The actual fighting phase of this memorable campaign was confined to
the four days from the 15th to the 18th of June, both days inclusive.
The literature concerning itself with that period would make a library
of itself. Scarcely a military writer of any European nation but has
delivered himself on the subject, from Clausewitz to General Maurice,
from Berton to Brialmont. Thiers, Alison, and Hooper may be cited of
the host of civilian writers whom the theme has enticed to description
and criticism. There is scarcely a point in the brief vivid drama that
has not furnished a topic for warm and sustained controversy; and the
cult of the Waterloo campaign is more assiduous to-day than when the
participators in the great strife were testifying to their own
experiences.
Quite recently an important work dealing chiefly with the inner history
of the campaign has come to us from the other side of the Atlantic.
[Footnote: _The Campaign of Waterloo: a Military History_. By John
Codman Ropes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. February 1893.] Its
author, Mr. John Ropes, is a civilian gentleman of Boston, who has
devoted his life to military study. He has given years to the
elucidation of the problems of the Waterloo campaign, has trodden every
foot of its ground, and has burrowed for recondite matter in the
military archives of divers nations. A citizen of the American
Republic, he is free alike from national prejudices and national
prepossessions; if he is perhaps not uniformly correct in his
inferences, his rigorous impartiality is always conspicuous. By his
research and acute perception he has let light in upon not a few
obscurities; and it may be pertinent briefly to summarise the inner
history of the campaign, giving what may seem their due weight to the
arguments and representations of the American writer.
The following were the respective positions on the 14th of
June:--Wellington's heterogeneous army, about 94,000 strong with 196
guns, lay widely dispersed in cantonments from the Scheldt to the
Charleroi-Brussels chaussée, its front extending from Tournay through
Mons and Binche to Nivelles and Quatre Bras. Of the Prussian army under
Blücher, about 121,000 strong with 312 guns, one corps was at Liège,
another near the Meuse above Namur, a third at Namur, and Ziethen's in
advance holding the line of the Sambre. The mass of Blücher's command
had already seen service and, with the exception of the Saxons, was
full of zeal; the corps were well commanded, and their chief, although
he had his limits, was a thorough soldier. The French army, consisting
of five corps d'armée, the Guard, four cavalry corps and 344
guns--total fighting strength 124,500--Napoleon had succeeded in
assembling with wonderful celerity and secrecy south of the Sambre
within an easy march of Charleroi. Its officers and soldiers were alike
veterans but its organisation was somewhat defective. Napoleon scarcely
preserved the phenomenal force of earlier years; but, in Mr. Ropes's
words, he disclosed "no conspicuous lack of energy and activity." Soult
was far from being an ideal chief of staff. Ney, to whom was assigned
the command of the left wing, only reached the army on the 15th, and
without a staff; Grouchy, to whom on the 16th was suddenly given the
command of the right wing, was not a man of high military capacity.
Napoleon's plan of campaign was founded on the circumstance that the
bases of the allied armies lay in opposite directions--the English base
on the German Ocean, the Prussian through Liège and Maestricht to the
Rhine. The military probability was that if either army was forced to
retreat, it would retreat towards its base; and to do this would be to
march away from its ally. Napoleon was in no situation to manoeuvre
leisurely, with all Europe on the march against him. His engrossing aim
was to gain immediate victory over his adversaries in Belgium before
the Russians and Austrians should close in around him. His expectation
was that Blücher would offer battle about Fleurus and be overwhelmed
before the Anglo-Dutch army could come to the support of its Prussian
ally. To make sure of preventing that junction the Emperor's intention
was to detail Ney with the left wing to reach and hold Quatre Bras. The
Prussians thoroughly beaten, drifting rearward toward their base, and
reduced to a condition of comparative inoffensiveness, he would then
turn on Wellington and force him to give battle.
