Army along the _chaussée_. Patrols were also
detached towards Lasne, Couture, and Aywiers, to observe the Defiles
along the rivulet of the Lasne.
Such were the dispositions of the defeated Prussians on the evening of
the 17th, while the victorious French had not advanced beyond Gembloux.
The former had fallen back, in good order, upon a line with, and a
short distance from, the Anglo-Allied Army on their Right; while their
opponents, though encountering no obstacle of importance, had made but
little progress, and were widely diverging from, instead of closely
co-operating with, the main Army from which they had been detached.
These dispositions, so ably planned and so efficiently performed,
were well calculated to facilitate the grand operation of the morrow,
namely, BLÜCHER's flank movement to the right, to effect a junction
with WELLINGTON.
The retreat to Wavre did not in any way incapacitate the Prussian Army
for the resumption of actively offensive operations. With respect
to its material, it so happened that the Park of Reserve Ammunition
Waggons had, in the first instance, been directed upon Gembloux; and
Colonel RÖHL, who superintended the Ordnance Department of the Army,
sent his Aide de Camp during the night of the 16th to conduct this
Reserve to Wavre; whilst he himself hastened to the latter town,
for the purpose of putting the whole of the Artillery, accordingly
as it arrived there, again in a fit state for action. The supply of
ammunition, however, was necessarily incomplete; but in order to
prevent any failure in this respect, should some mishap occur to
the Park of Reserve Ammunition Waggons, a Courier was despatched to
Maestricht, with directions for the speedy transport of a supply of
ammunition from thence to the Army, by means of the common waggons
of the country. Similar Orders were conveyed to Cologne, Wesel, and
Münster: and, by way of precaution, an express was sent to Liege for
the removal of the Battering Train to Maestricht; as also for the
destruction, in case of danger, of the iron foundry in the Arsenal of
the former place.
Fortunately, however, the Reserve Ammunition Waggons reached Wavre
safely at five o'clock in the afternoon of the 17th. The Corps and
Batteries were furnished with a complete supply of ammunition, and the
Army was thus placed in a perfectly efficient state for commencing
another battle. This turn of affairs was most encouraging, and BLÜCHER
delayed not another moment in despatching to WELLINGTON the reply to
which allusion has already been made. (See page 285.)
As regards the influence which the defeat at Ligny exercised over
the _morale_ of the Prussian Army, its injurious effects were made
manifest amongst the newly raised drafts from the Rhenish and
Westphalian Provinces, and from the Duchy of Berg. Of these troops,
8,000 men betook themselves to a flight which admitted of no check
until they reached Liege and Aix la Chapelle. Among the Rhenish
troops, particularly those from Provinces which had formerly belonged
to France, there were many old French soldiers; and although several
of them fought with great bravery, others evinced a bad disposition,
and there were instances in which they passed over to their former
companions in arms. Such, however, was not the case with the troops
from the other western districts of the Prussian State: there was
scarcely a single man amongst the missing, who belonged to any of the
old Westphalian Provinces, Mark, Cleve, Minden, and Ravensberg, whilst
several came from that of Münster.
But the _morale_ of the great mass of the Prussian Army continued
unshaken. The spirit of the troops was neither tamed nor broken; and
their enthusiasm, though damped, had not been subdued. Unbounded
confidence was placed in the firm decision and restless energy of
their aged and venerated Chief; who, though suffering from the effects
of his fall, by which his whole frame had sustained a severe shock,
evinced not the slightest apprehension of fatal consequences to the
Campaign resulting from this defeat. His unbending nature led him
to cast aside for the moment those purely political interests and
theoretically strategical principles, by which a more cautious and less
enterprising Commander might have been induced to secure the line of
the Meuse, and to preserve his direct communications with the Prussian
States, and thus afford but a doubtful and an inefficient support to
his Ally. Placing full reliance on the resources of his own mind, and
on the stern, warlike character of his troops; he devoted his whole
energies to the attainment of the one grand object--that of crushing
NAPOLEON by combining with WELLINGTON. This confidence in himself and
in his soldiers was strikingly and characteristically manifested in
the concluding words of a General Order which he issued to the Army
on the morning of the 17th. "I shall immediately lead you against the
Enemy;--we shall beat him, because it is our duty to do so."
