THE BATTLE OF JIDBALLI.
1904.
To say that the story of Somaliland lies before it, is, at first
sight, to make a self-evident and apparently obvious assertion. But
undoubtedly the future of the country will constitute by far the most
important part of its history. The “Unknown Horn of Africa” was but
recently, and is indeed still, a barbarous land whose tale is yet to
be told. Day by day, however, the story is being added to, and this
out-of-the-way district of Africa is at the present receiving an amount
of attention from European Powers which will ensure it, ere long, an
important and prosperous development.
As early as 1840 treaties with the native chiefs of this tract of
land opposite Aden had been concluded by the British. Between 1873-77
the country was practically annexed by Egypt, but was given up and
eventually occupied by the British in 1885, who declared a Protectorate
over it, to the great satisfaction of its inhabitants. The reasons for
such occupation were obvious--partly to save the country from relapsing
into barbarism, and partly to prevent its occupation by other Powers,
by which the overland route to the east might be menaced. Such Powers
were France, Italy, and Abyssinia. The outcome of conferences between
these Powers--with France in 1888, Italy in ’91 and ’94, and Abyssinia
in ’97--fixed the boundaries of the Somali Coast Protectorate. So
far the story of Somaliland development was a peaceful one, and the
commerce of the country in skins and hides, ostrich feathers, gums,
cattle and sheep bade fair to grow and flourish to the profit of all
concerned.
In 1899, however, the name of the Mullah began to be first heard. In
that year Haji Mohammed Abdullah, a strict Moslem and Somali patriot,
started a fanatical movement in the Dolbahanta country against both
British and Abyssinian rule.
For several months, however, apathy marked the attitude of the British
Government towards the Mullah and his following. It was thought that
the rebellion would in all probability come to nothing, and nothing
was accordingly done to check it. The issue proved the contrary, and
as the Mullah’s following increased and he now and again moved within
a threatening distance of Berbera, the principal port, it was felt
that something must be done. The Abyssinians were the first to make a
move, and, massing a large army, they fought a sanguinary battle in
the Ogaden country against the forces of the Mullah at Jig-gigga. The
immediate outcome of this engagement was to drive the Mullah towards
Berbera, and once more his presence in the vicinity, and his frequent
daring raids, had the affect of unsettling the countryside.
Accordingly, in 1901, Colonel Swayne, the Consul General of the
Protectorate, took the field with a small force, but with most
unfortunate results. It has been suggested that not only was the force
at Colonel Swayne’s disposal totally inadequate, but that his appeals
to the Foreign Office did not receive the backing they merited; in any
event, disaster overtook the small expeditionary force. Not at first,
however. On June 1st the column reached Sanala, and captured much of
the enemy’s live stock. Leaving a Zareba under Captain Macneil with
300 men, Colonel Swayne moved against the Mullah’s camp at Yahel. The
Zareba meantime was fiercely attacked, but gallantly defended, and the
enemy driven off. Further operations resulted in the break up of the
Mullah’s force, but the Mullah himself escaped across the Haud desert,
where pursuit was, under the circumstances, impossible.
A period of comparative quiet followed, extending to nearly six
months, but at length, in December, 1901, the Mullah once more resumed
his operations against the friendly tribes. Colonel Swayne again
got together a force, but while operating between Bohotte and Mudug
sustained a severe reverse at Erego. Two officers, Colonel Phillips
and Captain Angus, with 50 men, were killed, and the British wounded
numbered over 100. The force was attacked in the thick bush, and the
Somali levies were severely shaken by the savage onslaught of the
Mullah’s men. Under the circumstances Colonels Swayne and Cobbe, the
latter wounded in the engagement, decided to retreat to Bohotte.
Not a little anxiety was occasioned at home over this setback, and
the immediate outcome of Colonel Swayne’s urgent entreaty for more
men was the despatch of large reinforcements under General Manning.
Such measures were felt to be especially necessary, as a Hungarian
adventurer (“of the worst type,” says one account) was reported to be
directing the Mullah’s forces, and would assuredly make the most of the
British reverse. This report was, however, discredited. In any event,
large reinforcements were now despatched to Berbera; Bombay Grenadiers
from Aden, and Bombay Infantry from Simla, Soudanese and Sikhs, with
maxims and many extra officers--all were hastened to the scene of war.
General Manning himself set foot in Berbera on the morning of the 22nd
October, and at once all was renewed activity. The campaign, however,
was destined to be a failure, owing to inefficient transport, the
service of which utterly broke down, and also to the great daring and
activity of the opposing force, whose fighting qualities had been
seriously underestimated.
As far on as April 15th, 1903, advices reached this country from
Somaliland, telling of successful reconnaissances and bright prospects
of success, but two days later, on the 17th, and again on the 23rd of
the month, two such severe blows were inflicted on the large British
force now in the field as to render a second withdrawal from the
country necessary. Colonel Plunkett, in charge of a strong party of the
King’s African Rifles with maxims, set out from Galadi in the direction
of Walwal, on the 15th of the month for the purpose of rounding-up
stock in the bush. After marching 40 miles, the force left its spare
kit and maxims, and pushed on after the carriers, who, with the cattle,
were following the Mullah’s rear. On the 17th the force was surrounded
by the enemy and cut to pieces. No fewer than 10 officers and 174 men
were killed, among them Colonel Plunkett himself. The enemy’s force
was estimated at 80,000, of whom they left 2000 dead on the field.
Only 41 of the little British force managed to reach camp, six alone
being unwounded. Both maxims fell into the Mullah’s hands. A force
under Colonel Cobbe in the vicinity was, with the greatest difficulty,
extricated by General Manning, who left Bohotte at midnight on hearing
of the disaster.
