It is true that the battle of Balaclava was fought to "a gallery"
consisting of the gazers who looked down into the plain from the upland
of the Chersonese. But of close and virtually independent spectators of
the battle's most thrilling episodes, so near the climax of the Heavy
Cavalry charge that they heard the clash of the sabres, so close to the
lip of the Valley of Death that they discerned the wounds of our
stricken troopers who strewed its sward and could greet and be greeted
by the broken groups that rode back out of the "mouth of hell," there
was but one small body of people. This body consisted of the officers
and men of "C" Troop, Royal Horse Artillery. "C" Troop had been
encamped from 1st October until the morning of the battle close to the
Light division, in that section of the British position known as the
Right Attack. When the fighting began in the Balaclava plain on the
morning of the 25th, it promptly started for the scene of action.
Pursuing the nearest way to the plain by the Woronzoff road, at the
point known as the "Cutting" it received an order from Lord Raglan to
take a more circuitous route, as by the more direct one it was
following it might become exposed to fire from Russian cannon on the
Fedoukine heights. Pursuing the circuitous route it came out into the
plain through the "Col" then known as the "Barrier," crossed the
"South" or "Inner" valley, and reached the left rear of Scarlett's
squadrons formed up for the Heavy Cavalry charge. Here it received an
order from Brigadier-General Strangways, who commanded the Artillery,
with which it could not comply; and thenceforward "C" Troop throughout
the day acted independently, at the discretion of its enterprising and
self-reliant commander. What it saw and what it did are recorded in a
couple of chapters of a book entitled _From Coruña to Sevastopol_.
[Footnote: _From Coruña to Sevastopol_: The History of "C" Battery, "A"
Brigade (late "C" Troop), Royal Horse Artillery. W.H. Allen and Co.]
This volume was published some years ago, but the interesting and vivid
details given in its pages of the Balaclava combats and the light it
throws on many obscure incidents of the day have been strangely
overlooked. The author of the chapters was an officer in the Troop
whose experiences he shared and describes, and is a man well known in
the service to be possessed of acute observation, strong memory, and
implicit veracity. The present writer has been favoured by this officer
with much information supplementary to that given in his published
chapters, which is embodied in the following account throughout which
the officer will be designated as "the 'C' Troop chronicler."
The "Plain of Balaclava" is divided into two distinct valleys by a low
ridge known as the "Causeway Heights," which bisects it in the
direction of its length and is everywhere easily practicable for all
arms. The valley nearest to the sea and the town of Balaclava has been
variously termed the "South" and the "Inner" valley; it was on the
slope descending to it from the ridge that our Heavy Cavalry won their
success; the valley beyond the ridge is the "North" or "Outer" valley,
down which, their faces set eastward, sped to glorious disaster the
"noble six hundred" of the Light Brigade. On the north the plain is
bounded by the Fedoukine heights; on the west by the steep face of the
Chersonese upland whereon was the allied main position before
Sevastopol during the siege; on the south by the broken ground between
the plain and the sea; on the east by the River Tchernaya and the
Kamara hills. Our weakness in the plain invited attack. At Kadiköi, on
its southern verge, Sir Colin Campbell covered Balaclava with a
Scottish regiment, a Field battery, and some Turks. Near the western
end of the South valley were the camps of the cavalry division.
Straggled along the Causeway heights was a series of weak earthworks
whose total armament consisted of nine iron guns, and among which were
distributed some six or seven battalions of Turkish infantry. At
daybreak of 25th October the Russian General Liprandi with a force of
22,000 infantry, 3300 cavalry, and 78 guns, took the offensive by
driving the Turkish garrisons out of these earthworks in succession,
beginning with the most easterly--No. 1, known as "Canrobert's Hill."
The Turks holding it fought well and stood a storm and heavy loss
before they were expelled. The other earthworks fell with less and less
resistance, and the first three, with seven out of their nine guns,
remained in the Russian possession.
During the morning, while the Russians were taking the earthworks along
the ridge, our two cavalry brigades, in the words of General Hamley,
had been manoeuvring so as to threaten the flanks of any force which
might approach Balaclava, without committing themselves to an action in
which they would have been without the support of infantry. Ultimately,
until his infantry should become available, Lord Raglan drew in the
cavalry division to a position on the left of redoubt No. 6, near the
foot of the Chersonese upland.
