NAPOLEON, by his precautionary measures of strengthening his Advanced
Posts, and of displaying along the whole line of the Belgian frontier
an equal degree of vigilance and activity, had effectually concealed
from his adversaries the combined movements of his several _Corps
d'Armée_, and their concentration on the right bank of the Sambre.
During the night of the 13th, however, the light reflected upon the
sky by the fires of the French bivouacs, did not escape the vigilant
observation of ZIETEN's Outposts, whence it was communicated to the
Rear that these fires appeared to be in the direction of Walcourt and
of Beaumont, and also in the vicinity of Solre sur Sambre; further,
that all reports received through spies and deserters concurred in
representing that NAPOLEON was expected to join the French Army on
that evening; that the Imperial Guard and the Second Corps had arrived
at Avesnes and Maubeuge; also that, at one o'clock in the afternoon
of that day, four French Battalions had crossed the river at Solre
sur Sambre, and occupied Merbes le Château; that late in the night
the Enemy had pushed forward a strong Detachment as far as Sart la
Bussière; and lastly, that an attack by the French would certainly take
place on the 14th or 15th.
On the 14th of June, the Dutch-Belgian General VAN MERLEN, who was
stationed at St Symphorien, near Mons, and who commanded the Outposts
between the latter place and Binche which formed the extreme Right
of the Prussians, ascertained that the French troops had moved from
Maubeuge and its vicinity by Beaumont towards Philippeville, that there
was no longer any hostile force in his front, except a Picquet at
Bettignies, and some National Guards in other villages. He forwarded
this important information to the Prussian General STEINMETZ, on his
left, with whom he was in constant communication, and by whom it was
despatched to General ZIETEN at Charleroi.
The Prussian General PIRCH II., who was posted on the left of
STEINMETZ, also sent word to ZIETEN that he had received information
through his Outposts that the French Army had concentrated in the
vicinity of Beaumont and Merbes le Château; that their Army consisted
of 150,000 men, and was commanded by General VANDAMME, JEROME
BUONAPARTE, and some other distinguished Officers; that since the
previous day all crossing of the frontier had been forbidden by the
French under pain of death; and that a Patrol of the Enemy had been
observed that day near Biercée, not far from Thuin.
During the day, frequent accounts were brought to the troops of
ZIETEN's Corps, generally corroborative of the above, by the country
people who were bringing away, and seeking some place of safety
for, their cattle. Intelligence was also obtained of the arrival of
NAPOLEON, and of his brother, Prince JEROME.
ZIETEN immediately transmitted the substance of this information to
Prince BLÜCHER and to the Duke of WELLINGTON; and it was perfectly
consistent with that which the latter had received from Major General
DÖRNBERG, who had been posted in observation at Mons, and from General
VAN MERLEN (through the Prince of ORANGE) who, as already mentioned,
commanded the Outposts between that place and Binche. Nothing,
however, was as yet positively known concerning the real point of
concentration, the probable strength of the Enemy, or his intended
offensive movements, and the Allied Commanders therefore refrained from
making any alteration in their dispositions, and calmly awaited the
arrival of reports of a more definite character concerning the Enemy's
designs.
* * * * *
ZIETEN's troops were kept under arms during the night, and were
collected by Battalions at their respective points of assembly.
Later in the day ZIETEN ascertained, through his Outposts, that strong
French Columns, composed of all Arms, were assembling in his front, and
that every thing portended an attack on the following morning.
ZIETEN's communication of this intelligence reached BLÜCHER between
nine and ten o'clock on the night of the 14th.
Simultaneous Orders were consequently despatched by eleven o'clock for
the march of PIRCH's Corps from Namur upon Sombref, and of THIELEMANN's
Corps from Ciney to Namur. An Order had already, in the course of the
day, been forwarded to BÜLOW at Liege, desiring him to make such a
disposition of his _Corps d'Armée_ as should admit of its concentration
at Hannut in one march; and at midnight a further Order was despatched,
requiring him to concentrate his troops in cantonment about Hannut.
ZIETEN was directed to await the advance of the Enemy in his position
upon the Sambre; and, in the event of his being attacked by superior
numbers, and compelled to retire, to effect his retreat as slowly as
circumstances would permit, in the direction of Fleurus, so as to
afford sufficient time for the concentration of the other three Corps
in rear of the latter point.
The vigilance which was thus exercised along both the Anglo-Allied
and Prussian line of Outposts, obtained for WELLINGTON and BLÜCHER
the fullest extent of information which they could reasonably have
calculated on receiving respecting the dispositions of the Enemy
immediately previous to an attack. They had been put in possession of
the fact that considerable masses of French troops had moved by their
right, and assembled in front of Charleroi. Still, this baring of the
frontier beyond Tournai, Mons, and Binche, of the troops which had
previously occupied that line, and their concentration in front of
Charleroi, might be designed to mask the real line of operation, to
draw the Anglo-Allied troops towards Charleroi, upon which a feigned
attack would be made, while the real attack was intended to be by
Mons. Hence no alteration was made by the Duke in the disposition of
his forces; but the Prussian Field Marshal immediately ordered the
concentration of his own troops at a point where they would be at hand
in case Charleroi should be the real line of attack, and whence they
could far more readily move to the support of WELLINGTON, should that
attack be made by the Mons road.
* * * * *
ZIETEN's position, and his line of Advanced Posts, have already been
described. His Right Brigade (the First), having its Head Quarters at
Fontaine l'Evêque, held the ground between Binche and the Sambre; his
Centre Brigade (the Second) lay along the Sambre, occupying Marchienne
au Pont, Dampremy, La Roux, Charleroi, Châtelet, and Gilly; a portion
of his Third Brigade occupied Farciennes and Tamines on the Sambre,
while the remainder was posted in reserve between Fleurus and the
Sambre; and his Left Brigade (the Fourth) was extended along this river
nearly as far as Namur. The Reserve Cavalry of the First Corps had
been brought more in advance, and was now cantoned in the vicinity of
the Piéton, having Gosselies for its point of concentration.
In this position, ZIETEN, without making the slightest alteration,
remained fully prepared for the expected attack on the morrow.
* * * * *
While NAPOLEON was occupied in prescribing his intended order of
attack, he received a despatch from Count GÉRARD announcing that
Lieutenant General DE BOURMONT, and Colonels CLOUET and VILLOUTREYS,
attached to the Fourth Corps, had deserted to the Enemy--a circumstance
which induced the Emperor to make some alteration in his dispositions.
The morning of the 15th had scarcely broken, when the French Army
commenced its march towards the Sambre, in three Columns, from the
three bivouacs already mentioned as having been taken up during the
previous night. The Left Column advanced from Solre sur Sambre, by
Thuin, upon Marchienne au Pont; the Centre from Beaumont, by Ham sur
Heure, upon Charleroi; and the Right Column from Philippeville, by
Gerpinnes, upon Châtelet.
