Prince Blücher having ascertained, on the morning of the 16th, that his
communication with the Left Division of the Duke of WELLINGTON's forces
by Quatre Bras continued uninterrupted, resolved upon accepting battle
in the position in rear of Fleurus, which had been previously fixed
upon as the one most eligible, in the event of the Enemy's adoption of
that line of operations respecting which all doubt and uncertainty had
now ceased. Its importance in a strategical point of view, apart from
tactical considerations, was manifest. WELLINGTON having, on his part,
selected Quatre Bras as the point whereon to concentrate his forces,
the position in question, connected as it was with the latter by a
paved road over an extent of not more than six or seven miles, offered
great facility for co-operation and mutual support upon whichever point
the great mass of the French Army might be directed.
Should it prove tenable, then, considered in conjunction with the
advance of the Russians from the Rhine, the whole line of the Meuse
below Namur, and the communications with Aix la Chapelle and the
Prussian States, were effectually secured. If, on the other hand,
either position should be forced by the Enemy, then Mont St Jean and
Wavre, upon parallel lines of retreat towards Brussels and Louvain,
would likewise offer the means of co-operation on the south side of
the Forest of Soignies; and supposing BLÜCHER willing to risk for a
time his communication with the right bank of the Meuse, concentric
lines of retreat upon Brussels would bring the two Armies in combined
position in the immediate front of that capital.
Supposing also that NAPOLEON's plan had been to advance by Mons, the
concentration of the Prussian forces could not have been effected upon
a more favourable point than that of Sombref, whence they could have
advanced in support of their Allies, leaving a sufficient portion of
ZIETEN's Corps to watch the approaches by Charleroi: and, finally,
had the French Emperor directed his main attack by Namur, the retreat
of THIELEMANN's Corps would have secured time for effecting the
concentration of the First, Second, and Third Prussian _Corps d'Armée_,
if not also of the Fourth, while the Duke of WELLINGTON's forces might
have assembled at Quatre Bras, for the purpose of meeting any secondary
attack from the Charleroi side, and of forming a junction with the
Prussian Army.
The position itself comprises the Heights of Bry, Sombref, and
Tongrines, contiguous to the high road connecting Namur with Nivelles,
by Quatre Bras, and to the point of junction of that road with the
one from Charleroi, by Fleurus. These Heights are bounded upon the
south-west and western sides, or right of the position, by a ravine,
through which winds a small rivulet along the Villages of Wagnelé,
St Amand la Haye, and St Amand, near the lower end of which last, it
unites with the greater rivulet of the Ligny; and, along the whole
of the south side, or front of the position, by a valley, through
which flows the Ligny, and in which lie, partly bordering the stream
itself, and partly covering the declivities, the Villages of Ligny,
Mont Potriaux, Tongrenelles, Boignée, Balatre, and Vilrets. At the last
named point, another small rivulet falls into the Ligny on quitting
a deep ravine, which commences northward of the Village of Botey,
and thus tends to the security of the extreme Left of the position.
The extreme Right, however, resting upon the Namur road, in the
direction of Quatre Bras, was completely _en l'air_. The Heights in
rear of St Amand, Ligny, and Sombref, are somewhat lower than those on
the opposite or Fleurus side of the valley; and, from the nature of
the ground, troops, particularly Artillery, are more exposed on the
former than on the latter, where the undulations afford better cover.
The descent from either side into the Villages of Wagnelé, St Amand
la Haye, and St Amand, is gentle: between the latter point and Mont
Potriaux the sides of the valley descend more rapidly: and below that
Village they become steep, particularly about Tongrines, Boignée, and
Balatre: while the ground above commands alternately from side to side.
Above Mont Potriaux, the bed of the valley is soft, and occasionally
swampy: below that point it partakes still more of this character.
The buildings in the Villages are generally of stone, with thatched
roofs, and comprise several farm houses with courtyards, presenting
great capabilities for defence. St Amand and Boignée are the most
salient points of the position, the central portion of which retires
considerably, particularly near Mont Potriaux.
In the morning of the 16th, the First Corps (ZIETEN's) occupied that
portion of the position which is circumscribed by the Villages of
Bry, St Amand la Haye, St Amand, and Ligny. The four Brigades of
this Corps had been very much mixed up together when occupying these
Villages during the night, which will account in some measure for the
promiscuous manner in which their several Battalions appear to have
been distributed during the Battle. The main body of the Corps was
drawn up on the Height between Bry and Ligny, and upon which stands
the Farm and Windmill of Bussy, the highest point of the whole
position. Seven Battalions of the Second Brigade (General PIRCH II.)
were formed immediately in rear of this Farm; the 28th Regiment and
2nd Westphalian Landwehr in the First, and the 2nd and 3rd Battalions
of the 6th Regiment in the Second, Line; while the 3rd Battalion of
the latter Regiment occupied the Farm itself, which was put into a
state of defence. Two Battalions of the Fourth Brigade (General Count
HENKEL), namely, the 2nd Battalions of the 19th Regiment and of the 4th
Westphalian Landwehr, stood on the slope between the Second Brigade and
Ligny; while the remaining four Battalions of the Brigade--the 1st and
3rd of the 19th Regiment, and the 1st and 3rd of the 4th Westphalian
Landwehr--were charged with the defence of Ligny. The Village of Bry
was occupied by the 3rd Battalions of the 12th and 24th Regiments,
belonging to the First Brigade (General STEINMETZ); and the 2nd
Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr was posted in rear of the
Village in support. The 1st and 3rd Companies of the Silesian Rifles,
attached to this Brigade, were distributed about the intersected ground
between Bry and St Amand la Haye. The remainder of the First Brigade
was posted on the Height in the rear of St Amand, its Right resting
on St Amand la Haye; the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 12th Regiment
on the right, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24th Regiment
on the left, forming a First, and the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the
1st Westphalian Landwehr forming a Second, Line. The defence of St
Amand was confided to three Battalions of the Third Brigade (General
JAGOW)--the 1st and 2nd of the 29th Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion
of the 3rd Westphalian Landwehr. The remaining six Battalions of this
Brigade were posted in reserve northward of Ligny, and near the Bois
du Loup. The 2nd and 4th Companies of the Silesian Rifles were thrown
into Ligny. The Reserve Cavalry of ZIETEN's Corps continued in advance,
upon the Fleurus high road, watching the movements of the Enemy.
* * * * *
It was eight o'clock when these dispositions were completed; and about
eleven o'clock, PIRCH's Corps, which more than an hour before had
quitted its bivouac near Mazy, was formed up in reserve to ZIETEN. The
Fifth Brigade (General TIPPELSKIRCHEN) stood across the high road, near
its intersection with the old Roman road, in the customary Prussian
Brigade order of three lines of Columns of Battalions at deploying
intervals, and had in its front the two Batteries, Nos. 10 and 37.
The Sixth Brigade (General KRAFFT) was posted in similar order in
the rear of the Farm of Bussy, and in left rear of Bry. The Seventh
Brigade (General BRAUSE) stood more to the left: it had only the 14th
Regiment then present, for the 22nd Regiment and the Elbe Landwehr
did not rejoin it until one o'clock in the afternoon. The Eighth
Brigade (Colonel LANGEN) was ordered to remain upon the high road
leading from Sombref to Fleurus, until the arrival of the Third Corps
(THIELEMANN's). One of its Battalions--the 3rd of the 21st Regiment--as
also two Squadrons of the Neumark Dragoons attached to this Corps,
had been left in the line of Outposts beyond the Meuse, towards
Philippeville; and did not rejoin it until the 20th of June.
The Reserve Cavalry of PIRCH's Corps, under General JÜRGASS, was
stationed in rear of the high road, and on the west side of Sombref.
The twelve pounder Batteries, Nos. 4 and 8, and the Horse Batteries,
Nos. 5 and 18, remained in reserve, near Sombref.
THIELEMANN's Corps, which had quitted Namur about seven o'clock in the
morning, had reached Sombref before twelve. It was immediately assigned
its position in that part of the Field which lies between Sombref and
Balatre, and was posted in Columns upon both high roads, here to remain
available for either a movement to the right, or for the occupation of
the position in Left Front of Sombref, along the Heights in rear of the
Ligny rivulet.
Such were the dispositions made by BLÜCHER previously to NAPOLEON's
advancing from Fleurus. The occupation of Ligny and St Amand--the most
salient part of the position--by ZIETEN's Corps, and the posting of the
Reserve Cavalry of the latter in the intervening space between those
Villages and Fleurus, were justly calculated to secure for the Prussian
Commander ample time for further developing his Line of Battle in such
a manner as the direction and mode of his opponent's attack might
render most expedient.
* * * * *
In the morning of the 16th, the French troops which lay along the
Sambre, and which belonged to that main portion of the Army which was
more immediately under the orders and guidance of NAPOLEON, quitted
their bivouacs, and marched to join their leading Columns, the position
of which in front of Fleurus was described in the Fourth Chapter.
It was past ten o'clock when these troops debouched in two Columns from
the Fleurus Wood--the one along the High road, the other more to the
right--and drew up in two lines within a short distance of Fleurus. In
the First Line PAJOL's Light, and EXCELMANS' Heavy, Cavalry, formed
the Right, and VANDAMME's Corps, the Left, Wing; while GÉRARD's Corps
which had not received the Order to march until half past nine o'clock,
arrived much later, and occupied the Centre. GIRARD's Division was
detached some little distance on the extreme Left. The Imperial Guard
and MILHAUD's Corps of _Cuirassiers_ constituted the Second Line. More
than an hour was passed in this position before the arrival of the
Emperor, who then rode along the line of Vedettes, and reconnoitred the
Enemy's dispositions.
It appeared to NAPOLEON that BLÜCHER had taken up a position
perpendicular to the Namur road, and had, in this way, completely
exposed his Right Flank; whence he inferred that the Prince placed
great reliance upon the arrival of auxiliary forces from the Duke of
WELLINGTON's Army.
A single glance at the Prussian position, as it has been described,
will suffice to prove that the French Emperor was in error as regarded
BLÜCHER's assumed Line of Battle, and that so far from its having
been perpendicular to, it was, in the general military acceptation
of the term, parallel with, the Namur road. At the same time it is
proper to remark, that he may have been misled by the massing of the
Prussian troops between the salient point of the position, St Amand,
and the road in question, as well as by the direction of the line of
the occupied Villages of St Amand, Ligny, and Sombref. It must also
be acknowledged that although the inference was incorrectly drawn, it
accorded in substance with the real fact, that BLÜCHER did rely upon
the arrival of a portion of WELLINGTON's forces by the Namur road from
Quatre Bras.
NAPOLEON having returned from his reconnaissance, immediately gave his
Orders for the advance of the Army, and for the disposition of each
individual Corps in his intended Line of Battle.
Impressed with the important advantage which, according to his assumed
view of BLÜCHER's position, might accrue from a vigorous and well timed
attack upon the Right and Rear of the Prussians, while vigorously
assailing them himself in their Front, he directed SOULT to address
to NEY the despatch, dated two o'clock, to which reference was made in
the preceding Chapter, acquainting the Marshal that in half an hour
thence he proposed attacking BLÜCHER, posted between Sombref and Bry,
and desiring that he would, on his part, also attack whatever might be
in his front, and that after having vigorously repulsed the Enemy, he
should move towards the Emperor's Field of Battle, and fall upon the
Right and Rear of the Prussians; adding, at the same time, that should
the Emperor be first successful, he would then move to the support of
the Army at Quatre Bras.
