THE BATTLE OF VIMIERO.
1808.
Vimiero stands at the bottom of a valley, and at the eastern extremity
of a ridge of hills extending westward towards the sea. The river
Maceira flows through it, and on the opposite side, heights rise
eastward, over which winds the mountain road of Lourinho. In front
of the village a plateau of some extent is slightly elevated above
the surrounding surface; but it, in turn, is completely overlooked
by the heights on either side. The British, never anticipating an
attack, had merely taken up ground for the night, and with more
attention to convenience than security. Six brigades occupied the
high ground westward of Vimiero--one battalion, the 50th, with some
rifle companies, were bivouacked on the plateau, having a half brigade
of nines, and a half brigade of six pounders. The eastern heights
were occupied by pickets only, as water could not be procured in the
vicinity--and in the valley, the cavalry and reserve artillery had
taken their ground for the night.
The communication immediately made by Sir Arthur Wellesley to his
senior officer, Sir Harry Burrard, both of the past and the intended
operations, had been unfavourably received--and Sir Harry declined the
daring but judicious step of an immediate advance on Mafra, by which
the position taken by the French on the heights of Torres Vedras must
have been necessarily turned. In fact, to every suggestion of Sir
Arthur he raised continuous objections, and seemed totally opposed
to any forward movement. He pleaded, in apology for inaction, that
the cavalry was weak, the artillery badly horsed; that a march, which
should remove the British from their shipping, would interrupt their
supplies and endanger the army; and the best of the bad reasons which
he gave was the expected arrival of Sir John Moore with a strong
reinforcement. It was useless in Sir Arthur Wellesley to point out,
as he did, the advantages of an advance, with an assurance, which
proved true, that if they did not, the French would become assailants.
Sir Harry appeared to have formed a stubborn resolution of remaining
quiet that no argument or remonstrance could disturb, and Sir Arthur
Wellesley returned to his camp, convinced that the military incapacity
of his superior officer would, when it paralysed early success as
it did that of Rolica, entail upon the expedition ulterior disaster
and disgrace. It was otherwise decreed, and the decision of an enemy
wreathed the laurel on Wellesley’s brow, of which the timidity of a
feeble-minded colleague would have robbed him.
Delaborde had executed his orders to check the advance of the British
with a zeal and ability that added greatly to his military reputation.
Junot, in the interim, was actively engaged in concentrating his
brigades, and drawing every disposable man from his garrisons, to
enable him to bring a force to bear against the British, that, from its
superior formation, must ensure success. His whole corps was formed
into two divisions; Delaborde commanding one, and Loison the other,
while the reserve, composed entirely of grenadiers, was entrusted to
Kellerman. All his dispositions having been completed, the Duke of
Abrantes advanced to Vimiero, where he had ascertained that his enemy
was halted.
Sir Arthur was awakened at midnight by a German officer in charge of
the outlying picket, with the intelligence of Junot’s movements, and
an assurance that an attack was certain, as the French advance was not
above a league distant. Patrols were immediately sent out; and while
every care was taken against surprise, the line was not alarmed, nor
the men permitted to be disturbed.
Junot quitted his position on the evening of the 20th, and marched all
night by roads bad in themselves, and interrupted by numerous defiles;
consequently great delay occurred, and it was seven o’clock next
morning, when he arrived within four miles of the British outposts.
The formation of his columns was effected unseen, as the broken
ground behind which he made his dispositions, entirely concealed his
movements. The first intimation of a serious attack was only given when
a mass of Junot’s cavalry deployed in front of the picket that was
observing the Lourinho road. Perceiving instantly the point on which
the French were about to direct their column, Sir Arthur crossed the
ravine with the brigades of Ferguson, Nightingale, Aucland, and Bowes,
thus securing his weakest point--the left--before Junot had made a
demonstration against it.
Presently the enemy’s columns came on; the right by the Lourinho road,
and left marching on the plateau, occupied by the 50th and rifles.
The onset of both divisions was made with the usual impetuosity of
Frenchmen, and in both the British skirmishers were driven in.
The British right was furiously attacked. Unchecked by the light troops
covering the line, the French came boldly forward, until it found
itself directly in front of the 36th, 40th, and 71st. It deployed
instantly, and several volleys of musketry were mutually returned,
and at a distance so close as to render the effect murderous. But
the fusilade was ended quickly; the 82nd and 29th pushed forward,
and joined their comrades when pressed by an enormous superiority.