As early as half past three o'clock in the morning, the head of the
Left Column came in contact with the Prussian troops in front of
Lobbes, firing upon, and driving in, the Picquets of the 2nd Battalion
of the 1st Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr, commanded by Captain
GILLHAUSEN. This Officer who was well aware that the French troops that
had assembled, the night before, in great force in his front, intended
to attack him in the morning, had posted his Battalion so as to afford
it every advantage to be derived from the hilly and intersected ground
it occupied. The French, however, inclined more to their right, and
joined other troops advancing along the road to Thuin, which lay on
his left. Shortly after, they drove back an advanced Cavalry Picquet;
and, at half past four, commenced a fire from four guns upon the
Outpost of Maladrie, about a mile in front of Thuin.
This cannonade, which announced the opening of the Campaign by the
French, was heard by the Prussian troops forming the Left Wing of
STEINMETZ's Brigade; but the atmosphere, which was extremely thick and
heavy, was most unfavourable for the conveyance of sound; so much so,
that the greater portion of the Right Wing of the Brigade remained for
a considerable time in ignorance of the Enemy's advance.
The firing, however, was distinctly heard at Charleroi; and ZIETEN,
who, by the reports which he forwarded on the 14th to WELLINGTON and
BLÜCHER, had fully prepared these Commanders to expect an attack, lost
no time in communicating to them the important fact, that hostilities
had actually commenced.
Shortly before five o'clock, he despatched _Courier Jägers_ to their
respective Head Quarters, Brussels and Namur, with letters containing
the information that since half past four o'clock, he had heard several
cannon shots fired in his front, and at the time he was writing, the
fire of musketry also, but that he had not yet received any report
from his Outposts. To BLÜCHER he at the same time intimated that he
should direct the whole Corps to fall back into position; and, should
it become absolutely necessary, to concentrate at Fleurus. His report
to the Duke of WELLINGTON arrived in Brussels at nine o'clock in the
morning; that to Prince BLÜCHER reached Namur between eight and nine
o'clock. The former, while it placed the British Commander on the _qui
vive_, did not induce him to adopt any particular measure--he awaited
further and more definite information; but the latter satisfied the
Prussian Field Marshal that he had taken a wise precaution in having
already ordered the concentration of his several Corps in the position
of Sombref.
The Prussian troops at Maladrie checked, for a time, the advance of
the French upon Thuin, and maintained their ground for more than an
hour, with the greatest bravery. They were overpowered, and driven back
upon Thuin. This place was occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd
Westphalian Landwehr, under Major MONSTERBERG, who, after an obstinate
and gallant resistance, during which the Battalion suffered an immense
loss, was forced to retire, about seven o'clock, upon Montigny, where
he found Lieutenant Colonel WOISKY, with two Squadrons of the 1st West
Prussian Dragoons.
The French succeeded in taking this village, and the retreat was then
continued in good order, under the protection of WOISKY's Dragoons,
towards Marchienne au Pont; but before reaching this place, the latter
were attacked, and completely overthrown by the French Cavalry; and the
Infantry getting into disorder at the same moment were partly cut down,
and many were taken prisoners. Indeed so severe was the loss which the
3rd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr suffered in this retreat,
that the mere handful of men which remained could not possibly be
looked upon as constituting a Battalion in the proper meaning of the
term. It was reduced to a mere skeleton. Lieutenant Colonel WOISKY was
wounded on this occasion; but continued, nevertheless, at the head of
his Dragoons.
Captain GILLHAUSEN, who, as before stated, commanded the Prussian
Battalion posted at Lobbes, as soon as he had satisfied himself that
Thuin was taken, saw the necessity of effecting his own retreat, which
he did, after the lapse of half an hour, drawing in his Picquets, and
occupying the Bridge over the Sambre with one Company. He then fell
back, and occupied the Wood of Sar de Lobbes, where he received an
Order, as soon as the Post of Hoarbes was also taken by the Enemy, to
continue his retreat, taking a direction between Fontaine l'Evêque and
Anderlues.
The Post at Abbaye d'Alnes, occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 1st
Westphalian Landwehr, under the temporary command of Captain GROLLMANN,
also fell into the hands of the French, between eight and nine o'clock.
As soon as the Commander of the First Prussian Brigade--General
STEINMETZ--was made acquainted with the attack upon his most Advanced
Posts along the Sambre, he despatched an Officer of his Staff--Major
ARNAULD--to the Dutch-Belgian General VAN MERLEN at St Symphorien,
situated on the road between Binche and Mons, to make him fully
acquainted with what had taken place, and with the fact that his
Brigade was falling back into position. On his way, Major ARNAULD
directed Major ENGELHARDT, who commanded the Outposts on the right, to
lose not a moment in withdrawing the chain of Picquets; and on arriving
at Binche, he spread the alarm that the French had attacked, and that
the Left of the Brigade was warmly engaged, which rendered it necessary
that the Right should retire with the utmost expedition. Until this
Officer's arrival, the Prussian troops in this quarter were wholly
ignorant of the attack; the state of the atmosphere, to which allusion
has already been made, having prevented their hearing the slightest
sound of any firing. They had a much greater extent of ground to pass
over in retreat than the rest of the Brigade, and yet, by the above
unfortunate circumstance, they were the last to retire.
ZIETEN, having ascertained, about eight o'clock, that the whole
French Army appeared to be in motion, and that the direction of the
advance of its Columns seemed to indicate the probability of Charleroi
and its vicinity being the main object of the attack, sent out the
necessary Orders to his Brigades. The First was to retire by Courcelles
to the position in rear of Gosselies; the Second was to defend the
three Bridges over the Sambre, at Marchienne au Pont, Charleroi, and
Châtelet, for a time sufficient to enable the First Brigade to effect
its retreat towards Gosselies, and thus to prevent its being cut off
by the Enemy, after which it was to retire behind Gilly; the Third and
Fourth Brigades, as also the Reserve Cavalry and Artillery, were to
concentrate as rapidly as possible, and to take up a position in rear
of Fleurus.
The three points by which the First Brigade was to fall back, were Mont
St Aldegonde, for the troops on the right, Anderlues for those in the
centre, and Fontaine l'Evêque for the left. In order that they might
reach these three points about the same time, ZIETEN ordered that those
in front of Fontaine l'Evêque should yield their ground as slowly as
the Enemy's attack would admit. Having reached the line of these three
points, about ten o'clock, the Brigade commenced its further retreat
towards Courcelles, having its proper Left protected by a separate
Column consisting of the 1st Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr and two
Companies of Silesian Rifles, led by Colonel HOFFMANN, in the direction
of Roux and Jumet, towards Gosselies.
