encountered General Fitz-John Porter, his class-mate whom he always
regarded as a first-class soldier, and with whom upon this occasion he
had a conversation, the facts of which go far to justify this high
estimate. Noting that Porter seemed greatly depressed he asked what was
the matter. In reply, Porter told him that as soon as he had become
certain the evening before that the enemy had been broken and beaten
back from his reckless attack on the Union lines at Malvern Hill, and
had withdrawn in disorder from the field, he had gone to McClellan on
board the boat which he had occupied with his headquarters, and had
begged him with all the arguments he could bring to bear, and all the
force he could command, to assume the offensive at dawn. He said he had
spent half the night in advocacy of this policy, expressing the
confident belief that if adopted it would result, not only in the
destruction of Lee's army, but in the capture of Richmond. He had no
doubt that our own army, encouraged by the sanguinary repulse it had
finally inflicted upon the enemy, would respond to every demand which
could be made upon it, and would thus turn a series of indecisive
combats, which the country would surely regard as defeats, into a
magnificent victory. Smith's testimony shows this splendid conception
to have been no afterthought with Porter, as it was with many who
subsequently came to understand the facts of the case, but coming as it
did hot from a desperate battle field, must be regarded as the
inspiration of true military genius, while the fact that McClellan
rejected it must always be considered as the best possible evidence of
his unreadiness to meet great emergencies. Smith does not say
specifically that he approved it, but the context of his narrative
leaves but little doubt that he thought favorably of it and would have
given it hearty support.
In the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula, and
its transfer to Washington, as ordered by Halleck and the Secretary of
War, Smith and his division necessarily played a subordinate part. With
the rest of the army they formed a tardy junction with Pope in front of
Washington, and did their share towards making the capital safe and
unassailable, but they were not again engaged till they met the enemy
in the bloody and successful action at Crampton's Gap, in the South
Mountain. The division also took part three days later in the battle of
Antietam, but notwithstanding McClellan's claim that the battle was a
"master piece of art," neither Smith's troops, nor the corps to which
they belonged, were seriously engaged. This was not the fault of either
Franklin or Smith, both of whom were greatly displeased with the
disjointed and irresolute manner in which the Union forces were handled
and the battle was fought. The most that can be said is that both
General Smith and his division did all that was asked of them, not only
in the battle of Antietam, but in following Lee's army back to
Virginia. These operations are now justly regarded as reflecting but
little credit on the generalship by which the national army was
controlled during that period of its history. While they ended
McClellan's military career, they afforded but little chance for any of
his subordinates to gain distinction, and those who escaped
responsibility for supporting his policy of delay had good reasons to
regard themselves as fortunate.
The withdrawal of McClellan and the accession of the weak and
vacillating Burnside to command was followed by a re-arrangement of the
Army of the Potomac into three grand divisions, and a re-assignment of
leading generals. Franklin was placed in command of the Third Grand
Division, consisting of the First Corps under General Reynolds, and the
Sixth Corps under General Smith. In the abortive Fredericksburg
campaign which followed, these corps had the extreme left of the Union
line, but it should have been evident from the start that with the
opposing armies separated by a broad river occupying a deep valley,
from three-quarters of a mile to a mile and a half between the opposite
crests, the movement which was to bring on the battle must necessarily
be fought under extraordinary disadvantages to the attacking army. In
the mind of those who were to carry out the details of the movements,
success must have seemed hopeless from the first. Burnside was from the
beginning of the campaign overcome by the weight of his
responsibilities, and between tears at one time and lack of sleep at
another, his fatuous mind failed to evolve for itself, or to accept
from others a definite and comprehensive plan of operations. He seemed
at successive times to have had hopes of surprising Lee, of breaking
his center and overwhelming his left, of seizing two important points
in his main line of defence and completely turning his left, but withal
it is certain that he gave to none of these operations sufficient
attention to justify the slightest hope that it could be successfully
carried into effect.
On the other hand, Lee was on the alert with his army of 78,000 men,
well and compactly posted in a commanding and almost impregnable
position along the wooded heights which overlooked Fredericksburg and
the valley of the Rappahannock from the south. Burnside had 113,000 men
of all arms, well supplied and thoroughly organized, commanded by the
ablest generals in the service. His preponderance of force was
therefore close to fifty per cent., but unfortunately that was not
enough to outweigh the natural and artificial obstacles, the heights,
stone walls, entrenchments, open fields and river to be overcome by the
advancing army. The task was a hopeless one from the start, and to make
matters worse, Burnside, who at best had but a vague and uncertain
comprehension of the work before him, seems to have lost what little
head he was endowed with before his operations were fully under way.