While it was temporarily quiescent there Liprandi was engaging in an
operation of enterprise rare in the record of Russian cavalry. General
Ryjoff at the head of a great body of horse started on an advance up
the North valley. Presently he detached four squadrons to his left,
which moved toward where Sir Colin Campbell was in position at the head
of the Kadiköi gorge, was repulsed without difficulty by that soldier's
fire, and rode back whence it had come. The main body of Russian horse,
computed by unimaginative authorities to be about 2000 strong,
continued up the valley till it was about abreast of redoubt No. 4
[Footnote: See Map.], when it halted; checked apparently, writes
Kinglake, by the fire of two guns from a battery on the edge of the
upland. The "C" Troop chronicler states that in addition to "a few"
shots fired by this battery (manned by Turks), the guns of "I" troop
R.H.A., temporarily stationed in a little hollow in front of the Light
Brigade [Footnote: See Map.], fired rapidly one round each,
"haphazard," over the high ground in their front. General Hamley
assigns no ground for the Russian halt, but mentions that just at the
moment of collision between our Heavies and the Russian mass "three
guns" on the edge of the upland were fired on the latter. From whatever
cause, the Russian cavalry wheeled obliquely to the leftward, crossed
the Causeway heights about redoubt No. 5, and began to descend the
slope of the South valley. Kinglake heard of no ground for believing
that the Russian horse thus wheeling southward, were cognisant of the
presence of the Heavies in the valley they were entering. But the "C"
Troop chronicler states that as the Troop was crossing the plain a few
Russian horsemen were seen by it trotting fast along the top of the
ridge [Footnote: See Map.], who, when almost immediately afterwards the
head of the Russian column showed itself on the skyline, were set down
as the General commanding it and his staff.
Kinglake observes that the Russians have declared their object in this
operation to have been the destruction of a non-existent artillery park
near Kadiköi, while some of our people imagined it to have been a real
attempt on Balaclava. But up the centre of the North valley was neither
the directest nor the safest way to Kadiköi, much less to Balaclava. Is
it not more probable that the enterprise was of the nature merely of a
sort of "snap-offensive"; while as yet the allied infantry visibly
pouring down the slopes of the upland were innocuous because of
distance and while the sole occupants of the plain were a couple of
weak cavalry brigades and a single horse battery? Ryjoff on the ridge
could see in his front at least portions of the Light Brigade; its fire
told him the horse battery was thereabouts too, and there were those
shots from the cannon on the upland. Is it not feasible that, looking
down on his left to Scarlett's poor six squadrons--his two following
regiments were then some distance off--and seeing those squadrons as
yet without accompanying artillery, he should have judged them his
easier quarry and ordered the wheel that should bring his avalanche
down on them?
Kinglake recounts how, while our cavalry division yet stood intact near
the foot of the upland, Lord Raglan had noticed the instability of the
Turks under Campbell's command at Kadiköi and had sent Lord Lucan
directions to move down eight squadrons of Heavies to support them; how
Scarlett started with the Inniskillings, Greys, and Fifth Dragoon
Guards, numbering six squadrons, to be followed by the two squadrons of
the Royals; how the march toward Kadiköi was proceeding along the South
valley, when all of a sudden Elliot, General Scarlett's aide-de-camp,
glancing up leftward at the ridge "saw its top fretted with lances, and
in another moment the skyline broken by evident squadrons of horse."
Then, Kinglake proceeds, Scarlett's resolve was instantaneous; he gave
the command "Left wheel into line!" and confronted the mass gathering
into sight over against him. Soon after Scarlett had started Lord Lucan
had learned of the advance up the North valley of the great mass of
Russian cavalry, which he had presently descried himself, as also its
change of direction southward across the Causeway ridge; and after
giving Lord Cardigan "parting instructions" which that officer
construed into compulsory inactivity on his part when a great
opportunity presented itself, he had galloped off at speed to overtake
Scarlett and give him directions for prompt conflict with the Russian
cavalry. Thus far Kinglake.
