[As the authorship of this remarkable paper has sometimes been imputed
to another person, it may be proper to give the facts respecting its
preparation, although they involve nothing more important than a
question of literary interest.
Mr. Webster, as has been stated, arrived at Marshfield on the 9th of
October, 1850, where he remained for the space of two weeks. He brought
with him the papers relating to this controversy with Austria. Before he
left Washington, he gave to Mr. Hunter, a gentleman then and still
filling an important post in the Department of State, verbal
instructions concerning some of the points which would require to be
touched in an answer to Mr. Hülsemann's letter of September 30th, and
requested Mr. Hunter to prepare a draft of such an answer. This was
done, and Mr. Hunter's draft of an answer was forwarded to Mr. Webster
at Marshfield. On the 20th of October, 1850, Mr. Webster, being far from
well, addressed a note to Mr. Everett,[1] requesting him also to prepare
a draft of a reply to Mr. Hülsemann, at the same time sending to Mr.
Everett a copy of Mr. Hülsemann's letter and of President Taylor's
message to the Senate relating to Mr. Mann's mission to Hungary.[2] On
the 21st Mr. Webster went to his farm in Franklin, New Hampshire, where
he remained until the 4th of November. While there he received from Mr.
Everett a draft of an answer to Mr. Hülsemann, which was written by Mr.
Everett between the 21st and the 24th of October.
Soon after Mr. Webster's death, it was rumored that the real author of
"the Hülsemann letter" was Mr. Hunter,--a rumor for which Mr. Hunter
himself was in no way responsible. At a later period, in the summer of
1853, the statement obtained currency in the newspapers that Mr. Everett
wrote this celebrated despatch, and many comments were made upon the
supposed fact that Mr. Everett had claimed its authorship. The facts
are, that, while at Franklin, Mr. Webster, with Mr. Hunter's and Mr.
Everett's drafts both before him, went over the whole subject, making
considerable changes in Mr. Everett's draft, striking out entire
paragraphs with his pen, altering some phrases, and writing new
paragraphs of his own, but adopting Mr. Everett's draft as the basis of
the official paper; a purpose which he expressed to Mr. Everett on his
return to Boston toward Washington. Subsequently, when he had arrived in
Washington, Mr. Webster caused a third draft to be made, in the State
Department, from Mr. Everett's paper and his own additions and
alterations. On this third draft he made still other changes and
additions, and, when the whole was completed to his own satisfaction,
the official letter was drawn out by a clerk, was submitted to the
President, and, being signed by Mr. Webster, was sent to Mr.
Hülsemann.[3]
There are, no doubt, passages and expressions in this letter which are
in a tone not usual with Mr. Webster in his diplomatic papers. How he
himself regarded the criticisms that might be made upon it may be seen
from the following note:--
[TO MR. TICKNOR.]
"Washington, January 16, 1851.
"My dear Sir,--If you say that my Hülsemann letter is boastful and
rough, I shall own the soft impeachment. My excuse is twofold: 1. I
thought it well enough to speak out, and tell the people of Europe who
and what we are, and awaken them to a just sense of the unparalleled
growth of this country. 2. I wished to write a paper which should touch
the national pride, and make a man feel _sheepish_ and look _silly_ who
should speak of disunion. It is curious enough but it is certain, that
Mr. Mann's private instructions were seen, somehow, by Schwarzenberg.
"Yours always truly,
"DANIEL WEBSTER."[4]
Department of State, Washington,
December 21, 1850.
The undersigned, Secretary of State of the United States, had the honor
to receive, some time ago, the note of Mr. Hülsemann, Chargé d'Affaires
of his Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, of the 30th of September.
Causes, not arising from any want of personal regard for Mr. Hülsemann,
or of proper respect for his government, have delayed an answer until
the present moment. Having submitted Mr. Hülsemann's letter to the
President, the undersigned is now directed by him to return the
following reply.
The objects of Mr. Hülsemann's note are, first, to protest, by order of
his government, against the steps taken by the late President of the
United States to ascertain the progress and probable result of the
revolutionary movements in Hungary; and, secondly, to complain of some
expressions in the instructions of the late Secretary of State to Mr. A.
