THE BATTLES OF THE PYRENEES.
PART SECOND.
1813.
Winter had now set in, and a season of unusual severity commenced. The
allies were sadly exposed to the weather, and an increasing difficulty
was felt every day in procuring necessary supplies. Forage became so
scarce, that part of the cavalry had nothing for their horses but
grass; while the cattle for the soldiers’ rations, driven sometimes
from the interior of Spain, perished in immense numbers by the way, or
reached the camp so wretchedly reduced in condition as to be little
better than carrion. Resources from the sea could not be trusted to;
for in blowing weather the coast was scarcely approachable, and even in
the sheltered harbour of Passages, the transports could with difficulty
ride to their moorings, in consequence of the heavy swell that tumbled
in from the Atlantic. The cold became intense, sentries were frozen at
their posts, and a picket at Roncesvalles, regularly snowed up, was
saved with great difficulty. All this plainly showed that the present
position of the allies was not tenable much longer, and that a forward
movement into France was unavoidable.
But great difficulties in advancing presented themselves; and, all
things considered, success was a matter of uncertainty. Soult’s army
had been powerfully reinforced by the last conscription; and for three
months the French marshal had been indefatigable in fortifying the
whole line of his position, and strengthening his defences, wherever
the ground would admit an enemy to approach. The field-works extended
from the sea to the river, as the right rested on St. Jean-de-Luz,
and the left on the Nivelle. The centre was at Mont La Rhune and the
heights of Sarré. The whole position passed in a half-circle through
Irogne, Ascain, Sarré, Ainhoue, and Espelette. Though the centre was
commanded by a higher ridge, a narrow valley interposed between them.
The entire front was covered with works, and the sierras defended by a
chain of redoubts. The centre was particularly strong--in fact, it was
a work regularly ditched and palisaded.
To turn the position, by advancing Hill’s corps through St. Jean
Pied-de-Port, was first determined on; but, on consideration, this plan
of operations was abandoned, and, strong as the centre was, the allied
leader resolved that on it his attack should be directed, while the
heights of Ainhoue, which formed its support, should, if possible, be
simultaneously carried.
A commander less nerved than Lord Wellington, would have lacked
resolution for this bold and masterly operation. Everything was against
him, and every chance favoured the enemy. The weather was dreadful, the
rain fell in torrents, and while no army could move, the French had the
advantage of the delay to complete the defences of a position which was
already deemed perfect as art and nature could render it. Nor did their
powerful works produce in the enemy a false security. Aware of the
man and the troops which threatened them, they were always ready for
an attack, and their outpost duty was rigidly attended to. Before day
their corps were under arms, and the whole line of defence continued
fully garrisoned until night permitted the troops to be withdrawn.
At last the weather moderated. Ainhoue was reconnoitred by Wellington
in person, and the plan of the attack arranged. No operation could be
more plain or straightforward. The centre was to be carried by columns
of divisions, and the right centre turned. To all the corps their
respective points of attack were assigned, while to the light division
and Longa’s Spaniards the storming of La Petite Rhune was confided.
The latter were to be supported by Alten’s cavalry, three brigades of
British artillery, and three mountain guns.
The successful result of the battle was owing in no inconsiderable
degree to the able direction of the artillery under Colonel Dickson.
Guns were brought to bear on the French fortifications from situations
which they considered totally inaccessible to that arm. Mountain
guns on swivel carriages, harnessed on the backs of mules purposely
trained for that service, ascended the rugged ridges of the mountains,
and showered destruction on the intrenchments below. The foot and
horse-artillery displayed a facility of movement which must have
astonished the French, the artillerymen dragging the guns with ropes up
steep precipices, or lowering them down to positions from whence they
could with more certain aim pour forth their fatal volleys against the
enemy.
The 8th December had been named for the attack, but the roads were
so dreadfully cut up, that neither the artillery nor Hill’s brigade
could get into position, and it was postponed for two days longer,
when the 10th dawned, a clear and moonlight morning. Long before day,
Lord Wellington, and several of the generals of division and brigade
with their respective staffs, had assembled in a small wood, five
hundred yards from the redoubt above the village of Sarré, waiting for
sufficient light to commence the arranged attack.