Mr. Ropes refutes the contention maintained by a great array of
authorities, that Napoleon's design was to "wedge himself into the
interval between the allied armies" by seizing simultaneously Sombreffe
and Quatre Bras, in order to cut the communication between the two
armies and then defeat them in succession. Against this view he
successfully marshals Napoleon himself, Wellington by the mouth of Lord
Ellesmere, and the great German strategist Clausewitz. It will suffice
to quote Napoleon:--
The Emperor's intention was that his advance should
occupy Fleurus, the mass concealed behind this town;
he took good care ... above all things not to occupy
Sombreffe. To have done so would have caused the
failure of all his dispositions, for then the battle of Ligny
would not have been fought, and Blücher would have had
to make Wavre the concentration-point for his army.
Wellington alludes pointedly to the obvious danger to the French army
of the suggested wedge position in what the Germans call _die taktische
Mitte_, where, instead of being able to defeat the allies in
succession, it would itself be liable to be crushed between the upper
and the nether millstone.
At daybreak of the 15th Napoleon took the offensive, driving in Ziethen
on and through Charleroi although not without sharp fighting. On that
evening three French corps, the Guard, and most of the cavalry, were
concentrated about Charleroi and forward toward Fleurus, ready to
attack Blücher next day. Controversy has been very keen on the question
whether or not on the afternoon of the 15th Napoleon gave Ney verbal
orders to occupy Quatre Bras the same evening. Mr. Ropes holds it
"almost certain" that the order was given. From Napoleon's bulletin
despatched on the evening of the 15th, which is the only piece of
strictly contemporary evidence, he quotes: "Le Prince de la Moskowa
(Ney) a eu le soir son quartier général aux Quatres-Chemins;" and he
remarks that this must have been the belief in the headquarter "unless
we gratuitously invent an intention to deceive the public." There is no
need for Mr. Ropes to put that strain on himself, since the main
purport of Napoleon's bulletins notoriously was to deceive the public.
But if Napoleon had not intended that Ney should occupy Quatre Bras on
the night of the 15th, the statement that this had been done would have
been a purposeless futility; and if he had intended that Ney should do
so it is unlikely that he should have omitted to give him instructions
to that effect. Grouchy claims to have heard Napoleon censure Ney for
his omission to occupy Quatre Bras; an omission which had its
importance, for the reason, among others, that it was ominous of the
Marshal's infinitely more harmful disobedience of orders next day.
All writers agree that Blücher ordered the concentration of his army in
the fighting position previously chosen in the event of the French
advancing by Charleroi, "without," in Mr. Ropes's words, "any definite
agreement or undertaking with Wellington that he was to have English
aid in the impending battle." He was content to take his risk of the
English general's possible inability for sundry obvious reasons, to
come to his support. And while the Prussian army with the unfortunate
exception of Bülow's corps, was on the 15th moving toward the chosen
position of Ligny, where its right was to be on St. Amand, its centre
on and behind Ligny, and its left about Balâtre, what was happening in
the Anglo-Dutch army lying spread out westward of the
Charleroi--Brussels chaussée?
Wellington was at Brussels expecting the French invasion by or west of
the Mons-Brussels road, to meet which he considered his army very well
placed, but could expect no Prussian cooperation. His courier service,
with his forces so dispersed, should have been well organised and
alert, but it was neither; and Napoleon's secrecy and suddenness in
taking the offensive were worthy of his best days. It has been freely
imputed to Wellington that he was thereby in a measure surprised. There
is the strange and probably mythical story in the work professing to be
Fouché's _Memoirs_ to the effect that Wellington was relying on him for
information of Napoleon's plans, and that he--Fouché--played the
English commander false. "On the very day of Napoleon's departure from
Paris," say the _Memoirs_, "I despatched Madame D----, furnished with
notes in cipher, narrating the whole plan of the campaign. But at the
same time I privately sent orders for such obstacles at the frontier,
where she was to pass, that she could not reach Wellington's
headquarters till after the event. This was the real explanation of the
inactivity of the British generalissimo which excited such universal
astonishment." Readers of the _Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury_
will remember the apparently authentic statement of Captain Bowles,
that Wellington, rising from the supper-table at the famous ball,
whispered to ask the Duke of Richmond if he had a good
map. The Duke of Richmond said he had, and took
Wellington into his dressing-room. Wellington shut the
door and said, "Napoleon has humbugged me, by God;
he has gained twenty-four hours' march on me.... I
have ordered the army to concentrate at Quatre Bras;
but we shall not stop him there, and if so I must fight
him _there_" (passing his thumb-nail over the position of
Waterloo). The conversation was repeated to me by the
Duke of Richmond two minutes after it occurred.