Dudley Mann, a confidential agent of the United States, as communicated
by President Taylor to the Senate on the 28th of March last.
The principal ground of protest is founded on the idea, or in the
allegation, that the government of the United States, by the mission of
Mr. Mann and his instructions, has interfered in the domestic affairs of
Austria in a manner unjust or disrespectful toward that power. The
President's message was a communication made by him to the Senate,
transmitting a correspondence between the executive government and a
confidential agent of its own. This would seem to be itself a domestic
transaction, a mere instance of intercourse between the President and
the Senate, in the manner which is usual and indispensable in
communications between the different branches of the government. It was
not addressed either to Austria or Hungary; nor was it a public
manifesto, to which any foreign state was called on to reply. It was an
account of its transactions communicated by the executive government to
the Senate, at the request of that body; made public, indeed, but made
public only because such is the common and usual course of proceeding.
It may be regarded as somewhat strange, therefore, that the Austrian
Cabinet did not perceive that, by the instructions given to Mr.
Hülsemann, it was itself interfering with the domestic concerns of a
foreign state, the very thing which is the ground of its complaint
against the United States.
This department has, on former occasions, informed the ministers of
foreign powers, that a communication from the President to either house
of Congress is regarded as a domestic communication, of which,
ordinarily, no foreign state has cognizance; and in more recent
instances, the great inconvenience of making such communications the
subject of diplomatic correspondence and discussion has been fully
shown. If it had been the pleasure of his Majesty, the Emperor of
Austria, during the struggles in Hungary, to have admonished the
provisional government or the people of that country against involving
themselves in disaster, by following the evil and dangerous example of
the United States of America in making efforts for the establishment of
independent governments, such an admonition from that sovereign to his
Hungarian subjects would not have originated here a diplomatic
correspondence. The President might, perhaps, on this ground, have
declined to direct any particular reply to Mr. Hülsemann's note; but out
of proper respect for the Austrian government, it has been thought
better to answer that note at length; and the more especially, as the
occasion is not unfavorable for the expression of the general sentiments
of the government of the United States upon the topics which that note
discusses.
A leading subject in Mr. Hülsemann's note is that of the correspondence
between Mr. Hülsemann and the predecessor of the undersigned, in which
Mr. Clayton, by direction of the President, informed Mr Hülsemann "that
Mr. Mann's mission had no other object in view than to obtain reliable
information as to the true state of affairs in Hungary, by personal
observation." Mr. Hülsemann remarks, that "this explanation can hardly
be admitted, for it says very little as to the cause of the anxiety
which was felt to ascertain the chances of the revolutionists." As this,
however, is the only purpose which can, with any appearance of truth, be
attributed to the agency; as nothing whatever is alleged by Mr.
Hülsemann to have been either done or said by the agent inconsistent
with such an object, the undersigned conceives that Mr. Clayton's
explanation ought to be deemed, not only admissible, but quite
satisfactory.
Mr. Hülsemann states, in the course of his note, that his instructions
to address his present communication to Mr. Clayton reached Washington
about the time of the lamented death of the late President, and that he
delayed from a sense of propriety the execution of his task until the
new administration should be fully organized; "a delay which he now
rejoices at, as it has given him the opportunity of ascertaining from
the new President himself, on the occasion of the reception of the
diplomatic corps, that the fundamental policy of the United States, so
frequently proclaimed, would guide the relations of the American
government with other powers." Mr. Hülsemann also observes, that it is
in his power to assure the undersigned "that the Imperial government is
disposed to cultivate relations of friendship and good understanding
with the United States."
The President receives this assurance of the disposition of the Imperial
government with great satisfaction; and, in consideration of the
friendly relations of the two governments thus mutually recognized, and
of the peculiar nature of the incidents by which their good
understanding is supposed by Mr. Hülsemann to have been for a moment
disturbed or endangered, the President regrets that Mr. Hülsemann did
not feel himself at liberty wholly to forbear from the execution of
instructions, which were of course transmitted from Vienna without any
foresight of the state of things under which they would reach
Washington. If Mr. Hülsemann saw, in the address of the President to the
diplomatic corps, satisfactory pledges of the sentiments and the policy
of this government in regard to neutral rights and neutral duties, it
might, perhaps, have been better not to bring on a discussion of past
transactions. But the undersigned readily admits that this was a
question fit only for the consideration and decision of Mr. Hülsemann
himself; and although the President does not see that any good purpose
can be answered by reopening the inquiry into the propriety of the steps
taken by President Taylor to ascertain the probable issue of the late
civil war in Hungary, justice to his memory requires the undersigned
briefly to restate the history of those steps, and to show their
consistency with the neutral policy which has invariably guided the
government of the United States in its foreign relations, as well as
with the established and well-settled principles of national
intercourse, and the doctrines of public law.
