THE BATTLE OF MAZRA.
1880.
The battle of Mazra, one of the stiffest of the many battles between
Britain and Afghanistan, was the deciding blow in a campaign with a
curious history.
About 1878, hostilities were very pronounced in Afghanistan against
Britain, and, as a result of these, the Ameer, who appeared unnerved
at the troubles, abdicated the throne. This action after a time was
consented to, General Roberts temporarily taking over the supreme
control.
While Britain was casting about for someone qualified to fill
the position of Ameer, Abdurrahman Khan appeared on the scene.
Abdurrahman was the son of Afzool, and nephew of the Ameer, Sheer
Ali. He had taken a prominent part in the rebellions formed by his
father and uncle against the Ameer. This prince entered the country
with a few followers, and in the belief that, from the capacity he
had displayed during Sheer Ali’s time, he was likely to make a good
ruler, negotiations were opened up with him on behalf of the British
Government. Eventually he accepted the position of Ameer, and was
installed at Cabul.
While these events had been taking place in and about Cabul, Ayoob
Khan, the brother of Yakoob Khan, who had been deposed, was at Herat.
During Sheer Ali’s rule, Yakoob Khan and Ayoob Khan had together
governed Herat independently of their father, and as soon as it became
known to Ayoob that the Indian Government had resolved not to place
Yakoob Khan on the musnud of Cabul, he began making preparations to
assert, by force of arms, his own claim to the Ameership.
The intention of the new claimant was to make an advance on Kandahar,
the capital, and it was as a result of the success of this movement
that the battle of Mazra had ultimately to be fought. During several
months Ayoob, with fixed determination, occupied himself in making
arrangements for the advance on Kandahar, and so satisfactorily had
these been accomplished that by the 9th June, 1880, he was ready to
form his camp outside the walls of Herat, preparatory to a march
forward. The town of Herat is situated about 367 miles from Kandahar,
and, as a matter of fact, the Indian Government was somewhat sceptical
as to Ayoob’s capability of marching an army so far. Nevertheless he
did it, with what results we shall see.
About the 12th June the claimant commenced his march. His army at
starting consisted of 2500 cavalry, of whom only 900 were regulars, the
rest being Khazadars, or mounted militia; ten regiments of infantry,
varying in strength from 350 to 500 men; and 5 batteries, including one
mule battery, with about 30 guns. Roughly, he had altogether between
7000 and 8000 men, and when it is remembered how hardy and resolute the
average Afghan is, this in itself was a fairly formidable enemy that
had set its mask towards the capital of Kandahar.
Hearing of the advance of Ayoob, British forces were at once posted to
various parts of the country to obstruct the journey forward, but it
was not to be; for, as was afterwards discovered, the unusual precedent
was to present itself to Britain of her beginning a campaign in very
bad fashion and finishing up brilliantly.
We have already referred to the strength of the forces which Ayoob Khan
was to lead, and with these he made splendid progress on his journey
to the capital. The obstructions which were put in his way were easily
overcome, and the defeat of General Burrows was one of Ayoob’s greatest
triumphs of the campaign.
By about 20th July Kandahar was occupied by about 4000 British troops,
and on the 9th August General Roberts, according to orders, started his
famous march from Cabul to relieve Kandahar.
About this time Ayoob Khan’s army was considerably strengthened by
Ghilzais, having an army then under his control of nearly 20,000. But
the real crisis was only brewing, and the splendid skill and resource
of that ablest of British generals, Sir Frederick Roberts, was soon to
be rewarded in the splendid triumph of Mazra.
The arrangements made by General Roberts prior to setting out on his
famous mission to Kandahar, were of the most complete order, and he led
in round numbers fully 10,000 troops to the scene of hostilities. Of
these, close on 2000 were Europeans, and 8000 camp followers. General
Roberts took with him a certain amount of European stores, such as rum,
tea, and five days’ flour, but trusted largely for other supplies to
the food and forage to be obtained on the line of march. But even this
was not left to chance, and to facilitate the General’s obtaining such
supplies, the Ameer sent with him several chiefs.