At Marchienne au Pont stood the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Prussian
Regiment, belonging to the Second Brigade of ZIETEN's Corps. The Bridge
was barricaded, and with the aid of two guns, resolutely maintained
against several attacks; after which these troops commenced their
retreat upon Gilly, by Dampremy. In the latter place were three
Companies of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Westphalian
Landwehr, with four guns. These also retired about the same time
towards Gilly, the guns protecting the retreat by their fire from the
Churchyard; after which they moved off as rapidly as possible towards
Gilly, while the Battalion marched upon Fleurus; but the 4th Company,
which defended the Bridge of La Roux until Charleroi was taken, was too
late to rejoin the latter, and therefore attached itself to the First
Brigade, which was retreating by its Right Flank.
* * * * *
Lieutenant General Count PAJOL's Corps of Light Cavalry formed the
Advanced Guard of the Centre Column of the French Army: it was to have
been supported by VANDAMME's Corps of Infantry, but by some mistake,
this General had not received his Orders, and at six o'clock in the
morning had not quitted his bivouac. NAPOLEON, perceiving the error,
led forward the Imperial Guards in immediate support of PAJOL. As the
latter advanced, the Prussian Outposts, though hard pressed, retired,
skirmishing in good order. At Couillet, on the Sambre, about a mile and
a half below Charleroi, the French Cavalry fell upon a Company of the
3rd Battalion of the 28th Prussian Regiment, surrounded it, and forced
it to surrender.
Immediately afterwards, the French gained possession of Marcinelles,
a village quite close to Charleroi, and connected with this town by a
dike 300 paces in length, terminating at a Bridge, the head of which
was palisaded. Along this dike the French Cavalry ventured to advance,
but was suddenly driven back by the Prussian Skirmishers, who lined the
hedges and ditches intersecting the opposite slope of the embankment;
a part of the village was retaken, and an attempt made to destroy the
Bridge. The French, however, having renewed the attack with increased
force, succeeded in finally carrying both the dike and the Bridge, and
by this means effected their entrance into Charleroi. Major ROHR, who
commanded this Post, now felt himself under the necessity of effecting
his retreat with the 1st Battalion of the 6th Prussian Regiment,
towards the preconcerted position in rear of Gilly, which he did in
good order, though hotly pursued by Detachments of PAJOL's Dragoons.
By eleven o'clock, the French were in full possession of Charleroi, as
also of both banks of the Sambre above the town, and REILLE's Corps was
effecting its passage over the river at Marchienne au Pont.
The right Column of the French Army, commanded by Count GÉRARD, having
a longer distance to traverse, had not yet reached its destined point,
Châtelet on the Sambre.
* * * * *
The Fourth Brigade of ZIETEN's Corps, as also the advanced portion of
the Third, continued their retreat towards Fleurus; General JAGOW, who
commanded the latter, having left the two Silesian Rifle Companies and
the Fusilier Battalion[8] of the 7th Prussian Regiment at Farciennes
and Tamines, for the purpose of watching the points of passage across
the Sambre, and of protecting the Left Flank of the position at Gilly.
But, from the moment the French made themselves masters of Charleroi,
and of the left bank of the Sambre above that town, the situation of
the First Brigade under General STEINMETZ became extremely critical.
ZIETEN immediately ordered General JAGOW, whose Brigade was in
reserve, to detach Colonel RÜCHEL with the 29th Regiment of Infantry
to Gosselies, for the purpose of facilitating General STEINMETZ's
retreat. The Colonel found that General RÖDER (commanding the Reserve
Cavalry of the Corps) had posted there the 6th Regiment of Prussian
Uhlans (Lancers) under Lieutenant Colonel LÜTZOW, to whom he confided
the defence of Gosselies, which he occupied with the 2nd Battalion of
the 29th Regiment, while he placed himself in reserve with the other
two Battalions.
As soon as the French had assembled in sufficient force at Charleroi,
NAPOLEON ordered Count PAJOL to detach General CLARY's Brigade towards
Gosselies, and to advance with the remainder of the First Corps of
Reserve Cavalry towards Gilly. General CLARY, with the 1st French
Hussars, reached Jumet, on the left of the Brussels road, and only
but little more than a mile from Gosselies, before the First Prussian
Brigade had crossed the Piéton. He now advanced to attack Gosselies,
but was met by Lieutenant Colonel LÜTZOW and his Dragoons, who defeated
and repulsed him, and thus secured for General STEINMETZ time to
pass the Piéton; and as soon as the latter had turned the Defile of
Gosselies, Colonel RÜCHEL with the 29th Regiment moved off to rejoin
the Third Brigade.
The check thus experienced by General CLARY led to his being supported
by Lieutenant General LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES, with the Light Cavalry
of the Guard and the two Batteries attached to this force; and a
Regiment from Lieutenant General DUHESME's Division of the Young Guard
was advanced midway between Charleroi and Gosselies as a Reserve to
LEFÈBVRE-DESNOUETTES. The Advanced Guard of REILLE's Corps, which had
crossed the Sambre at Marchienne au Pont, was also moving directly upon
Gosselies, with the design both of cutting off the retreat of ZIETEN's
troops along the Brussels road, and of separating the Prussians from
the Anglo-Allied Army. D'ERLON's Corps, which was considerably in the
rear, received orders to follow and support REILLE.
General STEINMETZ, upon approaching Gosselies, and perceiving the
strength of the Enemy and the consequent danger of being completely
cut off, with the utmost promptitude and decision directed the 2nd
Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr to march against the Enemy's
Left Flank, with a view to divert his attention and to check his
advance, while, protected by the 6th Lancers and the 1st Silesian
Hussars, he continued his retreat towards Heppignies. This plan was
attended with complete success; and STEINMETZ reached Heppignies
with scarcely any loss, followed by General GIRARD at the head of
the Seventh Division of the Second French _Corps d'Armée_, with the
remainder of which REILLE continued his advance along the Brussels
road. Heppignies was already occupied by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions
of the 12th Prussian Regiment, and with this increase of strength
STEINMETZ drew up in order of battle, and upon GIRARD's attempting to
force the place, after having previously occupied Ransart, he advanced
against him, and drove him back in the direction of Gosselies. A brisk
cannonade ensued, which was maintained on the part of the Prussians,
only so long as it was deemed necessary for covering their retreat upon
Fleurus.
