THE BATTLE OF MAIDA.
1806.
It has been remarked with great justice, that until the Peninsular war
had been for some time in progress, the military enterprises of Great
Britain invariably failed from the blind policy of those who planned
them. Instead of condensing the power of the empire into one grand
and sustained effort, its strength was frittered away in paltry and
unprofitable expeditions. An army, imposing in its full integrity,
if subdivided into corps, and employed on detached services, and in
different countries, can achieve nothing beyond a partial success, for
soon after its divided brigades are landed on their scenes of action,
their weakness produces their discomfiture, and they retire necessarily
before a superior force. In the first moment of disembarkation it may
create a temporary alarm; but beyond this no object can be gained, and
the result ends in an idle demonstration.
Political details are generally unconnected with the actual occurrences
on the battle-field; and it will be enough to remark, that Sicily
should have at this period commanded more attention from Britain than
she did. Naturally defensible, with a well-affected population of
nearly a million and a half, she had been taught to place but little
reliance on her allies. One British corps held Messina, but a French
force was moving to the extremity of Calabria, avowedly to drive it
from the island. Though well-affected, the Sicilians were distrustful;
they feared that they should be abandoned to the vengeance of those
troops who had already overrun Naples, and they believed that the
British regiment waited only until the French army should make its
descent, when they would embark for Malta, and leave the Sicilians to
their fate.
At this time, Sir John Stuart succeeded Sir James Craig, a man best
described by terming him an “old-school commander.” Under him the
army had been totally inactive; and eight thousand excellent troops
were permitted to occupy their quarters idly, when so much depended
upon a bold, even though not a very fortunate, display of energy in
the British. Stuart at once perceived the mischievous consequences
this indolence of his predecessor had occasioned; and he determined
by active operations to redeem the British army from the apathetic
character it had too justly obtained among the Sicilian people.
The British corps, amounting to eight thousand men, was concentrated
at Messina. In Calabria the French were considerably detached; and
though numerically stronger, with three thousand in the South, four
thousand in Upper Calabria, and the remainder occupying numerous posts,
it was quite practicable to take them in detail, effect a landing
between the two corps, engage them separately, and clear the country
from St. Euphemia to the Castle of Scylla. To insure success, despatch
and secrecy were required. The first rested with Stuart, and every
arrangement necessary on his part was effected; the latter depended on
the Sicilian court, and by it the secrecy of the intended expedition
was undoubtedly betrayed.
On the 28th of June, at Melazzo, the embarkation of five thousand men
was quietly accomplished, and on the third morning they landed on the
beach of St. Euphemia. During the 2nd and 3rd stores and supplies were
disembarked; and moving forward, on that evening the pickets of the
rival armies confronted each other. The enemy’s force was at first
supposed to be merely the division of Upper Calabria; but that of
the South had formed a junction; and Reynier had now seven thousand
infantry, and a few troops of cavalry amounting to three hundred and
fifty sabres.
The British in numbers were greatly inferior. Five thousand infantry,
six six-pounders and eight mountain guns formed their whole strength.
Reynier was also in position--his army being posted on some heights
which overlooked the march of the British as they moved through a low
country, at first partially wooded, but opening into a spacious plain,
and of course permitting their numbers and dispositions to be correctly
ascertained by their enemy during the advance.
This, as the result proved, was an unfortunate advantage for the French
General. Whether reckoning too much on his opponent’s inferiority
of force, or undervaluing the character of his soldiers, Reynier,
supposing that Stuart, having advanced in error, would retire on
discovering his mistake, abandoned the heights, passed a river in his
front, and offered battle on the plain. As his columns approached,
General Stuart at once perceived, from the ground they covered, that
Reynier’s force was much larger than he had expected, and that he
had united his detached brigades; but, with the just confidence of a
British leader he trusted to the bravery of his troops; and in that
safe reliance boldly stood “the hazard of the die.”
The battle commenced (6th July) about nine o’clock, and there was no
manœuvring on either side. The ground was level, and both armies,
under cover of their light troops, advanced steadily and deployed into
line. The enemy’s left was composed of voltigeurs, and the right of
the British that opposed them (Kempt’s brigade) was formed of a light
infantry battalion and the Corsican Rangers. After an interchange of
three volleys, the French were ordered to advance; at the same time
the British lowered their bayonets, and both pressed boldly forward.