The French Light Troops moved forward against Fleurus, of which place
they gained possession between eleven and twelve o'clock, and then
opened from their Light Artillery a cannonade upon the Prussian Cavalry
Posts taken up by the 6th Uhlans. The latter immediately retired,
and formed upon the left of the Brandenburg Dragoons, which Regiment
had been placed in front of the Tombe de Ligny, along with the Horse
Battery No. 2, in support. The Brandenburg Uhlans were also in support,
but more to the rear, and on the left of the high road.
At this time, NAPOLEON was on the Height of Fleurus, again
reconnoitring the Prussian position; and it was also about the same
period that WELLINGTON joined BLÜCHER in person near the Mill of Bussy.
As soon as RÖDER perceived the imposing array of the French Columns in
full advance, he ordered the immediate retreat of his Cavalry, which
he covered with the 6th Uhlans and the Brandenburg Dragoons, together
with two pieces of Horse Artillery. He sent the main body, which he
had stationed in a hollow, in rear of the Tombe de Ligny, as also the
remainder of the Artillery, across the Ligny, with directions to take
post between the Village of that name and Sombref. He himself continued
with the above two Regiments, and the two guns, near the Tombe de
Ligny, until he received Orders also to retire.
* * * * *
In the mean time, the main body of the French Army advanced in great
regularity in Columns of Corps. The Left Column, consisting of the
Third _Corps d'Armée_ under VANDAMME, to which was attached the
Infantry Division under Lieutenant General GIRARD belonging to REILLE's
Corps (then with NEY), being destined to advance against St Amand, the
most salient point of the Prussian position, and therefore having the
shortest distance to pass over, was the first to take up its ground,
preparatory to attack. Whilst thus engaged in making its preliminary
dispositions for this purpose, it was cannonaded by the Prussian
Batteries posted on the Heights in rear of the Village. GIRARD's
Division took post on the left of VANDAMME's Corps, and DOMON's Light
Cavalry Division on the left of GIRARD.
The Centre Column, consisting of the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, under
GÉRARD, advanced along the Fleurus high road, and took up, somewhat
later, a position upon the Heights fronting Ligny, and parallel to the
general direction of that Village; its Left being near the Tombe de
Ligny, and its Right resting on an eminence southward of Mont Potriaux.
The Right Column, under GROUCHY, comprising the Cavalry Corps of
PAJOL and EXCELMANS, moved by its right, and took post, as did also
the Light Cavalry Division under Lieutenant General MAURIN, belonging
to the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_, on the right of GÉRARD, and showing
front towards the Villages of Tongrines, Tongrenelle, Boignée, and
Balatre. GROUCHY disposed this Cavalry so as to protect GÉRARD from
any attempt which the Prussians might make to debouch in his rear from
Mont Potriaux or Tongrenelle; as also to watch any hostile movements
on their Left, and to divert their attention from the Centre. PAJOL's
Corps, which was formed on the Right, detached along the cross road
which leads to Namur. The Villages of Boignée and Balatre being
situated on the French side of the valley, and occupied by Prussian
Infantry, GROUCHY was supplied with two Battalions from GÉRARD's Corps.
The 1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry belonging
to THIELEMANN's Corps, which had been posted in advance, upon the
Fleurus road, retired skirmishing until they reached the barrier at the
Bridge, whither they were pursued by the French Cavalry. Here, however,
the latter were checked and driven off by the 3rd Battalion of the 4th
Kurmark Landwehr, belonging to Colonel Luck's Brigade.
The Imperial Guard and MILHAUD's _Cuirassiers_ were halted in reserve,
the former on the left, and the latter on the right, of Fleurus.
The numerical strength of the French Emperor's forces prepared to
engage with the Prussian Army amounted to:--
Infantry, 43,412
Cavalry, 12,614
Artillery, 6,856
------
Total, 62,882 men, with 204 guns.
If to this we add LOBAU's Corps, which was on the march from Charleroi,
the total amount of available force was:--
Infantry, 51,564
Cavalry, 12,614
Artillery, 7,788
------
Total, 71,966 men, with 242 guns.
The Prussian Army in the Field amounted to:--
Infantry, 73,040
Cavalry, 8,150
Artillery, 3,437
------
84,617
Deduct loss of first Corps on 15th June, 1,200
------
Total, 83,417, with 224 guns.
As soon as the direction of the Enemy's movements for attack became
sufficiently manifest, BLÜCHER made such further disposition of his
force as appeared to him requisite to meet that attack.
He ordered the Batteries of the First _Corps d'Armée_ (ZIETEN's) to
be suitably posted for impeding the Enemy's advance. The three Heavy
Batteries of the Corps were immediately drawn up on the Height between
Ligny and St Amand. They were supported by the Battery of the First
Brigade, posted in rear of St Amand. Somewhat later, when the direction
of attack by GÉRARD's Corps became more developed, the Battery of the
Third Brigade was placed on the right of Ligny, near a quarry, and the
Battery of the Fourth Brigade on the left of the Village, upon the
declivity descending to the rivulet. The Battery of the Second Brigade,
the Foot Battery No. 1, and the Horse Battery No. 10, remained in
reserve. Of the remaining Horse Batteries of the Corps, one continued
with the Cavalry under General RÖDER (which was posted in a hollow, as
before stated, between Ligny and Sombref), and the other was with the
1st Silesian Hussars, which Regiment had been detached in observation
on the Right Flank of the Army, and posted between the northern
extremity of the village of Wagnelé and a large pond contiguous to the
old Roman road.
By the time the action commenced in front of St Amand and Ligny--half
past two o'clock--BLÜCHER was satisfied that no necessity existed
for any movement of his Third _Corps d'Armée_ to the right; and he
therefore ordered it to proceed from the position it had hitherto held
in Columns upon the two high roads near Sombref, and form the Left Wing
of his line of battle; resting its Right upon Sombref, and occupying
the Heights, at the foot and on the declivities of which are situated
the Villages of Mont Potriaux, Tongrines, Tongrenelle, Boignée,
Balatre, Vilrets, and Botey.
The Ninth Brigade (General BORKE) was formed in Brigade order in rear
of Sombref and northward of the Namur high road, having detached one
of its Battalions (the 3rd of the 8th Regiment) with the Foot Battery
No. 18, to Mont Potriaux, where the former posted itself on the north,
and the latter took up a favourable position on the south, side of the
Church. The Eleventh Brigade (Colonel LUCK) with the twelve pounder
Battery No. 7, stood across the Fleurus high road, in front of the
junction of the latter with the Namur road upon the Height of Le
Point du Jour, having detached the 3rd Battalion of the 4th Kurmark
Landwehr into the valley, where it occupied the houses in its immediate
vicinity. Four Battalions of the Tenth Brigade (Colonel KÄMPFEN) were
drawn up on the Height of Tongrines, resting their Right on this
Village, and having in their front the Foot Battery No. 35, and at a
short distance from their Left, the Horse Battery No. 18. The remaining
two Battalions of the Brigade were detached, the 3rd Battalion of the
27th Regiment, to occupy Tongrines and the Castle of Tongrenelle, and
the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Kurmark Landwehr, to hold the Villages of
Boignée and Balatre. The 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr,
belonging to the Brigade, as also two Squadrons of the 6th Kurmark
Landwehr Cavalry, and two Squadrons of the 9th Hussars, attached to
this Corps, still continued in the line of Outposts in the vicinity of
Dinant, to observe Givet; and rejoined on the morning of the 17th of
June. The Twelfth Brigade (Colonel STÜLPNAGEL) with the Horse Battery
No. 20, was formed in Brigade order, in reserve, near the Windmill,
on the Height of Le Point du Jour. The Reserve Cavalry of this Corps,
with the Horse Battery No. 19, was posted on the extreme Left of the
position between Botey and Vilrets, whence it detached the 3rd Squadron
of the 7th Uhlans to Onoz, in observation.
This position and the order of battle which was thus developed, were
well calculated to answer the object which BLÜCHER had in view, namely,
to hold his ground long enough to gain sufficient time for the arrival
of at least a portion of WELLINGTON's forces, expected to join the
Prussian extreme Right by the Namur road; as also, perhaps, for the
arrival and co-operation of BÜLOW's Corps, in rear of THIELEMANN, by
the Gembloux road. In either of these cases, if not previously favoured
by the circumstances of the general battle about to take place, such
a marked accession to his strength would enable him to assume the
offensive; whilst, in the first mentioned, WELLINGTON would effectually
prevent a junction between NAPOLEON's and NEY's forces.
The position had been long before selected, and the whole of the ground
had even been surveyed, with a view to meet the contingency which
had now actually occurred; but then it must be remembered, that in
this design the co-operation of the Fourth _Corps d'Armée_ was fully
contemplated, whereas the latter had now become a doubtful question:
and hence it was that BLÜCHER was led to place more reliance upon a
direct support from WELLINGTON, than would otherwise have been the case.
To accept a battle, notwithstanding the absence of BÜLOW's Corps, was
undoubtedly the wisest course. The Enemy's force in the field did not
appear to exceed that of the Prussians; and therefore, considering
the nature of the position, the contest would, in all probability,
become protracted, perhaps until the arrival of BÜLOW; perhaps, also,
until the close of day, without any distinct advantage being gained
by either party. In the former case, the required preponderance might
instantly give a decidedly favourable turn to the scale; in the latter,
the junction of the Fourth Corps during the night would enable BLÜCHER
on the following morning to attack his opponent with every prospect
of success, and either to relieve WELLINGTON, if necessary, from any
pressure in his front, or so to combine his further operations with
those of the British Commander, should the latter have held his ground
and concentrated his Army, as to lead to the complete overthrow of both
NAPOLEON's and NEY's forces.
To have declined the contest, and retired so as to effect a junction
with his Fourth Corps, he must still, if he wished to act in close
concert with WELLINGTON, have abandoned his direct communication with
the Meuse and the Rhine, whence he drew all his supplies; a result
which might as well be trusted to the chances of a battle.
These considerations were also, in all probability, strongly seconded
by a desire on the part of the Prussian Commander, and one perfectly in
keeping with his ardent character, to take every possible measure which
was at all warranted by the actual posture of affairs, for vigorously
opposing NAPOLEON's advance.
In a tactical point of view, the position was undoubtedly defective.
Nearly the entire of the ground situated between the line of Villages
of Ligny, St Amand, and Wagnelé, and the great Namur road, was
exposed to the view of the Enemy; and as there was every probability
of a protracted village fight along the front of the position, the
Supports and Reserves required to maintain a contest of that nature,
would necessarily be subjected to the full play of the Batteries on
the opposite heights. Upon the space above mentioned every movement
could be detected from the French side; where, on the contrary, the
undulations were such as to admit of the concealment of the disposition
of considerable masses of troops. The defect in this respect was
subsequently made strikingly manifest by the fact that the gradual
weakening of the Prussian Centre for the purpose of reinforcing the
Right, was closely observed by NAPOLEON, who took advantage of the
insight thus obtained into his opponent's designs, by collecting in
rear of the Heights of Ligny that force with which, when he saw that
the Prussians had no Reserve remaining, he so suddenly assailed and
broke the Centre of their line.
* * * * *
NAPOLEON's dispositions having been completed, the Battle commenced,
about half past two o'clock, with an attack upon the Village of St
Amand, by Lieutenant General LEFOL's Division of VANDAMME's Corps.
