THE BATTLE OF MOODKEE.
1845.
The fatal _dénouement_ of the retreat from Cabul was still in vivid
colouring before the British public, when tidings from the East
announced that it might be considered only as the fore-runner of
still more alarming demonstrations, and these from a power fully as
unfriendly, and far more formidable to British interests than the
Ghiljies and fanatic tribes of Afghanistan. The Punjaub for years had
been internally convulsed. The musnud in turn was occupied by women
whose debaucheries were disgusting, and men who had reached it by the
foulest murders. The country was frightfully disorganised; one bond
of union alone existed among the Sikhs, and that was the most deadly
hostility to the British.
The region of North-Western India, known in modern times under the name
of the Punjaub, is remarkably well defined by geographical limits. On
the north, it is bounded by one of the Himalaya ranges. On the west
by the Khybur and Soliman mountains and the Indus. On the south and
east the Sutlej divides it from British India. Its area is computed
to inclose 85,000 square miles. The arteries of the Indus, namely the
Jelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, traverse the whole country, and
form its local divisions into what are termed doabs. The Punjaub, being
translated, hence means “the country of five rivers.”
The state of things beyond the Sutlej alarmed the Indian government,
and Lord Ellenborough acted with energy and good judgment; Scinde and
Gwalior must be deprived of the power of being mischievous, and while
the former was annexed in form to the possessions of the Company,
Gwalior was being prepared for undergoing a similar change. To give
effect to these important measures, an army of observation marched
upon the Sutlej, but long before any results from his policy could
be developed, Lord Ellenborough was recalled, and Sir Henry Hardinge
appointed to succeed him. In the spring of 1844 the new governor
reached Calcutta.
The Cabul disasters had rendered the very thought of Eastern war most
unpopular at home, and Sir Henry assumed the chief command, with a
full determination to avoid a rupture with the Sikhs--could such be
avoidable; but that, as events proved, was impossible, and pacific
policy was tried and found wanting.
The summer of 1845 was marked by frightful excesses in Lahore. Murder
and debauchery went hand-in-hand together; and the Ranee herself,
as well as her chief adviser, Jowar Singh, no longer disguised their
purpose of coming to blows with the British. On the part of Jowar
Singh, this was but the prosecution of a policy which had long been in
favour with him; and as he was heartily detested by the rest of the
sirdars, they made it a pretext for conspiring against him and putting
him to death. But the Ranee was swayed by different motives. From day
to day her army became more unmanageable; and she desired, above all
things, to get rid of the nuisance, even if her deliverance should come
with a victorious British force to Lahore. Accordingly, after having
long withstood the clamours of her officers, she gave a hearty, yet a
reluctant, consent to the proposed invasion of the protected states;
and a plan of operations was drawn up, which indicated no slight
knowledge of the art of war on the part of those from whom it emanated.
As yet, Sir Henry had avoided every appearance of angry demonstration.
Loodiana and Ferozepore were well garrisoned. The former place was
weak--the latter better calculated for resistance. A magazine to supply
both places had been judiciously established where the Umballa road
touches that of Kurnaul--for Busseean was equally accessible to the
garrisons which were threatened.
Coming events had not been disregarded by the chief in command, and
in June, Sir Henry in person proceeded to the western provinces.
Approaching hostilities had in the autumn become too evident; the
Sikhs were advancing to the Sutlej, and instead of having, as formerly
reported, 15,000 men in and about Lahore, they had actually seven
divisions, which might fairly average, each with the other, 8000 men.
One of these was to remain to garrison the capital, the remainder were
disposable, and, as it was believed, destined to attack Loodiana,
Kurrachee, Ferozepore, Scinde, and Attock.
Before the subsequent transactions are described, a detail of the
strength, organisation, and _matériel_ of the Sikh army, as given at
the time by Lieutenant-Colonel Steinbach, formerly in the service of
the Maharajah, will be interesting.
“This force, consisting of about 110,000 men, is divided into regulars
and irregulars; the former of whom, about 70,000 strong, are drilled
and appointed according to the European system. The cavalry branch of
the disciplined force amounts to nearly 13,000, and the infantry and
artillery to 60,000 more. The irregulars, variously armed and equipped,
are nearly 40,000 strong, of which number upwards of 20,000 are
cavalry, the remainder consisting of infantry and matchlock-men, while
the contingents, which the sirdars or chiefs are obliged to parade on
the requisition of the sovereign, amount to considerably above 30,000
men. The artillery consisted in Runject’s time of 376 guns, and 370
swivels mounted on camels or on light carriages adapted to their size.
