CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE BATTLE OF PEGU.

1852.

The next event of importance in this campaign was the desperate attack

made by the Burmese on Martaban, to recover the town which they had

lost. On the 26th May, upwards of a thousand Burmese made a violent

onslaught upon the British troops in occupation. Major Hall of the 49th

Madras Light Infantry was in command, and, after some pretty severe

fighting, during which three men of a reconnoitring party were killed,

the artillery were brought into action with deadly effect, and the foe

driven back.

Says one account:--“The British cannon-balls made literal lanes in the

seething masses of Burmese, crushing many to atoms, and dismembering

others who were unlucky enough to be in their track.” The discomfiture

of the enemy was subsequently largely augmented by shot and shell from

the British war vessels, and a total rout of the attacking party was

the result. Martaban was thus securely retained in British hands; but

the war was far from being over.

Early in July, Captain Tarleton, R.N., was ordered to ascend the

Irrawaddy with five steamers and reconnoitre the position and defences

of the Burmese in the vicinity of Prome. This town of wooden houses is

about a mile and a half in circumference, and lies on the left bank

of the river. It is surrounded by low-lying swamps which at times

are inundated by the overflow of the Irrawaddy. At a short distance

from the city the river divides itself into two streams--the left, or

western, being the deeper, and the only one navigable, except in the

heart of the rainy season. On the left bank of the navigable branch

of the stream Captain Tarleton soon decried a force of nearly 10,000

Burmese, who from a strongly-fortified bastion were preparing to oppose

his advance up the left branch of the river. Eagerly the Burmese

watched the approach of the British gunboat, which they believed would

shortly be at their mercy, as it steamed steadily forward towards the

left branch of the river, where their cannon and musketry were already

trained to receive it. Captain Tarleton, however, had no intention of

being caught in the trap. Realising the enemy’s strength, he resolved

to risk his vessel, which was of light draught, in the waters of the

eastern branch of the stream, aware that at the rainy season it would

be navigable for at least some distance. Such, indeed, proved to be

the case, and, to the astonishment of the crowds of baffled Burmese

onlookers, the little craft plunged boldly up the eastern water, and

was very soon out of range of their cannon. A few shot indeed reached

the British vessel, but no damage was done, and Prome was reached on

the 9th without further opposition. Here it was found that no garrison

had been left in charge, and after carrying off some guns, and spiking

others, and destroying all the enemy’s stores they could lay hands on,

the expedition returned to Rangoon.

On the return journey the main Burmese army was encountered crossing

the parent stream of the Irrawaddy, and a heavy cannonade was opened by

the British on the confused mass as it performed its clumsy evolutions.

Not only the state barge of the Burmese general fell into our hands,

but between 40 and 50 boats containing stores and munitions of war,

which were destroyed. After nine days’ absence, Captain Tarleton

returned to Rangoon in triumph, well satisfied with the result of his

reconnoitring operations.

On the 27th July, Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India,

arrived at Rangoon on a brief visit, and expressed his great

satisfaction with the work of the troops.

Not until the 16th September were any more extensive operations

conducted by General Godwin, the interval being spent in collecting

munitions of war and transport material, and, by the gunboats, in

patrolling the river between Rangoon and Prome. On the date mentioned,

however, the embarkation began, with Prome as the objective. On the

morning of the 9th October the expedition came in sight of Prome, and

the war vessels anchored in the small bay which lies opposite the town.

Towards evening the troops were landed. A suburb to the north of Prome,

and outside the town, was chosen as the point of debarkation, as it was

known that the enemy were in force further to the south.

The landing was opposed by the Burmese with musket and gingale. From

some of the wooden houses of the suburb, from the adjacent jungle, and

from a small pagoda which faced the immediate path of the troops, a

fierce musket fire was poured upon the attacking force, and so hot did

this become that it became necessary to dislodge the unseen assailants.

Brigadier Reignolds, with Captains Christie and Welsh, with several

companies of the 80th regiment, were quickly sent forward to rush the

foe from their position--an operation which they performed with great

gallantry and with every success, one man only being killed in the

attack. The captured pagoda was retained by our men for the night,

the enemy not returning to the attack. In the morning the landing was

completed, and, on a general advance being made, it was found that the

enemy had been so severely handled in the engagement of the previous

evening that they had evacuated the place, “leaving in our possession

a town overrun with thick and rank vegetation and abounding in swamps.”

Says General Godwin of the position of our troops at this stage of the

war:--“I have been for a long time aware of the assemblage of a large

force of troops about ten miles east of Prome--nearly 18,000 men, well

posted in two or more stockades. It is not my intention to disturb them

in any way at present, as, by their concentration at that point, the

fine force now assembling here will have an opportunity of striking a

blow which may put an end to much future opposition.”

Accordingly, a different scene of operations was next chosen. The

Burmese, as early as the month of June, had occupied the town of Pegu,

capital of the old kingdom of that name, to the great distress of the

native inhabitants, who were, however, powerless to offer resistance on

their own behalf.

Pegu forms the southern portion of the Burmese empire, and by it had

been annexed in 1757. The town itself is situated some seventy miles

north of Rangoon. These marauding Burmese it was now determined to

dislodge, and to occupy the city by British arms. Brigadier McNeill of

the Madras army was selected by General Godwin to command the venture,

but the General himself accompanied the expedition. The flotilla was

commanded by Commander Shadwell.