The attack, which was made in three Columns, proved successful; the
three Battalions of the 29th Prussian Regiment which defended it,
were compelled, after a stout resistance, to yield to greatly superior
numbers, and were driven out of the Village. General STEINMETZ,
whose Brigade was posted in rear of St Amand, pushed forward all the
Sharpshooters of the 12th and 24th Regiments to their support.
These, however, being unable to make head against the Enemy, who
already made a disposition to debouch from the village, the 12th and
24th Regiments were led forward to renew the contest. In the mean time,
just as the French appeared at the outlet of the Village, a shower of
grape and canister was poured right down amongst them from the Foot
Battery No. 7. Immediately upon this, both Battalions of the 12th
Regiment descended into the ravine, rushed upon the inclosures, and,
driving the Enemy's shattered Infantry before them, regained possession
of the Village. The 24th Regiment advancing by Wings of Battalions--the
one in line and the other in column of reserve respectively--supported
this attack upon the left, and established itself in the lower part of
St Amand.
In the course of this short prelude, the Batteries ranged along the
little eminences which rose on either side of the valley of the Ligny,
opened a furious cannonade along the whole extent of the Front Lines
of the contending Armies. Ligny, as also St Amand (when repossessed by
the Prussians), both of which lay so directly under the French guns,
seemed devoted to destruction. Their defenders, sheltered in a great
degree by stone walls, hollow ways, and banked up hedges, appeared
perfectly motionless while the deluge of shot and shell poured fast and
thick around them; but no sooner did those in Ligny discover a dusky
mass emerging from the clouds of smoke which enveloped the Heights
above them, and wending its course downwards upon the lower portion
of the Village, than they rushed out of their concealment, and lining
with their advanced Skirmishers the outermost inclosures, prepared to
meet the onset which would probably bring them into closer contact with
their Enemies, and lead to a struggle in which physical strength and
innate courage, combined with individual skill and dexterity, might
effect a result unattainable by a recourse to projectiles alone. It was
the 2nd Battalion of the 19th Prussian Regiment, which, issuing from
its cover, where it had stood in column, rapidly deployed, and, by a
well directed volley, shook the advancing mass, which it then threw
into disorder by following up this advantage with a well sustained fire.
Twice was this attack repeated on the part of GÉRARD's troops, but with
a similar result. A second Column now advanced against the centre of
the Village, and shortly afterwards a third was launched against the
upper part of it, near the old Castle; but their attempts to penetrate
within its precincts proved equally futile, and the four Prussian
Battalions of HENKEL's Brigade gallantly maintained the post of Ligny.
As the French Column withdrew, their Batteries played with redoubled
energy upon the Village, and fresh Columns prepared for another assault.
The troops of VANDAMME's Corps renewed the attack upon St Amand
with the utmost vigour; and forcing back the 12th and 24th Prussian
Regiments, which suffered most severely, penetrated into the Village,
where the fight became obstinate, and the fire most destructive.
STEINMETZ had only two more Battalions of his Brigade remaining at
his disposal--the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 1st Westphalian
Landwehr--and these he pushed forward into the Village, to restore
confidence to the defenders, whose numbers were so fearfully reduced,
and, if possible, to stem the progress of the assailants. They had
scarcely got fairly into action, however, when their Commanding
Officers were wounded, and both Battalions gave way before the furious
onset of the French, the 3rd Battalion leaving numbers of its men
killed, along the outlets of the Village. The whole Brigade, which,
within a short period, had suffered a loss of 46 Officers and 2,300
men, having rallied in rear of St Amand, retired into position between
Bry and Sombref, and the three Battalions which had first occupied the
Village, marched to rejoin the Third Brigade; whilst the loud shouts of
"_Vive l'Empereur!_" which immediately followed the cessation of the
sharp rattle of the musketry, heard even amidst the incessant thunder
of the Artillery, proclaimed the triumph of the French Infantry.
In the meantime, another assault was made upon Ligny, whose defenders
had been reinforced by the two remaining Battalions of HENKEL's
Brigade. The French now changed their mode of attack. They advanced
simultaneously against the centre with the view of gaining the
Churchyard, and against the lower end of the Village in order to turn
the Left Flank of the defenders; and taking advantage of the unusually
great height of the corn, their line of Skirmishers, strengthened by
whole Battalions so as to give it a decided superiority over that of
the Prussians, approached so cautiously and silently as to continue
unperceived until they suddenly possessed themselves of the outermost
hedges and gardens. A hand to hand contest ensued, and the Prussians,
pressed in front by superior numbers, and taken in flank at the same
time, were forced to yield. Presently, however, stimulated by the
combined exertions of the Commanding Officers, Majors Count GRÖBEN,
KUYLENSTIERNA, and REX, they recovered themselves, rallied, and again
faced their Enemies.
The Battle, on this part of the Field, now presented an awfully grand
and animating spectacle, and the hopes of both parties were raised
to the highest state of excitement. Intermingled with the quick but
irregular discharge of small arms throughout the whole extent of the
Village, came forth alternately the cheering "_En avant!_" and exulting
"_Vive l'Empereur!_" as also the emphatic "_Vorwärts!_" and the wild
"_Hourrah!_" whilst the Batteries along the Heights, continuing their
terrific roar, plunged destruction into the masses seen descending
on either side to join in the desperate struggle in the valley, out
of which there now arose, from the old Castle of Ligny, volumes of
dark thick smoke, succeeded by brilliant flames, imparting additional
sublimity to the scene.
The Prussians gradually gained ground, and then pressing forward upon
all points of the Village, succeeded in clearing it of the French; who,
in retreating, abandoned two guns which had been moved close down to
the principal outlet on that side. General JAGOW's Brigade (the Third)
had made a change of front to its left, and approached the Village; the
3rd Battalions of both the 7th and 29th Regiments had been detached to
the right, to protect the Foot Batteries Nos. 3 and 8, and to remain in
reserve; the four remaining Battalions descended into the Village as a
reinforcement.
* * * * *
Beyond an occasional cannonading, the action on the eastern side
of the Field, between the Corps of GROUCHY and of THIELEMANN, was
comparatively languid: being limited to a contest, varied in its
results, for the possession of the village of Bognée, and subsequently,
of those houses of Tongrines which were situated along the bottom of
the valley; as also to some skilful manoeuvring on the part of GROUCHY
with his Cavalry, with a view of menacing the Prussian Left.
In the mean time, the French maintained possession of St Amand, but
ZIETEN's twelve pounder Batteries, which were now moved forward,
presented a formidable obstruction to their debouching from that
Village.
NAPOLEON directed General GIRARD, on the extreme Left, to take
possession, with his Division, of St Amand la Haye; and this operation
having been successfully accomplished, gave the French the advantage of
outflanking from thence any attack upon St Amand itself.
BLÜCHER ordered General PIRCH II. to retake this Village; whereupon the
latter advanced with his Brigade from the Height of Bry, and withdrew
the 1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment from the Windmill of Bussy, which
was then occupied by the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment (Eighth
Brigade), and near to which the 1st Westphalian Landwehr Cavalry
remained during the whole of the action.
At the same time, the Prussian Chief, fully sensible of the very
critical position in which he would be placed, were the French,
following up the advantages they had already gained upon his right,
to debouch from St Amand and St Amand la Haye in sufficient force to
overpower ZIETEN's Corps, and thus cut off his communication with
WELLINGTON; he decided upon occupying the Village of Wagnelé, whence
repeated attacks might be directed against the Enemy's Left Flank;
and, with this view, he desired General PIRCH I., who commanded the
Second Corps, to detach the Fifth Brigade (General TIPPELSKIRCHEN's)
to the latter Village, and to place it under the orders of General
JÜRGASS, who was also sent to that part of the Field, with Lieutenant
Colonel SOHR's Brigade of Cavalry (consisting of the 3rd Brandenburg,
and 5th Pomeranian, Hussars), together with two Squadrons of the 6th
Neumark Dragoons, and the Horse Battery No. 6. Colonel MARWITZ, of
THIELEMANN's Corps, was also ordered to join these troops with two
Regiments of his Brigade, the 7th and 8th Uhlans. The Brigade of
General BRAUSE (the Seventh), which had been rejoined by detached
Battalions, was pushed forward as far as the Roman road, to occupy the
position vacated by the advance of General TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade, to
which it was to act as a Support in case of necessity.
It was four o'clock when General PIRCH II. who had formed his Brigade
for the attack of St Amand la Haye, having his Left Flank protected by
the 12th Regiment, which had reassembled in rear of St Amand, moved his
Front Line against the former Village. As it advanced, however, its
ranks were dreadfully shattered by the fire from the French Artillery,
nor were they less thinned by that of the musketry as they entered
the Village; and such was the determined resistance on the part of
the French, that they were unable to penetrate beyond the centre of
the Village; and though reinforced by the 1st Battalion of the 6th
Regiment, from the Second Line, they found it quite impracticable
to drive the Enemy out of a Large Building which was surrounded by
a stone wall, and which formed the point of connection between the
two Villages. The Prussians having got into great disorder, and
being closely pressed by the French, were compelled to abandon the
Village, in order to collect their scattered remnants, and to reform.
General GIRARD, whose Division had, under his own immediate guidance,
so gallantly maintained the Village, fell mortally wounded on this
occasion.
BLÜCHER now decided on a renewed attack upon St Amand la Haye, in
order to occupy the front of GIRARD's Division, while he should carry
into effect his previously projected movement against the Enemy's Left
Flank; and, anxious to ensure the due execution of his instructions
and to direct the attacks himself, he repaired in person to this
part of the Field. General TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade, having advanced
along the Roman road, was already formed in Brigade order, in rear of
Wagnelé, while JÜRGASS had posted his Cavalry more to the left, and
opposite to the interval between that Village and St Amand la Haye,
whence he could with considerable advantage fall upon the Enemy, should
the latter venture to debouch in that direction.
These movements did not escape the watchful eye of NAPOLEON, who
detached a Division of the Young Guard and a Battery of the same Corps
in support of his Left Wing, as also General COLBERT's Brigade of
Lancers from Count PAJOL's Corps, to reinforce the Cavalry on the Left,
and to preserve the communication with NEY.
When all was ready for the attack, BLÜCHER, who felt how much depended
on its result, galloped up to the leading Battalions, and thus
earnestly and impassionately ordered the advance:--"Now, lads, behave
well! don't suffer the _Grande Nation_ again to rule over you! Forward!
In God's name--forward!" Instantly his devoted followers rent the air
with their re-echoing shouts of "_Vorwärts!_"
Nothing could surpass the undaunted resolution and intrepid mien
which PIRCH's Battalions displayed as they advanced against, and
entered, St Amand la Haye, at a charging pace; they completely swept
the Enemy before them; while Major QUADT, who commanded the 28th
Regiment, supported by some Detachments of the 2nd Regiment (from
TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade) gained possession of the great building. The
1st Battalion of the 6th Regiment, after having forced its way right
across the Village, sallied forth from the opposite side, in pursuit
of the Enemy, with a degree of impetuosity which its Officers had
the utmost difficulty in restraining, while numbers of the men were
on the point of plunging into the very midst of the French Reserves.