It was indeed a curious sight as the troops plodded onward, eager for
the fray, for, in view of the difficulty of the road, the General took
no wheeled vehicles with him, and even the guns were mounted on mules
and elephants. But the commander’s foresight as to the difficulties he
would have to encounter did not end here, and knowing that the ordinary
road for supplies might be exhausted by the previous passage of troops
and the presence of large bodies of insurgents, he changed from this
route, and marched by the Logur Valley, which had been comparatively
untouched. Although this road had the small disadvantage of hindering a
couple of days longer the progress of the army by the ordinary route,
it brought him into contact with the latter again a short distance
before reaching Ghuzni. Here some opposition was anticipated, but,
notwithstanding, none was experienced, and the army continued its march
unmolested.
General Roberts accomplished this march, which must, reckoning his
detour, have been little less than 370 miles, without any opposition,
in 24 days, being an average of 14½ miles a day. Considering the
difficulties that had to be encountered on the way, this was splendid
progress. Picking up the garrison of 1100 men at Khelat-i-ghilzai, he
arrived at Kandahar on August 31. Here was a feat almost unparalleled
in history, and reflecting the highest credit on the troops, and their
skilful, gallant and energetic commander.
The news of General Roberts’ approach soon spread, and Ayoob Khan,
knowing well apparently what he had to face in furtherance of
his desires before referred to, at once made an effort to open
communications with him. General Roberts, however, having in view
the whole situation and the nature of the negotiations, was entirely
against this course, and would hear of nothing but unconditional
surrender from the other side, and also the surrender of such prisoners
as had been previously taken in the course of engagements.
The General then proceeded to encamp, and prepared for the coming
battle. Passing round the northern wall of Kandahar, he encamped
between the city and the enemy’s position. The British General was
continually on the alert, and in the determination not to leave a
stone unturned to accomplish his purpose, he immediately sent out his
cavalry to reconnoitre. The main reason for this action was the fear
that the Afghans, after hearing of the way their leader’s attempt
at negotiations had been received, would retreat without fighting,
and thus prolong the trouble, another prominent reason being General
Roberts’ repeated experience of the moral effect of a prompt blow. In
furtherance of his designs, Roberts determined to give battle the very
next day.
During the first week in August, Ayoob, fresh from his victories
elsewhere, directed his main body to appear in front of the city, his
cavalry having invested it several days previously. Still watchful and
on the alert, his method of going about matters was extremely guarded.
He had erected batteries and occupied villages and posts on every side
save the north. Up to the time of the approach of General Roberts,
however, he did not venture on more than annoying the town with a
distant and desultory cannonade, and the occupation, chiefly by the
armed peasants and Ghazis, of a few posts near the walls.
On the other hand, the citadel was occupied in great force, and the
garrison felt confident that they could defend their position against
all Ayoob’s attacks. In an attempt, however, by one of the British
Generals, General Primrose, to impede the progress of the besiegers,
the British troops lost heavily. The garrison set about the work of
repairing the fortifications and otherwise taking every opportunity to
make their position as strong as possible.
Returning to General Roberts’ decision to strike a prompt blow, the
result of the cavalry reconnaissance and the General’s own personal
examination was the plan that we will mention after describing the
position taken up by Ayoob Khan more minutely. About three miles from
the north-west angle from the city of Kandahar is a range of heights
running from south-west to north-east. Parallel to this range, and
at a distance from its crest varying between one and three-quarters
and two and three-quarters miles flows the Argaridub, which, by the
way, is almost everywhere fordable at the end of August. In the
intervening valley are many villages, enclosures, and gardens. Towards
the south-west, or the enemy’s right, the range is terminated rather
abruptly by a hill about 1000 feet above the level of Kandahar. This
hill, called the Pir Paimal, is joined to the rest of the range by a
col or neck, over which passes the road leading from the north-west
angle of the city to the valley of the Helmund, in which is situated,
at a distance of about four miles, the village of Mazra. Here, after a
close scrutiny of his position, Ayoob had determined to establish his
standing camp and headquarters.
The pass above mentioned is called Baba-wali Pass, and provided the
advantage of leading directly to the centre of the enemy’s advanced
position, which was on both sides of the road. The front of the Pass
is screened from the city by an isolated hill, lower than the range
in front. In front of Pir Paimal and to its right rear are situated
several villages. In rear of the position again, and covering the
village of Mazra from an enemy advancing up the river is a detached
hill. It was on the crest of the main ridge of this that guns had been
mounted, and, taking into consideration the arrangement of Ayoob’s
camp, the leader of the Afghans was evidently expecting a front attack.