But alas! this was not all. A week later, on the 23rd, the flying
column under Major Gough, operating to the north, was attacked with a
loss of two officers, Captains Godfrey and Bruce, and 13 men. With the
greatest difficulty it reached Bohotte, and here the 1902 campaign came
to a disastrous termination.
Small wonder that considerable dissatisfaction should by this time
have arisen at home over the conduct of the Somaliland campaign.
The question of withdrawal from the country was even mooted, but
fortunately overruled, and a still stronger force was once more got
together to initiate the campaign which is at the present time (1904)
in progress.
Meanwhile the Mullah sustained a trifling defeat at the hands of an
Abyssinian force on the 31st May, the remains of the British expedition
being still at Bohotte, where they were detained until plans of
reinforcement and advance had been duly organised.
On the 21st June Major-General Sir C. Egerton was appointed to command
the Somaliland expeditionary force.
Shortly after the General’s arrival at Berbera, active and most
strenuous preparations were made for an expedition which should at
last succeed in overthrowing the Mullah’s power. Several months were
spent in these preparations. Reinforcements began to arrive in large
quantities at Berbera; from Simla came mounted infantry and Punjaubees,
companies of the Norfolk and Yorkshire regiments, mounted infantry
from Bombay, 300 of the Hampshire regiment from Aden, a telegraph
battalion of the Royal Engineers from Lorne, two companies of the Army
Service Corps from Durban, Natal, and even a strong contingent from the
newly-formed Boer colony in South Africa, with camels and transport
materials, and all the munitions of war poured into Somaliland in a
steady stream.
Sheikh was chosen as a first base of concentration, and later this was
advanced to Kurit, where there is a capital and abundant water supply.
Lack of water indeed has constituted one of the chief difficulties
attending operations in Somaliland--the possessor of the somewhat
infrequent wells being master of the situation. Transport, too, is of
even greater importance than ever in such a country, Somali camels
alone being found thoroughly suitable for the purpose. Many thousands
of other camels were imported into the country, but it was found that
they stood the climate ill, and in many instances were totally useless.
Under the circumstances, the local supply had to be mainly depended
upon, and as this proved to be wholly inadequate, the best had to be
done under adverse circumstances. In due course, however, garrisons
were established at Bohotte, Ganero, and Burao, and early in December
the General issued a proclamation to the tribes that operations were
about to commence, and abjured them to preserve a loyal and helpful
attitude to the British arms.
On the 19th December occurred the first fight of any importance. On
that date Colonel Kenna, moving out of Eil Dab, on a reconnaissance,
came on 2000 of the enemy at Jidballi at the head of the Nogal Valley.
Fierce fighting ensued, the enemy losing 80 killed and nearly 100
wounded. The British loss was two of the Tribal horse killed. These
troops fought with conspicuous gallantry, and earned the special
commendation of their British leaders. After the engagement, Colonel
Kenna fell back upon the main body as the Mullah was reported to be in
force in the Nogal Valley.
Such indeed proved to be the case. On January 11th was fought what
may be described as an important battle at Jidballi, the enemy losing
over 1000 killed, and retreating considerably shaken. At nine o’clock
on the morning of the 11th, General Egerton advanced upon the enemy’s
position. Leaving the heavy transport in a zareba, 12 miles in the
rear, the force advanced in the following order.
The 1st and 2nd Brigades, commanded respectively by Generals Manning
and Fasken, marched in one large square, covered by a screen of
Illaloe natives on the front. The advance guard was composed of the
Gadabursi horse, with the Somali mounted infantry. On the south flank
was Major Kenna with two companies of British and three companies of
Indian mounted infantry. The Tribal horse, supported by the Bikauirs,
had been sent from the north flank to work round the enemy’s rear to
prevent them making a way to the east or north.
Slowly the British force worked up towards the enemy’s position--a
deep nullah directly in front of the line of march. Nearer and nearer
came the attacking party, until within 700 yards of the position.
Suddenly the Mullah’s dervishes swept down with wild cries, and hurled
themselves towards the square. They never reached it. From rifle and
maxim swept forth such a fire as must have astounded those who lived to
recall it. For ten minutes an awful hurricane of bullets hurled back
the Mullah’s soldiers, and then, doubly bewildered by the flank attack
of the mounted troops, they turned and fled. The attempt to rush the
square had failed. It was the only one they made. Losing heart under
the terrific storm of lead, they scattered, helpless and disordered, in
all directions. Three hundred lay dead upon the field.
Major Kenna’s mounted infantry now took a hand in the engagement, and
for two hours inflicted severe punishment on the fugitives at short
range, killing over 500, as they fled hither and thither, and only
pausing when his horses were worn out for lack of water, and ammunition
began to run short.
The Mullah’s army at Jidballi was estimated at 5000 men, of whom they
left, as stated, 1000 dead behind their line of flight. The Mullah
himself, who was a few miles distant, escaped. But the victory had cost
us dear. Three officers, including Lieutenants C. H. Bowden-Smith and
V. R. Welland, were killed, together with nine of the native troops,
whilst the wounded officers numbered nine, and other wounded 22. The
total British force numbered 3200 of all ranks.
Captain the Hon. T. Lister, of the 10th Hussars, who was at first
reported missing, was found also to have been killed. He was the eldest
son of Lord Ribbledale--a young man of five and twenty.
Thus ended the fight at Jidballi, a position which the Mullah had
ordered his forces to hold to the last, and there can be no doubt
that the effect of the victory was far-reaching, if indeed it did not
succeed in shattering the morale of his troops. Meanwhile, the pursuit
of the fugitive was actively proceeded with.