Facts, however, are stronger evidence than words; and this confession
on Wellington's part is inconsistent with the circumstance that he had
not hurried to retrieve the time he is represented as having owned that
Napoleon had gained on him--that he had, on the contrary, allowed his
adversary to gain several hours more. Wellington's combination of
caution and decision throughout this momentous period is a very
interesting study. It was not until 3 P.M. (of the 15th) that there
reached him tidings almost simultaneously of firing between the
outposts about Thuin and that Ziethen had been attacked before
Charleroi, the two places ten miles apart and both occurrences in the
early morning. Those affairs might have been casual outpost skirmishes;
and the Duke, in anticipation of further information, took no measures
for some hours. At length, in default of later tidings he determined on
the precautionary step of assembling his divisions at their respective
rendezvous points in readiness to march; further specifically directing
a concentration of 25,000 men at Nivelles on his then left flank, when
it should have been ascertained for certain that the enemy's line of
attack was by Charleroi. These orders were sent out early in the
evening--"between 5 and 7." Later in the evening came a letter from
Blücher announcing the concentration of the Prussian army to occupy the
Ligny fighting position, in which disposition Wellington acquiesced;
but, still uncertain of Napoleon's true line of attack--his conviction
being, as is well known, that Napoleon should have moved on the British
right--he would not definitely fix the point of ultimate concentration
of his army until he should receive intelligence from Mons. But
Blücher's tidings caused him to issue about 10 P.M. a second set of
orders, commanding a general movement of the army, not as yet to any
specific point of concentration but in prescribed directions towards
its left (eastward). At length, when the news came from Mons that he
need have no further serious solicitude about his right since the whole
French army was advancing by Charleroi, he saw his way clear. Towards
midnight, writes Müffling the Prussian Commissioner at his
headquarters, Wellington informed him of the tidings from Mons, and
added: "The orders for the concentration of my army at Nivelles and
Quatre Bras are already despatched. Let us, therefore, go to the ball."
There are three definite evidences that before midnight of the 15th
Wellington had resolved to concentrate about Quatre Bras, and had
issued final orders accordingly--his statement to the Duke of Richmond,
his statement to Müffling, and his statement in his official report to
Lord Bathurst. Yet Mr. Ropes believes that his decision to that effect
"could not have been arrived at very long before he left Brussels" on
the morning of the 16th, which he did "probably about half-past seven."
He founds this belief on two orders dated "16th June" sent to Lord Hill
in the early morning of that day, in which there is no allusion to a
concentration at Quatre Bras. But those were merely supplementary
instructions as to points of detail; for example, one of them enjoined
that a division ordered earlier to Enghien should move instead by way
of Braine le Comte, that being a nearer route toward the final general
destination of Quatre Bras specified in the earlier (the "towards
midnight") orders. The latter orders are not extant, having been lost
according to Gurwood, with De Lancey's papers when he fell at Waterloo;
but that they must have been issued is proved by the fact that they
were acted upon by the troops; and that they were issued before
midnight of the 15th is made clear by Wellington's three specific
statements to that effect.