The undersigned will first observe, that the President is persuaded his
Majesty, the Emperor of Austria, does not think that the government of
the United States ought to view with unconcern the extraordinary events
which have occurred, not only in his dominions, but in many other parts
of Europe, since February, 1848. The government and people of the United
States, like other intelligent governments and communities, take a
lively interest in the movements and the events of this remarkable age,
in whatever part of the world they may be exhibited. But the interest
taken by the United States in those events has not proceeded from any
disposition to depart from that neutrality toward foreign powers, which
is among the deepest principles and the most cherished traditions of the
political history of the Union. It has been the necessary effect of the
unexampled character of the events themselves, which could not fail to
arrest the attention of the contemporary world, as they will doubtless
fill a memorable page in history.
But the undersigned goes further, and freely admits that, in proportion
as these extraordinary events appeared to have their origin in those
great ideas of responsible and popular government, on which the American
constitutions themselves are wholly founded, they could not but command
the warm sympathy of the people of this country. Well-known
circumstances in their history, indeed their whole history, have made
them the representatives of purely popular principles of government. In
this light they now stand before the world. They could not, if they
would, conceal their character, their condition, or their destiny. They
could not, if they so desired, shut out from the view of mankind the
causes which have placed them, in so short a national career, in the
station which they now hold among the civilized states of the world.
They could not, if they desired it, suppress either the thoughts or the
hopes which arise in men's minds, in other countries, from contemplating
their successful example of free government. That very intelligent and
distinguished personage, the Emperor Joseph the Second, was among the
first to discern this necessary consequence of the American Revolution
on the sentiments and opinions of the people of Europe. In a letter to
his minister in the Netherlands in 1787, he observes, that "it is
remarkable that France, by the assistance which she afforded to the
Americans, gave birth to reflections on freedom." This fact, which the
sagacity of that monarch perceived at so early a day, is now known and
admitted by intelligent powers all over the world. True, indeed, it is,
that the prevalence on the other continent of sentiments favorable to
republican liberty is the result of the reaction of America upon Europe;
and the source and centre of this reaction has doubtless been, and now
is, in these United States.
The position thus belonging to the United States is a fact as
inseparable from their history, their constitutional organization, and
their character, as the opposite position of the powers composing the
European alliance is from the history and constitutional organization of
the government of those powers. The sovereigns who form that alliance
have not unfrequently felt it their right to interfere with the
political movements of foreign states; and have, in their manifestoes
and declarations, denounced the popular ideas of the age in terms so
comprehensive as of necessity to include the United States, and their
forms of government. It is well known that one of the leading principles
announced by the allied sovereigns, after the restoration of the
Bourbons, is, that all popular or constitutional rights are holden no
otherwise than as grants and indulgences from crowned heads. "Useful and
necessary changes in legislation and administration," says the Laybach
Circular of May, 1821, "ought only to emanate from the free will and
intelligent conviction of those whom God has rendered responsible for
power; all that deviates from this line necessarily leads to disorder,
commotions, and evils far more insufferable than those which they
pretend to remedy." And his late Austrian Majesty, Francis the First, is
reported to have declared, in an address to the Hungarian Diet, in 1820,
that "the whole world had become foolish, and, leaving their ancient
laws, were in search of imaginary constitutions." These declarations
amount to nothing less than a denial of the lawfulness of the origin of
the government of the United States, since it is certain that that
government was established in consequence of a change which did not
proceed from thrones, or the permission of crowned heads. But the
government of the United States heard these denunciations of its
fundamental principles without remonstrance, or the disturbance of its
equanimity. This was thirty years ago.
