THE BATTLE OF ALBUERA.
1811.
While Marshal Beresford was endeavouring to reduce Badajoz,
intelligence reached him that Soult was marching from Larena.
Beresford, of course, at once abandoned the siege, removed the
artillery and stores, and having united himself with Blake, Castanos,
and Ballasteros, the combined armies took position behind the Albuera,
where the Seville and Olivenca roads separate.
On the westward of the ground where the allies determined to abide a
battle, the surface undulated gently, and on the summit, and parallel
with the river, their divisions were drawn up. The village of Albuera
was in front of the left, and the right was formed on a succession
of knolls, none of them of any strength, and having no particular
appui. On the eastern side of the river, an open country extends for a
considerable distance, terminating in thick woods; and in these Soult
bivouacked on the night of the 15th, and there made his dispositions
for attack.
The French army, though numerically weaker, was composed of veteran
troops, and amounted to twenty thousand infantry, three thousand
cavalry, and forty pieces of cannon. The allies numbered twenty-seven
thousand infantry, two thousand cavalry, and thirty-two guns; but of
this force, fourteen thousand were Spanish.
These last were formed in a double line upon the right, Stewart’s
division was in the centre, a Portuguese division on the left. The
light infantry, under Alten, held the village, and the dragoons,
under Lumley, were placed on the right flank of the Spaniards. Cole’s
division (the fusileers) and a Portuguese brigade, which came up after
the action had commenced, were formed in rear of the centre.
Beresford’s was a medley of three nations. He had thirty thousand
men in position, but not a fourth was British; while nearly one-half
was composed of that worst of military mobs--the Spaniards; nor were
these even brought up in time to admit of their being properly posted.
Blake had promised that his corps should be on the hill of Albuera
before noon on the 15th May, and, with but a few miles to march, with
excellent roads to traverse, the head of his columns reached the ground
near midnight, and the rear at three on the morning of the 16th. Bad as
Beresford’s army was, had it been in hand, more might have been done
with it. It was three o’clock on the 16th before Blake was fairly up,
and six before the fourth division reached the ground; while three fine
British regiments under Kemmis, and Madden’s Portuguese cavalry, never
appeared. As the event showed, a few British soldiers would have proved
invaluable, and these troops, though immediately contiguous during the
long and doubtful struggle that ensued, remained _non-combattant_.
Beresford’s position had been carefully reconnoitred by Soult on the
evening of the 15th, and aware that the fourth British division was
still before Badajoz, and Blake not yet come up, he determined to
attack the marshal without delay. A height, commanding the Valverde
road, if a front attack were made, appeared on his examination of the
ground to be the key of the position; and as Beresford had overlooked
its occupation, Soult ably selected it as the point by which his
principal effort should be made.
A wooded hill behind the Albuera, and within cannon-shot of the allied
right, afforded the French marshal the means of forming a strong column
for attack, without his design being noticed by his opponent. Covered
by the darkness, he brought forward the artillery of Ruty, the fifth
corps under Girard, with the cavalry of Latour Maubourg, and formed
them for his intended assault; thus concentrating fifteen thousand men
and forty guns within ten minutes’ march of Beresford’s right wing, and
yet that general could neither see a man, nor draw a sound conclusion
as to the real plan of attack. The remainder of his corps was placed in
the wood on the banks of the Feria, to bear against Beresford’s left,
and by carrying the bridge and village sever the wings of the allied
army.
The engagement commenced by Godinot debouching from the wood, and
making a feint on the left, while the main body of the French ascended
the heights on the right of the Spaniards. On perceiving the true
object of Soult’s attack, Beresford, who had vainly endeavoured,
through an aide-de-camp, to persuade Blake to change his front, rode to
the Spanish post, pointed out the heads of the advancing columns, and
induced his ally to take up a new alignment. It was scarcely done until
the French bore down upon the Spanish infantry; and though at first
they were stoutly opposed, the battalions gradually began to yield
ground; and, being farther forced back, Soult commenced deploying on
the most commanding point of the position. A serious attack was to be
dreaded; the French cavalry sweeping round the allies, threatened their
rear, and Godinot’s column made fresh demonstrations of vigorously
assailing the left.
All this was most alarming; the Spanish line confusedly endeavouring to
effect the difficult manœuvre of changing its front, while two-thirds
of the French, in compact order of battle, were preparing to burst
upon the disordered ranks, and insure their total destruction. The
French guns had opened a furious cannonade, the infantry were firing
volley after volley, the cavalry charging where the Spanish battalions
seemed most disordered. Already their ranks were wavering, and Soult
determined to complete the ruin he had begun, ordered up the reserve,
and advanced all his batteries.