There is no distinct corps of artillery as in other services, but there
are 4000 or 5000 men, under a daroga, trained to the duty of gunners,
and these are distributed with the ordnance throughout the regular army.
The costume of the regular infantry is scarlet, with different coloured
facings, to distinguish regiments, as in the British service. The
trousers are of blue linen; the head-dress is a blue turban, with one
end loose, and spread so as to entirely cover the head, back of the
neck, and shoulders; the belts are of black leather; the arms a musket
and bayonet, the manufacture of Lahore. The cavalry wear helmets or
steel caps, round which shawls or scarfs are folded. The _irregulars_,
in their dress and appointments, fully justify the appellation which
their habits and mode of making war obtained for them. Cotton, silk,
or broad cloth tunics of various colours, with the addition of shawls,
cloaks, breastplates, or coats of mail, with turban or helmets, _ad
libitum_, impart to them a motley but picturesque appearance. They are
all badly mounted, and, indeed, little can be said even of the regular
cavalry in this respect. The Punjaub breed of horses is far from good,
and they do not import stock from other countries to improve their own
cattle.
The pay of the sepoys of the regular army of the Punjaub is higher
than that of the same class in the army of the East India Company,
each common soldier receiving ten rupees per mensem. The troops of the
irregulars receive twenty-five rupees each, out of which they provide
their arms and clothing, and feed their horse, putting the government
to no other expense whatever for their services.
Enlistment in the regular army of the Punjaub is quite voluntary, and
the service is so popular that the army could upon an emergency be
increased to almost any amount. The soldiery are exceedingly apt in
acquiring a knowledge of their military duties; but they are so averse
to control that instances of insubordination are common; latterly,
indeed, open mutiny has frequently characterised the relations of
officer and soldier. Insubordination is punished--when punishment is
practicable--with confinement, loss of pay, or extra duty. But in
the present state of military disorganisation no means of chastising
rebellion are available.
No pensions were, or are, assigned to the soldiery for long service,
nor is there any provision for the widows and families of those who
die, or are killed in the service of the state. Promotions, instead
of being the right of the good soldier in order of seniority, or the
reward of merit in the various grades, is frequently effected by
bribery. In the higher ranks, advancement is obtained by the judicious
application of _douceurs_ to the palm of the favourites at court, or
the military chieftains about the person of the sovereign.
In the event of the government of the Punjaub falling into the hands
of the British, some time would probably elapse before the dissolute
rabble which now composes the army could be brought under a state of as
perfect discipline as that which exists in the Anglo-Indian army; but
there is no doubt that ultimately the result of a system, strict and
severe from the commencement, when supported by a stern and absolute
monarchy, would display itself, and render the Sikh troops as devoted a
body as the regular native army of Hindostan.
Only twenty-three years have elapsed since the military force in the
Punjaub consisted of a large and undisciplined horde. In 1822, the
first European officers presented themselves (according to Prinsep) at
Runjeet Singh’s durbar, seeking military service and entertainment.
These were Messrs. Allard and Ventura, who had served in the French
army until the annihilation of Napoleon Buonaparte deprived them of
employment. At first, Runjeet Singh, with the suspicion common to a
native Indian prince, received them coldly; and his distrust of their
purposes was heightened by the Punjaubee chieftains, who were naturally
jealous of the introduction of Europeans into the military service;
but a submissive and judicious letter from these officers removed the
apprehensions of the Maharajah, and he, with the spirit and originality
of a man of genius, admitted them into his service; appointing them
instructors of his troops in the European system of drill and warfare.
The good conduct and wise management of these gentlemen speedily
removed Runjeet Singh’s prejudices against Europeans; and the door to
employment being thrown open, several military men entered the service
of the Maharajah, and at the close of his reign there were not less
than a dozen receiving his pay, and, to use an Indian expression,
‘eating his salt.’
The successors of Runjeet Singh, however, did not look with an eye
of favour upon men who were not to be bought, and whose sense of
personal dignity revolted at the treatment to which the unbridled Sikh
chieftains were inclined to subject them. The greater part accordingly
resigned their commissions; some of them retiring with ample fortunes,
and others seeking honourable employment elsewhere.
The Sikh army, until lately, was considered by many British officers,
who had the opportunity of seeing it, to have been in a fair state
of discipline. They form very correct lines, but in manœuvring their
movements are too slow, and they would, in consequence, be in danger,
from a body of British cavalry, of being successfully charged during
a change of position. They would also run the risk of having their
flanks turned by their inability to follow the motion of an European
enemy with equal rapidity.
