EXTRACTS FROM THE SPEECH ON "THE PANAMA MISSION," DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE 14TH OF APRIL, 1826.
It has been affirmed, that this measure, and the sentiments expressed by
the Executive relative to its objects, are an acknowledged departure
from the neutral policy of the United States. Sir, I deny that there is
an acknowledged departure, or any departure at all, from the neutral
policy of the country. What do we mean by our neutral policy? Not, I
suppose, a blind and stupid indifference to whatever is passing around
us; not a total disregard to approaching events, or approaching evils,
till they meet us full in the face. Nor do we mean, by our neutral
policy, that we intend never to assert our rights by force. No, Sir. We
mean by our policy of neutrality, that the great objects of national
pursuit with us are connected with peace. We covet no provinces; we
desire no conquests; we entertain no ambitious projects of
aggrandizement by war. This is our policy. But it does not follow from
this, that we rely less than other nations on our own power to vindicate
our own rights. We know that the last logic of kings is also our last
logic; that our own interests must be defended and maintained by our own
arm; and that peace or war may not always be of our own choosing. Our
neutral policy, therefore, not only justifies, but requires, our anxious
attention to the political events which take place in the world, a
skilful perception of their relation to our own concerns, and an early
anticipation of their consequences, and firm and timely assertion of
what we hold to be our own rights and our own interests. Our neutrality
is not a predetermined abstinence, either from remonstrances, or from
force. Our neutral policy is a policy that protects neutrality, that
defends neutrality, that takes up arms, if need be, for neutrality. When
it is said, therefore, that this measure departs from our neutral
policy, either that policy, or the measure itself, is misunderstood. It
implies either that the object or the tendency of the measure is to
involve us in the war of other states, which I think cannot be shown, or
that the assertion of our own sentiments, on points affecting deeply our
own interests, may place us in a hostile attitude toward other states,
and that therefore we depart from neutrality; whereas the truth is, that
the decisive assertion and the firm support of these sentiments may be
most essential to the maintenance of neutrality.
An honorable member from Pennsylvania thinks this congress will bring a
dark day over the United States. Doubtless, Sir, it is an interesting
moment in our history; but I see no great proofs of thick-coming
darkness. But the object of the remark seemed to be to show that the
President himself saw difficulties on all sides, and, making a choice of
evils, preferred rather to send ministers to this congress, than to run
the risk of exciting the hostility of the states by refusing to send. In
other words, the gentleman wished to prove that the President intended
an alliance; although such intention is expressly disclaimed.
Much commentary has been bestowed on the letters of invitation from the
ministers. I shall not go through with verbal criticisms on these
letters. Their general import is plain enough. I shall not gather
together small and minute quotations, taking a sentence here, a word
there, and a syllable in a third place, dovetailing them into the course
of remark, till the printed discourse bristles in every line with
inverted commas. I look to the general tenor of the invitations, and I
find that we are asked to take part only in such things as concern
ourselves. I look still more carefully to the answers, and I see every
proper caution and proper guard. I look to the message, and I see that
nothing is there contemplated likely to involve us in other men's
quarrels, or that may justly give offence to any foreign state. With
this I am satisfied.
I must now ask the indulgence of the committee to an important point in
the discussion, I mean the declaration of the President in 1823.[1] Not
only as a member of the House, but as a citizen of the country, I have
an anxious desire that this part of our public history should stand in
its proper light. The country has, in my judgment, a very high honor
connected with that occurrence, which we may maintain, or which we may
sacrifice. I look upon it as a part of its treasures of reputation; and,
for one, I intend to guard it.