Towards midnight of the 17th, a communication reached BLÜCHER from
General MÜFFLING (already mentioned as having been attached to the
British Head Quarters) to the following effect. "The Anglo-Allied Army
is posted with its Right upon Braine l'Alleud, its Centre upon Mont St
Jean, and its Left near La Haye; having the Enemy in its front. The
Duke awaits the attack, but calculates upon Prussian support."
This intelligence was forwarded, at midnight, to General Count BÜLOW,
accompanied by the following Order:--"You will therefore, at daybreak,
march with the Fourth Corps from Dion le Mont, through Wavre, taking
the direction of Chapelle St Lambert, in which vicinity you will keep
your force concealed as much as possible, in case the Enemy should
not, by that time, be seriously engaged with the Duke of WELLINGTON;
but should it be otherwise, you will make a most vigorous attack upon
the Enemy's Right Flank. The Second Corps will follow you as a direct
Support: the First and Third Corps will also be held in readiness to
move in the same direction if necessary. You will leave a Detachment in
observation at Mont St Guibert; which, if pressed, will gradually fall
back upon Wavre. All the Baggage Train, and everything not actually
required in the Field of Action, will be sent to Louvain."
Instructions, in conformity with the above, were also forwarded to
the Commanders of the other Corps; and a communication of these
arrangements was despatched to General MÜFFLING, with an explanation
that the fatigue of the troops could not possibly admit of earlier
support. This General was, at the same time, requested to forward
timely intelligence of the attack upon the Duke, and of the nature of
that attack, that measures might be adopted accordingly.
* * * * *
At five o'clock on the morning of the 18th, PAJOL started from Mazy,
with SOULT's Cavalry Division and TESTE's Infantry Division, marching
by St Denis and Grand Lez, to Tourinnes; where he was to await further
Orders. At about eight o'clock, EXCELMANS' Corps of Heavy Cavalry,
consisting of eight Regiments of Dragoons, was put in motion; and at
nine o'clock, VANDAMME's and GÉRARD's Infantry Corps began their march
along one and the same road, by Sart à Wallain, upon Wavre. The Left of
this Column was protected, towards the Dyle, by the advance of MAURIN's
Division of Light Cavalry, under General VALLIN.
It was about half past ten o'clock, when EXCELMANS' Advanced Guard came
up with the Prussian Rear Guard, on the road to Wavre. He immediately
formed his troops in position, resting their Left upon the wooded
ravine near the Farm of La Plaquerie, and their Right in the direction
of Neuf Sart. While his Skirmishers were engaged with those of the
Enemy, he sent the _Chef d'Escadron_ D'ESTOURMEL, to inform Marshal
GROUCHY of what was going on in front, and also to make known to him
that the Prussian Army had continued its retreat upon Wavre during a
part of the night and that morning, for the purpose of forming a closer
communication with the Duke of WELLINGTON's forces.
The march of the Third and Fourth Corps was greatly retarded by the
bad state of the roads, and frequent halts were occasioned by the
narrowness and miry nature of the Defiles. GÉRARD, having preceded
the Column, reached Sart à Wallain at eleven o'clock, where he found
GROUCHY breakfasting in the house of M. HOLLAËRT, a Notary. In about
half an hour after his arrival, Colonel SIMON LORIÈRE, who was acting
as his Chief of the Staff, suddenly heard, while walking in the garden
of the house, a distant but violent cannonade, of which he immediately
went to apprise his General. GROUCHY repaired at once to the garden,
accompanied by GÉRARD, VANDAMME, EXCELMANS, and several other Officers.
He immediately called for M. HOLLAËRT, and asked him in what part of
the country he considered this tremendous cannonade to be going on. The
latter, pointing to the Forest of Soignies, replied that it must be in
the direction of Planchenoit, Mont St Jean, and that vicinity.