At this perilous moment, when the day seemed lost, General Stewart
pushed the leading brigade of the fourth division up the hill under
Colonel Colborne, and it mounted by columns of companies. To form line
on gaining the top, under a withering fire, was difficult; and while
in the act of its being effected, a mist, accompanied by a heavy fall
of rain, shut every object out from view, and enabled the whole of the
light cavalry of Godinot’s division to sweep round the right flank,
and gallop on the rear of the companies at the time they were in loose
deployment. Half the brigade was cut to pieces--the 31st, who were
still fortunately in column, alone escaping the lancers, who, with
little resistance, were spearing right and left a body of men surprised
on an open flat, and wanting the necessary formation which can alone
enable infantry to resist a charge of horse.
This scene of slaughter, by a partial dispersion of the smoke and fog
that had hitherto concealed the battleground, was fortunately observed
by General Lumley, and he ordered the British cavalry to gallop to the
relief of the remnant of Colborne’s brigade. They charged boldly; and,
in turn, the lancers were taken in rear, and many fell beneath the
sabres of the British.
The weather, that had caused the destruction of the British regiments,
obscured the field of battle, and prevented Soult from taking an
immediate advantage by exterminating that half-ruined brigade. Stewart
brought up Houghton’s corps; the artillery had come forward, and opened
a furious cannonade on the dense masses of the French; and the 31st
resolutely maintained its position on the height. Two Spanish brigades
were advanced, and the action became hotter than ever. For a moment the
French battalions recoiled, but it was only to rally instantly, and
come on with greater fury. A raging fire of artillery on both sides,
sustained at little more than pistol range, with reiterated volleys
of musketry, heaped the field with dead, while the French were vainly
endeavouring to gain ground, and the British would not yield an inch.
But the ranks of the island soldiery were thinning fast, their
ammunition was nearly exhausted, their fire slackened, and
notwithstanding the cannonade checked the French movement for a time,
Soult formed a column on the right flank of the British, and the
French lancers charging furiously again, drove off the artillerymen
and captured six guns. All now seemed lost, and a retreat appeared
inevitable. The Portuguese were preparing to cover it, and the marshal
was about to give the order, when Colonel Hardinge suggested that
another effort should be made, and boldly ordered General Cole to
advance, and then riding to Colonel Abercrombie, who commanded the
remaining brigade of the second division, directed him also to push
forward into the fight.
The order was instantly obeyed; General Harvey, with the Portuguese
regiments of the fourth division, moved on between the British cavalry
and the hill; and though charged home by the French dragoons, he
checked them by a heavy fire and pushed forward steadily; while General
Cole led on the 7th and 23rd fusileers in person.
In a few minutes more the remnant of the British must have abandoned
the hill or perished. The French reserve was on its march to assist the
front column of the enemy, while, with the allies all was in confusion;
and as if the slaughter required an increase, a Spanish and a British
regiment were firing in mutual mistake upon each other. Six guns were
in possession of the French, and their lancers, riding furiously over
the field, threatened the feeble remnant of the British still in line,
and speared the wounded without mercy.
At this fearful moment the boundless gallantry of British officers
displayed itself; Colonel Arbuthnot, under the double musketry, rushed
between the mistaken regiments, and stopped the firing; Cole pushed up
the hill, scattered the lancers, recovered the guns, and passed the
right of the skeleton of Houghton’s brigade, at the same instant that
Abercrombie appeared upon its left. Leaving the broken regiments in its
rear, the fusileer brigade came forward with imposing gallantry, and
boldly confronted the French, now reinforced by a part of its reserve,
and who were, as they believed, coming forward to annihilate the
“feeble few” that had still survived the murderous contest.
From the daring attitude of the fresh regiments, Soult perceived,
too late, that the battle was not yet won; and, under a tremendous
fire of artillery, he endeavoured to break up his close formation
and extend his front. For a moment the storm of grape poured from
Ruty’s well-served artillery, staggered the fusileers; but it was
only for a moment. Though Soult rushed into the thickest of the fire,
and encouraged and animated his men, though the cavalry gathered on
their flank and threatened it with destruction, on went these noble
regiments; volley after volley falling into the crowded ranks of
their enemy, and cheer after cheer pealing to Heaven in answer to the
clamorous outcry of the French, as the boldest urged the others forward.
Nothing could check the fusileers; they kept gradually advancing,
while the incessant rolling of their musketry slaughtered the crowded
sections of the French, and each moment embarrassed more and more
Soult’s efforts to open out his encumbered line. The reserve,
coming to support their comrades--now forced to the very edge of
the plateau--increased the crowd without remedying the disorder.
The British volleys rolled on faster and more deadly than ever; a
horrid carnage made all attempts to hold the hill vain, and uselessly
increased an unavailing slaughter. Unable to bear the withering fire,
the shattered columns of the French were no longer able to sustain
themselves, the mass were driven over the ridge, and trampling each
other down, the shattered column sought refuge at the bottom of the
hill.