The power of this republic, at the present moment, is spread over a
region one of the richest and most fertile on the globe, and of an
extent in comparison with which the possessions of the house of Hapsburg
are but as a patch on the earth's surface. Its population, already
twenty-five millions, will exceed that of the Austrian empire within the
period during which it may be hoped that Mr. Hülsemann may yet remain in
the honorable discharge of his duties to his government. Its navigation
and commerce are hardly exceeded by the oldest and most commercial
nations; its maritime means and its maritime power may be seen by
Austria herself, in all seas where she has ports, as well as they may be
seen, also, in all other quarters of the globe. Life, liberty, property,
and all personal rights, are amply secured to all citizens, and
protected by just and stable laws; and credit, public and private, is as
well established as in any government of Continental Europe; and the
country, in all its interests and concerns, partakes most largely in all
the improvements and progress which distinguish the age. Certainly, the
United States may be pardoned, even by those who profess adherence to
the principles of absolute government, if they entertain an ardent
affection for those popular forms of political organization which have
so rapidly advanced their own prosperity and happiness, and enabled
them, in so short a period, to bring their country, and the hemisphere
to which it belongs, to the notice and respectful regard, not to say the
admiration, of the civilized world. Nevertheless, the United States have
abstained, at all times, from acts of interference with the political
changes of Europe. They cannot, however, fail to cherish always a lively
interest in the fortunes of nations struggling for institutions like
their own. But this sympathy, so far from being necessarily a hostile
feeling toward any of the parties to these great national struggles, is
quite consistent with amicable relations with them all. The Hungarian
people are three or four times as numerous as the inhabitants of these
United States were when the American Revolution broke out. They possess,
in a distinct language, and in other respects, important elements of a
separate nationality, which the Anglo-Saxon race in this country did not
possess; and if the United States wish success to countries contending
for popular constitutions and national independence, it is only because
they regard such constitutions and such national independence, not as
imaginary, but as real blessings. They claim no right, however, to take
part in the struggles of foreign powers in order to promote these ends.
It is only in defence of his own government, and its principles and
character, that the undersigned has now expressed himself on this
subject. But when the people of the United States behold the people of
foreign countries, without any such interference, spontaneously moving
toward the adoption of institutions like their own, it surely cannot be
expected of them to remain wholly indifferent spectators.
In regard to the recent very important occurrences in the Austrian
empire, the undersigned freely admits the difficulty which exists in
this country, and is alluded to by Mr. Hülsemann, of obtaining accurate
information. But this difficulty is by no means to be ascribed to what
Mr. Hülsemann calls, with little justice, as it seems to the
undersigned, "the mendacious rumors propagated by the American press."
For information on this subject, and others of the same kind, the
American press is, of necessity, almost wholly dependent upon that of
Europe; and if "mendacious rumors" respecting Austrian and Hungarian
affairs have been anywhere propagated, that propagation of falsehoods
has been most prolific on the European continent, and in countries
immediately bordering on the Austrian empire. But, wherever these errors
may have originated, they certainly justified the late President in
seeking true information through authentic channels.
His attention was first particularly drawn to the state of things in
Hungary by the correspondence of Mr. Stiles, Chargé d'Affaires of the
United States at Vienna. In the autumn of 1848, an application was made
to this gentleman, on behalf of Mr. Kossuth, formerly Minister of
Finance for the Kingdom of Hungary by Imperial appointment, but, at the
time the application was made, chief of the revolutionary government.
The object of this application was to obtain the good offices of Mr.
Stiles with the Imperial government, with a view to the suspension of
hostilities. This application became the subject of a conference between
Prince Schwarzenberg, the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr.
Stiles. The Prince commended the considerateness and propriety with
which Mr. Stiles had acted; and, so far from disapproving his
interference, advised him, in case he received a further communication
from the revolutionary government in Hungary, to have an interview with
Prince Windischgrätz, who was charged by the Emperor with the
proceedings determined on in relation to that kingdom. A week after
these occurrences, Mr. Stiles received, through a secret channel, a
communication signed by L. Kossuth, President of the Committee of
Defence, and countersigned by Francis Pulszky, Secretary of State. On
the receipt of this communication, Mr. Stiles had an interview with
Prince Windischgrätz, "who received him with the utmost kindness, and
thanked him for his efforts toward reconciling the existing
difficulties." Such were the incidents which first drew the attention of
the government of the United States particularly to the affairs of
Hungary, and the conduct of Mr. Stiles, though acting without
instructions in a matter of much delicacy, having been viewed with
satisfaction by the Imperial government, was approved by that of the
United States.