“Charge!” was the order; and a cheer, “loud, regular, and appalling,”
announced that Britain was coming on.
The French stood manfully; but though they waited the onset, they could
not withstand it. They were driven from the field--a vain attempt to
rally, when the 71st and 82nd had flung themselves on the ground to
recover breath, failed--and six guns were taken. The front rank of the
French division was literally annihilated; it lay as it had fallen, and
told with what determination it had stood, and the desperation with
which it had been assaulted.
On the left, the French column having pushed the rifles before it,
advanced upon the 50th formed in line. The regiment was strong,
numbering about nine hundred bayonets, and supported by a half brigade
of guns; and though the French had seven pieces with their column, it
suffered heavily from the British cannonade. The enemy’s advance was
made in close order of half battalions. Sheltered from the fire of the
artillery, the French halted behind a broken hillock, closed up their
ranks, and advanced to the attack. The 50th remained until this moment
with “ordered arms.” With excellent judgment, the colonel, leaving the
left wing of his regiment in line, threw his right into echelons of
companies, and ordered it to form line upon the left. But there was
not time to complete the formation, as the enemy came on, opening a
hot but inefficient fire from its flanks. Part of the right wing of
the 50th bore directly on the angle of the advancing column--and when
within twenty paces, the order was given to fire, and that to “Charge!”
succeeded. Broken totally by the close discharge, the angle of the
column forced itself on the centre; all was instantly disorganised, and
the artillery cutting their traces, added to the confusion. The British
pressed on, the French got mobbed, and assisted by part of the 20th
light dragoons, a column five times numerically superior were for two
miles fairly driven from their ground by one regiment, until they were
relieved by the French cavalry reserve, which came up in a force not to
be resisted.
While these more important operations were repulsed, the town of
Vimiero was attacked by a lesser column (Kellerman’s reserve), that
had flanked the larger, and the 43rd regiment was furiously assailed.
One company occupied the churchyard, another held some houses that
covered the road by which the French attack was made; and the fire of
both was so destructive, that the column was repelled with immense
slaughter. On the extreme left, the 97th and 52nd repulsed Delaborde
with considerable loss; on every point the attack failed, and the field
was won.
No troops fought better than the French, and no battle could have been
more determinately contested. The enemy’s reserve “performed prodigies
of valour, advancing under a cross fire of musketry and cannon, and
never giving way until the bayonets of the British troops drove them
down the descent.” But they were routed on every side; and, with
relation to the numbers engaged, the slaughter was terrific. Upwards
of three thousand Frenchmen were killed and wounded, and a number
of prisoners made, while the British loss was computed, in killed,
wounded, and missing, at seven hundred and eighty-three.
One casualty was sincerely deplored. In leading a squadron of the
20th, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor was killed. He had charged the broken
infantry of Kellerman, and committed sad havoc among the _élite_ of the
reserve, when, surrounded by a whole brigade of French cavalry, he fell
in the _mêlée_, shot through the heart.
Sir Harry Burrard landed after the battle commenced, but very prudently
left the termination of the contest in his hands by whom the first
disposition had been made. Sir Harry was not in time to assist in the
victory--but he had ample leisure to mar its results. Wellesley urged
that this was the moment to advance, push on to Torres Vedras, place
Junot between two fires, and oblige him to begin a retreat of immense
difficulty by Alenquer and Villa Franca. All was admirably prepared for
the movement. The supply of ammunition was sufficient, provisions were
abundant, and the troops in high courage and superb discipline. The
French, on the contrary, were depressed by an unexpected defeat; and,
greatly disorganised and wearied by long marches, were certain of being
materially inconvenienced by an immediate advance of the British.
But Sir Harry was immovable. He had made his mind up to await the
arrival of Sir John Moore before he should advance a step from Vimiero.
A victory had been gained--a complete and brilliant victory. But
what was that to him? “The cavalry,” he said, “were certainly not
strengthened, nor the artillery horses improved, by the exertions
they had undergone.” Stop he would--and Junot was permitted to return
without annoyance; and the British, who should have never halted until
they had reached Lisbon, rested on the ground they won.
Is it not inconceivable, that Britain should have consigned her armies
to the leading of antiquated tacticians, bigoted in old-world notions,
and who would scarcely venture beyond a second bridge without spending
half the day in reconnoitring? But such things were--and the energies
of the first military people in the world were paralysed for half a
century, by commands being entrusted to men, who, in cases of ordinary
embarrassment, would have been found incompetent to extricate a
regiment from a difficulty. But such things were!