On that bloody height stood the conquerors. From fifteen hundred
muskets a parting volley fell upon the routed column as it hurried down
the Sierra. Where was the remainder of the proud army of Britain, that
on the morning had exceeded six thousand combatants? Stretched coldly
in the sleep of death, or bleeding on the battleground!
During the time this desperate effort of the fusileer brigade had
been in progress, Beresford, to assist Hardinge, moved Blake’s first
line on Albuera, and with the German light troops, and two Portuguese
divisions, advanced to support the 7th and 23rd, while Latour
Maubourg’s flank attack was repelled by the fire of Lefebre’s guns, and
a threatened charge by Lumley. But the fusileers had driven the French
over the heights before any assistance reached them, and Beresford was
enabled to form a fresh line upon the hill, parallel to that by which
Soult had made his attack in the morning. For a short time the battle
continued at Albuera, but the French finally withdrew from the village,
and at three o’clock in the evening the firing had totally ceased.
There is not on record a bloodier struggle. In four hours’ fighting
fifteen thousand men were _hors de combat_. The allied loss was
frightful; it amounted to nearly seven thousand in killed, wounded,
and missing. Almost all its general officers were included in the
melancholy list; Houghton, Myers, and Duckworth in the killed; and
Cole, Stewart, Ellis, Blakeney, and Hawkshaw among the wounded. The
loss of some regiments was terrible; the 57th came into action with
five hundred and seventy bayonets, and at the close it had lost its
colonel (Inglis), twenty-two officers, and four hundred rank and file.
The proportion of the allied casualties told how fatal Albuera had
proved to the British; two thousand Spaniards, and six hundred German
and Portuguese, were returned as their killed and wounded, leaving
the remainder to be completed from the British regiments. Hence, the
unexampled loss of more than four thousand men, out of a corps little
exceeding six, was sustained in this sanguinary battle by the British.
Never was more heroism displayed than by the British regiments engaged
in the murderous conflict of Albuera. The soldiers dropped by whole
ranks, but never thought of turning. When a too ardent wish to succour
those pressed upon the hill induced Stewart to hurry Colborne’s brigade
into action, without allowing it a momentary pause to halt and form,
and in the mist that unluckily favoured the lancer charge the companies
were unexpectedly assailed, though fighting at dreadful disadvantage,
the men resisted to the last. Numbers perished by the lance-blade;
but still the dead Poles that were found intermingled with the fallen
British, showed that the gallant islanders had not died without
exacting blood for blood.
The French exceeded the British by at least a thousand. Of their worst
wounded, eight hundred were left upon the field. Their loss in superior
officers, like that of the British, had been most severe--two generals
having been killed, and three severely wounded.
To a victory both sides laid claim--the French resting theirs on the
capture of some colours, the taking of a howitzer, with some five
hundred prisoners whom they had secured unwounded. But the British kept
the battleground, and though neither cannon nor eagle remained with
them, a field covered with carcases, and heaped with bleeding enemies,
was the best trophy of their valour, and clearly established to whom
conquest in reality belonged.
Much military controversy has arisen from the fight of Albuera,
and Marshal Beresford has received some praise and more censure.
Probably the battle should not have been fought at all; or, if it
were unavoidable, greater care might have been bestowed in taking the
position.
If Beresford’s judgment be open to censure, his personal intrepidity
must be admitted and admired. No man could make greater exertions to
retrieve the day when defeat appeared all but certain. When Stewart’s
imprudence, in loosely bringing Colborne’s brigade into action, had
occasioned it a loss only short of annihilation, and the Spaniards,
though they could not be induced to advance, fired without ceasing,
with a British regiment in their front, Beresford actually seized an
ensign and dragged him forward with the colours, hoping that these
worthless troops would be inspirited to follow. Not a man stirred,
and the standard-bearer, when the marshal’s grasp relaxed, instantly
flew back to herd with his cold-blooded associates. In every charge
of the fight, and on every part of the field, Beresford was seen
conspicuously; and whatever might have been his failing as a general,
his bravery as a man should have commanded the respect of many who
treated his arrangements with unsparing severity.
A painful night succeeded that sanguinary day. The moaning of the
wounded and the groans of the dying were heard on every side; and it
was to be dreaded that Soult, who had still fifteen thousand troops
fit for action, would renew the battle. On the next day, however, three
fresh British regiments joined the marshal by a forced march; and on
the 18th, Soult retreated on the road of Solano, covered by the heavy
cavalry of Latour Maubourg. He had previously despatched such of his
wounded as could bear removal towards Seville, leaving the remainder to
the generous protection of the British commander.
Soult continued retreating, and Beresford followed him, by order of the
allied commander.