The testimony of the "C" Troop chronicler differs from the above
statement in every detail. He significantly points out that Kinglake
does not, as is his custom, quote the words of Lord Raglan's order
directing the march of the Heavies to Kadiköi. His averment is to the
following effect. When the cavalry division after its manoeuvring of
the morning was retiring by Lord Raglan's command along the South
valley toward the foot of the upland, it was followed as closely as
they dared by some Cossacks who busied themselves in spearing and
capturing the unfortunate Turks flying from the ridge toward Kadiköi
athwart the rear of the British squadrons. Eventually the Cossacks
reached the camp of the Light Brigade and set about stabbing and
hacking at the sick and non-effective horses left standing at the
picket-lines. Lord Raglan from his commanding position on the upland
saw those Cossacks working mischief in our lines, and sent a message to
Lord Lucan "to take some cavalry forward and protect the camp from
being destroyed." The "C" Troop chronicler has in his possession a
letter from the actual bearer of this message, to the effect that he
duly delivered it to Lord Lucan and that consequent on it his lordship
moved forward some heavy cavalry into the plain toward the
picket-lines. Testimony to be presently noted will indicate the
importance of this statement. The chronicler denies that Lord Lucan, as
Kinglake states, galloped after Scarlett after having given Lord
Cardigan his "parting instructions." No doubt he did give those
instructions, when apprised by Lord Raglan's aide-de-camp of the
threatening advance of Russian horse. But what he then did, assured as
he was of the stationary attitude of the heavy squadrons sent out to
protect the camp, was to ride forward along the ridge-line to discern
for himself where, if indeed anywhere, the Russians were intending to
strike. He most daringly remained at a forward and commanding point of
the ridge [Footnote: See Map.] until actually chased off his ground by
the van of the Russian wheel, and he then galloped straight down the
slope to join Scarlett drawing out his squadrons for the conflict with
the Russian mass whose leading files Elliot's keen eye had discerned on
the skyline.
If Kinglake were right as to his alleged movement of the Heavies toward
Kadiköi and its sudden arrestment because of Elliot's discovery, "C"
Troop, as it approached them, would have seen the squadrons still in
motion. But the chronicler testifies that "C" Troop, while moving to
the scene of action and when still more than a mile and a half distant
(at least fifteen minutes at the pace the weakened gun-teams
travelled), had a full view of the South valley. And it then saw five
squadrons of heavy cavalry thus early halted in the plain near the
cavalry picket-lines, fronting towards the ridge and apparently
perfectly dressed--the Greys (two squadrons deep) in the centre,
recognised by their bearskins; a helmeted regiment (also two squadrons
deep) on the left (afterwards known to be the 5th Dragoon Guards); and
one helmeted squadron on the right (2nd squadron Inniskillings). A
sixth squadron (1st Inniskillings) was visible some distance to the
right rear and it was also fronting towards the ridge. This force, so
and thus early positioned, consisted, avers the chronicler, of the
identical troops which Kinglake erroneously describes as straggling
hurriedly into deployment under the urgency of Scarlett and Lucan to
cope with the suddenly disclosed adversary.
When "C" Troop and its chronicler reached the rear of the formed-up
squadrons they were found in the same formation as when first observed,
but the whole had in the interval been moved somewhat to the right,
farther into the plain, with intent no doubt to be clear of obstacles
on the previous front. Kinglake speaks throughout of the force that
first charged under Scarlett--"Scarlett's three hundred," as consisting
of three squadrons ranked thus:--
------------------- ------------------- -------------------
2nd squad. lst squad. 2nd squad. Inniskillings
\__________________________/
Greys.
And, although his words are not so clear as usual, he appears to
believe that the 5th Dragoon Guards, whom in his plan he places some
little distance to the left rear of the Greys, were actually the last
to move to the attack, of all the five regiments participating in the
heavy cavalry onslaught. The "C" Troop chronicler, noting details, be
it remembered, from his position immediately in rear of the cavalry
force which first charged, describes its composition and formation
thus:--
------------------- ------------------- -------------------
Front squad. 5th Dr. Guards. 1st squad. Greys. 2nd squad.
Inniskillings.
------------------- -------------------
Rear squad. 5th Dr. Guards. 2nd squad. Greys.
in all five squadrons, instead of Mr. Kinglake's three. Nor, according
to the chronicler, did the three squadrons in first line start
simultaneously, as Kinglake distinctly conveys. The leading squadron of
the Greys moved off first, and just as it was breaking into a gallop
was temporarily hampered by the swerving of the horse of Colonel
Griffiths, who was struck in the head by a bullet from the halted
Russians' carbine fire. Next moved, almost simultaneously, the 2nd
squadron Inniskillings and the front squadron 5th Dragoon Guards;
thirdly, the 2nd squadron Greys, and finally the rear squadron 5th
Dragoon Guards. Lord Lucan is represented as having been "personally
concerned in or approving of everything connected with the five
squadrons at this moment," galloping to each in succession, giving
orders when and in what sequence it was to start, what section of the
Russian front it was to strike, and exerting himself to the utmost to
have everything fully understood. His errors were in omitting to call
in the outlying regiments of the brigade, and either now--or earlier
before he left the ridge, specifically to order Lord Cardigan to fall
on the flank of the Russians at the moment when their front should be
_aux prises_ with Scarlett's heavy squadrons. "C" Troop's position was
such that it could command, over the heads of the stationary Heavies,
the gradual slope up to the Russian front, and every detail of the
charge was under its eyes. Scarlett's burnished helmet and plain blue
coat were conspicuous in front. The Troop also had the opportunity of
making a deliberate study of the Russian cavalry both before and during
the combat.