In the course of the year 1848, and in the early part of 1849, a
considerable number of Hungarians came to the United States. Among them
were individuals representing themselves to be in the confidence of the
revolutionary government, and by these persons the President was
strongly urged to recognize the existence of that government. In these
applications, and in the manner in which they were viewed by the
President, there was nothing unusual; still less was there any thing
unauthorized by the law of nations. It is the right of every independent
state to enter into friendly relations with every other independent
state. Of course, questions of prudence naturally arise in reference to
new states, brought by successful revolutions into the family of
nations; but it is not to be required of neutral powers that they should
await the recognition of the new government by the parent state. No
principle of public law has been more frequently acted upon, within the
last thirty years, by the great powers of the world, than this. Within
that period, eight or ten new states have established independent
governments, within the limits of the colonial dominions of Spain, on
this continent; and in Europe the same thing has been done by Belgium
and Greece. The existence of all these governments was recognized by
some of the leading powers of Europe, as well as by the United States,
before it was acknowledged by the states from which they had separated
themselves. If, therefore, the United States had gone so far as formally
to acknowledge the independence of Hungary, although, as the result has
proved, it would have been a precipitate step, and one from which no
benefit would have resulted to either party; it would not, nevertheless,
have been an act against the law of nations, provided they took no part
in her contest with Austria. But the United States did no such thing.
Not only did they not yield to Hungary any actual countenance or succor,
not only did they not show their ships of war in the Adriatic with any
menacing or hostile aspect, but they studiously abstained from every
thing which had not been done in other cases in times past, and
contented themselves with instituting an inquiry into the truth and
reality of alleged political occurrences. Mr. Hülsemann incorrectly
states, unintentionally certainly, the nature of the mission of this
agent, when he says that "a United States agent had been despatched to
Vienna with orders to watch for a favorable moment to recognize the
Hungarian republic, and to conclude a treaty of commerce with the same."
This, indeed, would have been a lawful object, but Mr. Mann's errand
was, in the first instance, purely one of inquiry. He had no power to
act, unless he had first come to the conviction that a firm and stable
Hungarian government existed. "The principal object the President has in
view," according to his instructions, "is to obtain minute and reliable
information in regard to Hungary, in connection with the affairs of
adjoining countries, the probable issue of the present revolutionary
movements, and the chances we may have of forming commercial
arrangements with that power favorable to the United States." Again, in
the same paper, it is said: "The object of the President is to obtain
information in regard to Hungary, and her resources and prospects, with
a view to an early recognition of her independence and the formation of
commercial relations with her." It was only in the event that the new
government should appear, in the opinion of the agent, to be firm and
stable, that the President proposed to recommend its recognition.
Mr. Hülsemann, in qualifying these steps of President Taylor with the
epithet of "hostile," seems to take for granted that the inquiry could,
in the expectation of the President, have but one result, and that
favorable to Hungary. If this were so, it would not change the case. But
the American government sought for nothing but truth; it desired to
learn the facts through a reliable channel. It so happened, in the
chances and vicissitudes of human affairs, that the result was adverse
to the Hungarian revolution. The American agent, as was stated in his
instructions to be not unlikely, found the condition of Hungarian
affairs less prosperous than it had been, or had been believed to be. He
did not enter Hungary, nor hold any direct communication with her
revolutionary leaders. He reported against the recognition of her
independence, because he found she had been unable to set up a firm and
stable government. He carefully forbore, as his instructions required,
to give publicity to his mission, and the undersigned supposes that the
Austrian government first learned its existence from the communications
of the President to the Senate.
Mr. Hülsemann will observe from this statement, that Mr. Mann's mission
was wholly unobjectionable, and strictly within the rule of the law of
nations and the duty of the United States as a neutral power. He will
accordingly feel how little foundation there is for his remark, that
"those who did not hesitate to assume the responsibility of sending Mr.