GÉRARD then declared his opinion to be in favour of the expediency
of marching in the direction of the cannonade, in order to connect
the movements of the detached force more closely with NAPOLEON's
operations; and offered to lead his own Corps towards the Battle. This
measure was opposed by the Marshal, as also by General BALTUS, of the
Artillery, who represented the difficulties of a march in which this
Arm might be compromised. On the other hand, General VALAZE, Commanding
Engineer of GÉRARD's Corps, after having coincided in the opinion
expressed by the latter, observed that he had three Companies of
Sappers, by aid of which he could remove many obstacles. GÉRARD then
gave his assurance that he could at all events move on with the gun
carriages and limbers.
GROUCHY, however, stated his determination to act in conformity with
his instructions; which were, to pursue and attack the Prussians, and
never to lose sight of them. It had just been intimated to him that
his troops had come up with a Rear Guard of the Enemy's Infantry, and
he did not consider his information was sufficient to warrant the
conclusion that BLÜCHER was drawn up, in expectation of being attacked
by him at Wavre; or that he would continue his retreat upon Brussels;
or, that if, in manoeuvring to effect his junction with WELLINGTON, he
would do so in front, or in rear, of the Forest of Soignies.
He has since declared, that he did not deem it his duty to follow the
counsel given by GÉRARD, but to attack the Prussians; that to effect
the proposed movement with the whole of his forces would have been
acting contrary to his Orders; that to have detached only a portion of
those forces in the direction of the Forest of Soignies, would have
been to separate the two Corps of his Army by a river, whose waters
were swollen by the rain, and whose banks were swampy, and thus have
rendered their mutual support impossible, however essential it might
have become; finally, that a war of inspiration appertains alone to the
General in Chief, and that his Lieutenants must confine themselves to
that of execution. Hence the march to Wavre was continued.
Whilst proceeding to the Advanced Guard, GROUCHY received the despatch,
dated from the Farm of Caillou, the 18th of June, at ten o'clock in
the morning, acquainting him that the Emperor was going to attack the
Anglo-Allied Army, in its position at Waterloo; desiring him to direct
his movements upon Wavre in such a manner as to draw his forces nearer
to those of NAPOLEON, and, especially, to keep up a close communication
with the latter.
The receipt of these instructions was not followed by any immediate
change in GROUCHY's dispositions. He despatched no Cavalry force--not
even a single Patrol--to watch any movements that might be attempted,
or actually then in course of execution, by the Prussians, towards
the Field on which the Emperor had intimated to him his intention
of attacking the force under WELLINGTON; and hence it is almost
needless to add, that he neglected to establish that close and active
communication with the main Army which was so essentially important for
the accomplishment of the object of the general plan of operations, and
to which NAPOLEON had especially directed his attention in the before
mentioned despatch. His sole aim seemed to be a direct advance upon
Wavre; and this he carried into execution without at all detaching to,
or in any way manoeuvring by, his left. On the contrary, upon arriving
in person at the position occupied by EXCELMANS, he desired the latter
to move to his right, and take post at Dion le Mont; and the ground
thus vacated was shortly afterwards taken up by VALLIN's Light Cavalry
Division.
* * * * *
At daybreak of the 18th of June, BÜLOW, in conformity with the
Order which he had received during the previous night from BLÜCHER,
quitted his position near Dion le Mont, to march through Wavre to St
Lambert. This was the commencement of the important flank movement
of the Prussians in support of the Anglo-Allied Army in position in
front of Waterloo; and every measure of precaution was adopted with
a view to its being carried into effect with certainty and safety.
The sun had not yet risen when Major WITOWSKY was despatched with a
Detachment of the 2nd Silesian Hussars, to Maransart, for the purpose
of closely reconnoitring the Defiles of the Lasne, which had already
been patrolled the evening before, and to observe the country in front
of those Defiles, in the direction of the Enemy's position. Major
FALKENHAUSEN, previously mentioned as having pushed a reconnaissance
beyond Seroulx on the 17th, was now directed also to reconnoitre the
Lasne. Scouring parties were sent out, which kept up the communication
that had been opened the previous day with Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR
at Mont St Guibert: the whole country between the Dyle and the
Charleroi high road was carefully explored; and correct intelligence
was continually sent to the rear concerning the French Army.