On the other hand, General Roberts’ plan of operations was entirely in
contrast, and was yet simple, effective and safe. In the first place,
the General resolved to amuse the enemy by demonstrations by General
Primrose with a part of the Kandahar garrison against the Baba-wali
Pass. Secondly, he sent General Gough’s cavalry to the river at the
entrance to the valley, to turn the enemy’s right with the three
infantry brigades of the Cabul-Kandahar force. The whole scheme was
worked out with admirable foresight, and thoughtful resource.
At nine o’clock in the morning of 1st September the battle began.
According to instructions, General Primrose made demonstrations against
the Baba-wali Pass, and fired with his heavy battery at the troops
occupying it. The ruse succeeded well, and attention was fixed for the
time on Primrose and his attempted attack.
It was recorded by one of the officers of Primrose’s forces that this
trick on the part of General Roberts succeeded in a greater degree
than was really expected, and, as the enemy appeared to be entirely
deluded by it, the British forces were encouraged on seeing that the
very initial part of the proceedings pointed to complete success.
Primrose having thus attracted the enemy’s attention, General Roberts
next despatched Gough’s cavalry brigade to the Argaridab, where it was
favourably placed, either to cut off a retreat towards Girishk or to
carry out a pursuit up the valley.
Simultaneous with this, he gave the order to the infantry, commanded
by General Ross, to advance. All the forces were now in action, and
the battle had commenced in real earnest. One eye-witness of the scene
stated that the spectacle of the forces marching towards each other was
one of the most impressive of many campaigns. The first of the brigades
to come into collision with the Afghans was General Macpherson’s of
the 1st Brigade. In front of Macpherson, and a little in advance of
the right of Pir Paimal Hill, was an elevated and strongly-occupied
village. This village was heavily shelled by the British artillery
for a time with steady effect, and the enemy made an effectual reply.
Gradually the opposing forces seemed to be wavering, and, observing
this cringing, the 92nd Highlanders and the 2nd Goorkhas rushed on and
stormed the village in most gallant fashion.
The bravery displayed by these regiments was splendid, and in
determined fashion they forced the enemy out of their position. The
2nd, or Baker’s, Brigade then came into line with the 1st, the 3rd, or
Macgregor’s, Brigade being in support. These two brigades were making
for Pir Paimal, but they were to encounter stubborn resistance.
On the way, a number of orchards and enclosures had to be passed
through, and here the enemy, showing in great numbers, fought
desperately and well. Great forces of the Afghans came out of hiding,
and, as the brigades appeared, rushed on them in overwhelming numbers,
forming a formidable attack. As a great show of fight was anticipated,
however, the brigades never rallied a moment, and nothing could resist
the heroic onslaught which they made to win the day. The Afghans, with
admirable foresight, had prepared thoroughly for any attack that might
be made upon them in turn, and, besides occupying every available
covert, they also lined every wall.
The Afghans, as indeed most Orientals, are an exceedingly formidable
foe when under cover, and at the outset they absolutely refused to give
ground to the fire. It was only to the repeated rushes of the brigades
that they yielded, and it was here that the British losses were
greatest. But the British attempt was shortly to be successful. Natives
and Europeans vied with each other in courage, and cut the enemy off at
every corner. Forcing their way on, the brigades made great progress,
and were ultimately successful in their desire to capture Pir Paimal.
The resistance still shown by the Afghans was characteristic of the
race, and, although falling in large numbers, there was a determination
goading them on almost equal to that prevailing on our side. From Pir
Paimal the infantry continued to push on notwithstanding the desperate
attempts of the enemy to hold their ground. Pressing the Afghans still
further from their position, two of their camps and several pieces of
artillery fell into the hands of the brigades, and here there was a
perceptible slackening of the resistance on the part of Ayoob’s army.
It is one of the most wonderful things in war to note to what extent an
apparently trifling occurrence will turn the scales of fortune.
Up to this time, although the British forces had certainly had the best
of matters, in that they had made good progress, the Afghan army had
never belied their reputation as a daring, if not foolhardy, race. But
at this stage, when so little lay between the armies in regard to the
main issue, the inevitable hitch was to occur and spoil the ultimate
prospect of an Afghan victory. It was only a slight hitch, to be sure,
but it was sufficient to create a much wider breach, and after the
British brigades had been successful in making the small capture noted
above, an extraordinary alarm began to spread along the enemy’s line,
and soon the flight became general. The whole of the Afghan forces
retreated before the British infantry in the utmost confusion, leaving
behind all ammunition and so on in their flight. The infantry, much
exhausted as a result of their heavy work, pursued the retreating
forces, picking up guns at almost every step.