* * * * *
In conformity with ZIETEN's Orders, General PIRCH II., when forced to
abandon Charleroi, retired to Gilly, where, having concentrated the
Second Brigade, about two o'clock, he took up a favourable position
along a ridge in rear of a rivulet; his Right resting upon the Abbey
of Soleilmont, his Left extending towards Châtelineau, which Flank
was also protected by a Detachment occupying the Bridge of Châtelet,
GÉRARD's Corps not having as yet arrived at that point. He posted the
Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment in a small Wood which lay in
advance on the exterior slope of the ridge; four guns on the right,
upon an eminence commanding the valley in front; two guns between this
point and the Fleurus road, as also two guns on the right of the road,
to impede as much as possible the advance of any Columns towards Gilly.
The Sharp Shooters of the Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment, by
lining some adjacent hedges, afforded protection to the Artillery. The
2nd Battalion of the 28th Regiment was stationed beyond the Fleurus
road, near the Abbey of Soleilmont, in such a manner as to be concealed
from the Enemy. The 1st Battalion of this Regiment stood across the
road leading to Lambusart; and its Fusilier Battalion was posted more
to the left, towards Châtelet. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian
Landwehr was posted in support of the Battery in rear of Gilly. The
1st Battalion of this Regiment, previously mentioned as on the march
from Dampremy to Fleurus, passed through Lodelinsart and Soleilmont,
and rejoined the Brigade in rear of Gilly, before the affair had
terminated. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 6th Regiment formed the
Reserve. The 1st West Prussian Dragoons were posted on the declivity
of the ridge towards Châtelet: they furnished the Advanced Posts, and
patrolled the valley of the Sambre, maintaining the communication with
the Detachment at Farciennes, belonging to the Third Brigade.
General PIRCH, foreseeing that in the event of the Enemy succeeding
in turning his Right, a rapid advance along the Fleurus road would be
the means of greatly molesting, if not of seriously endangering, his
retreat upon Lambusart, took the precaution of having this road blocked
up by an _abatis_ in the Wood through which it led.
VANDAMMME did not reach Charleroi until three o'clock in the afternoon,
when he received Orders to pursue the Prussians, in conjunction with
GROUCHY, along the Fleurus road. It was, however, a considerable
time before any advance was made. In the first place, the whole of
VANDAMME's Corps had to cross the Sambre by a single Bridge; secondly,
both Generals were deceived by exaggerated reports concerning the
strength of the Prussians in rear of the Fleurus Woods; and GROUCHY
who had gone forward to reconnoitre, returned to the Emperor with
a request for further instructions. Upon this, NAPOLEON undertook
a reconnaissance in person, accompanied by the four Squadrons _de
Service_; and having formed an opinion that the amount of force in
question did not exceed 18, or 20,000 men, he gave his Orders for the
attack of General PIRCH's Brigade.
The French Generals having directed their preparatory dispositions
from the Windmill near the Farm of Grand Drieu, opened the engagement
about six o'clock in the evening, with a fire from two Batteries. Three
Columns of Infantry advanced in echelon from the right, the first
directing its course towards the little Wood occupied by the Fusilier
Battalion of the 6th Prussian Regiment; the second passing to the right
of Gilly; and the third winding round the left of this Village. The
attack was supported by two Brigades of General EXCELMANS' Cavalry
Corps, namely, those of Generals BOURTHE and BONNEMAIN; of which one
was directed towards Châtelet, thus menacing the Prussian Left Flank,
and the other advanced along the Fleurus road.
The Battery attached to the Second Prussian Brigade was in the act
of replying with great spirit to the superior fire from the French
Artillery, and the Light Troops were already engaged, when General
PIRCH received ZIETEN's Orders to avoid an action against superior
numbers, and to retire by Lambusart upon Fleurus.
Perceiving the formidable advance and overwhelming force of the
Enemy, he did not hesitate a moment in carrying those Orders into
effect, and made his dispositions accordingly; but the retreat had
scarcely commenced when his Battalions were vigorously assailed by the
French Cavalry. NAPOLEON, in the hope of profiting by this retrograde
movement, sent against the retreating Columns the four Squadrons _de
Service_ of the Guard, under General LETORT, a distinguished Cavalry
Officer attached to his Staff. The Prussian Infantry withstood the
repeated attacks of the French Cavalry with undaunted bravery, and
aided by the gallant exertions of Lieutenant Colonel WOISKY, who
boldly met the Enemy with the 1st West Prussian Dragoons, and checked
his progress, the greater part of it succeeded in gaining the Wood of
Fleurus. The Fusilier Battalion of the 28th Regiment (of which it will
be recollected, one Company had previously been captured on the right
bank of the Sambre) was the only Column broken on this occasion. It had
been ordered to retire into the Wood by Rondchamp, but before it could
complete the movement, it was overtaken by the Enemy's Cavalry, by
which it was furiously assailed, and suffered a loss of two thirds of
its number.
The Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment was more fortunate. When
about five hundred paces from the Wood, it was attacked by the Enemy's
Cavalry on the plain, but forming Square, and reserving its fire until
the French horsemen had approached within twenty or thirty paces, it
gallantly repelled several charges. As the vigour with which these
attacks were made began to slacken, the Battalion cleared its way with
the bayonet through the Cavalry that continued hovering round it. One
of its Companies immediately extended itself along the edge of the
wood, and kept the French Cavalry at bay. The latter suffered severely
on this occasion, and General LETORT who led the attacks was mortally
wounded.
The Brandenburg Dragoons had been detached by ZIETEN in support of
PIRCH's Brigade, and opportunely reaching the Field of Action, made
several charges against the French Cavalry, which they repulsed and
compelled to relinquish its pursuit.
PIRCH's Brigade now took up a position in front of Lambusart, which
was occupied by some Battalions of the Third Brigade, and General
RÖDER joined it with his remaining three Regiments of Cavalry and a
Battery of Horse Artillery. At this moment, the French Cavalry, which
was formed up in position, opened a fire from three Batteries of Horse
Artillery, and thus brought on a cannonade, with which, however, the
affair terminated.
The First Prussian Brigade having safely executed its retreat from
Heppignies, towards Fleurus, reached St Amand about eleven o'clock at
night.
The Detachments left by the Third Brigade at Farciennes and Tamines,
had been previously called in, and effected their retreat without
any molestation, as did also, subsequently, the Second Brigade from
Lambusart, by Boulet, towards Fleurus, protected by the Reserve Cavalry.
ZIETEN's Corps, at three o'clock in the morning had possessed a line
of Advanced Posts, from Dinant on the Meuse, crossing the Sambre
at Thuin, and extending as far as Bonne Esperance, in advance of
Binche; thus stretching along a space of from forty to fifty miles in
length: its main force occupied the Sambre from Thuin as far as its
confluence with the Meuse, an extent of, at least, thirty six miles,
exclusive of the numerous windings throughout the whole course of the
river between those two points. The men had, since daybreak, been
constantly under arms, in motion, and almost as constantly engaged,
pursued, and assailed upon all points by an overwhelming superiority
of force, headed by the _élite_ of the French Cavalry; and it was
not until about eleven o'clock at night that the Corps effected its
concentration in position between Ligny and St Amand, at a distance
varying from fourteen to twenty miles in rear of its original extended
line of Outposts; after having successfully and gloriously fulfilled
the arduous task imposed upon it of gaining sufficient time for the
concentration, on the following day, of all the Prussian Corps, by
stemming, as well as its scattered force would admit, the imposing
advance of the whole French Army.