By means of this vigilant look out, the Prussians secured the important
advantage of retarding the communications between the French Emperor
and his Marshal, since it compelled the bearer of despatches to pursue
a very circuitous route.
At half past nine o'clock, on the morning of the 18th, whilst BÜLOW's
Corps was on the march to St Lambert, the following additional despatch
was forwarded to General MÜFFLING:--
"Wavre, 18th June 1815, at half past nine o'clock.
"I request you will say to the Duke of WELLINGTON, in my name, that
even ill as I am, I shall, nevertheless, put myself at the head of my
troops, for the purpose of immediately attacking the Enemy's Right
Flank, should NAPOLEON undertake anything against the Duke. If,
however, the day should pass over without a hostile attack, it is my
opinion that we ought tomorrow, with our combined forces, to attack
the French Army. I commission you to communicate this as the result
of my inward conviction, and to represent to him that I consider this
proposal to be the best and most suitable in our present position.
"BLÜCHER."
The Prussians very soon discovered that the French had made no
disposition whatever for the protection of their Right Flank. Major
WITOWSKY had proceeded as far as Maransart before he fell in with an
Enemy's Patrol; and Major FALKENHAUSEN found the Defiles of the Lasne
perfectly free and unobserved. Upon receiving this intelligence,
BLÜCHER decided upon supporting the Anglo-Allied Army, by directing the
march of his whole force, or at least of three Corps, towards the Wood
of Paris, and debouching from thence upon the Flank and Rear of the
Enemy; and Major LÜTZOW was immediately despatched for the purpose of
narrowly watching, from the other side of the above Wood, the French
movements directed against the position of the Anglo-Allied Army.
No report as yet had been received from the Rear Guard, concerning
GROUCHY's advance, and as BLÜCHER's object was now to gain the Defiles
of the Lasne without interruption, and to occupy in force the Wood of
Paris, he determined to avail himself of the time and opportunity which
offered for the projected movement. Being, however, uncertain as to the
amount of GROUCHY's force, the Prince deemed it advisable that Wavre
should not be abandoned until the greater part of the Army had passed
the Defiles of St Lambert; and with this view, he directed that as soon
as BÜLOW's Corps should have proceeded beyond Wavre, ZIETEN's Corps
was to commence its march by Fromont and Ohain to join the Left Wing
of WELLINGTON's Army near La Haye. PIRCH's Corps was ordered to follow
BÜLOW's in the direction of St Lambert; and THIELEMANN's Corps, after
retaining possession of the Defile of Wavre sufficiently long to render
the general movement of the Army secure, was then gradually to follow
ZIETEN's Corps upon Ohain.
An unfortunate incident occurred during the passage of BÜLOW's Corps,
through Wavre, which materially impeded the march of the troops. The
Advanced Guard, consisting of the Fifteenth Brigade (under General
LOSTHIN), with the 2nd Silesian Hussars, and a twelve pounder Battery,
had scarcely passed through the town when a fire broke out in the
main street, and extended itself with great rapidity. This not only
caused a suspension of the march of the main body of the Corps, but
created much alarm, in consequence of the great number of ammunition
waggons in the place. Every exertion was made to extinguish the fire.
The 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment, under Major LÖWENFELD, and the
7th Pioneer Company, were ordered upon this duty; and after they had
encountered considerable difficulty, their efforts were crowned with
success.
In the mean time the Advanced Guard of BÜLOW's Corps had continued its
march, and reached St Lambert by eleven o'clock. The Sixteenth, and
then the Thirteenth, Brigade arrived much later; and the Fourteenth
Brigade, which formed the Rear Guard, was a long way behind. The
Advanced Guard did not wait the arrival of the other Brigades, but
proceeded forthwith to cross the Defile of St Lambert. Having effected
the passage, which was attended with great difficulty, in consequence
of the soft and miry state of the valley, it halted in the Wood of
Paris, where it continued a considerable time, waiting for the approach
of the main body. Patrols, however, from the 2nd Silesian Hussars, were
immediately sent forward to feel for the Anglo-Allied Left, and to
reconnoitre the French Right.