By noon, Ayoob’s standing camp at Mazra was in our hands, and the
battle was over. The enemy was completely routed. But while the
infantry were thoroughly exhausted with their morning’s work,
the cavalry, which up till now had largely participated only as
spectators, at this juncture began to play a vital part in the issue.
With his fine body of horsemen, Gough waited his opportunity, and, as
soon as he saw the chance, dashed forward and crossed the river to
where the fugitives were fleeing in retreat. The sight of the enemy
with the cavalry in chase was in entire contrast with that which had
been witnessed an hour before. The pursuit of the cavalry at the heels
of the retreating Afghans was continued over a great distance at a
terrific pace in the direction of the valley of Khakrey to the north,
till the pursuing body, getting even with their quarry, succeeded in
sabring between 200 and 300 of them. By this time the Afghans were
utterly fatigued, but, scattering on all sides, many managed to get
clear of their pursuers. The main object of Gough’s dash forward--that
of dispersing the enemy on all sides--had been satisfactorily
accomplished, and, making a complete circuit, he afterwards returned to
camp.
On the way back Gough’s forces joined the 3rd Bombay cavalry and 3rd
Scinde horse, under General Nuttal, so that had any mishap occurred in
Gough’s pursuit of the enemy, these other forces would have yet saved
disaster. General Nuttal, during the hottest part of the fighting, had
been stationed with his brigade at Baba-wali Pass. When General Roberts
saw the enemy was breaking, Nuttal and his forces were brought through
the Pass, and ordered to carry on the pursuit for no less than fifteen
miles up the river. In the course of his chase, Nuttal was successful
in cutting up more than a hundred of the fugitives, and, like Gough,
completely dispersed the enemy in flight.
The loss of the enemy in this battle, one of the stiffest in the
history of Afghanistan, were severe. The killed alone would probably be
upwards of 1200. A study of the figures as regards the work done, shows
the havoc played by the respective British forces. Thus, on the direct
line of the infantry advance no fewer than 650 dead bodies were found,
while between 300 and 400 were slain by the cavalry in pursuit, many
corpses never being recovered. This in itself shows that the attack on
all hands by the British forces had been a deadly one, and was in most
instances followed by disaster to Ayoob’s army.
In the action itself Ayoob lost some 32 guns, and six others, including
two captured by General Burrows, were afterwards brought in, thus
completing the total number of pieces possessed by the Afghan leader on
the morning of 1st September, when the battle began. The general nature
of the flight is here strongly evidenced. Not only was Ayoob’s army
completely dispersed in every direction, but also completely cowed,
while he himself, a discredited man without any political future, made
the best of his way to Herat.
The only drawback, if such it can be called, to the entire success of
this action, was that the Afghans got away too easily. For, in point of
fact, the cavalry, from the difficulty of their positions, were unable
to inflict the crushing blow upon the retreating forces that they
might otherwise have done if better situated. Nevertheless, it has to
be recognised that if the infantry had been so greatly fatigued there
could have been no flight. For we have seen how desperate the Afghans
were in their attempts to gain a victory, while the main object of the
cavalry’s pursuit, that of dispersing the enemy, was yet successfully
accomplished.
The total number of casualties in General Roberts’ force was only a
little over 200--surely a small price to pay for so brilliant and
decisive a victory.
The real cause of the enemy’s flight, the incident recorded about the
taking of two of their camps, was greatly aided, it is supposed, by
the spirit of dissension in the Afghan ranks. As to Ayoob himself,
there was no want of skill on the part of his advisers, no matter what
the ultimate result was. Ayoob himself was not a man of much ability
or force of character, but it was evident all along that he had some
excellent military counsellors with him.
In the papers relating to this campaign presented to the Houses of
Parliament, the very important statement was made as a matter of
fact that never had an army been handled with more skill than was
Ayoob’s during its brief and ultimately disastrous campaign. Such a
statement, coming from such a source, goes far to prove that the acumen
shown in things military on the part of the Afghan leader was not a
little remarkable. His advances to the scene of the final battle were
conducted most methodically, and in accordance with all the rules of
war. Indeed, the generalship of Ayoob, and the conduct of his troops
were such that the conviction got abroad that the operations had been
directed, and the guns worked, under the supervision of Europeans,
although no proof of this could be obtained.