THE BATTLE OF KEMMENDINE.
1824.
In 1824 the British were forced into a war with the kingdom of Burmah.
The war, however, was not of our seeking; we were forced into it. The
Burmese a few years previously had taken forcible possession of the
province of Assam, which was soon followed by parties of these people
committing serious devastations within British territory, burning
a number of villages, plundering and murdering the inhabitants,
or carrying them off as slaves. At the same time an island in the
Brahmaputra, on which the British flag had been erected, was invaded,
the flag was thrown down, and an armed force collected to maintain the
insult.
To meet these difficulties, and to strengthen their eastern frontier,
the British Government resolved upon occupying Kachar, with the more
important province of Manipur, which had long ago requested the
protection of the British against the tyranny of the Burmahs. Active
hostilities had by this time broken out at the boundaries.
The British asked for a commission of inquiry and settlement to be
appointed. This request was answered by an attack upon, and the capture
of, the British post of Shahpuri, an affair that was attended with
considerable loss of life; and which was followed by a menacing letter
from the Rajah of Arracan, to the effect that unless the British
Government submitted quietly it would be followed by the like forcible
seizure of the cities of Dacca and Moorshedabad. The British now called
upon the court of Ava to disavow the proceedings of its officers in
Arracan. This last act of mistaken and temporising policy had no other
effect than that of confirming the court of Ava in their confident
expectation of annexing the eastern provinces of Bengal--if not of
expelling the British from India altogether.
There followed several minor engagements, and in May of 1824 the
British forces got possession of Rangoon after a trifling resistance.
The troops were posted in the immense pagoda of the town, where many
unfortunate prisoners were discovered, forgotten by the Burmahs in the
confusion of their retreat.
Rumours of the arrival of Bandoola with the main body of his grand
army, reached Rangoon early in November, 1824, and towards the end of
the month an intercepted dispatch from Bandoola to the ex-governor of
Martaban, announced his having left Prome, at the head of an invincible
army, with horses and elephants, and every kind of stores, to capture
or expel the British from Rangoon. Every arrangement was then made to
give him a warm reception.
The post at Kemmendine was strongly occupied and supported on the
river, by His Majesty’s sloop Sophie, commanded by Captain Ryves, and
a strong division of gunboats; this post was of great importance in
preventing the enemy from attacking Rangoon by water, or launching from
a convenient distance the many fire rafts he had prepared for effecting
the destruction of our shipping.
On the 30th of November the Burmese army was assembled in the extensive
forest in front of the pagoda, and his line extending from the river
above Kemmendine in a semi-circular direction towards Puzendown,
might be distinguished by a curved line of smoke rising above the
trees from the bivouacs of the different corps. During the following
night, the low continued murmur and hum of voices proceeding from the
Burmese encampment, suddenly ceased, and was succeeded by the distant,
but gradually approaching sounds of a multitude in slow and silent
movement through the woods. The enemy’s masses had approached to the
very edge of the jungle, within musket shot of the pagoda, apparently
in readiness to rush from their cover to the assault at break of day.
Towards morning, however, the woods resounded with the blows of the
felling axe and hammer, and with the crash of falling trees, leaving
the British for some time in doubt whether or not the noise was
intended as a ruse to draw attention from the front, or whether the
Burmese commanders had resolved to proceed with their usual slow and
systematic measures of attack.
Day had scarcely dawned on the 1st of December, when hostilities
commenced with a heavy fire of musketry and cannon at Kemmendine, the
reduction of that place being a preliminary to any general attack on
our line. The fire continued long and animated, and from the commanding
situation of the great pagoda, though nearly two miles distant from the
scene of action, we could distinctly hear the yells and shouts of the
infuriated assailants, occasionally answered by the hearty cheers of
the British seamen as they poured in their heavy broadsides upon the
resolute and persevering masses.
In the course of the forenoon Burmese columns were perceived on the
west side of the river, marching across the plain of Dalla, towards
Rangoon. They were formed in five or six different divisions, and moved
with great regularity, led by numerous chiefs on horseback, their gilt
umbrellas glittering in the rays of the sun, with a sufficiently
formidable and imposing effect, at a distance that prevented our
perceiving anything motley or mobbish, which might have been found in a
closer inspection of these warlike legions.