When the Duke left Brussels for the front on the morning of the 16th he
took with him a singularly optimistic paper styled "Disposition of the
British Army at 7 A.M., 16th June," which was "written out for the
information of the Commander of the Forces by Colonel Sir W. de
Lancey," his Quartermaster-General. In the nature of things for the
most part guess-work, the wish as regarded almost every particular set
out in this document was father to the thought. Wellington was no doubt
reasonably justified in accepting and relying on this flattering
"Disposition;" but its terms, as Mr. Ropes conclusively shows, simply
misled him and caused him also unconsciously to mislead Blücher, both
by the expressions of the letter written by him to that chief on his
arrival at Quatre Bras and later when he met the Prussian commander at
the mill of Brye. Wellington was indeed trebly fortunate in finding the
Quatre Bras position still available to him--fortunate that Ney on the
previous evening had defaulted from his orders in refraining from
occupying it; fortunate that Ney still on this morning was remaining
passive; and more fortunate still that it had been occupied, defended,
and reinforced by Dutch-Belgian troops not only without orders from him
but in bold and happy violation of his orders. Perponcher's division
was scarcely a potent representative of the Anglo-Dutch army, but there
was nothing more at hand; and pending the coming up of reinforcements
Wellington, with rather a sanguine reliance on Ney's maintenance of
inactivity, rode over to Brye and had a conversation with Blücher.
There are contradictory accounts of its tenor, and Gneisenau certainly
seems to have formed the impression that the Duke gave a positive
pledge of support. Mr. Ropes considers that, misled by the erroneous
"Disposition," Wellington honestly believed he would be able to
co-operate with Blücher, and that he "certainly did give that commander
some assurance of support by the Anglo-Dutch army in the impending
battle." Müffling, who was present, states that the Duke's last words
were: "Well, I will come, provided I am not attacked myself;" and this
probably was the final undertaking. Wellington's words were in
accordance with the caution of his character; and it is certain that
Blücher had decided to fight at Ligny whether assured or not of his
brother-commander's support. That Wellington regarded Blücher's
dispositions for battle as objectionable is proved by his blunt comment
to Hardinge--"If they fight here they will be damnably licked!"
It would have been possible for Napoleon to have crushed the Prussian
army in the early hours of the 16th when it was in the throes of
formation for battle; and this he would probably have done if Ney had
occupied Quatre Bras on the previous evening. But in Ney's default of
accomplishing this Napoleon, in his solicitude that Wellington should
be hindered from supporting Blücher, determined to delay his own stroke
against the latter until Ney should be in possession of Quatre Bras
with the left wing, where, in Soult's words, "he ought to be able to
destroy any force of the enemy that might present itself," and then
come to the support of the Emperor by getting on the Prussian rear
behind St. Amand. Napoleon's instructions were explicit that Ney was to
march on Quatre Bras, take position there, and then send an infantry
division and Kellerman's cavalry to points eastward, whence the Emperor
might summon them to participate in his own operations. If Ney had
fulfilled his orders by utilising the whole force at his disposal, in
all human probability he would have defeated Wellington at Quatre Bras,
whose troops, arriving in detail, would have been crushed by greatly
superior numbers as they came up. As it was, although at the beginning
of the battle he was in superior strength, Ney never utilised more than
22,000 men; whereas by its close Wellington had 31,000, and, thanks to
the stanchness of the British infantry, was the victor in a very
hard-fought contest. But Mr. Ropes has reason in holding it humanly
certain that he would have been beaten--in which case the battle of
Waterloo would never have been fought--had not D'Erlon's corps of Ney's
command while marching towards Quatre Bras, been turned aside in the
direction of the Prussian right.
In the justifiable belief that Ney was duly carrying out his orders
Napoleon at half-past one opened the battle of Ligny. He had expected
to have to deal with but a single Prussian corps, but the actual fact
was that, while he had 74,000 men on the field, Blücher had 87,000 with
a superior strength of artillery. The fighting was long and severe.