The Cavalry on the right of the Village seemed to have caught up the
intrepid spirit and enthusiastic devotion of the Infantry; and, as
if impatient to join in the struggle, a Squadron of the Brandenburg
Uhlans supported the attack of the Village by a charge upon the
Enemy's Cavalry: after which, the remainder of this Regiment, with
the 1st Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, advanced under General TRESKOW,
into the plain on the left of the Village, of which the whole contour
now bristled with the bayonets of the 46th Regiment, while the 28th
Regiment held the Post of the Great Building, which it had so gallantly
carried, and the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr stood in Second Line, as a
Reserve.
So completely absorbed was the attention of the twelve pounder Battery
No. 6, which stood in a somewhat isolated position, by the contest in
St Amand la Haye, which it covered by its fire, that it had not noticed
the stealthy advance of a Troop of the Enemy's horsemen, wearing the
uniform of the Light Artillery of the Guard, and most unexpectedly
found itself attacked in flank by these bold adventurers. This give
rise to a curious scene, for the Prussian Gunners, in the first
moment of surprise, could only defend themselves with their rammers
and handspikes; but with these they plied the intruders with so much
adroitness and resolution as to hurl their leaders to the ground, and
force the remainder to betake themselves to a hasty flight.
Prince BLÜCHER had, in the meantime, on perceiving COLBERT's French
Lancers hovering upon, and stretching out beyond, his extreme Right,
ordered General PIRCH to detach two more Cavalry Regiments--the Queen's
Dragoons and the 4th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry--as a reinforcement to
the Cavalry of ZIETEN's Corps.
The nearly simultaneous attack upon Wagnelé by TIPPELSKIRCHEN's
Brigade, previously mentioned as having taken post in rear of that
Village, was not attended with an equal degree of success. The 1st
and 2nd Battalions of the 25th Regiment advanced in Column through
the centre of Wagnelé; but on debouching, the 2nd Battalion, which
led the advance, was suddenly assailed by a fire from the French
Skirmishers who lay concealed in the high corn. Although its order was
thus considerably disturbed; it succeeded, nevertheless, in effecting
its deployment. The 1st Battalion also deployed, but, in doing so, its
Left Wing covered the right of the 2nd Battalion; and while executing
a second movement, intended to clear the front of the latter, the
French Battalions pressing forward, drove in the Prussian Skirmishers
upon the Regiment, which consisted mostly of young soldiers; when,
notwithstanding the conspicuously meritorious exertions of all their
Officers, they were overthrown and dispersed in such a manner that
it became impracticable to lead them back into action in any other
way than by separate Detachments. The 3rd Battalion of this Regiment
shared nearly the same fate; for, having plunged into the high corn,
it received a volley which disordered its ranks, and killed its three
senior Officers; and although it maintained for some time a fire in
return, it was eventually compelled to retire, as were also the 1st and
2nd Battalions of the 5th Westphalian Landwehr, under precisely similar
circumstances. The Brigade was reformed, under the protection of the
2nd Prussian Regiment, which now advanced from the Reserve, boldly
encountered the Enemy, and aided by the efficacious fire of the Foot
Battery No. 10, stemmed the further progress of the French, and thus
gained time for the remaining Battalions to reform in rear of Wagnelé.
Upon the advance, however, of a French Column towards its Left Flank,
it fell back as far as the entrance into the Village.
The French now renewed their attacks upon St Amand la Haye, and made
their appearance simultaneously in front and in both flanks of that
Village. The fight again became desperate. PIRCH's Brigade had,
however, exhausted both its ammunition and its strength, when BLÜCHER
pushed forward the 3rd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment (from the Eighth
Brigade--Colonel LANGEN's), and soon afterwards the 3rd Battalion of
the 9th Regiment, together with the whole of the 26th Regiment (from
the Sixth Brigade--General KRAFFT's); whereupon General PIRCH withdrew
his Battalions, which had suffered so severely, to the rear of Bry. The
Foot Battery No. 3, belonging to PIRCH's Brigade, had at an earlier
period moved to its left, and had taken up a position near the quarries
on the right of Ligny, by the side of the Foot Battery No. 8, of
JAGOW's Brigade.
* * * * *
While the struggle in the Villages in front of the Right of the
Prussian position continue to wear an indecisive and unsettled aspect;
let us return for a moment to Ligny, which we left in possession of
Count HENKEL's Fourth Prussian Brigade, supported by the Third Brigade
under General JAGOW.
The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 7th Regiment (of JAGOW's Brigade)
were ordered to traverse the Village, and to advance in column against
the Enemy. Just as they debouched, they found in their immediate front,
several French Battalions, in Close Column, moving directly against the
village. Both parties at once came to a halt; the Prussians without
being able to deploy in the defile, and the French without attempting
to do so, probably unwilling to lose the time which such a movement
would require. A fire of musketry commenced which lasted half an hour,
and caused much loss. Other Battalions now hastened across the village,
but all at once, a rumour flew rapidly among them, that the French
were in possession of the Churchyard, and in a moment several muskets
were aimed in that direction, and either thoughtlessly or nervously
discharged. Those Battalions that were in front, at the outlet of the
village, became alarmed by this unexpected firing in their rear. At
the same time, a discharge of grape, from some guns suddenly brought
forward by the French, in their immediate front, augmented their
confusion, and forced them to a retreat. They were closely pursued
by the Enemy, whose Skirmishers made a dash at the Colour of the 2nd
Battalion of the 7th Regiment, which they would have captured but for
the noble and determined gallantry with which it was defended.
General KRAFFT, from whose Brigade (the Sixth) five Battalions had
already been detached, namely, four for the defence of St Amand la
Haye, and one in aid of that of Ligny, now received BLÜCHER's Order
with his remaining four Battalions (the 1st and 2nd of the 9th, and
the 1st and 3rd of the 1st Elbe Landwehr), to drive the Enemy out of
the latter Village. The Foot Battery No. 15, was posted between the
left of Ligny and the Bois du Loup, and the Foot Battery No. 37, was
directed towards St Amand. The other Batteries posted between Ligny and
St Amand received Orders to retire accordingly as they expended their
ammunition, for the purpose of refitting; and they were successively
relieved by the Foot Battery No. 1, the Horse Battery No. 10, and the
twelve pounder Batteries Nos. 4 and 8. The Horse Battery No. 14 was
advanced across the stream between Ligny and Sombref, and took post on
the other side of the valley, where it was much exposed to the Enemy's
fire, and lost 19 Gunners and 53 horses.
General KRAFFT moved forward, in the first instance, only two
Battalions, and kept the others in reserve; but all of them soon
became engaged; for the French, though driven back at first, received
considerable reinforcements.
The fight throughout the whole Village of Ligny was now at the hottest:
the place was literally crammed with the combatants, and its streets
and inclosures were choked up with the wounded, the dying, and the
dead: every house that had escaped being set on fire, was the scene of
a desperate struggle: the troops fought no longer in combined order,
but in numerous and irregular groups, separated by houses either in
flames, or held as little forts, sometimes by the one, and sometimes
by the other party; and in various instances, when their ammunition
failed, or when they found themselves suddenly assailed from different
sides, the bayonet, and even the butt, supplied them with the ready
means for prosecuting the dreadful carnage with unmitigated fury. The
entire Village was concealed in smoke; but the incessant rattle of the
musketry, the crashing of burning timbers, the smashing of doors and
gateways, the yells and imprecations of the combatants, which were
heard through that misty veil, gave ample indication to the troops
posted in reserve upon the Heights, of the fierce and savage nature
of the struggle beneath. In the meantime, the relieving Batteries
on the Prussian side, which had arrived quite fresh from the rear,
came into full play, as did also a reinforcement, on the French side,
from the Artillery of the Imperial Guard. The earth now trembled
under the tremendous cannonade; and as the flames, issuing from the
numerous burning houses, intermingled with dense volumes of smoke,
shot directly upwards through the light grey mass which rendered the
Village indistinguishable, and seemed continually to thicken, the scene
resembled for a time some violent convulsion of nature, rather than a
human conflict--as if the valley had been rent asunder, and Ligny had
become the focus of a burning crater.
Long did this fierce and deadly strife continue without any material
advance being made on either side. At length the French gained
possession of a large House, as also of the Churchyard, into which they
brought forward two pieces of cannon. General JAGOW vainly endeavoured
with the 7th Regiment to retake this House. The 1st Battalion of the
3rd Westphalian Landwehr displayed the most inflexible perseverance in
its endeavours to drive the French out again from the Churchyard: it
made three unsuccessful attempts to cross an intervening ditch, and
subsequently tried to gain a hollow way, which lay in the flank of that
post, but falling upon the French reinforcements that were advancing
towards it, they were compelled to abandon the enterprise.
Fresh victims were still required to satiate the "King of Terrors," who
might be said to hold a gala day in this "Valley of Death." BLÜCHER had
ordered Colonel LANGEN's Brigade (the Eighth) to follow in succession
that of General KRAFFT. The position vacated by the former, in front of
Sombref, was taken up by Colonel STÜLPNAGEL's Brigade (the Twelfth) of
THIELEMANN's Corps, and the chain of Skirmishers of the latter Brigade
extended along the rivulet as far as Ligny. As soon as Colonel LANGEN
had reached the immediate vicinity of Ligny, he posted the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of the 21st Regiment upon an eminence near the Village, and
the Foot Battery No. 12, covered by two Squadrons of the 5th Kurmark
Landwehr Cavalry, upon the left of the road leading to Ligny. The
21st Regiment made no less than six different attacks, partly in
conjunction with the other troops that fought in Ligny, and partly
isolated, without succeeding in disturbing the position of the Enemy in
that portion of the village which lies on the right bank of the Ligny.
Colonel LANGEN, observing the increased fury and obstinacy of the fight
in Ligny, detached thither also the 1st Battalion of the 23rd Regiment,
and the 2nd of the 3rd Elbe Landwehr: he then took up a position, with
the remainder of his Brigade, near the Mill of Bussy, into which he
threw the 2nd Battalion of the 23rd Regiment. The 1st Battalion of this
Corps, having formed two Columns, rushed into the Village, and, after
crossing the stream, received a sharp fire from the windows of the
houses on the opposite side. The Left Column of the Battalion stormed a
farm house, of which, after it had burst in the gates with hatchets, it
gained possession, and thus protected the advance of the Right Column.
* * * * *
At this moment, NAPOLEON's final and decisive attack commenced on this
point; but previously to entering upon an account of it, it will be
necessary to resume the narrative of the contest along the remainder of
the Line of Battle.
On the Right, TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade (the Fifth) was ordered to
renew the attack upon St Amand la Haye; and, as an auxiliary movement,
a bold push was to be made upon the group of houses in rear of that
village, and of Wagnelé, called the Hameau de St Amand. Both of the
3rd Battalions of the 2nd and 25th Regiments, under Major WITZLEBEN,
advanced against the latter point, while the 1st and 2nd Battalions of
the 2nd Regiment, the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Westphalian Landwehr,
and a Battalion of the 25th Regiment made a direct attack upon St
Amand la Haye. Both movements were supported by the Foot Batteries
Nos. 10 and 37, and Colonel THÜMEN was detached, with the Silesian
Uhlans, and the 11th Hussars, to cover the Right of the Brigade: the
1st and 2nd Squadrons of the 5th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry were posted
in reserve. The 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment opened the attack
upon the Hameau de St Amand, and being well protected on their right by
the 11th Hussars, carried it by storm. The French appeared determined
to regain this point, which from its position, was, in fact, the key
to the defence of the three Villages of St Amand, St Amand la Haye,
and Wagnelé; and the struggle for its possession was most obstinate
and sanguinary. All the Battalions of TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade became
successively engaged. Four times was St Amand la Haye lost and retaken
by the 2nd Regiment, which suffered severely. General JÜRGASS ordered
forward the Horse Battery No. 6, on the right of which the Foot Battery
No. 10 then took post. The Silesian Uhlans and the 11th Hussars
suffered considerably from their exposure to the Enemy's Artillery.