Dudley Mann on such an errand should, independent of considerations of
propriety, have borne in mind that they were exposing their emissary to
be treated as a spy." A spy is a person sent by one belligerent to gain
secret information of the forces and defences of the other, to be used
for hostile purposes. According to practice, he may use deception, under
the penalty of being lawfully hanged if detected. To give this odious
name and character to a confidential agent of a neutral power, bearing
the commission of his country, and sent for a purpose fully warranted by
the law of nations, is not only to abuse language, but also to confound
all just ideas, and to announce the wildest and most extravagant
notions, such as certainly were not to have been expected in a grave
diplomatic paper; and the President directs the undersigned to say to
Mr. Hülsemann, that the American government would regard such an
imputation upon it by the Cabinet of Austria as that it employs spies,
and that in a quarrel none of its own, as distinctly offensive, if it
did not presume, as it is willing to presume, that the word used in the
original German was not of equivalent meaning with "spy" in the English
language, or that in some other way the employment of such an
opprobrious term may be explained. Had the Imperial government of
Austria subjected Mr. Mann for the treatment of a spy, it would have
placed itself without the pale of civilized nations; and the Cabinet of
Vienna may be assured, that if it had carried, or attempted to carry,
any such lawless purpose into effect, in the case of an authorized agent
of this government, the spirit of the people of this country would have
demanded immediate hostilities to be waged by the utmost exertion of the
power of the republic, military and naval.
Mr. Hülsemann proceeds to remark, that "this extremely painful incident,
therefore, might have been passed over, without any written evidence
being left on our part in the archives of the United States, had not
General Taylor thought proper to revive the whole subject by
communicating to the Senate, in his message of the 18th [28th] of last
March, the instructions with which Mr. Mann had been furnished on the
occasion of his mission to Vienna. The publicity which has been given to
that document has placed the Imperial government under the necessity of
entering a formal protest, through its official representative, against
the proceedings of the American government, lest that government should
construe our silence into approbation, or toleration even, of the
principles which appear to have guided its action and the means it has
adopted." The undersigned reasserts to Mr. Hülsemann, and to the Cabinet
of Vienna, and in the presence of the world, that the steps taken by
President Taylor, now protested against by the Austrian government, were
warranted by the law of nations and agreeable to the usages of civilized
states. With respect to the communication of Mr. Mann's instructions to
the Senate, and the language in which they are couched, it has already
been said, and Mr. Hülsemann must feel the justice of the remark, that
these are domestic affairs, in reference to which the government of the
United States cannot admit the slightest responsibility to the
government of his Imperial Majesty. No state, deserving the appellation
of independent, can permit the language in which it may instruct its own
officers in the discharge of their duties to itself to be called in
question under any pretext by a foreign power.
But even if this were not so, Mr. Hülsemann is in an error in stating
that the Austrian government is called an "iron rule" in Mr. Mann's
instructions. That phrase is not found in the paper; and in respect to
the honorary epithet bestowed in Mr. Mann's instructions on the late
chief of the revolutionary government of Hungary, Mr. Hülsemann will
bear in mind that the government of the United States cannot justly be
expected, in a confidential communication to its own agent, to withhold
from an individual an epithet of distinction of which a great part of
the world thinks him worthy, merely on the ground that his own
government regards him as a rebel. At an early stage of the American
Revolution, while Washington was considered by the English government as
a rebel chief, he was regarded on the Continent of Europe as an
illustrious hero. But the undersigned will take the liberty of bringing
the Cabinet of Vienna into the presence of its own predecessors, and of
citing for its consideration the conduct of the Imperial government
itself. In the year 1777 the war of the American Revolution was raging
all over these United States. England was prosecuting that war with a
most resolute determination, and by the exertion of all her military
means to the fullest extent. Germany was at that time at peace with
England; and yet an agent of that Congress, which was looked upon by
England in no other light than that of a body in open rebellion, was not
only received with great respect by the ambassador of the Empress Queen
at Paris, and by the minister of the Grand Duke of Tuscany (who
afterwards mounted the Imperial throne), but resided in Vienna for a
considerable time; not, indeed, officially acknowledged, but treated
with courtesy and respect; and the Emperor suffered himself to be
persuaded by that agent to exert himself to prevent the German powers
from furnishing troops to England to enable her to suppress the
rebellion in America. Neither Mr. Hülsemann nor the Cabinet of Vienna,
it is presumed, will undertake to say that any thing said or done by
this government in regard to the recent war between Austria and Hungary
is not borne out, and much more than borne out, by this example of the
Imperial Court. It is believed that the Emperor Joseph the Second
habitually spoke in terms of respect and admiration of the character of
Washington, as he is known to have done of that of Franklin; and he
deemed it no infraction of neutrality to inform himself of the progress
of the revolutionary struggle in America, or to express his deep sense
of the merits and the talents of those illustrious men who were then
leading their country to independence and renown. The undersigned may
add, that in 1781 the courts of Russia and Austria proposed a diplomatic
congress of the belligerent powers, to which the commissioners of the
United States should be admitted.