On reaching the bank of the river opposite to Rangoon, the men of
the leading Burmese division, laying aside their arms, commenced
entrenching and throwing up batteries for the destruction of the
shipping, while the main body disappeared in a jungle in the rear,
where they began stockading and establishing their camp, gradually
reinforcing the front line as the increasing extent of the batteries
and intrenchments permitted. Later in the day, several heavy columns
were observed issuing from the forest, about a mile in front of the
east face of the great pagoda, with flags and banners flying in
profusion. Their march was directed along a gently sloping woody ridge
towards Rangoon; the different corps successively taking up their
ground along the ridge, soon assumed the appearance of a complete line,
extending from the forest in front of the pagoda to within long gunshot
distance of the town, and resting on the river at Puzendown, which was
strongly occupied by cavalry and infantry; these formed the left wing
of the Burmese army. The centre, or the continuation of the line from
the great pagoda up to Kemmendine, where it again rested on the river,
was posted in so thick a forest as to defy all conjecture as to its
strength or situation; but we were well aware that the principal force
occupied the jungle in the immediate vicinity of the pagoda, which was
naturally considered as the key to our position, and upon which the
great effort would accordingly be made.
When this singular and presumptuous formation was completed, the
soldiers of the left columns also laying aside their spears and
muskets, commenced operations with their intrenching tools, with such
goodwill and activity that in the course of a couple of hours their
line had wholly disappeared, and could only be traced by a parapet of
new earth gradually increasing in height, and assuming such forms as
the skill and science of the engineer suggested.
The moving masses which had so lately attracted our anxious attention,
had sunk into the ground; and to anyone who had not witnessed the whole
scene, the existence of these subterraneous legions would not have been
credited; the occasional movement of a chief with his gilt chattah
(umbrella) from place to place superintending the progress of their
labour, was the only thing that now attracted notice. By a distant
observer, the hills, covered with mounds of earth would have been taken
for anything rather than the approaches of an attacking army.
In the afternoon, His Majesty’s thirteenth regiment, and the eighteenth
Madras native infantry, under Major Sale, were ordered to move rapidly
forward upon the busily employed and too confident enemy.
As was expected, they were quite unprepared for a sudden visit, not
expecting that we would venture to act on the offensive against so
numerous a body.
They had scarcely noticed the advance of our troops when they were upon
them, nor could the fire which they opened upon their assailants check
their advance. Having forced a passage through the intrenchments and
taken the enemy in flank, the British detachment drove the whole line
from their cover with considerable loss; and having destroyed as many
of their arms and tools as they could find, retired unmolested before
the numerous bodies which were now forming on every side around them.
The trenches were found to be a succession of holes, capable of
containing two men each, and excavated so as to afford shelter both
from the fire of their opponents and from the weather; even a shell
falling into the trench could only prove fatal to two men. As it is not
the Burmese custom to relieve their troops in making these approaches,
each hole had in it a sufficient supply of rice, water, and even fuel
for its inmates; under the excavated bank a bed of straw or brushwood
was placed in which one man could sleep whilst his comrade watched.
The Burmese in the course of the evening, re-occupied their trenches,
recommencing their labours as if nothing untoward had occurred. Their
commander, however, took the precaution of bringing forward a strong
corps of reserve to the verge of the forest, from which his left
wing had issued, to protect it from any future interruptions in its
operations.
During the day repeated attacks on Kemmendine had been made and
repulsed; but it was not until darkness set in that the last desperate
effort of the day was made, to obtain possession of that post. Already
had the fatigued soldiers laid down to rest, when all of a sudden the
heavens and country round became brilliantly illuminated, caused by the
flames of several immense fire-rafts, floating down the river towards
Rangoon. Scarcely had the blaze of light appeared when incessant rolls
of musketry and peals of cannon were heard from Kemmendine. The Burmese
had launched the fire-rafts into the stream with the first of the ebb
tide, in the hope of forcing the vessels from their stations off the
place, and they were followed by war-boats ready to take advantage of
the confusion likely to ensue, should any of the vessels have caught
fire. The skill and intrepidity, however, of British seamen proved more
than a match for the numbers and arts of the enemy; they grappled the
blazing rafts, and conducted them past the shipping or ran them ashore
upon the bank.
On the land side the enemy was equally unsuccessful, being again
repulsed with great loss in the most resolute attempt they had yet made
to reach the interior of the fort.
These fire-rafts, upon examination, were found to be of ingenious
construction, as well as formidable; they were made of bamboos firmly
wrought together, between every two or three rows of which a line of
earthen jars of considerable size, filled with petroleum, or earth-oil
and cotton, were securely fixed.