Colonel THÜMEN was killed at their head, by a cannon shot, and was
succeeded by Lieutenant Colonel SCHMIEDEBERG, who ordered both these
Regiments to make a change of front to the right; when the Prussian
Lancers dashed forward to meet the advance of a French Regiment, which
they completely defeated, and having followed up the attack with a
vigorous pursuit, fell all at once among the Enemy's Reserves; but they
immediately recovered themselves, and rallied with great celerity,
order, and precision.
About this time, the Light Cavalry Brigade of Colonel MARWITZ, already
mentioned as having been ordered from the Left, reached the Right
Flank, and was formed up in two lines: also the four Battalions that
had been detached from General KRAFFT's Brigade, arrived upon the right
of St Amand la Haye, and came into action. The Battle on both sides
on this part of the Field continued to rage with unabated violence,
and with such indefatigable ardour did the Prussians continue the
struggle, that when the fire of their Infantry Skirmishers was observed
to slacken, from the men having expended their ammunition, the soldiers
of the 11th Hussars rushed into the midst of them, and supplied them
with such cartridges as they had of their own; an act of devotion to
which many of them fell a sacrifice. General JÜRGASS ordered forward
the Brigade (Seventh) of General BRAUSE in support of that of General
TIPPELSKIRCHEN, which had suffered a very severe loss. When General
BRAUSE had, at an earlier period, taken post at the Trois Burettes,
upon TIPPELSKIRCHEN advancing from that point to Wagnelé (as previously
explained), he stationed both the 3rd Battalions of the 14th and 22nd
Regiments upon an eminence on the left of the high road, for the
purpose of keeping up the communication with TIPPELSKIRCHEN; and he
pushed on the other two Battalions of the 14th Regiment towards Bry,
that they might be nearer at hand, if required, for the contest in the
Villages of Wagnelé and St Amand la Haye, while the two Squadrons of
the Elbe Landwehr Cavalry, attached to his Brigade, kept a look out
upon both sides of the road. These two Battalions, thus posted, caught
the eye of BLÜCHER as he looked round for the nearest available force,
and he immediately ordered them to advance, and join in the contest;
and General BRAUSE, on being made acquainted with this disposition,
led forward the 3rd Battalions of the 14th and 22nd Regiments, and
the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Elbe Landwehr, while the four remaining
Battalions of his Brigade, making a change of front to their left,
formed up, in reserve, in rear of the Namur road. On approaching the
more immediate scene of the action, General BRAUSE came upon the 3rd
Battalion of the 9th Regiment, which had expended all its ammunition:
he procured for it a fresh supply, and ordered it to return into the
Village, along with the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment; while the
1st Battalion of this Regiment threw itself into St Amand la Haye, and
relieved the 2nd Regiment, which now retired, as did also the remainder
of TIPPELSKIRCHEN's Brigade to the rear of Wagnelé, where it reformed.
Here, in these Villages on the Right, as well as at Ligny, the fight
never slackened for a moment: fresh masses, from both sides, poured in
among the burning houses as often as the fearfully diminished numbers
and dreadfully exhausted state of the combatants rendered relief
imperatively necessary; partial successes on different points were
constantly met by corresponding reverses on others; and so equally were
the courage, the energies, and the devotion of both parties balanced,
that the struggle between them appeared, from its unabated vigour,
likely to continue until the utter exhaustion of the one should yield
the triumph to the greater command of Reserves possessed by the other.
The anxiety at that time on the part of BLÜCHER for the arrival of
either a portion of WELLINGTON's forces, or BÜLOW's Corps, was extreme;
and frequently, as he cheered forward his men in their advance to
take part in the contest, did he address them with the exhortation,
"Forward, lads! we must do something before the English join us!"
In fact, his only Reserve remaining was the Ninth Brigade (General
BORCKE's), the withdrawal of which would greatly expose his Centre; and
NAPOLEON, who had already entertained a suspicion that such was the
case, resolved upon terminating the sanguinary combat in the valley, by
boldly advancing a portion of his own intact Reserves, consisting of
the Guard and LOBAU's Corps (which had just arrived and was posted on
the right of Fleuras) against the Prussian Centre.
* * * * *
For the execution of his project the French Emperor destined the
Imperial Guard, with MILHAUD's Corps of _Cuirassiers_ in support. He
wished to conceal this movement as much as possible from the Enemy,
and caused it to be made to the right, along the rear of the Corps of
GÉRARD, a portion of whose Batteries were ordered to be withdrawn, for
the purpose of affording greater protection to the Guard, by diverting
the Enemy's fire to other points, and of deceiving him as to the real
object of the movement, if observed previously to the actual execution
of the Emperor's design.
This far-famed band of veteran warriors, and MILHAUD's splendid Corps
of mailed _Cuirassiers_, were in full march towards the lower extremity
of Ligny, where they were to cross the stream, when, all at once, they
were halted by an Order direct from the Emperor, who had decided upon
suspending the movement, until he should ascertain the result of an
incident that had occurred upon his extreme Left, and which had placed
him for the time in considerable doubt and anxiety respecting its real
nature.
He had received a message from VANDAMME, informing him that a strong
Column, composed of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery, was advancing
towards Fleuras; that it had at first been looked upon as the Corps
detached from NEY's forces, until it was discovered that it moved by a
different road from that along which those troops had been expected,
and in a direction towards the French Left Rear, instead of the
Prussian extreme Right; that GIRARD's Division had been consequently
induced to fall back, and take up a position to cover Fleurus; and
that the effect produced upon his own Corps by the sudden appearance
of this Column was such, that if his Majesty did not immediately move
his Reserve to arrest its progress, his troops would be compelled to
evacuate St Amand and commence a retreat.
This intelligence could not fail to create alarm in the mind of the
French Emperor, who concluded that the Corps in question had been
detached against his Rear, as a diversion in favour of BLÜCHER, from
the Army of WELLINGTON, who had probably obtained some signal triumph
over NEY. Another Officer arrived from VANDAMME, reiterating the
account previously given. NAPOLEON instantly gave the Order for the
halt of the Imperial Guard; and despatched one of his Aides de Camp to
reconnoitre the strength and disposition of the Column, and to discover
the object of its movement.
* * * * *
The commencement of the march of the Imperial Guard and MILHAUD's
_Cuirassier_ Corps towards Ligny, had been conducted with so much
skill, and the manoeuvring of these troops at one point in their line
of march to shelter themselves from the fire of the Prussian Batteries,
to which they had become suddenly exposed, bore so much the appearance
of a retrograde movement, accompanied as it was by the withdrawal
of a portion of the guns of GÉRARD's Corps, that the Prussians were
completely deceived by it. Intelligence was hastily conveyed to BLÜCHER
that the Enemy was retreating; whereupon he ordered the march of
all the remaining disposable Battalions of Colonel LANGEN's Brigade
(the Eighth) upon St Amand, to enable him to take advantage of the
circumstance by pressing upon the Enemy's Left.
In the mean time, Colonel MARWITZ had been menaced by the advance of a
considerable line of Cavalry and a Battery, which latter annoyed him
but little. This Cavalry did not, however, seem much disposed to risk a
close encounter: once it put forward a Detachment, which was overthrown
by two Squadrons of the 7th and 8th Uhlans, and then a Regiment of
French _Chasseurs à Cheval_ fell upon the Skirmishers of the 2nd
Regiment of Infantry, but was driven back by two Squadrons of the 5th
Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry. Colonel MARWITZ had been ordered by General
JÜRGASS to send out Patrols in different directions from the Right
Flank, for the purpose of seeking out the communication with the Duke
of WELLINGTON's forces. These brought in prisoners, from whom it was
ascertained that a whole French Corps, the First, under Count D'ERLON,
was in that vicinity.
Subsequently, French Cavalry were perceived between Mellet and Villers
Perruin; whereupon Colonel MARWITZ, who had been reinforced by two
Squadrons of the Pomeranian Hussars, ordered a change of front of his
Brigade in this direction, then deployed his eight Squadrons in two
lines, with considerable intervals, and withdrew them, alternately,
towards the high road; followed, though not vigorously, by three French
Regiments of Cavalry and a Battery, comprising JAQUINOT's Light Cavalry
Brigade, attached to d'Erlon's Corps. As he approached the _chaussée_,
the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 2nd Elbe Landwehr, as also the 3rd
Battalion of the 22nd Regiment, advanced to his support.
Until about six o'clock the action along that part of the line which
extended from Sombref to Balatre, had not been carried on with any
degree of energy, and the occupation of the opposing forces was
generally limited to mutual observation. Now, however, the French
Infantry (of which only a small portion was attached to GROUCHY's
Cavalry), penetrated as far as the precincts of the Village of
Tongrines; but Colonel KÄMPFEN's Brigade (the Tenth), having been
successively reinforced by all the Battalions of Colonel LUCK's Brigade
(the Eleventh) excepting one which was left in reserve, the French were
easily repulsed, and the Prussians maintained full possession of all
this portion of their original position.
* * * * *
It was about seven o'clock when the Aide de Camp returned from his
reconnaissance, and reported to NAPOLEON that the Column in the
distance which had caused so much uneasiness proved to be D'ERLON's
Corps; that GIRARD's Division, upon being undeceived, had resumed
its position in the Line of Battle; and that VANDAMME's Corps had
maintained its ground.
This movement of D'ERLON's Corps admits of being satisfactorily
explained. NAPOLEON, having received information that D'ERLON had
been left in reserve in front of Gosselies, and inferring, perhaps,
from this circumstance that NEY was sufficiently strong to be able to
hold his ground at Quatre Bras, without further aid than what he had
at hand, resolved upon employing this Corps upon the Prussian Right
Flank; but in the meantime, D'ERLON had, in pursuance of instructions
from NEY, continued his march towards Quatre Bras; and having himself
proceeded in advance, had reached Frasne, at which place Colonel
LAURENT found him, and communicated to him the Emperor's Order for the
march of his Corps upon St Amand; adding that on coming up with the
head of his Column, he had taken upon himself to change its direction
of march into that of St Amand. D'ERLON hastened to comply with
NAPOLEON's wishes, and despatched General D'ELCAMBRE, his Chief of the
Staff, to make known the movement to Marshal NEY.
His route from Frasne towards St Amand, the point prescribed by the
Order, lay through Villers Perruin, and the movement was altogether
one of a retrograde nature. Hence the direction of the Column, as seen
in the distance, was well calculated to alarm the troops of the French
extreme Left; as also to excite surprise in the mind of NAPOLEON,
who having formed no expectation of the arrival of any French troops
in the Field by any other direction than that from Gosselies upon St
Amand, or perhaps from Quatre Bras upon Bry, also participated in the
opinion that the Column in question, under its attendant circumstances
and general disposition, could be no other than that of an Enemy.
As D'ERLON debouched from Villers Perruin, and advanced upon the
prescribed point, St Amand, he threw out his Cavalry (JAQUINOT's) to
his Left, for the protection of this Flank; and it was before this
Cavalry that the Prussian Brigade, under Colonel MARWITZ, retired
in the manner already explained, a movement which fully restored
confidence to GIRARD's Division.