The loss of the First Prussian _Corps d'Armée_ on the 15th of June,
amounted to 1200 men. The Fusilier Battalions of the 28th Regiment
and of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr, reduced to mere skeletons, were
united, and formed into one Battalion.
Before ten o'clock on the morning of the 15th, a further Order was
despatched from the Prussian Head Quarters to the Third _Corps
d'Armée_, to the effect that after resting during the night at Namur,
it was to continue its march upon the morning of the 16th, towards
Sombref.
At half past eleven o'clock in the forenoon a despatch was forwarded to
BÜLOW, announcing the advance of the French, and requesting that the
Corps after having rested at Hannut, should commence its march upon
Gembloux by daybreak of the 16th, at the latest.
By three o'clock in the afternoon of the 15th, the Second _Corps
d'Armée_ had taken up the position assigned to it between Onoz and Mazy
in the immediate vicinity of Sombref, with the exception, however, of
the Seventh Brigade, which, having been stationed in the most remote of
the Quarters occupied by the Corps, did not reach Namur until midnight.
Here the latter found an Order for its continuance in Namur until the
arrival of the Third _Corps d'Armée_; but as this had already taken
place, the Brigade, after a few hours' rest, resumed its march, and
joined its Corps at Sombref about ten o'clock in the morning of the
16th June.
THIELEMANN passed the night at Namur, which he occupied with the Tenth
Brigade; the Ninth Brigade bivouacked on the right, and the Eleventh
on the left, of Belgrade, a village at a short distance from the town,
on the road to Sombref; the Twelfth Brigade in rear of the Ninth; the
Reserve Cavalry at Flavinne, between that road and the Sambre; and the
Reserve Artillery on the left of the road.
* * * * *
It has already been explained that on the 14th, BLÜCHER sent off a
despatch to BÜLOW desiring him to make such a disposition of his Corps
as should enable his troops to reach Hannut in one march; and that at
midnight of the 14th, a second despatch was forwarded, requiring him to
concentrate the Fourth Corps at Hannut. The first of these despatches
reached BÜLOW, at Liege, at five o'clock on the morning of the 15th;
when he issued the necessary Orders with an instruction that they
should be acted upon as soon as the troops had dined, and forwarded a
report of this arrangement to Head Quarters. These Orders to his troops
had been despatched some hours, and the consequent movements were for
the most part in operation, when, towards noon, the second despatch
arrived. BÜLOW, considering the effect which the change required by
this new Order would have upon the troops, inasmuch as their reception
was prepared in quarters to which, in this case, they would no longer
proceed, and they would have nothing provided for them in the destined
bivouac near Hannut, also as a great proportion of them could not
receive the Orders for the change in the direction of their march until
evening, decided upon deferring the new movement until daybreak of the
16th. The despatch, moreover, did not require him to establish his
Head Quarters at Hannut, but merely suggested that the latter appeared
the most suitable for the purpose. The General was, besides, perfectly
unconscious of the commencement of hostilities, which, indeed, he
had expected would be preceded by a Declaration of War; and he had
also good grounds for an opinion which he had formed that it was in
contemplation to assemble the whole Army at Hannut.
He made a report to Head Quarters of his reasons for deferring the
execution of the Order, with the intimation that he would be at Hannut
by midday of the 16th. Captain BELOW, on BÜLOW's Staff, who carried
this despatch, arrived at nine o'clock in the evening of the 15th at
Namur, where he discovered that the Head Quarters of the Army had been
transferred to Sombref.
At half past eleven o'clock in the forenoon of the 15th, another
despatch was forwarded to BÜLOW from Namur, announcing the advance
of the French, and requesting that the Fourth Corps, after having
rested at Hannut, should commence its march upon Gembloux, by daybreak
of the 16th at latest. The Orderly who carried it was directed to
proceed to Hannut, the presumed Head Quarters of BÜLOW's Corps on that
day. On reaching that place, the Orderly found the previous despatch
lying in readiness for the General, and, mounting a fresh horse,
he then went on with both despatches to Liege, where he arrived at
sunrise. The Orders which they contained had now, however, become
impracticable, in consequence of BÜLOW's not having immediately carried
into effect the _first_ Order to collect at Hannut; and thus by one
of those mischances, which, in war, occasionally mar the best planned
operations, the opportune arrival of the Fourth Prussian Corps at the
Battle of Ligny, which would, in all probability, have changed the
aspect of affairs, was rendered a matter of impossibility.
Late in the evening, and after Prince BLÜCHER had established his Head
Quarters at Sombref, Captain BELOW arrived with the before mentioned
report from Count BÜLOW; on receiving which his Highness was made
sensible that he could no longer calculate with certainty upon being
joined by the Fourth Corps on the following day.
* * * * *
It was seven o'clock in the evening of the 15th, when Marshal NEY,
who had just arrived, joined the Emperor near Charleroi, at the point
where the road to Fleurus branches off from the one to Brussels. Having
expressed the pleasure he felt at seeing him, NAPOLEON gave him the
command of the First and Second _Corps d'Armée_; explaining at the same
time that REILLE was advancing with three Divisions upon Gosselies;
that D'ERLON would pass the night at Marchienne au Pont; that he would
find under his orders PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Division; as also the two
Regiments of _Chasseurs_ and Lancers of the Guard, of which, however,
he was not to make use except as a Reserve. "Tomorrow," added the
Emperor, "you will be joined by the Reserve Corps of Heavy Cavalry
under KELLERMANN. Go and drive back the Enemy."
* * * * *
It has already been shown in the preceding Chapter, that the extreme
Left of the Duke of WELLINGTON's Army, composed of DE PERPONCHER's
Second Dutch-Belgian Division, rested upon the Charleroi road to
Brussels. The Second Brigade of this Division, under Colonel GÖDECKE,
was thus located:--1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, at
Hautain le Val; the 2nd Battalion, at Frasne and Villers Peruin;
the 3rd Battalion, at Bezy, Sart à Mavelines, and Quatre Bras; both
Battalions of the Regiment of Orange-Nassau, at Genappe. There was also
at Frasne a Dutch Battery of Horse Artillery, under Captain BYLEVELD.