From the first, recognising the defects of his adversary's position,
Napoleon was satisfied that he could defeat the Prussian army. But he
needed to do more--to crush, to rout it, so that he need give himself
no further concern regarding it. This he saw his way to accomplish if
Ney were to strike in presently on the Prussian right; and so, with
intent to stir that chief to vigorous enterprise, the message was sent
him that "the fate of France was in his hands." The battle proceeded,
Blücher throwing in his reserves freely, Napoleon chary of his and
playing the waiting game pending Ney's expected co-operation. About
half-past five he was preparing to put in the Guard and strike the
decisive blow, when information reached him from his right that a
column, presumably hostile, was visible some two miles distant marching
toward Fleurus. Napoleon sent an aide to ascertain the facts and until
his return postponed the decisive moment. Two hours later the
information was brought back that the approaching column was D'Erlon's
from Ney's wing. This intelligence dispelled all anxiety. Strangely
enough, no instructions were sent to the approaching reinforcement, and
the suspended stroke was promptly dealt. The Prussians, after desperate
fighting, were everywhere driven back. Napoleon with part of the
Imperial Guard broke Blücher's centre, and the French army deployed on
the heights beyond the stream. In a word, Napoleon had defeated the
Prussians, but had neither crushed nor routed them. There was no
pursuit.
D'Erlon's corps on this afternoon had achieved the doubly sinister
distinction of having prevented Ney from gaining a probable victory at
Quatre Bras, and of detracting from the thoroughness of Napoleon's
actual victory at Ligny. While it was leisurely marching towards
Frasnes in support of Ney, it was diverted eastward towards the
Prussian right flank in consequence of an order given (whether
authorised or not is uncertain) by an aide-de-camp of the Emperor. It
was about to deploy for action, when, on receiving from Ney a
peremptory order to rejoin his command; and in absence of a command
from Napoleon to strike the Prussian flank, it went about and tramped
back towards Frasnes. D'Erlon's promenade was as futile as the famous
march of the King of France up the hill and then down again.
Mr. Ropes considers that on the morning of the 17th Napoleon had thus
far in the main fulfilled his programme. This view may be questioned.
He had merely defeated two of the four Prussian corps; he had not
wrecked Blücher. He had failed to occupy Quatre Bras; the Anglo-Dutch
army had succeeded in effecting a partial concentration and in
repulsing his left wing there. Still it must be admitted that with two
corps absolutely intact and with no serious losses in the Guard and
cavalry, Napoleon was in good shape for carrying out his plan. If Ney
had sent him word overnight that Wellington's army was bivouacking
about Quatre Bras in ignorance, as it turned out, of the result of
Ligny, he might have attacked it to good purpose in conjunction with
Ney in the early morning of the 17th. But Ney was silent and sulky;
Napoleon himself was greatly fatigued, and Soult was of no service to
him.
During the night the Prussians "had folded their tents like the Arabs,
and as silently stolen away." They had neither been watched nor
followed up, all touch of them had been lost, and there was nothing to
indicate their line of retreat. This slovenliness on the part of the
French would not have occurred in Napoleon's earlier days; nor in those
days of greater vigour would he have delayed until after midday of the
17th to follow up an army which he had defeated on the previous
evening, and which had disappeared from before him in the course of the
night. The reports which had been sent in from a cavalry reconnaissance
despatched in the morning indicated that the Prussians were retiring on
Namur. No reconnaissance had been made in the direction of Tilly and
Wavre. This was a strange error, since Blücher had two corps still
untouched, and as above everything a fighting man, was not likely to
throw up his hands and forsake his ally after one partial discomfiture.
Napoleon tardily determined to despatch Grouchy on the errand of
following up the Prussians with a force consisting of about 33,000 men
with ninety-six guns. Thus far all authorities are agreed; but as
regards the character of the orders given to Grouchy for his guidance
in an obviously somewhat complicated enterprise, there is an
extraordinary contrariety of evidence. It is stated in the _St. Helena
Memoirs_ that Grouchy received positive orders to keep himself always
between the main French army and Blücher; to maintain constant
communication with the former and in a position easily to rejoin it;
that since it was possible that Blücher might retreat on Wavre, he
(Grouchy) was to be there simultaneously; if the Prussians should
continue their march on Brussels and should pass the night in the
forest of Soignies, he was to follow to the edge of the forest; should
they retire on the Meuse, he was to watch them with part of his cavalry
and himself occupy Wavre with the mass of his force, where he should be
in position for easy communication with Napoleon's headquarters. Those
orders are certainly specific enough, but there is no record of them;
and they may be assumed to represent rather what Napoleon at St. Helena
considered Grouchy should have done, than what he was actually ordered
to do.