All at once this Column was observed to halt, to indicate an indecision
in its intentions, and finally to withdraw from the Field. D'ERLON had
in fact just received from NEY a peremptory Order to join him without
delay, with which he resolved to comply, probably concluding that he
was bound to do so from the circumstance of his having been in the
first instance placed under the Marshal's immediate command; having
ascertained also from the Emperor's Aide de Camp that he was not the
bearer of any instructions whatever from NAPOLEON as to his future
movements, and that the appearance of his Corps upon that part of the
Field of Battle had been quite unexpected. This pressing Order had
been despatched by NEY immediately previous to the arrival of Colonel
LAURENT on the Heights of Gemioncourt.
If the first appearance of this Column had caused alarm and perplexity
among the troops of the French Left Wing, the apprehensions it excited
on the Prussian Right, when its Cavalry was observed to advance and to
drive back Colonel MARWITZ' Brigade, which had been sent towards it _en
reconnaissance_ (as already explained), were still greater; and its
equally unexpected disappearance (with the exception of its Cavalry,
and a portion of its Infantry), at a moment when it was felt that
its vigorous co-operation must have rendered the issue of the Battle
no longer doubtful, was looked upon as a particularly fortunate turn
of affairs; and BLÜCHER's hopes revived as he prepared to carry into
effect his meditated attack upon the French Left Flank.
There did not appear on the part of NAPOLEON any eagerness to resume
the movement of the Imperial Guard towards the lower extremity of
Ligny, but rather an anxiety to await calmly the most favourable moment
for his projected attack. Doubtless he had discovered the march of
the remaining Battalions of Colonel LANGEN's Brigade, from Sombref
towards St Amand, as a further reinforcement to the Prussian Right,
and calculated upon paralysing the attack which BLÜCHER was evidently
preparing against his Left Flank, by executing a sudden and vigorous
assault on the Prussian Centre, with a preponderating mass of fresh
troops.
* * * * *
At length, towards eight o'clock, the Emperor gave the Order for the
Guard and MILHAUD's Corps of _Cuirassiers_ to resume their march. The
same precautions were observed as before for masking the movement as
much as possible, and so successfully, that THIELEMANN, on observing a
French Battery opposite Tongrines entirely withdrawn, and GROUCHY's
lines of Cavalry presenting a diminished extent of front, and
conceiving, at the same time, that the contest in Ligny was assuming
a change favourable to the Prussians, concluded that the moment had
then arrived in which an attack might be made with every probability
of success, upon the Right Flank of the Enemy. He had only one Brigade
remaining of the Cavalry of his Corps, namely that of Colonel Count
LOTTUM; the other Brigade, under Colonel MARWITZ, having been, as
already explained, for some time detached to the extreme Right of the
Prussian Army. General HOBE, who commanded this Cavalry Division, had
previously moved forward Count LOTTUM's Brigade and posted it in rear
of Colonel KÄMPFEN's Infantry Brigade. THIELEMANN now desired him to
advance with LOTTUM's Brigade and the Horse Battery No. 19, along the
Fleurus high road.
In carrying this Order into effect, General HOBE posted the Battery,
in the first instance, close to the twelve pounder Battery No. 7,
which stood across the Fleurus high road, about midway between the
junction of the latter with the Namur road and the Bridge over the
Ligny. A cannonade was opened from this point upon the French guns on
the opposite Height, to which the latter replied with great spirit, and
one of the guns of the Battery was dismounted. The remaining guns were
now advanced rapidly along the high road, preceded by two Squadrons of
the 7th Dragoons: on getting into position, two of the guns continued
upon the road itself, on which the French had also posted two pieces,
but scarcely had the Squadrons formed up, and the Battery fired a few
rounds, when they were furiously attacked by the 5th and 13th French
Dragoons of EXCELMANS' Cavalry Corps: in an instant they were thrown
into confusion; the two guns upon the road escaped, while the remainder
fell into the hands of the French Dragoons, who closely pursued the
Prussians.
General BORCKE (commanding the Ninth Brigade) observing this _mêlée_
upon the Fleurus road, immediately pushed forward the 1st and 3rd
Battalions of the 1st Kurmark Landwehr, and posted them in rear of the
hedges and walls running parallel with the high road, so as to flank
the Enemy's Cavalry; the 2nd Battalion of the same Regiment followed
the movement, and was finally stationed upon the road. In order to
support these Battalions, and to preserve the communication with
Colonel STÜLPNAGEL's Brigade (the Twelfth) on his right, he occupied
Mont Potriaux and its outlets with the remainder of his Brigade,
excepting the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 8th Regiment, which he held
in reserve.
The 5th and 13th French Dragoons finding themselves likely to be
thus seriously impeded both in front and on their left, and finally
experiencing on their right a cannonade from the two Batteries attached
to Colonel KÄMPFEN's Brigade, which had moved forward from the Height
above Tongrines to the rise of ground south of Tongrenelle, retired
from this part of the Field.
It will be recollected that Colonel STÜLPNAGEL's Brigade, on relieving
that of Colonel LANGEN in front of Sombref, had extended a chain of
Skirmishers along the stream as far as Ligny: these were now reinforced
by both the 3rd Battalions of the 31st Regiment and the 6th Kurmark
Landwehr, with the 3rd Battalion of the 5th Kurmark Landwehr in
reserve. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the Kurmark Landwehr were posted
on the Height between Sombref and Bois du Loup, having on their right
and somewhat in advance, two Squadrons from each of the 5th and 6th
Regiments of Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, together with two guns from the
Foot Battery No. 12. The remaining four Battalions of the Brigade were
in reserve immediately in front of the inclosures of Sombref.
It was nearly eight o'clock, when General KRAFFT despatched an Aide de
Camp to the rear with a message stating, that it was only by dint of
extraordinary efforts that the troops in Ligny could hold out against
the Enemy, who was continually advancing with fresh reinforcements.
General Count GNEISENAU (the Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army),
in the absence of the Prince, sent word that the Village must be
maintained, at whatever sacrifice, half an hour longer.
About the same time, General PIRCH II. sent word to BLÜCHER that his
Brigade, in defending St Amand la Haye, had expended the whole of its
ammunition, and that even the pouches of the killed had been completely
emptied. To this the Prince replied, that the Second Brigade must,
nevertheless, not only maintain its Post, but also attack the Enemy
with the bayonet.
In fact, the exhaustion of the Prussian troops was becoming more
manifest every moment. Several Officers and men, overcome by long
continued exertion, were seen to fall solely from excessive fatigue.
No kind of warfare can be conceived more harassing to the combatants
than was the protracted contest in the Villages which skirted the
front of the Prussian position. It partook also of a savage and
relentless character. The animosity and exasperation of both parties
were uncontrollable. Innumerable individual combats took place. Every
house, every court, every wall, was the scene of a desperate conflict.
Streets were alternately won and lost. An ungovernable fury seized
upon the combatants on both sides, as they rushed wildly forward to
relieve their comrades exhausted by their exertions in the deadly
strife--a strife in which every individual appeared eager to seek out
an opponent, from whose death he might derive some alleviation to the
thirst of hatred and revenge by which he was so powerfully excited.
Hence no quarter was asked or granted by either party.
[Illustration:
BATTLE OF LIGNY
at 1/2 past 8 o'clock p.m.]
When it is considered that a very great portion of the Prussian Army
consisted of young soldiers, who were under fire for the first time,
their bravery and exertions in maintaining so lengthened a contest of
this nature, with the veteran warriors of the French Army, cannot fail
to be regarded with the highest admiration.
* * * * *
Such were the distribution and the state of the Prussian troops
throughout their Line, when NAPOLEON arrived near the lower extremity
of Ligny, with a formidable Reserve. This consisted of eight Battalions
of the Guard, of MILHAUD's Corps of Heavy Cavalry, comprising eight
Regiments of _Cuirassiers_, and of the _Grenadiers à Cheval_ of the
Guard. It was not, however, his sole Reserve; for most opportunely
LOBAU's Corps had just arrived and taken post on the right of Fleurus.
The troops which the French Emperor held thus in hand ready to launch
as a thunderbolt against the weakened Centre of the Prussian Line
of Battle, were perfectly fresh, not having hitherto taken any part
whatever in the contest, and they might justly be styled the flower
of his Army. It was this consciousness of the vantage ground he then
possessed which, upon his perceiving the comparatively unoccupied
space in rear of Ligny, called forth from him the remark to Count
GÉRARD, "They are lost: they have no Reserve remaining!" He saw that
not another moment was to be delayed in securing the victory which was
now within his grasp, and gave his last Orders for the attack at the
very time when BLÜCHER, whose Right had just been strengthened by the
arrival of the remaining three Battalions of Colonel LANGEN's (the
Eighth) Infantry Brigade, was making his dispositions for vigorously
assailing the French Army in its Left Flank.
The projected movement that was to decide the Battle was preceded,
at about half past eight o'clock, by the rapid advance of several
Batteries of the Guard, which opened a most destructive fire upon
the Prussians posted within, and formed in the immediate rear of,
Ligny. Under cover of this cannonade, GÉRARD, with PECHEUX's Infantry
Division, reinforced the troops that still maintained that half of
the Village which lay on the right bank of the rivulet, and pushed
forward with a determination to dislodge the Enemy from the remaining
portion on the left bank. While the Prussian Infantry in rear of Ligny
were in movement for the purpose of relieving their comrades who were
already giving way before this renewed attack, they suddenly perceived,
on the French right of the Village, a Column issuing from under the
heavy smoke that rolled away from the well served Batteries which had
so unexpectedly opened upon them, and, which continued so fearfully
to thin their ranks; and, as the mass rapidly advanced down the slope
with the evident design of forcing a passage across the valley, they
could not fail to distinguish both by its well sustained order and
compactness, and by its dark waving surface of bearskins, that they
had now to contend against the redoubted Imperial Guard. Ligny being
thus turned, the Prussian Infantry, instead of continuing its advance
into the Village, was necessitated, by its inferiority of numbers, to
confine its operations to the securing, as far as possible, an orderly
retreat for the defenders of the place.
Notwithstanding their dreadfully exhausted and enfeebled state, and
their knowledge that a body of fresh troops was advancing against
them, a body, too, which they knew was almost invariably employed
whenever some great and decisive blow was to be struck, they evinced
not the slightest symptom of irresolution, but, on the contrary,
were animated by the most inflexible courage. The sun had gone down,
shrouded in heavy clouds, and rain having set in, the battlefield would
speedily be enveloped in darkness; hence the Prussians felt that it
required but a little more perseverance in their exertions to enable
them to counterbalance their deficiency of numbers upon any point of
their Line by a stern and resolute resistance, sufficient to secure for
the entire of their Army the means of effecting a retreat, unattended
by those disastrous consequences which a signal defeat in the light of
day might have entailed upon them.
The 21st Regiment of Infantry boldly advanced against the French
Column, with a determination to check its further progress; but soon
found itself charged in flank by Cavalry that had darted forward
from the head of a Column which, by the glimmering of its armour,
even amidst the twilight, proclaimed itself a formidable body of
_Cuirassiers_. It was, in fact, MILHAUD's whole Corps of that
description of force, which had effected its passage on the other side
of the village. The 9th Regiment of Infantry fought its way through
a mass of Cavalry, whilst Major WULFFEN, with two weak Squadrons of
the 1st Westphalian Landwehr Cavalry, made a gallant charge against
the French Infantry, which received it with a volley at a distance
of twenty paces. The Prussian Infantry compelled to evacuate Ligny,
effected its retreat in Squares, in perfect order, though surrounded by
the Enemy, bravely repelling all further attacks, made in the repeated
but vain attempts to scatter it in confusion.