The result was unfortunate in the extreme. Two Grand Divisions
succeeded in crossing the river without material opposition, but at
once found themselves confronted by difficulties and forces they could
not overcome. Franklin, in compliance with his instructions, took two
days to get into position, but when his two corps had reached the place
assigned them on the old Richmond Road, with the aid of Smith and
Reynolds, he looked over the ground and made up his mind that the only
chance of victory was offered by an assault upon the enemy's right
center, with the full force of his two corps, amounting to 40,000 men.
Burnside, at his invitation, came to that part of the field, and after
listening to the views of the three generals, either of whom was vastly
his superior as a soldier, approved the plan and promised to give a
written order for its execution. Franklin waited all night for the
order, telegraphed twice, and finally sent a staff officer for it, but
it never came. Indeed it was never issued but a different order
directing him to seize the heights at Hamilton's House, nearly three
miles from his right division, and to keep the whole of his command in
readiness to move at once, was sent instead. Sumner received an order
equally inane, in reference to Marye's Heights. The resulting
operations which should have been carefully co-ordinated and vigorously
supported, were weak and indecisive. As the day wore away Lee took
advantage of the delays and the opportunities which they offered him,
and assumed the offensive. There was much severe but desultory and
disconnected fighting. The Union generals with their officers and men
did their best, but Burnside was on the opposite side of the river and
could neither give intelligent orders nor act promptly upon the
suggestions which were sent to him from the field. There was no chance
for maneuvering. It was from the first head-on, face-to-face fighting
with no hope of victory for the assailants. The Union losses were over
12,500 men killed, wounded and missing, of which 4,962 belonged to
Franklin's Grand Division, while Jackson's corps which confronted him
lost 5,364.
A full description of this mid-winter campaign would be out of place in
this sketch, and the same may be said of the abortive Mud Campaign six
weeks later, which had for its object the passage of the Rappahannock
by a movement above Fredericksburg. Both Franklin and Smith took part
in this ill planned and poorly executed undertaking. The weather and
the roads were against it, and it soon came to an end quite as pitiful,
though not so costly, as its predecessor.
Following these failures, Burnside, in futile desperation, prepared an
order relieving Franklin, Smith and several other officers of inferior
rank from duty, and dismissing Hooker, Brooks, Newton and Cochrane from
the service. He made no further charge against these officers than that
they had no confidence in himself, and this much was probably true, but
it would have been equally as true of any other generals serving at
that time in the Army of the Potomac. The President, instead of
approving the order, it should he noted, at once relieved Burnside and
assigned Hooker to the command. Sumner and Franklin both of whom
outranked Hooker were relieved from further service with that army,
while Smith was transferred to the command of the Ninth Corps, which he
held but a short time, owing to the failure of the Senate to confirm
him as a major general. This was doubtless brought about by
misrepresentation, made to the Senate committee on the Conduct of the
War, but as the action of the Senate and its committees in reference to
confirmations were secret, no correct explanation can now he given of
the allegations against Smith, though they were generally attributed at
the time to Burnside and his friends, and while they were neither
properly investigated nor supported, they resulted in reducing Smith to
the rank of brigadier general and depriving him of the high command
which he would have otherwise continued to hold.
It is worthy of note that before these changes were made, and while the
Army of the Potomac was still floundering in the mud under the
inefficient command of Burnside, Franklin and Smith joined in the
letter previously referred to, advising the President to abandon the
line on which the Army was then operating, with such ill success, and
after reinforcing it to the fullest extent, to send it back again to
the line of the James River. This letter was doubtless written in
entire good faith, but at a time when it seemed to be impossible for
the government, even if it had so desired, to carry out its
recommendations. Its only immediate effect was to arouse the antagonism
of Mr. Stanton against these two able officers, and to deprive the
country for a while of their services. A wiser and more temperate
Secretary of War would have filed and ignored it, or sent for the
officers and explained why he deemed their advice to be impracticable
at that time. That, however, was not Mr. Stanton's way. Although
intensely patriotic and in earnest, he was imperious and overbearing
both to high and low alike, and preferred to banish and offend rather
than to listen and conciliate.
The winter of 1862-3 is now by common consent regarded as the darkest
period of the war for the Union. The failure of Burnside's plans and
the defeat of Hooker at Chancellorsville severely tried the discipline
and organization of the Army of the Potomac, and filled the loyal North
with alarm, while it correspondingly encouraged the Confederate
government and raised the confidence of its army. As soon as the winter
was over and the roads were settled Lee assumed the initiative, drove
Hooker back from the Rappahannock, crossed the Potomac, advanced
confidently to Chambersburg and pushed his cavalry as far north as
Harrisburg and York.