Nothing could exceed the courage and rapidity with which the troops
rushed on, and overcame every artificial and natural obstacle. The 3rd
and 7th advanced in front of the village, Downie’s Spanish brigade
attacked the right, while the left was turned by Cole’s, and the whole
of the first line of defences remained in possession of the allies.
On this glorious occasion, the light division was pre-eminently
distinguished. By moonlight it moved from the greater La Rhune, and
formed in a ravine which separates the bolder from the lesser height.
This latter was occupied in force by the enemy, and covered on every
assailable point with intrenchments. As morning broke, the British
light troops rushed from the hollow which had concealed them. To
withstand their assault was impossible; work after work was stormed;
forward they went with irresistible bravery, and on the summit of
the hill united themselves with Cole’s division, and then pushed on
against the intrenched heights behind, which formed the strongest part
of the position. Here, a momentary check arrested their progress; the
supporting force (Spanish) were too slow, and the ground too rugged for
the horse artillery to get over it at speed. The rifles were attacked
in turn, and for a moment driven back by a mass of the enemy. But the
reserve came up; and again the light troops rushed forward, the French
gave way, and the whole of the lower ridge was left in possession of
the assailants.
For four hours the combat had raged, and on every point the British
were victorious. A more formidable position still remained behind, and
Wellington combined his efforts for a vigorous and general attack.
This mountain position extended from Mondarin to Ascain, and a long
valley, through which the Nivelle flows, traversed it; where the
surface was unequal, the higher points were crowned with redoubts,
and the spaces of leveller surface occupied by the French in line or
column, as the nature of the ground best admitted. Men inclined to
fight never had a field that offered so many advantages; and there were
none, save the British leader and the splendid army he commanded, who
would have ventured to assault equal numbers posted as the enemy were.
The dispositions were soon complete, the word was given, and in six
columns, with a chain of skirmishers in front, the allies advanced to
the attack.
To carry a strong work, or assail a body of infantry in close column,
placed on the crest of an acclivity that requires the attacking force
to halt frequently for breathing-time, requires a desperate and
enduring valour which few armies can boast--but such bravery on that
occasion characterised the allied divisions. Masses posted on a steep
height were forced from it by the bayonet, though hand and foot were
often required to enable the assaulting party to reach them. Redoubts
were carried at a run, or so rapidly turned by the different brigades
that the defenders had scarcely time to escape by the rear. Nothing
could resist the dash and intrepidity of the British; and over the
whole extent of that formidable position, on no point did the attack
fail.
The French were driven from their works, and forced in great confusion
on the bridge of the Nivelle. One redoubt, from its superior strength,
had been obstinately maintained, but the regiment that occupied it was
completely cut off from retreating, and the whole were made prisoners.
In every other point the British attack succeeded. Hill’s division
carried the heights of Ainhoue, the whole of the redoubts falling to
the British and Portuguese under Hamilton; while Stewart drove the
enemy from a parallel ridge in the rear, and the divisions, by an
united attack, forcing the enemy from their works at Espelette, obliged
them to retire towards Cambo, thus gaining the rear of the position
originally occupied, and forcing Soult’s centre on his right.
The French marshal formed in great force on the high grounds over
Ascain and St. Pe, and Lord Wellington made instant dispositions to
attack him. Three divisions, the third, sixth, and seventh, advanced
against the heights--two by the left of the Nivelle, and one, the
sixth, by the right bank. As the position was exceedingly strong, the
enemy determined to hold it to the last, and maintained a furious
cannonade, supported by a heavy fire of musketry. But the steady and
imposing advance of the allies could not be repelled, and the French
retired hastily. The right of the position was thus entirely cut
through, and though for months the Duke of Dalmatia had been arming
every vulnerable point, and his engineers had used their utmost skill
in perfecting its defences, the British commander’s dispositions were
so admirably made and so gallantly carried out, that his numerous and
most difficult attacks were crowned with brilliant success, unalloyed
by a single failure.
Night ended the battle, the firing ceased, Soult retreated, and,
covered by the darkness, withdrew a beaten army, that had numbered
fully seventy thousand men. His killed and wounded exceeded three
thousand, besides a loss of fifty guns, and twelve hundred prisoners.
The allies reckoned their casualties at two thousand four hundred
killed and wounded; which, the nature of the ground, the strength of
its defences, and the _corps d’armée_ that held it, considered, was
indeed a loss comparatively light.