BLÜCHER, who had arrived upon the spot from his Right, having, in
consequence of this sudden turn of affairs, been under the necessity
of relinquishing his meditated attack upon the French Left, now made
a last effort to stem the further advance of the Enemy, and, if
possible, to force him back upon Ligny. The rain having ceased, it
became lighter, and the Enemy's Columns being more clearly discernible,
the Prince immediately ordered the advance of three Regiments of the
Cavalry attached to the First _Corps d'Armée_, namely, the 6th Uhlans,
the 1st West Prussian Dragoons, and the 2nd Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry.
These Regiments, which constituted the only Cavalry force immediately
at hand, had for some time been posted in reserve, and had suffered
severely from their exposure to the fire from the French Artillery.
Lieutenant General RÖDER directed the 6th Uhlans to make the first
charge. The Regiment was led on by Lieutenant Colonel LÜTZOW, to
whose Brigade it belonged. In the charge which was directed upon the
Enemy's Infantry, LÜTZOW and several of his Officers fell under a
volley of musketry. The Regiment, which was about 400 strong, lost on
this occasion 13 Officers and 70 men. A second attack, made by the
1st West Prussian Dragoons, and supported by the 2nd Kurmark Landwehr
Cavalry, seemed to offer a fair prospect of penetrating the French
Infantry, when the former Regiment was unexpectedly charged in flank by
the Enemy's _Cuirassiers_, and completely dispersed. The Westphalian,
and 1st Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, with several other Squadrons of the
Landwehr, were collected together, and formed a mass of twenty four
Squadrons, with which a further attack was made upon the Enemy, but
without success.
The cause of this failure is to be attributed not to the want of
sufficient Cavalry, for indeed there was an ample number for the
purpose, but to the confusion and disorder consequent upon the surprise
which the Enemy's attack had occasioned, and which was augmented by
the darkness that had set in upon the Field. Nor was the failure
caused by the absence of that most essential requisite in a charge of
Cavalry, good example on the part of the Officers who lead the well set
Squadrons into the midst of an Enemy's ranks.
* * * * *
BLÜCHER himself, seeing that the fate of the day depended solely on the
chance of the Cavalry at hand succeeding, while there was yet light,
in hurling back the French Columns into the valley which they had so
suddenly and so resolutely crossed, rallied his routed horsemen; and
placing himself at their head, charged, in his old Hussar style, with
the full determination of restoring, if possible, that equal footing
with the Enemy which had hitherto been so gallantly maintained. The
French firmly stood their ground, and the charge proved ineffectual.
As BLÜCHER and his followers retired to rally, they were rapidly
pursued by the French _Cuirassiers_. At this moment, the Prince's
fine grey charger--a present from the Prince Regent of England--was
mortally wounded by a shot, in its left side, near the saddle girth. On
experiencing a check to his speed, BLÜCHER spurred, when the animal,
still obedient to the impulse of its gallant master, made a few
convulsive plunges forward; but on feeling that his steed was rapidly
losing strength, and perceiving at the same time the near approach of
the _Cuirassiers_, he cried out to his Aide de Camp:--"NOSTITZ, now I
am lost!" At that moment the horse fell from exhaustion, rolling upon
its right side, and half burying its rider under its weight. Count
NOSTITZ immediately sprang from his saddle, and holding with his left
hand the bridle of his own horse, which had been slightly wounded, he
drew his sword, firmly resolved to shed, if necessary, the last drop
of his blood in defending the precious life of his revered General.
Scarcely had he done so, when he saw the _Cuirassiers_ rushing forward
at the charge. To attract as little as possible their attention,
he remained motionless. Most fortunately, the rapidity with which
the _Cuirassiers_ advanced amidst the twilight, already sensibly
obscured by the falling rain, precluded them from recognising, or even
particularly remarking, the group, although they swept so closely by
that one of them rather roughly brushed against the Aide de Camp's
horse. Shortly afterwards, the Prussian Cavalry having rallied, and
reformed, in their turn began to drive back the French. Again the
thunder of their hoofs approached, and again the flying host whirled
past the Marshal and his anxious friend; whereupon the latter, eagerly
watching his opportunity as the pursuers came on, darted forward, and
seizing the bridle of a Noncommissioned Officer of the 6th Uhlans,
named SCHNEIDER, ordered him and some Files immediately following, to
dismount and assist in saving the Prince. Five or six powerful men now
raised the heavy dead charger, while others extricated the fallen hero,
senseless and almost immoveable. In this state they placed him on the
Noncommissioned Officer's horse. Just as they moved off, the Enemy was
again pressing forward with renewed speed, and NOSTITZ had barely time
to lead the Marshal, whose senses were gradually returning, to the
nearest Infantry, which gladly received the party, and, retiring in
perfect order, bade defiance to the attacks of its pursuers.
The Horse Battery No. 2, which had supported these Cavalry attacks by
directing its fire against the Left Flank of the Enemy, became, all at
once, surrounded by French Dragoons. These vainly endeavoured to cut
the traces, and the Prussian Artillerymen defended themselves so well
that they succeeded in effecting the escape of the Battery through an
opening in the inclosures of Bry. The Foot Battery No. 3, however, was
overtaken in its retreat by the Enemy's Cavalry, between the Windmill
and Bry, and lost one of its guns.
During these Cavalry attacks, the Prussian Infantry, already exhausted,
and broken up into separate divisions by the desperate contest in
the valley, had collected together at the outlets of the villages.
Some of the Regiments presented a remarkable degree of steadiness
and good order. At length the Cavalry Brigade of General TRESKOW,
then comprising the Queen's and the Brandenburg Dragoons, and the
Brandenburg Uhlans, were brought forward, and made several attacks upon
the French Infantry and _Cuirassiers_. Colonel LANGEN advanced, at
the same time, from near the Windmill, with the only Battalion of his
Brigade remaining at his disposal, the 2nd of the 23rd Regiment, under
the guidance of General PIRCH I., and covered by the Cavalry of General
TRESKOW; but all his efforts proved unavailing. He himself was wounded,
and then driven over by a gun. The Battalion, however, by continuing
in admirable order, enabled General PIRCH I., on whom, at this time,
the defence of Ligny had devolved, to effect the retreat of the troops
from the Village. General JAGOW retired, with a part of his Brigade to
Bry, and immediately occupied this point. Some Battalions of General
KRAFFT's Brigade (the Sixth) fell back from Ligny, towards the high
road, leaving Bry on their left; others still more to the left towards
Bry.
General PIRCH II., whose Brigade (the Second) had been posted by the
Prince in rear of St Amand la Haye, preparatory to a renewed attack,
was upon the point of proceeding to support the Seventh and Eighth
Brigades, then seriously engaged, when he observed the retreat towards
Bry. He immediately withdrew his Brigade to this point, where he
supported and facilitated the retreat of the troops from the Village,
with the assistance of the twelve pounder Battery No. 6, and the Foot
Battery No. 34, as also of the Westphalian Landwehr Cavalry, under
Major WULFFEN, to which latter Corps several Dragoons that had become
separated from their own Regiments, attached themselves.
General GROLMAN, the Quartermaster General of the Prussian Army,
foreseeing the consequences of the Line having been thus broken by
the Enemy, hastened to Bry, and desired General PIRCH II. to cover
the retreat by means of the troops here collected together. He then
proceeded in the direction of Sombref, and finding near this place two
Battalions of the 9th Regiment (Sixth Brigade) he posted them in rear
of a hollow road, leading from Bry towards Sombref. These Battalions
had, in their retreat from Ligny, defeated several attempts on the part
of the Enemy's Cavalry to break them. GROLMAN, on perceiving a twelve
pounder had stuck fast in this hollow road, ordered the Battalions to
advance again in front of the latter, to assist in extricating the
Battery, and to protect its retreat; which was immediately accomplished
within view of the French Cavalry.
It was at this critical period of the battle, that the 2nd Battalion
of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr, which still continued in reserve, in
rear of Bry, under the command of Captain GILLNHAUSSEN, appeared upon
the Height in front, where it particularly distinguished itself. In the
first place it succeeded in effectually checking, by its vigorous fire,
the French _Cuirassiers_, who were in pursuit of the Prussian Infantry.
Then it drove back French Cavalry which was on the point of making a
fresh attack upon the Prussian Dragoons. Afterwards it successfully
withstood three charges by the French Cavalry of the Guard. General
GROLMAN now ordered this Battalion to join the 9th Regiment near
Sombref; and, with the latter, to take up a position at the junction of
the cross road from Ligny with that from Bry to Sombref. This position,
which was in rear of the before mentioned hollow road, was maintained
until past midnight.
* * * * *
Such were the circumstances resulting from the French having forced
the Prussian Line at Ligny, and pursued in the direction of Bry: it is
now necessary to explain what occurred at that time, at, and in the
vicinity of, Sombref.
The First Brigade, which had been placed in reserve, was ordered to
take post, in Squares, upon the high road to Sombref, to check the
pressure of the Enemy's Cavalry. Subsequently, when the direction of
the retreat was decided upon, it fell back upon Tilly. The Fourth
Brigade, with the exception of one or two Battalions, advanced again
through Sombref towards Ligny, just as the French Cavalry pushed
towards the high road. The Battalions of the Brigade formed Squares,
and fell back upon the high road, whence they continued their further
retreat.
At the time the French troops were debouching from Ligny, Colonel
STÜLPNAGEL's (the Twelfth) Brigade was posted in front of Sombref;
and Colonel ROHR had just pushed forward towards Ligny with the 2nd
Battalion of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr, when he perceived three French
Cavalry Regiments advancing against the Right Wing of the Brigade;
whereupon he gradually retired, and the whole Brigade threw itself into
Sombref, just as the French Cavalry made an attack at the entrance of
the Village, and captured the two guns of the Battery No. 12, which
had been posted there. Major DORVILLE faced about the rear division of
the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, and gallantly attacked the French
Cavalry, in the hope of checking their progress; but the lances of his
brave followers were shivered against the cuirasses of their opponents,
and for a moment the former could only defend themselves with their
broken poles. The Prussian Infantry, however, hastened forward in
support; the French were driven out of the Village; and one of the lost
guns was retaken.
Every exertion was now made to secure the possession of Sombref.
General BORCKE (Ninth Brigade) sent thither two Battalions of the 1st
Kurmark Landwehr; which, during this movement, fired upon the flank
of the Enemy's Cavalry as the latter fell back. The defence of the
entrance into the Village from the side of Ligny was confided to the
2nd Battalion of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr, under Colonel ROHR.
About this time, General JÜRGASS received Orders to cover with his
Cavalry (of the Second Corps) the retreat of the Prussian Infantry
from St Amand la Haye and Wagnelé. General BRAUSE, perceiving that the
Enemy had attacked Colonel MARWITZ' Cavalry Brigade, on his right, and
endangered his communication with the rear, hastened with the Fusilier
Battalions of the 22nd Regiment (which had continued in reserve in rear
of St Amand la Haye) towards the high road, upon which the greater part
of the Seventh Brigade had by this time been collected. The Prussians,
on retiring from St Amand la Haye, were closely followed by the French.