The vessels forming the expedition dropped anchor about two miles below

Pegu, which is connected by the Pegu river with the Irrawaddy, on the

evening of the 20th November. The next morning the debarkation was

carried out without any opposition, the troops landing in high grass

jungle, and the whole country being enveloped in a thick fog.

The position of the enemy was known to the British commander, as a

previous expedition in June had enabled Captain Laller to roughly

map the country. The site of the old city, which formed the enemy’s

position, was formed by a square surrounded by a high bund, each side

of which was estimated to be two miles in length. The west side faced

the river, and a moat, between 70 and 80 paces wide, ran entirely round

the position. It was determined to force a way along the moat and

endeavour to turn the enemy’s left.

Accordingly, the advance was commenced, Captain Laller and a Burmese

leading the direction of march. The Bengal Fusiliers were in front, the

5th Madras Native Infantry followed, and the Madras Fusiliers brought

up the rear. The troops marched in file. Slowly and laboriously the

invaders crept forward, struggling for two hours through the almost

impenetrable grass and jungle along the edge of the moat, and exposed

to a warm fire from the enemy. At length a part of the moat was reached

which admitted a passage for the troops, but unhappily it was covered

by a strong post of marksmen and two guns. From this point of vantage

the enemy kept up a galling fire, and it soon became evident the

battery would have to be stormed.

Colonel Tudor, with 250 men, was ordered to drive the Burmese out, and

with a cheer the gallant little band plunged into the muddy waters of

the moat and, scaling the bank in front of them, drove the foe from

their position with cold steel. Having mastered this point, the key

of the position, Pegu did not long remain in the possession of the

Burmese. With enormous difficulty, over the almost impassable ground,

Captain Mallock brought forward his artillery, and kept down the

enemy’s fire. A short halt followed to rest the troops and collect the

not inconsiderable number of wounded. A large pagoda now lay in the

path of advance, and from this the Burmese kept up a heavy musketry

fire. Here again history repeated itself. Gallantly springing forward

with some 200 of the Madras and Bengal Fusiliers, the steps of the

pagoda were soon ascended, the foe driven out, and Pegu was ours.

The amount of the Burmese force in Pegu which we drove out on capturing

the town, was estimated at 4000 or 5000; our own troops barely amounted

to 1000 men. A garrison of 400 was left in charge, and the success of

the enterprise duly reported to the Governor-General at Calcutta. The

immediate result was a proclamation annexing the entire province of

Pegu.

Fighting, however, in the vicinity was not at an end. Day by day

unceasing, but abortive, attacks were made by the Burmese to recover

their lost position. Major Hill gallantly defended his post, but at

length it became necessary to relieve him, and an attempt was made

to bring the Burmese to a general action. Early in December, General

Godwin once more left Rangoon for Pegu, and with an army of only 1200

men proceeded to seek the enemy in his lair. After a march of a few

miles through dense jungle, their position was discovered. “They were

admirably posted behind an entrenchment; large spars formed their

breastwork, and it appeared to be about a mile long, filled with masses

of men, a few hundreds of the Cassay horse, some elephants, and a few

guns.”

On the advance of the British the enemy for a time made no move beyond

firing an occasional shot, and all ranks believed that at length the

foe was to stand at bay. On coming, however, to close quarters, the

Burmese rapidly retreated, bitterly disappointing our men, and a two

days’ further march in pursuit failed to bring them to a standstill,

and General Godwin and his forces were compelled reluctantly to return.

No further event of importance occurred in ’52, but early in the year

following, taking advantage of the unsettled state of the country, and

the quarrels between British and Burmese, numerous dacoity chiefs made

inroads here and there upon the peaceful inhabitants of the country,

raiding and killing and striking terror into the hearts of the country

folk.

Against several of these General Godwin found it necessary to direct

his forces--one in particular, a chief named Mea Toon, giving immense

trouble ere he was finally subjugated. Three times was a British

force led against--on two occasions on the 10th January, and again

later, with disastrous results to our arms. On the second occasion

he succeeded in killing as many as 50 of our men. Finally, in March,

Sir John Cleape brought the dacoity chief to bay, and after a severe

struggle, lasting four hours, in the course of which two British

officers were killed, he succeeded in overpowering the foe. The wily

Mea Toon himself, however, effected his escape, and fleeing from the

neighbourhood of Donnabew, where the engagement took place, escaped

with his immediate following. No trouble was, however, given by him

later.

The main scheme of operations now took the form of a series of attempts

to bring the main Burmese army to bay, but besides an occasional

skirmish, little hard fighting resulted, the Burmese avoiding coming to

grips.

Commenting on the state of the Burmese campaign at this period the

“Annual Register” tersely sums up the enormous difficulties which

General Godwin and the devoted troops under his command had to contend

with:-

“An army can do little,” says the official narrative, “where there are

no roads, nor adequate means of transport for artillery, and when the

enemy retires into jungles, and we have to contend against the heat of

a tropical sun varied by long periods of incessant rain.”

The end, however, was not far off. By this time the greater portion

of the Burmese was under our jurisdiction, and the ultimate and final

success of the British arms seemed to be but a matter of time. Such,

at least, was the view taken by the King of Ava, and without the

drawing up of any formal treaty he at length decided to treat for peace

by granting the concessions demanded of him. Protection to British

trade and life was definitely assured, and the British forces shortly

thereafter withdrawn.

The battles of the British Army · 第 37 / 66 章