Its front had the appearance of three strong squadrons; its formation
was either close or quarter distance column--probably the former, since
the column could nowhere be seen through from front to rear; its depth
halted was about the same as its breadth of front; its pace across the
ridge was a sharp trot and its discipline was indicated by the
smartness with which it took ground to the left. Kinglake describes the
serried mass as encircled by a loose fringe of satellites, but the "C"
Troop chronicler saw neither skirmishers, flankers, nor scouts; and no
guns were discerned or heard, although General Hamley says that as the
huge cohort swept down batteries darted out from it and threw shells
against the troops on the upland. No Lancers were seen with the column,
certainly none with pennons. The "partial deployment" of which Kinglake
speaks, consisting of "wings or forearms" devised to cover the flanks
or fold inwards on the front, did not make itself apparent to any
observer of "C" Troop; and indeed the present writer never knew a
Russian who had heard of it, the species of formation adumbrated, so
far as he is aware, being confined to Zulu impis. It was noticed, and
this is not rare, that on the halt the centre pulled up a little
earlier than the flanks, so that the latter were somewhat prolonged and
advanced. The halt was quite brief and a slower advance ensued without
correction of the frontal dressing. Presently there was another halt
and some pistol or carbine fire from the central squadron on the
advancing first squadron of the Greys. Kinglake makes the Russian front
meet our assault halted, but the "C" Troop chronicler declares that
when the collision occurred the mass were actually moving forward but
at "a pace so slow that it could hardly be called a trot." General
Hamley describes "the impetus of the enemy's column carrying it on, and
pressing our combatants back for a short space," and the chronicler
speaks of the Russians as surging forward after the impact, but without
bearing back our people.
It is extremely difficult for the reader of a detailed narrative of a
combat that may become a landmark in the military history of a nation,
to realise that it may have been fought and finished in no longer time
than it has taken him to read the few paragraphs of introductory
matter. Mr. Kinglake has devoted a whole volume to the battle of
Balaclava, and four-fifths of it deals with the two cavalry
fights--Scarlett's charge, and the charge of the Light Brigade. The
latter deed was enacted from start to finish within the space of
five-and-twenty minutes; as regards the former, from the first
appearance of the Russian troopers on the skyline to their defeat and
flight a period of eight minutes is the outside calculation. General
Hamley, an eyewitness, says "some four or five minutes." During those
minutes "C" Troop R.H.A. under Brandling's shrewd and independent
guidance was moving slowly forward on the right of the ground that had
been covered by the charging Heavies. There was no opportunity for its
intervention while the melley lasted. Even when the Russian squadrons
broke it could not for the moment act while the redcoats were still
blended with the gray. But Brandling saw that his chance was nigh; he
galloped forward to the point marked C on the map, unlimbered, and
stood intent. Kinglake states that the fugitive Russians, hanging
together as closely as they could, retreated by the way they had come
and Hamley describes them as vanishing beyond the ridge. Kinglake also
says that "I" Troop R.H.A. (accompanying the Light Brigade) fired a few
shots at the retreating horsemen, against whom Barker's battery, from
its position near Kadiköi, also came into action. The "C" Troop
chronicler traverses those statements. His testimony is that the
Russian line of retreat was by their left rear along the slope of the
South valley, and not immediately over the ridge; that the mass was
spread over acres of ground; and that their officers were trying to
rally the men and had actually got some ranks formed, when "C" Troop
opened fire from about point C in the general direction of point D. "I"
Troop was out of sight, he says, and Barker out of range; neither came
into action; but "C" Troop, of whose presence in the field Kinglake
apparently was unaware, fired forty-nine shot and shells, broke up the
attempted rally, and punished the Russians severely. The range was
about 750 paces.
At the time when the Light Brigade started on its "mad-brained" charge
down the North valley, "C" Troop was halted dismounted on the slope of
the South valley a little below redoubt No. 5. In rear of it was the
Heavy Cavalry Brigade, halted on the scene of its recent victorious
combat. Lord Lucan was some little distance to the front. "C" Troop
presently saw him trot away over the ridge in the direction of the
Light Brigade, a scrap of paper in his hand at which he kept
looking--doubtless the memorable order which Nolan had just brought
him--and a group of staff officers, among whom was Nolan, behind him.