Early on the morning of the 15th, these troops were lying quietly in
their cantonments, perfectly unconscious of the advance of the French
Army, when they heard a brisk cannonade at a distance in the direction
of Charleroi; but not having received the slightest intimation of the
Enemy's approach, they concluded that the firing proceeded from the
Prussian Artillery practice, which they had frequently heard before,
and to which they had therefore become accustomed. Gradually towards
noon, however, the cannonade became more distinctly audible; and, in
the afternoon, the arrival of a wounded Prussian soldier completely
set at rest all doubt as to the advance of the French. An Orderly was
immediately despatched with the intelligence to the Regimental Head
Quarters, whence it was also communicated to General DE PERPONCHER's
Head Quarters at Nivelles.
In the meantime, Major NORMANN, who commanded the 2nd Battalion of the
2nd Regiment of Nassau, drew up the latter with the Battery in position
in rear of Frasne, and upon the road to Quatre Bras, after having
posted a Picquet of observation in advance of the village.
PERPONCHER lost not a moment in ordering both Brigades of his Division
to hasten towards their respective points of assembly; the 1st Brigade,
under General BYLANDT, to Nivelles, and the 2nd, under Colonel GÖDECKE,
to Quatre Bras.
Before this Order, however, could possibly reach these troops, Prince
BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar, who commanded the Regiment of Orange-Nassau,
at Genappe, having been informed by the Officer of the Dutch-Belgian
_Maréchaussées_, who had been compelled to quit his post at Charleroi,
that the French were advancing from that place, took upon himself to
move forward with the above Regiment from Genappe to Quatre Bras,
and despatched a report of such movement to the Head Quarters of
the Brigade at Hautain le Val, as also, subsequently, to General DE
PERPONCHER at Nivelles, by Captain GAGERN, of the Dutch-Belgian Staff,
who happened to be just then at Genappe, for the purpose of collecting
information.
About six o'clock in the evening, parties of Lancers belonging to
PIRÉ's Light Cavalry Division of REILLE's Corps appeared in front of
Frasne, and soon drove in Major NORMANN's Picquet.
This Officer placed a Company on the south or French side of Frasne,
for the purpose of preventing as long as possible the entrance of the
French into the Village. BYLEVELD's Battery took post on the north side
of the Village, and the remaining Companies of the 2nd Battalion of
the 2nd Regiment of Nassau drew up in its support. Two guns were upon
the road, and three on each side of it. After some time, the Lancers,
having been reinforced, compelled the Company before mentioned to
retire through the Village and fall back upon the main body, which
then opened a vigorous fire, by which this front attack by the French
Cavalry was defeated. The latter then made a disposition to turn the
Left Flank of these troops; on perceiving which Major NORMANN and
Captain BYLEVELD resolved upon falling back to within a short distance
in front of Quatre Bras. The retreat was conducted in excellent order,
the Battery continuing to fire along the high road.
Quatre Bras was the _rendezvous_ of the Second Brigade; and the 3rd
Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, which was cantoned in its
immediate vicinity, had already, without waiting for the receipt of
superior Orders, assembled at that point. Prince BERNHARD, on arriving
there with the Regiment of Orange-Nassau, and learning the particulars
of the engagement at Frasne, assumed the command as Senior Officer,
and being fully impressed with the importance of securing the point of
junction of the high road from Charleroi to Brussels, with that from
Namur to Nivelles, came to the resolution of making a firm stand at
Quatre Bras. This decision accorded entirely with the spirit of the
Orders which had in the meantime been despatched from Braine le Comte,
the Dutch-Belgian Head Quarters, on the receipt of intelligence of the
French having crossed the Sambre. General DE PERPONCHER, who commanded
the Division, had also approved of the Prince's determination, and
Colonel GÖDECKE who was at Hautain le Val, and who had hitherto
commanded the Second Brigade, now tendered his command to his Serene
Highness, who immediately accepted it.
The Prince pushed forward the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of
Nassau, in Column, upon the high road towards Frasne, detached two
Companies of the 1st Battalion, and the Volunteer _Jägers_, to the
defence of the Wood of Bossu, and the remaining Companies on the high
road towards Hautain le Val; and posted the remainder of the Brigade at
Quatre Bras, along the Namur road. Of BYLEVELD's Horse Battery, four
guns were posted in advance in the direction of Frasne, two on the road
to Namur, and two in rear of the main body.
By the determined show of resistance which his Serene Highness
displayed, as well as by the vigorous cannonade which he maintained,
PIRÉ's Advanced Guard, the Left Flank of which became endangered by the
Dutch occupying the Wood of Bossu, was forced to retire in its turn,
which it did unmolested, and brought back intelligence that Quatre Bras
was occupied by ten Battalions with Artillery, and that WELLINGTON's
troops were moving to concentrate at this important point.
At ten o'clock at night, NEY's forces were thus disposed:--PIRÉ's Light
Cavalry Division and BACHELU's Infantry Division occupied Frasne, a
village situated upon the Brussels road, about two miles and a half on
the French side of Quatre Bras; the two Regiments of _Chasseurs_ and
Lancers of the Guard were in reserve in rear of Frasne; REILLE was with
two Divisions, and the Artillery attached to them, at Gosselies: these
Divisions ensured the communication until the arrival of D'ERLON's
Corps, which was to remain that night at Marchienne au Pont. The
remaining Division of REILLE's Corps (GIRARD's) was at Heppignies,
and thus served to maintain the communication with the Main Column
under NAPOLEON. The troops were greatly fatigued by having been kept
constantly on the march since three o'clock in the morning; the
strength of the different Regiments, the names of their Colonels, and
even of the Generals, were unknown to the Marshal, as also the number
of men that had been able to keep up with the heads of the Columns at
the end of this long march.
These circumstances, combined with the information brought in from
Quatre Bras, induced NEY to decline risking a night attack upon that
point; and he contented himself with taking up a position in advance of
Frasne. Having issued such Orders as he deemed essential, and enjoined
the most vigilant look out, he returned to Charleroi, where he arrived
about midnight; partook of supper with NAPOLEON (who had just arrived
from the Right Wing of the Army), and conferred with the Emperor upon
the state of affairs until two o'clock in the morning.
* * * * *
The first intimation which the Duke of WELLINGTON received on the 15th,
of hostilities having commenced, was conveyed in the report already
alluded to, as having been forwarded by General ZIETEN, shortly before
five o'clock in the morning, and as having reached Brussels at nine
o'clock. It was not, however, of a nature to enable the Duke to form an
opinion as to any real attack being contemplated by the Enemy in that
quarter. It simply announced that the Prussian Outposts in front of
Charleroi were engaged. It might be the commencement of a real attack
in this direction, but it might also be a diversion in favour of an
attack in some other direction, such as Mons. In fact, until further
information was received, it could only be considered in the light of
an affair of Outposts.