ZIETEN's Corps (the First) commenced its march, upon the left bank of
the Dyle, towards Ohain, about noon.
Whilst BÜLOW's Reserve Cavalry, following the Thirteenth Infantry
Brigade, was passing through Wavre, French Cavalry had penetrated
between the Rear Guard of this Corps, at Vieux Sart, and the Detachment
under Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR at Mont St Guibert. The 2nd
Pomeranian, and the 1st Silesian, Landwehr Cavalry were immediately
detached from the Reserve Cavalry of the Corps, to aid in checking the
advance of the Enemy.
The Prussian Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR, who was still at Mont St
Guibert, having received intelligence of the approach of the French,
decided on commencing his retreat towards Wavre. Lieutenant Colonel
SOHR, who had fallen back early in the morning from Mont St Guibert,
sent 150 Cavalry and two guns of Horse Artillery as a reinforcement to
LEDEBUR. The latter now succeeded in forming a junction with the two
Cavalry Regiments detached from the Reserve, as also, subsequently,
with the Cavalry Brigade under SOHR, after a slight affair with the
Third French Corps (VANDAMME's), whilst making good his retreat to
Auzel.
PIRCH's Corps (the Second) broke up from its position between St Anne
and Aisemont, on the right bank of the Dyle, about noon, for the
purpose of passing the Defile of Wavre. The 1st Battalion of the 14th
Regiment, which occupied this town, was relieved by a Battalion of
the 30th Regiment, belonging to the Third Corps (THIELEMANN's). PIRCH
had just put his Corps in motion, with a view to cross the Dyle by
the town of Wavre, when the approach of the Enemy was announced. The
Defile was crowded with the troops; the progress of their march could
not be otherwise than slow; and at this moment Lieutenant Colonel SOHR,
whose Brigade formed the Rear Guard of the Corps, sent in word, that
the Enemy presented a force of six Regiments of Cavalry, ten pieces of
Artillery, and two strong Columns of Infantry.
The Wood of Sarats, close to the Farm of Auzel, was now occupied
by some Battalions of the Eighth Brigade, the command of which had
devolved upon Colonel RECKOW. PIRCH placed the whole of the Rear Guard
under the Orders of General BRAUSE, the Commander of the Seventh
Brigade, and reinforced Lieutenant Colonel SOHR with the 11th Hussars
and four pieces of Horse Artillery. BRAUSE posted the remaining
Battalions of the Eighth Brigade in rear of the Wood, and the three
Regiments of Cavalry on the right, with the Foot Battery No. 12 in
their front. The Seventh Brigade, deployed into line, remained in
reserve.
Lieutenant Colonel LEDEBUR retired slowly before the Enemy, and
formed a junction with the Eighth Brigade, under Colonel RECKOW; who
maintained his position until three o'clock in the afternoon, against
the Advanced Guard of VANDAMME's Corps. Between three and four o'clock,
General BRAUSE ordered the retreat. Lieutenant Colonel SOHR crossed the
Bridge at the Mill of Bierge, which was occupied by two Companies of
the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment; and then followed the Reserve
Cavalry of PIRCH's Corps, to which his Brigade belonged, but which he
did not overtake until he reached the Field of Waterloo. The Enemy did
not advance with much vigour; the retreat was conducted with perfect
order, and the Fusilier Battalion of the 1st Pomeranian Landwehr, under
Major KRÜGER, distinguished itself on the occasion. After the passage
of the river had been effected, the 1st Battalion of the Elbe Landwehr
remained at Bierge until the Bridge was destroyed and the Mill set on
fire. The 11th Hussars and the 2nd Battalion of the Elbe Landwehr were
posted in observation of the passages across the Dyle, and did not
rejoin the Corps before the following day.