With the possession of Kemmendine, the enemy would have launched
these destructive rafts into the stream from a point which would have
caused them to reach our shipping in the crowded harbour; but so long
as we retained possession of that post, they were obliged to launch
them higher up, and the setting of the current carried them, after
passing the shipping on the station, upon a projecting point of land
where they almost invariably grounded; this circumstance doubtless
greatly increased Bandoola’s anxiety to drive the British from such an
important position.
On the morning of the second, at daylight, the enemy were seen still
actively at work on every part of their line, and to have completely
entrenched themselves upon some high and open ground, within musket
shot distance of the north face of the great pagoda, from which it was
also separated by a considerable tank, named by the Rangoon settlers,
the Scotch tank, probably on account of the sulphureous qualities of
its water.
In the spirited encounters which the enemy’s near approach gave rise
to, it was highly gratifying to observe the undaunted bearing of the
British soldier, in the midst of countless numbers of the enemy who
were not to be driven from their ground by the united fire of musketry
and cannon. In the imagined security of their cover they firmly
maintained themselves, and returned our fire; and it was only at the
intrepid and decisive charge that they quailed to the courage of the
European, and declined meeting him hand to hand. During the third and
fourth, the enemy continued their approaches upon every part of our
position with indefatigable assiduity. At the great pagoda they had now
reached the margin of the tank, and kept up a constant fire upon our
barracks, saluting with a dozen muskets everyone who showed his head
above the ramparts, and when nothing better could be done, expending
both round and grape shot in vain attempts to strike the British ensign
which proudly waved high upon their sacred temple.
On the side of Rangoon they had approached near enough to fire an
occasional gun upon the town, while they maintained incessant warfare
with two small posts in its front to which they were now so near as to
keep their garrisons constantly on the alert, in the expectation of
being attacked.
From the intrenchments on the opposite side of the river an incessant
fire was kept up day and night upon our shipping, which were all
anchored as near as possible to the Rangoon side, with the exception of
one or two armed vessels which still kept the middle of the stream, and
returned the fire of the enemy.
At Kemmendine peace was seldom maintained above two hours at any time;
but the little garrison (composed of the 26th Madras native infantry,
and an European detachment), though worn out with fatigue and want of
rest, undauntedly received, and successfully repulsed, every successive
attack of the fresh troops brought to bear upon them.
The Sepoys, with unwearied constancy and the noblest feeling, even
declined leaving their post, or laying aside their muskets for the
purpose of cooking, lest the enemy should obtain any advantage, and for
several days felt contented with little else than dry rice for food.
The material and warlike stores of the enemy’s left wing being now
brought forward from the jungle to the intrenchments, and completely
within our reach, and their threatening vicinity to the town creating
some uneasiness for the safety of our military stores, which were all
lodged in that ill-protected and highly-combustible assemblage of
huts and wooden houses, the British general, Sir Archibald Campbell,
determined upon attacking decisively that portion of the opposing army.
On the morning of the 5th, two columns of attack, consisting of
detachments from different regiments, were formed for the purpose.
One column consisting of eight hundred men, under Major Sale of the
13th regiment, and the other of five hundred men under Major Walker of
the Madras army. Major Sale was directed to attack the centre of the
enemy’s line, and Major Walker to advance from the post in front of the
town, and to attack vigorously on that side; and a troop of dragoons,
which had only been landed on the previous day was added to the first
column, ready to take advantage of the retreat of the enemy across the
open ground to the jungle.
According to the arrangement, early on that morning, Captain Chads,
the naval commander, proceeded up to Puzendown Creek, within gun-shot
of the rear of the enemy’s line, with the man-of-war boats and part
of the flotilla, and commenced a heavy cannonade upon the nearest
intrenchments, attracting the enemy’s chief attention to that point,
until the preconcerted signal for attack was made, when both columns
moved off together; but from some obstacle in the ground Major Walker’s
party first reached its destined point, and made a spirited assault on
the lines.
The enemy made a stout resistance, and Major Walker and many of
his brave and gallant comrades fell in the advance to the first
intrenchment, which was finally carried at the point of the bayonet,
and the enemy driven from trench to trench, till this part of the field
presented the appearance of a total rout.
The other column now commencing its attack in front, quickly forced
the centre, and the whole Burmese left wing, intrenched upon the plain
was broken and dispersed, flying in hundreds, or assembled in confused
and detached parties, or else maintaining a useless and disjointed
resistance at different parts of the works, to which our troops had not
yet penetrated.