Sir, let us recur to the important political events which led to that
declaration, or accompanied it. In the fall of 1822, the allied
sovereigns held their congress at Verona. The great subject of
consideration was the condition of Spain, that country then being under
the government of the Cortes. The question was, whether Ferdinand should
be reinstated in all his authority, by the intervention of foreign
force. Russia, Prussia, France, and Austria were inclined to that
measure; England dissented and protested; but the course was agreed on,
and France, with the consent of these other Continental powers, took the
conduct of the operation into her own hands. In the spring of 1823, a
French army was sent into Spain. Its success was complete. The popular
government was overthrown, and Ferdinand re-established in all his
power. This invasion, Sir, was determined on, and undertaken, precisely
on the doctrines which the allied monarchs had proclaimed the year
before, at Laybach; that is, that they had a right to interfere in the
concerns of another state, and reform its government, in order to
prevent the effects of its bad example; this bad example, be it
remembered, always being the example of free government. Now, Sir,
acting on this principle of supposed dangerous example, and having put
down the example of the Cortes in Spain, it was natural to inquire with
what eyes they would look on the colonies of Spain, that were following
still worse examples. Would King Ferdinand and his allies be content
with what had been done in Spain itself, or would he solicit their aid,
and was it likely they would grant it, to subdue his rebellious American
provinces?
Sir, it was in this posture of affairs, on an occasion which has already
been alluded to, that I ventured to say, early in the session of
December, 1823, that these allied monarchs might possibly turn their
attention to America; that America came within their avowed doctrine,
and that her examples might very possibly attract their notice. The
doctrines of Laybach were not limited to any continent. Spain had
colonies in America, and having reformed Spain herself to the true
standard, it was not impossible that they might see fit to complete the
work by reconciling, in their way, the colonies to the mother country.
Now, Sir, it did so happen, that, as soon as the Spanish king was
completely re-established, he invited the co-operation of his allies in
regard to South America. In the same month of December, of 1823, a
formal invitation was addressed by Spain to the courts of St.
Petersburg, Vienna, Berlin, and Paris, proposing to establish a
conference at Paris, in order that the plenipotentiaries there assembled
might aid Spain in adjusting the affairs of her revolted provinces.
These affairs were proposed to be adjusted in such manner as should
retain the sovereignty of Spain over them; and though the co-operation
of the allies by force of arms was not directly solicited, such was
evidently the object aimed at. The king of Spain, in making this request
to the members of the Holy Alliance, argued as it has been seen he might
argue. He quoted their own doctrines of Laybach; he pointed out the
pernicious example of America; and he reminded them that their success
in Spain itself had paved the way for successful operations against the
spirit of liberty on this side of the Atlantic.
The proposed meeting, however, did not take place. England had already
taken a decided course; for as early as October, Mr. Canning, in a
conference with the French minister in London, informed him distinctly
and expressly, that England would consider any foreign interference, by
force or by menace, in the dispute between Spain and the colonies, as a
motive for recognizing the latter without delay. It is probable this
determination of the English government was known here at the
commencement of the session of Congress; and it was under these
circumstances, it was in this crisis, that Mr. Monroe's declaration was
made. It was not then ascertained whether a meeting of the Allies would
or would not take place, to concert with Spain the means of
re-establishing her power; but it was plain enough they would be pressed
by Spain to aid her operations; and it was plain enough, also, that they
had no particular liking to what was taking place on this side of the
Atlantic, nor any great disinclination to interfere. This was the
posture of affairs; and, Sir, I concur entirely in the sentiment
expressed in the resolution of a gentleman from Pennsylvania,[2] that
this declaration of Mr. Monroe was wise, seasonable, and patriotic.