BLÜCHER had quitted Wavre before eleven o'clock in the forenoon, and
repaired to the vicinity of Limale, in order to make himself acquainted
with the nature of the country in the direction of St Lambert. Whilst
here, he received intelligence of the approach of the Enemy towards
Wavre. Colonel CLAUSEWITZ, Chief of the Staff of the Third Corps, was
immediately made the bearer of an Order for THIELEMANN to defend the
position at this place, in the event of the Enemy advancing in force;
but, should the latter cross the Dyle higher up the stream, or not
appear in great strength (a point concerning which nothing positive
was then known), he was to leave only a few Battalions in position at
Wavre, and to follow the main Army, with his Corps, as a Reserve, in
the direction of Couture.
* * * * *
GROUCHY's movements, on the 17th and 18th, form so striking a feature
in the history of this Campaign, and exercised so important an
influence upon the fate of the decisive Battle of Waterloo, that it
becomes an essential point in the study of that history, to examine
how far he complied with, and carried into effect, the instructions
received from his Master, and to what degree his proceedings,
consequent upon his ascertaining the direction of the Prussian retreat,
coincided with the general plan and object of NAPOLEON's operations. On
a reference to the account of his transactions during the 17th, given
in the despatch written at ten o'clock on that night, it appears he
was completely ignorant of the line by which the principal mass of the
Prussian Army had retreated, namely, that of Tilly and Gentinnes, by
ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, although his Cavalry had driven back the
Prussian Detachment from the latter place to Mont St Guibert, but from
whence it appears to have been withdrawn in the night. His attention
seems to have been much less devoted to this quarter than it was to his
Right, in which direction he detached as far as Perwès. The main body
of his forces did not proceed further than Gembloux on the 17th, that
is, about five miles from the Field of Ligny.
Upon a first consideration, we are strongly impressed by the striking
contrast between this march, in pursuit of a defeated Army, which had
commenced its retreat on the previous night, and which presented no
check to the advance, and the march of NAPOLEON from the same Field,
by Quatre Bras and Genappe, as far as La Belle Alliance, in front of
the Waterloo position, a distance of about sixteen or seventeen miles;
and this, too, in rear of a victorious Army, with a Cavalry Rear Guard
boldly and successfully impeding the advance of its pursuers. It must,
however, be taken into account, that in one most important respect
NAPOLEON possessed a decided advantage over GROUCHY--an advantage,
the magnitude of which increased with every moment that elapsed after
the wet weather had set in; for while the former moved the whole
distance along a paved high road, the latter had to proceed entirely
by cross roads, which may more properly be designated common field
roads. It is to this particular point that both GROUCHY and GÉRARD
refer in justification of the late arrival of the Infantry at Gembloux.
Nevertheless, GROUCHY detached considerably to his Right, with his
Cavalry, misled by the same idea which had prevailed with NAPOLEON,
that BLÜCHER had retreated upon the Meuse; and the very circumstance
of his Dragoons having reached Perwès on the night of the 17th,
proves that had he organised a more extended, more combined, and more
energetic reconnaissance, with the sixty five Squadrons of Cavalry
which had been placed under his orders, he might have connected his
operations on the right of the Dyle with those of NAPOLEON on the left
of that river, by occupying the line of Nil St Vincent, Corbaix, Mont
St Guibert, and the Bridge of Moustier. The only check he would have
experienced would have been at the Prussian Post of Mont St Guibert;
which, however, in the case of an active reconnaissance, as above,
might have been attacked by a strong Detachment in front, and turned by
Corbaix on its left.
To show the connection which this disposition would have secured with
NAPOLEON's movements, it is only necessary to state, that the Third
Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General DOMON, had been detached
from the Emperor's Column to reconnoitre the country between the Dyle
and the high road to Brussels; and that the 4th Regiment of _Chasseurs
à Cheval_ pushed as far as the Bridge of Moustier, on which line its
Skirmishers exchanged a few carabine shots with some Prussian Dragoons,
who did not, however, appear willing to engage further with them. It
was by means of this reconnaissance that NAPOLEON ascertained the
retreat, through Tilly and Gentinnes, of the principal Prussian Column,
consisting of ZIETEN's and PIRCH's Corps, although the line by which
they retired was undiscovered by GROUCHY, in whose immediate sphere of
operations it was situated.