Grouchy's version, again--and it is adequately corroborated--is to the
effect that about midday of the 17th on the field of Ligny, the Emperor
gave him the verbal order to take the 3rd and 4th Corps and certain
cavalry and "go in pursuit of the Prussians." Grouchy raised sundry
objections which the Emperor overruled and repeated his commands,
adding that "it was for me (Grouchy) to discover the route taken by
Blücher; that he himself was going to fight the English, and that it
was for me to complete the defeat of the Prussians by attacking them as
soon as I should have caught up with them." So much for Grouchy for the
moment.
Soon after the Emperor had given Grouchy this verbal order, tidings
came in from a scouting party that a body of Prussian troops had been
seen about 9 A.M. at Gembloux, considerably northward of the Namur
road. The abstract probability no doubt was that the Prussians would
retire towards their base. But that Napoleon kept an open mind on the
subject is evidenced by his instruction to Grouchy to "go and discover
the route taken by Blücher," and this later intelligence, it may be
assumed, opened his mind yet further. He thought it well, then, to send
to Grouchy a supplementary written order which in the temporary absence
of Marshal Soult he dictated to General Bertrand. This order enjoined
on Grouchy to proceed with his force to Gembloux; to explore in the
directions of Namur and Maestricht; to pursue the enemy; explore his
march; and report upon his manoeuvres, so that "I (Napoleon) may be
able to penetrate what the enemy is intending to do; whether he is
separating himself from the English, or whether they are intending
still to unite in trying the fate of another battle to cover Brussels
or Liège." To me I confess--and the view is also that of Chesney and
Maurice--this written order is simply an amplification in detail of the
previous verbal order, which by instructing Grouchy "to discover the
route taken by Blücher" clearly evinced doubt in Napoleon's mind as to
the Prussian line of retreat. Mr. Ropes, on the other hand, bases an
indictment on Grouchy's conduct on the argument that not only was the
tone of the written order altogether different from that of the verbal
order, but that the duty assigned to Grouchy by the former was wholly
different from that specified in the latter.
He adds that Grouchy constantly and persistently denied having received
any other than the verbal order, that in this denial Grouchy lied, and
that "the mischievous influence of this deliberate concealment of his
orders by Grouchy caused for nearly thirty years after the battle of
Waterloo to be prevalent a wholly false notion as to the task assigned
by Napoleon to the Marshal." Certainly Grouchy's conduct is
inexplicable to any one holding the belief, as I do, that there is
nothing in the written order to account for Grouchy's denial of having
received it. It is more inexplicable than Mr. Ropes appears to be aware
of. It is true, as Mr. Ropes proves, that Grouchy vehemently denied
receiving the written order in all his works printed from 1818 to 1829.
But he had actually acknowledged its receipt almost immediately after
Waterloo. In his son's little book, _Le Maréchal de Grouchy du 16me au
19me Juin, 1815,_ is printed among the _Documents Historiques Inédits_
a paper styled "Allocution du Maréchal Grouchy à quelques-uns des
officiers généraux sous les ordres, lorsqu'il eût appris les désastres
de Waterloo." From this document I make the following extract: "A few
hours later the Emperor modified his first order, and caused to be
written to me by the Grand Marshal Bertrand the order to betake myself
to Gembloux, and to send reconnaissances towards Namur. 'It is
important,' continued the order, 'to discover the intentions of the
Prussians--whether they are separating from the English, or have the
design to take the chance of a new battle.'" It is strange that this
acknowledgment should never have been cited against Grouchy; stranger
still that in the face of it he should have maintained his denials; yet
more strange that those denials were never exposed; and most strange of
all, that finally the "written order" should have appeared for the
first time in a casual article published in 1842, without evoking any
explanation from Grouchy, or any strictures on his persistent mendacity.