Not long after three o'clock in the afternoon, the Prince of ORANGE
arrived in Brussels, and informed the Duke that the Prussian Outposts
had been attacked and forced to fall back. His Royal Highness had
ridden to the front at five o'clock in the morning, from Braine le
Comte, and had a personal interview at St Symphorien, with General VAN
MERLEN, whose troops were on the immediate right of the Prussians,
who had retired. After having given to this General Verbal Orders
respecting his Brigade, the Prince left the Outposts between nine and
ten o'clock, and repaired to Brussels to communicate to the Duke all
the information he had obtained respecting the Enemy's attack upon the
Prussian Advanced Posts.
This, however, was not sufficiently conclusive to induce his Grace to
resolve upon any immediate step; but, in about an hour afterwards,
that is, about half past four, General VON MÜFFLING, the Prussian
Officer attached to the British Head Quarters, waited upon the Duke
with a communication which had been despatched from Namur by Prince
BLÜCHER at noon, conveying the intelligence that the French had
attacked the Prussian Posts at Thuin and Lobbes on the Sambre, and
that they appeared to be advancing in the direction of Charleroi. The
Duke was fully prepared for this intelligence, though uncertain how
soon it might arrive. The reports which had been made to him from
the Outposts, especially from those of the 1st Hussars of the King's
German Legion, stationed in the vicinity of Mons and Tournai, gave
sufficient indication that the Enemy was concentrating his forces. But,
as observed in the preceding Chapter, his Grace was determined to make
no movement until the real line of attack should become manifest; and
hence it was, that if the attack had been made even at a later period,
his dispositions would have remained precisely the same.
The Duke at once gave Orders for the whole of his troops to assemble at
the Head Quarters of their respective Divisions and to hold themselves
in immediate readiness to march. At the same time an express was
despatched to Major General DÖRNBERG, requiring information concerning
any movement that might have been made on the part of the Enemy in the
direction of Mons.
The following were the movements ordered by the Duke. Upon the
Left of the Army, which was nearest to the presumed point of
attack--PERPONCHER's and CHASSÉ's Dutch-Belgian Divisions were to
be assembled that night at Nivelles, on which point ALTEN's British
Division (the Third) was to march as soon as collected at Braine le
Comte; but this movement was not to be made until the Enemy's attack
upon the Right of the Prussian Army and the Left of the Allied Army had
become a matter of certainty. COOKE's British Division (the First) was
to be collected that night at Enghien, and to be in readiness to move
at a moment's notice.
Along the central portion of the Army--CLINTON's British Division (the
Second) was to be assembled that night at Ath, and to be in readiness
also to move at a moment's notice. COLVILLE's British Division (the
Fourth) was to be collected that night at Grammont, with the exception
of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which were to be moved to Audenarde.
Upon the Right of the Army--STEDMANN's Dutch-Belgian Division, and
ANTHING's Dutch-Belgian (Indian) Brigade were, after occupying
Audenarde with 500 men, to be assembled at Sotteghem, so as to be ready
to march in the morning.
The Cavalry were to be collected that night at Ninhove, with the
exception of the 2nd Hussars of the King's German Legion, who were
to remain on the look out between the Scheldt and the Lys; and of
DÖRNBERG's Brigade, with the Cumberland Hussars, which were to march
that night upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high road near to that
town.
The Reserve was thus disposed--PICTON's British Division (the Fifth),
the 81st British Regiment, and BEST's Hanoverian Brigade (of COLE's
Division), were to be in readiness to march from Brussels at a moment's
notice. VINCKE's Hanoverian Brigade (of PICTON's Division) was to be
collected that night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight on the
following morning to move towards Brussels, and to halt on the road
between Alost and Assche for further orders. The Duke of BRUNSWICK's
Corps was to be collected that night on the high road between Brussels
and Vilvorde. KRUSE's Nassau Brigade was to be collected at daylight on
the following morning upon the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to
move at a moment's notice. The Reserve Artillery was to be in readiness
to move at daylight.
* * * * *
It was ten o'clock at night when the first intelligence of the attack
made by the French in the direction of Frasne, was received at the
Prince of ORANGE's Head Quarters, at Braine le Comte. It was carried
by Captain GAGERN, who, as previously mentioned (see page 70), had
been despatched by Prince BERNHARD of Saxe Weimar, with his Serene
Highness's report of the affair, to General PERPONCHER at Nivelles,
and who was subsequently sent on by the General, with this information
to the above Head Quarters. Lieutenant WEBSTER, Aide de Camp to the
Prince of ORANGE, started soon afterwards for Brussels, with a report
from the Dutch-Belgian Quartermaster General, DE CONSTANT REBECQUE,
stating what had taken place, and detailing the measures which he had
thought proper to adopt. These measures did not entirely coincide with
the instructions above given, as issued by the Duke, because they
were consequent upon the affair at Frasne, with which his Grace at
that time was unacquainted; but they were perfectly consistent with
the spirit of those instructions, inasmuch as they were not adopted
"until the Enemy's attack upon the Right of the Prussian Army, and the
Left of the Allied Army had become a matter of certainty." The Enemy's
advance along the Charleroi road had already been successfully checked
at Quatre Bras, and the necessity of immediately collecting at this
important point, the troops ordered by the Duke "to be assembled that
night at Nivelles" was too obvious to be mistaken.
* * * * *
A little before ten o'clock on the same evening, a further
communication reached the Duke from Prince BLÜCHER, announcing the
crossing of the Sambre by the French Army, headed by NAPOLEON in
person; and the required intelligence from other quarters having
arrived almost at the same moment, and confirmed him in the opinion
"that the Enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack," he
issued, at ten o'clock P.M., the following Orders for the march of his
troops to their Left:--ALTEN's Division to continue its movement from
Braine le Comte upon Nivelles. COOKE's Division to move from Enghien
upon Braine le Comte. CLINTON's and COLVILLE's Divisions to move from
Ath, Grammont, and Audenarde, upon Enghien. The Cavalry to continue its
movement from Ninhove upon Enghien.
* * * * *
The disposition of the French Left Column, under NEY, during the night
of the 15th, has already been shown. The Centre Column of the French
Army was thus located--VANDAMME's Corps bivouacked in the Wood of
Fleurus; PAJOL's Corps of Light Cavalry at Lambusart; the Third Light
Cavalry Division, under DOMON, on the left, at the outlet of the Wood,
and the Heavy Cavalry Corps of EXCELMANS between the Light Cavalry
and VANDAMME; the Guards bivouacked between Charleroi and Gilly; and
LOBAU's Corps, together with MILHAUD's Heavy Cavalry Corps, lay in
rear of Charleroi. The Right Column, consisting of GÉRARD's Corps,
bivouacked in front of the Bridge of Châtelet, which point it had
reached during the evening.