But if such good grounds exist for inferring that, on the 17th, an
earlier and a clearer insight into the Enemy's movements might have
been obtained by the Corps detached in pursuit of the Prussians, and
that when obtained, it would have rendered the communication with the
operations of the main Army on the left of the Dyle, a matter not only
important in the highest degree, but also perfectly practicable; and if
a failure in this respect be attributable to the absence of sufficient
energy and vigour on the part of GROUCHY, how much more forcibly does
it not expose the extraordinary, the unaccountable, dilatoriness of
NAPOLEON himself during the whole of the precious morning of the 17th!
How striking a view it unfolds of what might have been accomplished,
had the bivouac at Ligny been broken up a few hours earlier! Then,
WELLINGTON's Army was still between Quatre Bras and the narrow Defile
of Genappe, open to an attack in front by NEY, simultaneously with one
in flank by the force collected at Marbais (a part of which might have
been detached across the Genappe, towards the rear of the Anglo-Allied
Army, by Villers la Ville and Bousseval, masked by the Wood of Berme);
and the rearmost Corps of the Prussian Army (THIELEMANN's), which was
retreating through Gembloux, might have been attacked with effect, by
the superior force of all Arms under GROUCHY.
As regards GROUCHY's movements during the early part of the 18th, it
is very remarkable, that although he had in his despatch, written at
ten o'clock the previous night, communicated to NAPOLEON his surmises
of an intended junction of a portion of BLÜCHER's forces with those of
WELLINGTON, and his consequent intention of following the Prussians in
the direction of Wavre, _afin qu'ils ne puissent pas gagner Bruxelles,
et de les séparer de WELLINGTON_, and although he must or ought to have
been aware that Wavre was only twelve miles distant from NAPOLEON's
main line of operations, whereas Gembloux was about fifteen miles
distant from Wavre, he not only delayed his departure from Gembloux
until between seven and eight o'clock in the morning, but manoeuvred by
his right; taking the more circuitous line, through Sart à Wallain, and
rendering his operations still more dilatory by moving both VANDAMME's
and GERARD's Corps along one and the same road. Had he not, from want
of sufficient vigilance, continued ignorant of the fact, that the
principal Prussian Column, consisting of the First and Second Corps,
had retired upon Wavre, at so short a distance from his left as by the
line of Tilly, Gentinnes, and Mont St Guibert, there can be very little
doubt that he would have marched upon the latter point, which the
Prussians, aware of its importance, had occupied with a Rear Guard; but
even with the amount of information which he possessed, and with the
inference justly impressed upon his mind that a co-operation between
BLÜCHER and WELLINGTON was projected, we are at a loss to account for
his not having moved upon Mont St Guibert, and manoeuvred by his left.
In his despatch, written at two o'clock in the morning, he mentioned to
the Emperor his design of marching upon Corbaix or Wavre; a movement
of which NAPOLEON, in his reply, expressed his approval; and if he
had directed one of his Infantry Corps along the line of Corbaix and
La Baraque, and the other by that of Mont St Guibert and Moustier,
there can be no doubt that, even late as was the hour at which he
started from Gembloux, he would, in a great measure, have fulfilled the
expectations of his Imperial Master. In this case, he would naturally
have so divided his Cavalry, that one portion would have scoured the
country along the Front and Right of the Column marching by Corbaix
and La Baraque, and the other portion would have been employed in a
similar manner along the Front and Left of the Column moving upon Mont
St Guibert and Moustier. Both at this point and at Ottignies, about
eight hundred yards lower down the stream, there is a stone bridge
across the Dyle. There is a direct road from Moustier to St Lambert,
scarcely five miles distant, and another to the Field of Waterloo.