Out of curiosity Brandling with his trumpeter rode up to the crest,
whence he commanded a view into the North valley. By and by some of the
Heavies were moved over the crest, no doubt the Royals and Greys which
Scarlett was to lead forward in support of the Light Brigade. All was
still quiet but for an occasional shot from a Russian battery about
redoubt No. 2, when suddenly Brandling came galloping back shouting
"Mount! mount!" and telling his officers as he came in that the Light
Cavalry had begun an advance on the other side of the ridge. But that
he had happened to ride to the crest, the charge of the Light Brigade
would have begun and ended without the knowledge of "C" Troop. No order
from any source reached it, and Brandling, acting on his own
initiative, took his guns rapidly to the front along the inner edge of
the ridge and unlimbered at point G. He durst not fire into the bottom
of the North valley where our light horsemen were mixed up with the
enemy; all the diversion he could effect was to open on the Russian
cannon-smoke directly in his front, about redoubt No. 2. Even from this
he had soon to desist, being without support and threatened by the
Russian cavalry, and he retired by the way he had advanced, to point F,
where the troop halted near the Heavies, whose advance Lord Lucan had
arrested resolving that they at all events should not be destroyed.
These regiments had been moved toward the ridge out of the line of fire
in the North valley, and were kept shifting their position and
gradually retiring, suffering frequent casualties from the Russian
artillery about redoubt No. 2 until they finally halted near the crest
in the vicinity of "C" Troop's latest position at point F.
At this point only the left-hand gun of "C" Troop was on the crest,
with a view into the North valley; the other guns were on the southern
slope. But little had been previously seen of the terrible and glorious
experiences of the Light Brigade; and now what was witnessed was not
the glory but the horror of battle. For the wounded of the charge were
passing to the rear, shattered and maimed, some staggering on foot,
others reeling in their saddles, calling to the gunners and the Heavies
to look at a "poor broken leg" or a dangling arm. Brandling and his
officers held their flasks to the poor fellows' mouths as long as the
contents lasted. The "C" Troop chronicler, whose narrative I have been
following, tells how Captain Morris, who commanded the 17th Lancers,
was carried past the front of the troop towards Kadiköi, dreadfully
wounded about the head and calling loudly: "Lord, have mercy on my
soul!" Kinglake gives a wholly different account of Captain Morris's
removal from the field; but the "C" Troop chronicler is quite firm on
his version, and explains that the 17th Lancers and "C" Troop having
lain together shortly before the war all the people of the latter knew
and identified Captain Morris.
Balaclava is rather an old story now, and some readers may require to
be reminded that the Light Brigade charged in two lines, the first line
being led by Lord Cardigan, the second by Lord George Paget; that the
first line rode into the Russian batteries considerably in advance of
the second, the latter having advanced at a more measured pace; and
that the second line, with sore diminished ranks and accompanied by a
couple of groups rather than detachments of the first, came back later
than did the few survivors of Cardigan's regiments other than the
groups referred to. The aspersion on Cardigan was that he returned
prematurely, instead of remaining to share the fortunes of the second
line of his brigade, and this he did not deny. Kinglake's statement is
that "he rode back alone at a pace decorously slow, towards the spot
where Scarlett was halted." He adds that General Scarlett maintained
that Lord Lucan was present at the time; but Lord Lucan's averment was
that Lord Cardigan did not approach him until afterwards when all was
over. Kinglake relates further that when Lord George Paget came back at
the head of the last detachment, some officers rode forward to greet
him one of whom was Lord Cardigan. Seeing him approach composedly from
the rear Lord George exclaimed: "Halloa, Lord Cardigan, weren't you
there?" to which, according to one version of the story, Cardigan
replied: "Wasn't I, though? Here, Jenyns, didn't you see me at the
guns?"
The reasonable inferences from Kinglake are that Cardigan's first halt
was made and that his earliest remarks were uttered when he reached
Scarlett, and that he and Paget met after the charge for the first time
when the alleged question and answer passed.