It may be questioned whether the force of 33,000 men entrusted to
Grouchy was not either too large or too small. The main French army, in
the possible contingencies before it, could not safely spare so large a
detachment, as events showed. Grouchy's command was not sufficiently
strong to oppose the whole Prussian army; two corps of which could
certainly have "held" it, while the other two were free to support
Wellington. Mr. Ropes thinks it might have been diminished by one-half,
but then a single Prussian corps could have dealt with it. It is
difficult to discern in what respect the 6000 cavalry assigned to
Grouchy should have been inadequate to such service as could reasonably
have been expected of his whole command.
The British force about Quatre Bras on the morning of the 17th amounted
to about 45,000 men. Early on that morning Wellington was in
conversation with the Captain Bowles previously mentioned, when an
officer galloped up and, to quote Captain Bowles,
whispered to the Duke, who then turned to me and said,
"Old Blücher has had a d----d good licking and has gone
back to Wavre. As he has gone back, we must go too. I
suppose in England they will say we have been licked--I
can't help that."
He quietly withdrew his troops from their positions, an operation which
Ney, with 40,000 men at his disposal, did not attempt to molest,
notwithstanding repeated orders from Napoleon to move on Quatre Bras.
Early in the afternoon Napoleon reached that vicinity with the Guard,
6th Corps, and Milhaud's Cuirassiers, picked up Ney's command, and
mounting his horse led the French army, following up Wellington's
retreat. His energy and activity throughout the march is described as
intense. Those characteristics he continued to evince during the
following night and in the morning of the eventful 18th. In the dead of
night he spent two hours on the picquet line, and about seven he was
out again on the foreposts in the mud and rain. His anxiety was not as
to the issue of a battle with Wellington, but lest Wellington should
not stand and fight. That apprehension was dispelled when, as he rode
along his front about 8 A.M., he saw the Anglo-Dutch army taking up its
ground. He was aware that at least one "pretty strong Prussian
column"--which actually consisted of the two corps beaten at Ligny--had
retired on Wavre. But notwithstanding the disquieting vagueness and
ineptitude of Grouchy's letter of 10 P.M. of the 17th from Gembloux,
and that up to the morning of the battle he had sent no suggestions or
instructions to that officer, he yet trusted implicitly to him to fend
off the Prussians; and it did not seem to occur to him that
Wellington's calm expectant attitude indicated his assurance of
Blücher's cooperation.
In one of the cavalry charges toward the close of the battle of Ligny,
Blücher had been overthrown, ridden over, almost taken prisoner, and
severely bruised; but the gallant old hussar was almost himself again
next morning, thanks to copious doses of gin and rhubarb, for the
effluvium of which restorative he apologised to Hardinge as he embraced
that wounded officer, in the extremely plain expression, "_Ich stinke
etwas_." Gneisenau, his Chief of Staff, rather distrusted Wellington's
good faith, and doubted whether it was not the safer policy for the
Prussian army to fall back toward Liège. But Blücher prevailed over his
lieutenants; and on the evening of the 17th all four Prussian corps in
a strength of about 90,000 men, were concentrated about Wavre, some
nine miles east of the Waterloo position, full of ardour and confident
of success. That same night Müffling informed Blücher by letter that
the Anglo-Dutch army had occupied the position named, wherein to fight
next day; and Blücher's loyal answer was that Bülow's corps at daybreak
should march by way of St. Lambert to strike the French right; that
Pirch's would follow in support; and that the other two would stand in
readiness. This communication, which reached Wellington at headquarters
at 2 A.M. of the 18th, has been held to have been the first actually
definite assurance of Prussian support. The story to the effect that on
the evening of the 17th the Duke rode over to Wavre to make sure from
Blücher's own mouth that he could rely on Prussian support next day, to
the truth of which not a little of vague testimony has been adduced,
may be now definitely disregarded. The evidence against the legend is
conclusive. An authoritative contradiction was given to it in an
article in the _Quarterly Review_ of 1842, from the pen of Lord Francis
Egerton, afterwards Lord Ellesmere, who confessedly wrote under the
inspiration of the Duke, and in this instance directly from a
memorandum drawn up by his Grace. Quite recently there have been found
and are now in the possession of the Rev. Frederick Gurney, the
grandson of the late Sir John Gurney, the notes of a "conversation with
the Duke of Wellington and Baron Gurney and Mr. Justice Williams,
Judges on Circuit, at Strath-fieldsaye House, on 24th February 1837."