The Cavalry in advance of the Left Column could not have failed to
discover the Prussian troops in march to join the Left of WELLINGTON;
for they were then passing slowly, and with extreme difficulty, through
the Defiles of St Lambert and Lasne. This discovery would have led to
the Right Column being moved by its left, from La Baraque to Moustier;
the Cavalry attached to it masking the movement as long as possible.
The Left Column would then, in all probability, have followed its
advanced Cavalry to St Lambert; and the Right Corps have either moved
upon the same point as a reinforcement, or have diverged upon Lasne as
a Support, upon which the former might have fallen back, if compelled
to effect its retreat towards Planchenoit.
In this manner might GROUCHY have so far realised the anxious
expectation of NAPOLEON as to have fallen upon BÜLOW _flagrante
delicto_, and have materially procrastinated the co-operation of
BLÜCHER with WELLINGTON on the 18th of June; a co-operation which a
contrary proceeding, originating in fatal tardiness of movement, and
exhibiting useless manoeuvring in a false direction, could not fail
to render easy in execution and successful in result. But beyond such
procrastination of the meditated junction of BLÜCHER's and WELLINGTON's
forces, GROUCHY could have effected nothing. The junction itself could
not have been prevented. The tendency of GROUCHY's movements had been
too narrowly watched; the country between the Dyle and the Charleroi
road to Brussels had been too vigilantly explored; and the movements,
in succession, of the different Prussian Corps had been too nicely
calculated and determined; to admit of the possibility of a failure, as
regarded the arrival of a considerable portion of the Prussian forces
on the Left of the Anglo-Allied Army.
BLÜCHER had made so admirable a disposition of his four _Corps
d'Armée_, that two of them could at any time have combined, and
therefore have presented a superior force to GROUCHY, at any point
between Wavre and Planchenoit; whilst the remainder of the Army might
have continued its march to the Field of Waterloo. Had Grouchy moved
by St Guibert and Moustier upon St Lambert, THIELEMANN's Corps would
then have been on the march towards Couture, according to his original
instructions; and finding BÜLOW engaged with the Enemy, would have
joined him. GROUCHY might then have contrived to hold both these Corps
at bay, and thus have reduced the co-operating Prussian force at
Waterloo to the two Corps under ZIETEN and PIRCH, besides considerably
retarding that co-operation; since without having experienced the
effects of any such interruption to the progress of the other Corps, as
we have here supposed, these two Generals did not reach the Field of
Battle until seven o'clock in the evening of the 18th.
Such is the extent of the advantage which, under the circumstances,
GROUCHY would have gained by a march from Gembloux upon St Lambert; a
most important one, no doubt, as time for pushing the struggle with
WELLINGTON, with the whole force at his immediate disposal, before
the arrival of the Prussians, was of the most vital consequence to
NAPOLEON; and this advantage GROUCHY entirely lost by his march upon
Wavre--a march which enabled BLÜCHER to appear with three, out of his
four, _Corps d'Armée_, on the great and decisive Field of Action; and
that in sufficient time to render the victory as complete as could
reasonably be desired.
No exertions, however, on the part of GROUCHY, after he broke up from
Gembloux on the morning of the 18th, could have effectually frustrated
the junction of WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER. Two great errors, for which
that Marshal was not accountable, reduced the contemplated junction
from a measure of calculation to one of certainty. The first and
principal of these has already been adverted to at some length, and
cannot be too closely kept in view--the fatal neglect of a vigorous
pursuit of the defeated Prussians, on the night of the 16th and morning
of the 17th, by a detached Corps; combined with the extraordinary
delay in the attack upon WELLINGTON at Quatre Bras, on the latter day.
The second error arose from the want of a strong reconnaissance and
vigilant look out on the right of the main French Army, on the morning
of the 18th, followed up by the occupation of the Defiles of the Lasne.
* * * * *
It was nearly four o'clock when VANDAMME's Corps arrived in front of
the position which THIELEMANN was in the act of quitting, with a view
to follow and support the remaining three Prussian Corps that were at
that moment on the march towards the Field of Waterloo; and, with a
fire that was opened from the French Batteries, commenced the Battle
of Wavre, which will be described in its proper place in a subsequent
Chapter.