The front ranks were now within six paces of each other--the French
advancing, cheered by the “_En avant, mes enfans!_” of their officers.
The British needed no encouragement; on they came, with that imposing
steadiness which told what the result must be, when bayonets crossed,
and “steel met steel.” The voltigeurs had not firmness to abide the
shock; they broke and turned, but too late for flight to save them.
Their front rank was bayonetted and trodden down, while the rear
endeavoured to escape by a disorderly rush from the field, exposed to
severe loss from the British artillery.
Kempt’s gallant and successful charge was ably seconded by Ackland’s
brigade, which held the right centre. They advanced against the
demi-brigade opposed to them, forced it back across the Amato, and
never allowed the routed wing one moment to rally. The pursuit was so
ardently continued that for a mile the French were followed by the
victors, suffering heavily in killed and wounded, and losing a number
of prisoners.
This success, though brilliant, was far from being decisive. The
ardour of the right wing had carried it away, leaving the left
totally unsupported, and open to Reynier’s undivided efforts. From
the superiority of his force, he showed a larger front, and availing
himself of this advantage, endeavoured to turn the British left, and
in this attempt his cavalry had nearly succeeded. After a feint upon
the centre, they wheeled sharply to the right, making a flank movement,
while their infantry threatened the British line with a charge. This
was the crisis of the action. The French advanced, Stuart refusing his
flank, and obliquing his line from the centre. Reynier’s cavalry were
about to charge, when, fortunately, the 20th regiment, under Colonel
Ross, which had landed after the march of the army, came up.
The attack was already made, the cavalry advancing, when Ross, under
cover of some underwood, deployed in double-quick. Within a short
distance, a close and murderous volley was thrown in, and the cavalry
completely broken. The British line cheered and moved forward, the
French gave way, and a complete _déroute_ succeeded. No victory,
considering the numbers opposed, could have been more decisive. Seven
hundred killed, a thousand prisoners, and a large proportion of
wounded, were the estimated loss of the enemy, while this was achieved
by an amount of casualties greatly disproportioned, the victors having
but one officer and forty-four men killed, and eleven officers and two
hundred and seventy-one men wounded.
For that night the British army bivouacked on the battleground, and
having received supplies from the shipping, advanced on the 6th to
overtake the enemy’s rear; while a brigade under Colonel Oswald marched
on the French depot at Montelione, of which it took possession, making
six hundred prisoners. The whole of the commissariat stores, with the
entire baggage, and the military chest, were captured; and the remnant
of the French army was saved only by abandoning arms and accoutrements,
and retiring with all the confusion attendant upon a signal defeat.
Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm with which the victors were
received. The defended places along the coast, turned on the land side
by the army, of course surrendered unconditionally. The whole of the
Peninsula was rapidly crossed, and on the 11th of July, the leading
British brigade invested the Castle of Scylla.
This place, so deeply associated with ancient recollections, stands
on a sheer rock, commanding the eastern point of the entrance of
the Straits of Messina. The difficulties experienced by navigators
occasionally in this confined channel, almost realise the old-world
legends of its dangers. Once caught in the currents, when passing
Cape Pelorus with light or contrary winds, a vessel must run for the
anchorage, which lies directly beneath the batteries of the castle; and
hence the possession of the place, especially to a maritime nation, was
an object of paramount importance.
For some days the efforts of the English were confined to firing on the
castle with the field guns. Of course, artillery of a light calibre
could effect nothing but annoyance; until, on the 19th, when some
heavy cannon were obtained from Messina. On the 21st they were placed
in battery and opened with great effect; and on the same evening, as
the guns were breaching rapidly, the commandant accepted terms, and
surrendered the castle to the besiegers.
Although military achievements, on a minor scale, have been eclipsed
by the more brilliant conquests obtained by British armies in
subsequent campaigns, still Maida was not only a glorious, but, in
its results, a most important victory. Independently of humbling a
presumptuous enemy, raising the depressed reputation of the British
army, and converting the distrusting population of Sicily into grateful
admirers, the positive results of Sir John Stuart’s expedition were
the destruction of all the military and naval resources of Calabria,
and the occupation of a post which for eighteen months secured
the navigation of the Straits of Messina, and, in a great degree,
occasioned the meditated descent on Sicily to fail.