The annotator was Baron Gurney, to the following effect:--"The
conversation had been commenced by my inquiring of him (the Duke)
whether a story which I had heard was true of his having ridden over to
Blücher on the night before the battle of Waterloo, and returned on the
same horse. He said--'No, that was not so. I did not see Blücher on the
day before Waterloo. I saw him the day before, on the day of Quatre
Bras. I saw him after Waterloo, and he kissed me. He embraced me on
horseback. I had communicated with him the day before Waterloo.'" The
rest of the conversation made no further reference to the topic of the
ride to Wavre.
It is not proposed to give here any account of the memorable battle,
the main incidents of which are familiar to all. It was of course
Wellington's policy to take up a defensive attitude; both because of
the incapacity of his raw soldiers for manoeuvring, and since every
minute before Napoleon should begin the offensive was of value to the
English commander, as it diminished the length of punishment he would
have to endure single-handed. Further, he was numerically weaker than
his adversary, while his troops were at once of divers nationalities
and divers character; his main reliance was on his British troops and
those of the King's German Legion. Napoleon for his part deliberately
delayed to attack when celerity of action was all-important to him,
disregarding the obvious probability of Prussian assistance to
Wellington, and sanguinely expecting that Grouchy would either avert
that support or reach him in time to neutralise it. Mr. Ropes has
written an admirable criticism of the errors of the French in their
contest with the Anglo-Dutch army, for which Ney was for the most part
responsible, since from before 3 P.M. Napoleon was engrossed in
preparing his right flank for defence against the Prussians. The issue
of the great battle all men know. The badness of the roads retarded the
Prussians greatly, and, save in Bülow's corps, there was no doubt
considerable delay in starting; but the proverb that "All's well that
ends well" might have been coined with special application to the
battle of Waterloo.
It only remains briefly to refer to Mr. Ropes's elaborate _résumé_ of
the melancholy adventures of Grouchy, on whom he may be regarded as too
severe. Sent out too late on a species of roving commission, more was
expected from him by Napoleon than could have been accomplished by any
but a leader of the highest order, whereas Grouchy had never given
evidence of being more than respectable. He received from his master
neither instructions nor information from the time he left the field of
Ligny until 4 P.M. of the 18th, nor until at Walhain he heard the
cannonade of Waterloo had he any knowledge of the whereabouts of the
French main army. On the morning of the 18th he was late in leaving
Gembloux, on not the most direct route towards Wavre; instead of moving
on which, when he heard the noise of the battle, he should no doubt
have marched straight for the Dyle bridges at Ottignies and Moustier.
Had he done so, spite of all delays he could have been across the Dyle
by 4 P.M. But when Mr. Ropes claims that thus Grouchy would have been
able to arrest the march toward the battlefield of the two leading
Prussian corps, one of which was four miles distant from him and the
other still farther away, he is too exacting. Had Grouchy made the vain
attempt, the two nearer Prussian corps would have taken him in flank
and headed him off, while Bülow and Ziethen pressed on to the
battlefield. If he had marched straight and swiftly on the
cannon-thunder of Waterloo, he might perhaps have been in time to
effect something in the nature of a diversion, although it is extremely
improbable that he could have materially changed the fortune of the
day; but instead, acting on the letter of Napoleon's instructions
despatched to him on the morning of the battle, he moved on Wavre and
engaged in a futile action with the Prussian 3rd Corps there. A shrewd
and enterprising man would have at least seen into the spirit of his
orders; Grouchy could not do this, and he is to be pitied rather than
blamed.