The arms, that is to say, the muskets, are of very inferior stamp,
incapable of throwing a ball to any distance, and on quick and repeated
discharges liable to burst. Their firing is bad, owing to the very
small quantity of practice ammunition allowed by the government; not
more than ten balls out of a hundred, at the distance of as many paces,
would probably tell upon an enemy’s ranks. They still preserve the old
system of three ranks, the front one kneeling when firing and then
rising to load--a method in action liable to create confusion.
In person, the infantry soldiers are tall and thin, with good features
and full beards; their superior height is owing to the extraordinary
length of their lower limbs. They are capable of enduring the fatigue
of long marches for several days in succession (the author having on
one occasion marched with his regiment a distance of 300 miles within
twelve days), and are, generally speaking, so hardy that exposure to
oppressive heats or heavy rains has little effect upon them. In a great
measure this is the result of custom. Excepting in the vicinity of
Lahore and Peshawur, there are few regular quarters or cantonments; the
men occupy small tents or caravanserais.
The drum and fife and bugle are in general use in the Sikh infantry
regiments, and in some of the favourite royal corps of Runjeet Singh an
attempt was made to introduce a band of music, but a graft of European
melody upon Punjaubee discord did not produce, as may be imagined, a
very harmonious result.
The cavalry of the Sikh army is very inferior in every respect to the
infantry. While the latter are carefully picked from large bodies of
candidates for service, the former are composed of men of all sorts and
sizes and ages, who get appointed solely through the interests of the
different sirdars. They are mean-looking, ill-dressed, and, as already
stated, wretchedly mounted. Their horse trappings are of leather of the
worst quality, and their saddles are of the same miserable material,
and badly constructed. When the horse is in motion, the legs and arms
of the rider wave backwards and forwards, right and left, by way, as
it were, of keeping time with the pace of the animal bestridden. The
horses are small, meagre, and ill-shaped, with the aquiline nose which
so peculiarly proclaims inferiority of breed. In the field, the conduct
of the Sikh cavalry has generally corresponded with their appearance
and efficiency. They are totally deficient of firmness in the hour of
struggle, and only charge the foe when a vast superiority of numerical
force gives them a sort of warranty of success.”
Undeceived touching the supposed weakness of the Sikh army, Sir Henry
Hardinge, in conjunction with his gallant superior in command, Sir
Hugh Gough, concentrated his troops, called for reinforcements from
the interior, added largely to his commissariate--and what in Eastern
warfare is altogether indispensable, largely increased his beasts of
burden and means of transport. Then taking a central position, he
waited calmly and prudently until the Sikh designs should be more
clearly developed.
November came; the storm had been gathering; remonstrances from the
Governor-General had failed; and on the 4th, the Sikh vakeel was
formally dismissed. Still immediate hostilities were not anticipated,
when suddenly news arrived on the 13th, that the enemy had crossed the
Sutlej, and Ferozepore was invested. The British commander hurried by
forced marches to its relief, and on the 18th, after a seven leagues’
march, at noon the Anglo-Indian army reached the village of Moodkee.
A movement of twenty miles under an eastern sun is most distressing,
and the wearied troops having bivouacked, ignorant of the proximity of
an enemy, cut wood, lighted fires, and commenced cooking. Strange as
it may appear, although in the immediate presence of the Sikh army, no
vidette had seen it, and the booming of the enemy’s guns first gave
note of preparation.
The army was in a state of great exhaustion, principally from the want
of water, which was not procurable on the road, when about 3 p.m.,
information was received that the Sikh army was advancing; and the
troops had scarcely time to get under arms and move to their positions,
when that fact was ascertained.
“I immediately,” says Lord Gough, “pushed forward the horse artillery
and cavalry, directing the infantry, accompanied by the field
batteries, to move forward in support. We had not proceeded beyond two
miles, when we found the enemy in position. They were said to consist
of from 15,000 to 20,000 infantry, about the same force of cavalry, and
forty guns. They evidently had either just taken up this position, or
were advancing in order of battle against us.
To resist their attack and to cover the formation of the infantry,
I advanced the cavalry under Brigadiers White, Gough, and Mactier,
rapidly to the front, in columns of squadrons, and occupied the plain.
They were speedily followed by the five troops of horse artillery,
under Brigadier Brooke, who took up a forward position, having the
cavalry then on his flanks.
The country is a dead flat, covered at short intervals with a low,
but in some places, thick jhow jungle and dotted with sandy hillocks.