Mr. Hülsemann thinks that in Mr. Mann's instructions improper
expressions are introduced in regard to Russia; but the undersigned has
no reason to suppose that Russia herself is of that opinion. The only
observation made in those instructions about Russia is, that she "has
chosen to assume an attitude of interference, and her immense
preparations for invading and reducing the Hungarians to the rule of
Austria, from which they desire to be released, gave so serious a
character to the contest as to awaken the most painful solicitude in the
minds of Americans." The undersigned cannot but consider the Austrian
Cabinet as unnecessarily susceptible in looking upon language like this
as a "hostile demonstration." If we remember that it was addressed by
the government to its own agent, and has received publicity only through
a communication from one department of the American government to
another, the language quoted must be deemed moderate and inoffensive.
The comity of nations would hardly forbid its being addressed to the two
imperial powers themselves. It is scarcely necessary for the undersigned
to say, that the relations of the United States with Russia have always
been of the most friendly kind, and have never been deemed by either
party to require any compromise of their peculiar views upon subjects of
domestic or foreign polity, or the true origin of governments. At any
rate, the fact that Austria, in her contest with Hungary, had an
intimate and faithful ally in Russia, cannot alter the real nature of
the question between Austria and Hungary, nor in any way affect the
neutral rights and duties of the government of the United States, or the
justifiable sympathies of the American people. It is, indeed, easy to
conceive, that favor toward struggling Hungary would be not diminished,
but increased, when it was seen that the arm of Austria was strengthened
and upheld by a power whose assistance threatened to be, and which in
the end proved to be, overwhelmingly destructive of all her hopes.
Toward the conclusion of his note Mr. Hülsemarnn remarks, that "if the
government of the United States were to think it proper to take an
indirect part in the political movements of Europe, American policy
would be exposed to acts of retaliation, and to certain inconveniences
which would not fail to affect the commerce and industry of the two
hemispheres." As to this possible fortune, this hypothetical
retaliation, the government and people of the United States are quite
willing to take their chances and abide their destiny. Taking neither a
direct nor an indirect part in the domestic or intestine movements of
Europe, they have no fear of events of the nature alluded to by Mr.
Hülsemann. It would be idle now to discuss with Mr. Hülsemann those acts
of retaliation which he imagines may possibly take place at some
indefinite time hereafter. Those questions will be discussed when they
arise; and Mr. Hülsemann and the Cabinet at Vienna may rest assured,
that, in the mean time, while performing with strict and exact fidelity
all their neutral duties, nothing will deter either the government or
the people of the United States from exercising, at their own
discretion, the rights belonging to them as an independent nation, and
of forming and expressing their own opinions, freely and at all times,
upon the great political events which may transpire among the civilized
nations of the earth. Their own institutions stand upon the broadest
principles of civil liberty; and believing those principles and the
fundamental laws in which they are embodied to be eminently favorable
to the prosperity of states, to be, in fact, the only principles of
government which meet the demands of the present enlightened age, the
President has perceived, with great satisfaction, that, in the
constitution recently introduced into the Austrian empire, many of these
great principles are recognized and applied, and he cherishes a sincere
wish that they may produce the same happy effects throughout his
Austrian Majesty's extensive dominions that they have done in the United
States.
The undersigned has the honor to repeat to Mr. Hülsemann the assurance
of his high consideration.