The "C" Troop chronicler's narrative of events is right in the teeth of
these inferences. While the troop was halted at point F and after a
great many wounded and disabled men had already passed it going to the
rear, Lord Cardigan came riding by at a "quiet pace" close under the
crest. He had passed the troop on his left for several horse-lengths,
when he came back and halted within a yard or two of the left-hand gun,
the only one fairly on the crest. He was not alone, but attended by
Cornet Yates of his own old regiment the 11th Hussars, a recently
commissioned ranker. "Lord Cardigan was in the full dress _pelisse_
(buttoned) of the 11th Hussars, and he rode a chestnut horse very
distinctly marked and of grand appearance. The horse seemed to have had
enough of it, and his lordship appeared to have been knocked about but
was cool and collected. He returned his sword, undid a little of the
front of his dress and pulled down his underclothing under his
waistbelt. Then, in a quiet way, as if rather talking to himself, he
said, 'I tell you what it is: those instruments of theirs,' alluding to
the Russian weapons, 'are deuced blunt; they tickle up one's ribs!'
Then he pulled his revolver out of his holster as if the thought had
just struck him, and said, 'And here's this d----d thing I have never
thought of until now.' He then replaced it, drew his sword, and said,
'Well, we've done our share of the work!' and pointing up toward the
Chasseurs d'Afrique on our left rear (ignorant of their opportune
service), he added, 'It's time they gave those dappled gentry a
chance.' Afterwards he asked, 'Has any one seen my regiment?' The men
answered, 'No, sir.'" Brandling was holding aloof; and his lordship
turned his horse and rode away farther back.
Just then a cheer was raised by some Heavies who had lately formed in
front of "C" Troop. Cardigan, so the chronicler tells, looked backward
to see the occasion, and saw the cheer was in compliment to the 8th
Hussars coming back with Colonel Sewell in front and Colonel Mayow, the
brigade-major, behind on the left. Cardigan wheeled, trotted back
towards the 8th, turned round in front of Colonel Sewell, and took up
the "walk." Then occurred something "painful to witness. It was seen
from the left of 'C' Troop that the moment Cardigan's back was toward
the 8th as he headed them, Colonel Mayow pointed toward him, shook his
head, and made signs to the officers on the left of the Heavies as much
as to say, 'See him; he has taken care of himself.'" Men in the ranks
of the 8th also pointed and made signs to the troopers of the Heavies
as they were passing left to left. There was, as well, a little excited
undertalk from one corps to the other. Colonel Sewell neither saw nor
took part in this wretched business; and of course Cardigan did not
know that he was being thus ridiculed and disparaged while he was
smiling and raising his sword to the cheers of the Heavies and the
gunners.
Immediately after this episode the returning 4th Light Dragoons came
obliquely across the North valley at a sharp pace, but fell into the
"walk" as they came within a hundred yards of "C" Troop. Lord George
Paget, who led what remained of the regiment, rode up to the flank of
"C" Troop and halted on the very spot where Cardigan had stood a few
minutes earlier. Lord George had the look of a man who had ridden hard,
and was heated and excited. He exclaimed in rather a loud tone, "It's a
d----d shame; there we had a lot of their guns and carriages taken, and
received no support, and yet there's all this infantry about--it's a
shame!" Meanwhile Lord Cardigan had come back and was close behind Lord
George while he was speaking, without the other knowing it. He called
out, "Lord George Paget!"; and on the latter turning round said to him
in an undertone, "I am surprised!"; and "tossing his head in the air
added some other remark which was not heard." Lord George lowered his
sword to the salute, and, without speaking turned his horse and rode on
after his men. The "C" Troop chronicler is positive that both officers
visited "C" Troop before going to any general or to any other command,
and that they met there for the first time after the combat.
When Lord Raglan came down from the upland after all was over, the "C"
Troop chronicler says that he went straight for Lucan then in front of
the Heavy Cavalry brigade, having first sent for Cardigan to meet him.
After a few moments the latter repassed the troop on his way toward the
remnant of his brigade. "Then Lord Raglan took Lucan a little forward
by himself out of hearing of the group of staff officers, and his
gesticulations of head and arm were so suggestive of passionate anger,
that the onlookers did not need to be told that the Commander-in-Chief
did not charge the blame chiefly on Cardigan." Lord Raglan's subsequent
interview with General Scarlett, which occurred in the hearing of "C"
Troop, was of a different character. After complimenting the gallant
old warrior his lordship said, "Now tell me all about yourself."
Scarlett replied, "When the Russian column was moving down on me, sir,
I began by sending first a squadron of the Greys at them, and--" but at
the word "and" Lord Raglan struck in, saying, "And they knocked them
over like the devil!" He then turned his horse away, as if he did not
need to hear any more.