The 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment was still in the Hamlet of St
Amand when it received the Order to retire. During its retreat it was
attacked whilst in a hollow way. It immediately showed a front on each
flank, and succeeded in driving back the Enemy. General JÜRGASS now
sent forward the 4th Squadron of the Brandenburg Hussars to attack
the Enemy's _Tirailleurs_, who were beginning to advance from out of
St Amand la Haye. The latter were immediately forced back upon the
Village. Somewhat later, however, the French _Tirailleurs_ poured forth
in greater numbers from out of Wagnelé, and threw themselves upon
the Right Flank of the retreating troops. A _mêlée_ ensued, in which
General JÜRGASS was shot in the shoulder.
* * * * *
When the Centre of the Prussian Army had been broken by the French
Cavalry, and the Prussian Commander had been placed so completely _hors
de combat_, Lieutenant General Count VON GNEISENAU, the Chief of the
Staff, having undertaken the direction of affairs, ordered the retreat
of the First and Second Corps upon Tilly; and despatched Colonel THILE
with directions to THIELEMANN, that if he could not effect a direct
retreat upon Tilly, he was to retire upon Gembloux, there to unite with
BÜLOW, and then effect a junction with the rest of the Army.
The occupation of Bry by General PIRCH II. offered a safe point of
retreat to the disordered Prussian Battalions; and, now that it had
become quite dark, PIRCH led all the troops from this post towards
Marbais, where they reformed, and whence, soon afterwards, under the
command of Lieutenant General RÖDER, they continued the retreat upon
Tilly. MARWITZ' Cavalry Brigade, which was not pursued with much vigour
by the Enemy, fell back to the rear of the Battalions formed up to
cover its movement, and now joined the rest of the Cavalry of the Right
Wing, in the general retreat.
The Fifth Infantry Brigade was in full retreat upon Marbais when the
1st and 2nd Battalions of the 22nd Regiment still continued posted on
the high road, not far from the Trois Burettes. The good order and
perfect steadiness of these Battalions, which were commanded by Major
SACK, completely checked the further advance of the French Cavalry,
and greatly facilitated the retreat of the Prussian troops.
After General JÜRGASS was wounded, the command of the Rear Guard
devolved upon Lieutenant Colonel SOHR, of whose Brigade (the
Brandenburg and Pomeranian Hussars) it consisted. He executed this duty
with great success, falling gradually back upon the Cavalry posted in
advance of Tilly by Lieutenant General ZIETEN; who then took command of
the whole of the Cavalry employed in protecting the retreat.
* * * * *
During the retreat of the Centre of the Prussian Army, which had been
effectually broken, and of its Right from St Amand and Wagnelé, which,
in consequence of BLÜCHER's previous dispositions for his contemplated
attack upon the French Left, was better prepared to sustain a reverse
of this kind; the Left Wing, under THIELEMANN, maintained its position,
and contributed not a little, by its firm countenance, in diffusing a
considerable degree of caution into the French movements in advance.
This was strikingly exemplified by the conduct of the 1st and 2nd
Battalions of the 30th Prussian Regiment. They were posted at Mont
Potriaux, and although their knowledge of what was passing on other
points of the Line was very imperfect, still it sufficed to prompt
their Commander to cross the rivulet, and undertake, if not a vigorous
attack, at least a demonstration, which, now that darkness had almost
covered the Field, would tend to impede, perhaps to paralyze, the
French movements against the Prussian Centre. Having effected their
passage, they met at first but a feeble opposition from a line of
Skirmishers: a French Regiment of Dragoons then advanced very close
upon the 2nd Battalion, but was driven off; whereupon both these
Battalions pushed forward, and gained a Height which was occupied in
force by the Enemy. Here they sustained two more Cavalry attacks, which
proved equally unsuccessful. A mass of Infantry belonging to LOBAU's
Corps, having its Flanks covered by parties of Cavalry, now advanced
against the 1st Battalion; but having, in the dark, exposed a Flank to
the Battalion, it was also repulsed.
Major DITTFURTH, however, finding himself in too isolated a position,
did not deem it prudent to advance further upon ground which he knew to
be in full possession of the Enemy, and therefore retraced his steps.
A renewed attempt was made, at the same time, by the French Light
Cavalry Brigade under General VALLIN, to push forward along the high
road towards Sombref, and gain possession of the barrier; but the
attack was as abortive as had been the former one upon this point.
* * * * *
With the darkness of night, now rapidly deepening, the din of battle,
which had been terrific and incessant until the last faint glimmering
of twilight, became gradually hushed: its expiring sounds still issuing
from the Heights in front of Bry, whence the flashes from the fire of
Artillery, and from that of Skirmishers along the outskirts of this
village (held by General JAGOW with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the
9th Regiment, and the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr),
indicated to the French Army the extreme verge of its advance; while
the still more vivid flashes emitted from the rattling musketry fire of
the two Battalions of the 30th Regiment, which had so gallantly sallied
forth out of Mont Potriaux, under Major DITTFURTH, as previously
described, as also from the Prussian guns which defended the approach
to Sombref, and frustrated the renewed attack along the high road
towards that point, plainly intimated that the Prussian Left Wing
(THIELEMANN's Corps) still firmly maintained itself in a position
whence it might seriously endanger the Flank of any further movement in
advance against the Centre.
VANDAMME's Corps (the Third) bivouacked in advance of St Amand,
GÉRARD's Corps (the Fourth) in front of Ligny, the Imperial Guard
upon the Heights of Bry, GROUCHY's Cavalry in rear of Sombref, and
LOBAU's Corps (the Sixth) in rear of Ligny. This possession of the
Field of Battle, and the capture of 21 pieces of cannon, were the only
advantages of which the French could boast as the immediate result of
so severe a struggle. With these, however, it would seem that their
Emperor was fully satisfied: if he had entertained any idea of pursuit,
it was now abandoned; he took no measures for watching the movements
and prying into the designs of his adversary: but left his troops
resting in their bivouacs, offering no molestation whatever to the
Prussians, whilst he in person returned to Fleurus, where he passed the
night.
* * * * *
The contrast between the circumstances of the two Armies during the
night was very striking; for whilst the victors were indulging in
perfect repose, the vanquished were completely on the alert, seizing
every possible advantage which the extraordinary quietude of their
Enemies afforded during the precious hours of darkness; and never,
perhaps, did a defeated Army extricate itself from its difficulties
with so much adroitness and order, or retire from a hard fought field
with so little diminution of its moral force.
The Prussian Commander was carried to Mélioreux, about six miles in
rear of Ligny, and the Head Quarters were established there for the
night.
THIELEMANN still retained possession of his original position in the
Line of Battle; and General JAGOW, with several detached Battalions
belonging to ZIETEN's Corps, occupied Bry and its immediate vicinity.
From this position the latter General quietly effected his retreat
about an hour after midnight, taking the direction of Sombref, and
thence proceeding to Gembloux, presuming, in all probability, that the
general retreat would be towards the Meuse. It was not until three
o'clock in the morning, when the Field of Battle had been completely
evacuated by the remainder of the Prussian Army, that THIELEMANN
commenced his retreat, which he conducted slowly, and in perfect order,
to Gembloux; near which BÜLOW's _Corps d'Armée_ (the Fourth) had
arrived during the night.
The loss of the Prussian Army on the 15th and 16th of June, amounted in
killed and wounded to about 12,000 men: that of the French to between
7,000 and 8,000. But few prisoners were taken on either side.
* * * * *
In consequence of this defeat, BLÜCHER was compelled, in order to
maintain and secure his close communication with WELLINGTON, to abandon
the line of the Meuse between Namur and Liege; but his orderly and
unmolested retreat afforded him sufficient time to remove all his
stores and material from these points to Maestricht and Louvain, which
now constituted his new base of operations.
It was not, however, a defeat which involved the loss of every
advantage previously gained. BLÜCHER was not _driven_ from the Field:
but, on the contrary, he maintained it during the night, with the
exception of the Villages of Ligny and St Amand in his front; thus
facilitating the orderly retreat of his own Army, and, at the same
time, affording a considerable degree of security to the direct line of
retreat of the Duke of WELLINGTON.
The defeat certainly compelled the latter to retire on the following
morning, whatever might have been his success at Quatre Bras; but so
long as BLÜCHER had it in his power to fall back in such a manner as to
effect his junction the next day with WELLINGTON, the advantage which
accrued to the common object of the two Commanders was of the highest
importance. They would then unite after the concentration of each Army
had been accomplished; hitherto, they had been compelled to meet their
opponents before they had succeeded in collecting their respective
forces. If, however, WELLINGTON had been unable to maintain his ground
against NEY, and NAPOLEON had in this manner succeeded in beating both
Armies in detail; or, if the Prussian defeat had been followed up by
a vigorous pursuit, the loss of the Battle of Ligny might have placed
both Armies in a critical position.
The struggle at Ligny was undoubtedly of a most desperate and
sanguinary character. It was, almost throughout, one continued village
fight; a species of contest which, though extremely harassing and
destructive to both parties engaged, was that most likely to prove of a
long duration, and consequently to afford a better prospect of relief
by the promised support from WELLINGTON, or by the hoped-for junction
of BÜLOW.
* * * * *
It remains a question whether BLÜCHER, had he confined himself during
the latter part of the action to the same defensive system he had so
successfully carried on up to that time, instead of detaching his
Reserves to the Right, and preparing for an attack upon the Enemy's
Left, might not have fully maintained his original position until
dark, and thus have saved his Army from defeat. By the arrival of
BÜLOW's Corps during the night, he would then have been prepared
to meet his opponent on the following morning with a greatly
preponderating force; whilst, on the other hand, WELLINGTON, having
concentrated a considerable portion of his Army, would have been placed
in an equally advantageous position as regards the already vanquished
Enemy in his own front. When it is considered that along the whole
extent of BLÜCHER's line, the French had not gained any material
advantage upon one single point, and that the Prussians continued to
hold their ground with most exemplary firmness; the circumstance of his
not having delayed the collecting of his Reserves, for a grand attack
upon the Enemy's Left, until actually joined by either the British
or BÜLOW's troops, can scarcely be explained except by a reference
to the peculiar character of the Prussian Chief, whose natural fiery
temperament led him, in all probability to seize with avidity the
first prospect which opened itself of a favourable opportunity of
aiming a deadly thrust at his hated foe, rather than to adhere to that
comparatively passive kind of warfare which so ill suited his own
individual inclination and disposition.
* * * * *
NAPOLEON had undoubtedly gained the victory from the moment he
succeeded in penetrating the Prussian Centre; but it was not
distinguished by that brilliant success, or by those immediate and
decisive advantages, which might have been anticipated from the
admirable manner in which the attack had been prepared, and the care
with which it was concealed from the Prussians, at a moment when they
had no Reserve remaining, and when the co-operation of the British on
their Right, or the arrival of BÜLOW's Corps from Hannut, had become
quite impracticable. This appears the more surprising when we reflect
that he had a considerable Corps of Cavalry under GROUCHY at hand to
support this attack, and that the whole of LOBAU's Corps was in the
Field, fully prepared for active operations.
The consequences resulting from the absence of energetic measures on
the part of the French Emperor, in following up the defeat of the
Prussians, on the evening of the 16th and morning of the 17th, will be
fully developed in subsequent Chapters.