It has been said, in the course of this debate, to have been a loose and
vague declaration. It was, I believe, sufficiently studied. I have
understood, from good authority, that it was considered, weighed, and
distinctly and decidedly approved, by every one of the President's
advisers at that time. Our government could not adopt on that occasion
precisely the course which England had taken. England threatened the
immediate recognition of the provinces, if the Allies should take part
with Spain against them. We had already recognized them. It remained,
therefore, only for our government to say how we should consider a
combination of the Allied Powers, to effect objects in America, as
affecting ourselves; and the message was intended to say, what it does
say, that we should regard such combination as dangerous to us. Sir, I
agree with those who maintain the proposition, and I contend against
those who deny it, that the message did mean something; that it meant
much; and I maintain, against both, that the declaration effected much
good, answered the end designed by it, did great honor to the foresight
and the spirit of the government, and that it cannot now be taken back,
retracted, or annulled, without disgrace. It met, Sir, with the entire
concurrence and the hearty approbation of the country. The tone which it
uttered found a corresponding response in the breasts of the free people
of the United States. That people saw, and they rejoiced to see, that,
on a fit occasion, our weight had been thrown into the right scale, and
that, without departing from our duty, we had done something useful, and
something effectual, for the cause of civil liberty. One general glow of
exultation, one universal feeling of the gratified love of liberty, one
conscious and proud perception of the consideration which the country
possessed, and of the respect and honor which belonged to it, pervaded
all bosoms. Possibly the public enthusiasm went too far; it certainly
did go far. But, Sir, the sentiment which this declaration inspired was
not confined to ourselves. Its force was felt everywhere, by all those
who could understand its object and foresee its effect. In that very
House of Commons of which the gentleman from South Carolina has spoken
with such commendation, how was it received? Not only, Sir, with
approbation, but, I may say, with no little enthusiasm. While the
leading minister[3] expressed his entire concurrence in the sentiments
and opinions of the American President, his distinguished competitor[4]
in that popular body, less restrained by official decorum, and more at
liberty to give utterance to all the feeling of the occasion, declared
that no event had ever created greater joy, exultation, and gratitude
among all the free men in Europe; that he felt pride in being connected
by blood and language with the people of the United States; that the
policy disclosed by the message became a great, a free, and an
independent nation; and that he hoped his own country would be prevented
by no mean pride, or paltry jealousy, from following so noble and
glorious an example.
It is doubtless true, as I took occasion to observe the other day, that
this declaration must be considered as founded on our rights, and to
spring mainly from a regard to their preservation. It did not commit us,
at all events, to take up arms on any indication of hostile feeling by
the powers of Europe towards South America. If, for example, all the
states of Europe had refused to trade with South America until her
states should return to their former allegiance, that would have
furnished no cause of interference to us. Or if an armament had been
furnished by the Allies to act against provinces the most remote from
us, as Chili or Buenos Ayres, the distance of the scene of action
diminishing our apprehension of danger, and diminishing also our means
of effectual interposition, might still have left us to content
ourselves with remonstrance. But a very different case would have
arisen, if an army, equipped and maintained by these powers, had been
landed on the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, and commenced the war in our
own immediate neighborhood. Such an event might justly be regarded as
dangerous to ourselves, and, on that ground, call for decided and
immediate interference by us. The sentiments and the policy announced by
the declaration, thus understood, were, therefore, in strict conformity
to our duties and our interest.
Sir, I look on the message of December, 1823, as forming a bright page
in our history. I will help neither to erase it nor tear it out; nor
shall it be, by any act of mine, blurred or blotted. It did honor to the
sagacity of the government, and I will not diminish that honor. It
elevated the hopes, and gratified the patriotism, of the people. Over
those hopes I will not bring a mildew; nor will I put that gratified
patriotism to shame.
[Footnote 1: In the message of President Monroe to Congress at the
commencement of the session of 1823-24, the following passage
occurs:--"In the wars of the European powers, in matters relating to
themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our
policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously
menaced, that we resent injuries or make preparations for defence. With
the movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately
connected, and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and
impartial observers. The political system of the Allied Powers is
essentially different, in this respect, from that of America. This
difference proceeds from that which exists in their respective
governments. And to the defence of our own, which has been achieved by
the loss of so much blood and treasure, and matured by the wisdom of
their most enlightened citizens, and under which we have enjoyed such
unexampled felicity, this whole nation is devoted. We owe it, therefore,
to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United
States and those powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt
on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere
as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or
dependencies of any European power, we have not interfered, and shall
not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their
independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great
consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any
interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any
other manner their destiny, in any other light than as the manifestation
of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States."]
[Footnote 2: Mr. Markley.]
[Footnote 3: Mr. Canning.]
[Footnote 4: Mr. Brougham.]