The two British columns now forming a junction, pursued, and drove the
defendants from every part of their works into the jungle, leaving the
ground behind them covered with the dead and wounded, with all their
guns and intrenching tools, and a great number of small arms; while
the judgment, celerity, and spirit with which the attack was made had
taken the enemy so completely by surprise, that our troops suffered
comparatively but little loss.
The 6th was spent by Bandoola in rallying his defeated left; but it
appeared to be still far from his intention to give up the contest on
account of the failures and defeats he had already sustained. In front
of the great pagoda his troops still laboured with the greatest zeal in
their approaches upon our position, and this part of his line had been
strongly reinforced by the troops which had been driven from the plain
on the preceding day.
The morning of the 7th was fixed upon for bringing matters to a crisis
at this point, and four columns of attack, composed of detachments,
were early formed under the superintendence of the commander of
the forces, in readiness to move from the pagoda and assail the
intrenchments on both flanks and in the centre. Before the troops
advanced, a severe cannonade was opened from many pieces of heavy
ordnance, brought up from the river, and placed in battery for
defending this important post. This the enemy stood with much firmness,
and returned it with a constant, though unequal, fire of musketry,
jingals, and light artillery.
While the firing continued, the columns of attack were already in
motion towards their several points; and when it ceased, the left
corps, under Colonel Mallet, was seen debouching from the jungle upon
the enemy’s right; the right column, under Colonel Brodie, Madras army,
in like manner advancing on the left; and the two central columns,
one under Colonel Parlby of the Madras army, and the other commanded
by Captain Wilson, of the 38th regiment, descending the stairs from
the north gate of the pagoda, and filing up towards the centre of
the position, by either side of the tank before alluded to, as partly
covering the intrenchments on this side.
The appearance of our troops at the same moment upon so many different
points seemed to paralyse the Burmese army, but they were not long in
recovering from their momentary panic, when they opened a heavy and
well-sustained fire upon our troops; and it was not until a decided
charge was made, and our troops actually in the trenches, that the
enemy finally gave way, and they were precipitately driven from their
numerous works, curiously shaped, and strengthened by many strange
contrivances, into the thick forest in their rear.
There, all pursuit was necessarily given up; our limited numbers,
exhausted by seven days of watching and hard service, were unequal
to the fatigue; though even when our men were fresh, the enemy could
always baffle their pursuit in a country which afforded them so many
facilities for escaping. Upon the ground the enemy left a great number
of dead, who seemed generally from their stout and athletic forms, to
have been their best troops. Their bodies had each a charm of some
description, in which the brave deceased had no doubt trusted for
protection, but in this case, they seemed to have lost any virtue ever
possessed by them. In the intrenchments were found scaling-ladders, and
every preparation for carrying the pagoda by storm.
No time was lost in completing the rout of the Burmese army, and on the
evening of the 7th, a body of troops from His Majesty’s eighty-ninth
regiment, and the forty-third Madras native infantry, under Colonel
Parlby, were in readiness to embark from Rangoon as soon as the tide
served, for the purpose of crossing the river and driving the enemy
from their intrenchments at Dalla. The night, fortunately, was dark,
and the troops were got over unperceived by the enemy. No shot was
fired, nor alarm given, until the British troops had actually entered
the Burmese intrenchments, and commenced firing at random among the
noisy groups which they now heard all around them, but the risk of
injuring each other in the dark made it advisable to desist. Parties
were sent to occupy various parts of the works, which a previous
acquaintance with the ground enabled them to accomplish with but little
opposition or loss. On the approach of daylight next morning they found
themselves in full and undisturbed possession of the whole position,
with all the guns and stores of this portion of the Burmese army, the
remains of which were perceived during the whole day, retracing their
steps across the plain of Dalla, with more expedition and less pomp
than they had exhibited but seven days before, when they traversed the
same plain “in all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war.”
Every gun they had, and the whole _matériel_ of the army, fell into
the hands of the conquerors. Desertions and the dispersion of entire
corps, followed the defeat, so that in the course of a few days the
haughty Bandoola, who so boasted of driving the rebel strangers into
the sea, found himself completely foiled in all his plans, humbled,
and surrounded by a beaten army, which he proudly called “invincible,”
alike afraid of the consequences of a final retreat, and of another
meeting with an adversary who had taught him such a severe lesson!