The enemy screened their infantry and artillery behind this jungle,
and such undulations as the ground afforded; and, whilst our twelve
battalions formed from echellon of brigade into line, opened a very
serious cannonade upon our advancing troops, which was vigorously
replied to by the battery of horse artillery under Brigadier Brooke,
which was soon joined by the two light field batteries. The rapid
and well-directed fire of our artillery appeared soon to paralyse
that of the enemy, and, as it was necessary to complete our infantry
dispositions without advancing the artillery too near to the jungle,
I directed the cavalry under Brigadiers White and Gough to make a
flank movement on the enemy’s left, with a view of threatening and
turning that flank, if possible. With praiseworthy gallantry, the 3rd
light dragoons, with the 2nd brigade of cavalry, consisting of the
bodyguard and fifth light cavalry, with a portion of the 4th lancers,
turned the left of the Sikh army, and, sweeping along the whole rear of
its infantry and guns, silenced for a time the latter, and put their
numerous cavalry to flight.
Whilst this movement was taking place on the enemy’s left, I directed
the remainder of the 4th lancers, the 9th irregular cavalry, under
Brigadier Mactier, with a light field battery, to threaten their right.
This manœuvre was also successful. Had not the infantry and guns of
the enemy been screened by the jungle, these brilliant charges of the
cavalry would have been productive of greater effect.
When the infantry advanced to the attack, Brigadier Brooke rapidly
pushed on his horse artillery close to the jungle, and the cannonade
was resumed on both sides. The infantry, under Major-Generals Sir
Harry Smith, Gilbert, and Sir John M‘Caskill, attacked in echellon of
lines the enemy’s infantry, almost invisible amongst the wood and the
approaching darkness of night. The opposition of the enemy was such as
might have been expected from troops who had everything at stake, and
who had long vaunted of being irresistible. Their ample and extended
line, from their great superiority of numbers, far outflanked ours;
but this was counteracted by the flank movements of our cavalry. The
attack of the infantry now commenced; and the roll of fire from this
powerful arm soon convinced the Sikh army that they had met with a foe
they little expected; and their whole force was driven from position
after position, with great slaughter, and the loss of seventeen pieces
of artillery, some of them of heavy calibre; our infantry using that
never-failing weapon, the bayonet, whenever the enemy stood. Night only
saved them from worse disaster, for this stout conflict was maintained
during an hour and a half of the dim starlight, amidst a cloud of dust
from the sandy plain, which yet more obscured every object.
I regret to say this gallant and successful attack was attended with
considerable loss; the force bivouacked upon the field for some hours,
and only returned to its encampment after ascertaining that it had
no enemy before it, and night prevented the possibility of a regular
advance in pursuit.”
In this brilliant and sanguinary battle, the British loss was
necessarily heavy. Sir Robert Sale, and Sir John McCaskill were killed,
and Brigadiers Bolton and Mactier, with Colonels Byrne and Bunbury
wounded. The total casualties amounted to 872 of all arms.
Nothing could have been more fortunate than the prestige which Moodkee
gave to the campaign. One damning fault of the Spanish generals on
the Peninsula was that they literally overmarched their troops until
they came to a dead standstill--and this the British commanders most
judiciously avoided.
There was great suffering everywhere for want of water. Hunger men may
endure for days together; but a burning thirst in a tropical climate is
terrible; and when the fever in the blood becomes aggravated by such
exertions as the British army had that day made, the whole world seems
valueless in comparison with a cup of cold water. None came, however,
for several hours; yet the gallant fellows bore the privation without
a murmur; and when the following day brought them a reinforcement of
two European regiments of infantry, with a small battery of heavy guns,
they felt that they were irresistible. Nevertheless, the general, with
great good sense, gave them two entire days to refresh; he had nothing
to gain by precipitating matters. Ferozepore had been saved by the
battle of the 18th, and his communications with the place being in some
sort restored, he had time to warn Sir John Littler of his purposes,
and to prepare him for co-operating in their accomplishment. These were
the chief advantages of delay; besides that, others probably occurred
to him, namely, the opportunity which was afforded for the coming up
of the corps which had been directed to march from Delhi, Meerut,
and other stations. And on the part of the Sikhs, it was doubtless
considered that their very numbers would render a long halt on one spot
impossible for them; for no country, however fertile, can sustain the
pressure of sixty thousand men many days.
A little delay in active operations was, under circumstances,
particularly politic, for while the Sikhs were shaken in confidence
and marvelling at their discomfiture, the British lion was gathering
strength to make another and a deadlier spring.