* * * * *
The result of the proceedings on the 15th was highly favourable
to NAPOLEON. He had completely effected the passage of the Sambre;
he was operating with the main portion of his forces directly upon
the preconcerted point of concentration of BLÜCHER's Army, and was
already in the immediate front of the chosen position, before that
concentration could be accomplished; he was also operating with another
portion upon the high road to Brussels, and had come in contact with
the Left of WELLINGTON's troops; he had also placed himself so far in
advance upon this line, that even a partial junction of the forces
of the Allied Commanders was already rendered a hazardous operation,
without a previous retrograde movement; and he thus had it in his power
to bring the principal weight of his arms against the one, whilst, with
the remainder of his force, he held the other at bay. This formed the
grand object of his operations on the morrow.
But however excellent, or even perfect, this plan of operation may
appear in theory, still there were other circumstances, which, if
taken into consideration, would scarcely seem to warrant a well
grounded anticipation of a successful issue. NAPOLEON's troops had been
constantly under arms, marching, and fighting, since two o'clock in the
morning, the hour at which they broke up from their position at Solre
sur Sambre, Beaumont, and Philippeville, within the French frontier:
they required time for rest and refreshment; they lay widely scattered
between their Advanced Posts and the Sambre; NEY's forces were in
detached bodies from Frasne as far as Marchienne au Pont, the halting
place of D'ERLON's Corps; and although VANDAMME's Corps was in the Wood
of Fleurus, LOBAU's Corps and the Guards were halted at Charleroi, and
GÉRARD's Corps at Châtelet. Hence, instead of an imposing advance, with
the first glimmering of the dawn of the 16th, the whole morning would
necessarily be employed by the French in effecting a closer junction of
their forces, and in making their preparatory dispositions for attack;
an interval of time invaluable to the Allies, by the greater facility
which it afforded them for the concentration of a sufficient force to
hold their Enemy in check, and to frustrate his design of defeating
them in detail.
* * * * *
In taking a calm retrospect of the dispositions made by NAPOLEON on
the night of the 15th of June, we become strongly impressed with a
conviction, that to the laxity of those dispositions, to the absence
which they indicated of that energetic perseverance and restless
activity which characterised the most critical of his operations in
former Wars, may, in a very great degree, be attributed the failure of
the Campaign on the part of the French. The great advantages derived
by NAPOLEON from the result of his operations during the 15th, have
been already set forth; but of what avail were those advantages to
him, if he neglected the requisite measures for effectually retaining
them within his grasp; or if, having secured them, he hesitated in
following them up with the promptitude and energy which their complete
development demanded of him? His position, if judged by that of his
most advanced forces, was all that could be desired; but, by fatally
neglecting to concentrate the remainder of his troops in the immediate
support of that advance, the important advantages which such a position
held forth were completely neutralized. Doubtless the troops required
rest; but, if one portion required it more than another, it was that
which now lay most in advance: they had performed the longest march,
and had withstood, in addition, the whole brunt of the action; so there
was no reason whatever why the remainder of the French Army should not
have been so far advanced as to afford direct support to the important
position taken up by the leading Divisions: that which had been so
successfully effected by the heads of the Columns, might have been
attained with infinitely greater ease and security by the masses which
followed. And even supposing that serious impediments stood in the way
of the full accomplishment of this concentration, such as the usual
delays occasioned by the lengthening out of the Columns of March, to
what did they amount in comparison with so many brilliant instances of
what had been overcome by the noble and heroic efforts of a French Army
headed by NAPOLEON? Had it even required some sacrifice, which at the
most could only have consisted in the temporary diminution of strength,
by the loss of stragglers on the march, what was this when placed in
the balance with the fulfilment of the grand design of NAPOLEON's
invasion of Belgium--preventing the junction of the Allied Armies, and
overthrowing them in detail?
The commencement of this design, in which the essential requisite was
rapidity of movement, had been eminently successful: a vantage ground
had been gained which offered the most encouraging prospect of success:
of BLÜCHER's four Corps, only one, ZIETEN's, had assembled in the
chosen position of Ligny, on the night of the 15th; PIRCH's, which had
arrived from Namur, was in bivouac between Onoz and Mazy, about six
miles from Ligny; THIELEMANN's Corps, which had quitted its cantonments
around Ciney at half past seven o'clock in the morning, passed the
night at Namur, about fifteen miles from Ligny; BÜLOW's Corps, supposed
by BLÜCHER to be then at Hannut, was still at Liege, about sixty miles
distant from Ligny. Between this position of Ligny and that occupied by
the leading Divisions of NAPOLEON's main Army, namely the villages of
Lambusart, Wagnée, and the Wood of Fleurus, there was an interval of
not more than from two to three miles! Hence every thing was favourable
to the French Emperor's plan, which only required to be carried on with
the same vigour and activity that had marked its commencement; the fate
of NAPOLEON, of France, and of Europe, hung upon its issue; not an
hour, not a moment should have been suffered to pass unheeded; and had
the French Right been concentrated during the night in this position,
as also the Left under NEY, between Gosselies and Frasne, and had an
impetuous attack, with overwhelming force, been made not later than
five o'clock on the following morning, upon both ZIETEN's and PIRCH's
Corps, not at that time united, it is very possible that these troops
would have been beaten in detail, that THIELEMANN's Corps, advancing
from Namur, would either have shared the same fate, or have moved off
in the direction of Hannut or Liege to effect a junction with BÜLOW,
whilst NEY would either have been enabled to secure the important point
of Quatre Bras before the arrival of any considerable portion of the
Anglo-Allied troops, or would have held his own force advantageously
disposed for a junction with that of NAPOLEON, on the latter moving to
the left, by the Namur road, for the purpose of bringing the great mass
of his Army against WELLINGTON.
Instead of this, what happened? Of the French Right, its main force
remained the whole night at Charleroi and Châtelet, on the Sambre,
whilst between the Advance of NEY's forces at Frasne and his Rear
at Marchienne au Pont, there was an interval of about twelve miles.
NAPOLEON did not advance towards Fleurus until between eleven and
twelve o'clock on the 16th, by which time ZIETEN's, PIRCH's, and
THIELEMANN's Corps were all concentrated and in position, and he did
not commence the Battle of Ligny until nearly three o'clock in the
afternoon; while NEY, on his side, in consequence of his operations
having been rendered subordinate to those of the Emperor, delayed to
advance with any degree of vigour until between two and three o'clock,
about which time WELLINGTON's Reserve reached Quatre Bras, from
Brussels, and joined the forces then engaged in front of that point!
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 8: The Prussian Regiments of Infantry generally consisted of
three Battalions, of which the Third was the Fusilier Battalion.]