Hooker had also proven himself to be incompetent, and desperate as the
measure was, the Washington government relieved him in the midst of an
active campaign, and entrusted the army and its fortunes to the
direction of Major General George G. Meade, a gallant and able soldier,
who checked the high tide of rebellion at Gettysburg on the 2nd and 3rd
of July, 1863. During this campaign Smith, who was on leave of absence
when it began, made haste to offer his services, without conditions,
and was at once sent to Harrisburg to assist Major General Couch, who
had been assigned to the command of the Pennsylvania and New York
militia. Taking command of an improvised division, he moved against the
enemy, then threatening Carlisle, with all the assurance of a veteran,
and while the prompt retreat of the enemy prevented any severe
engagement, the movement was entirely efficacious. With the true
instincts of a soldier he pressed on in the direction of the
Confederate army, and took part in its pursuit from Gettysburg back to
Virginia. Curiously enough, instead of commending and thanking him and
his raw troops for their gallant services, the Secretary of War ordered
his arrest for taking his command beyond the limits of Pennsylvania,
for the special defence of which the militia had been called out, but
fortunately the remonstrance of General Couch caused this order to be
recalled, and the gallant but unappreciated general again withdrew from
the field, as soon as the scare was over and his forces were permitted
to return to their homes.
It will be remembered that the news of Lee's defeat and his retreat
from Gettysburg reached the country on the 4th of July, and that the
same day was made triply memorable by the capture of Vicksburg with
Pemberton's entire army of 30,000 men with all their guns and
ammunitions. These two striking events threw the country into the
wildest enthusiasm. Even the most despondent now became confident that
the Southern Confederacy would soon be destroyed, and that the
triumphant Union would be finally re-established. But this confidence
was destined to be rudely shaken.
Later in the summer, taking advantage of the lull in operations
elsewhere, the Confederate leaders sent Longstreet's splendid corps of
veterans from Virginia, and that part of Johnston's army which had been
paroled, together with such detachments as could be got from Alabama,
to reinforce Bragg, who had been driven by Rosecrans from Middle
Tennessee to Northern Georgia. Turning fiercely upon his over-confident
pursuer, as soon as his reinforcements were at hand, Bragg struck a
staggering blow at Chickamauga, which not only came near giving
Chattanooga back to him, but filled the northern states with
consternation. The war was not only not ended, but had burst forth with
renewed vigor. Reinforcements in large numbers were hurried forward
from all parts of the country to Chattanooga. Hooker, with Howard's and
Slocum's corps, was sent out by rail from Virginia, while the greater
part of Grant's Army of the Tennessee was withdrawn from the lower
Mississippi, where it was resting after the capture of Vicksburg, and
marched over-land from Memphis to the same place. The separate
departments in the Mississippi Valley were consolidated into a military
grand division, under the supreme command of General Grant, and what
turned out to be of almost equal importance was the fact that Brigadier
General William F. Smith was relieved from service in West Virginia,
where he had been recently assigned to duty, and sent to contribute his
part towards strengthening the national grasp upon the vast region of
which Chattanooga was justly considered the strategic center.
Whatever the government at that time may have thought of him as a
commander of troops, it is certain that it was willing to recognize and
use his experience and marked intellectual resources as an engineer
officer to their fullest extent. As it turned out, it could not have
paid him a greater compliment, nor given him a better opportunity for
distinction. His fame had gone before him, and on his arrival at
Chattanooga, although he preferred the command of troops, he was
assigned at once to duty as Chief Engineer of the Department and Army
of the Cumberland. Fortunately this gave him the control, not only of
the engineer troops and materials, and the engineer operations of that
army, but carried with it the right and duty of knowing the army's
condition and requirements as well as all the plans which might be
considered for extricating it from the extraordinary perils and
difficulties which surrounded it.
Although efforts have been made at various times and by various
writers, to minimize these perils and difficulties, it cannot be denied
that the situation of that army was at that epoch an exceedingly grave
one. It had been rudely checked, if not completely beaten, in one of
the most desperate and bloody battles of the war, and shut up in
Chattanooga by Bragg's army on the south, and by an almost impassable
mountain region on the north and west. Its communication by rail with
its secondary base at Bridgeport, and with its primary base at
Nashville, had been broken by the Confederate cavalry and rendered most
uncertain. Its supplies were scanty and growing daily less, while its
artillery horses and draft mules were dying by hundreds, for lack of
forage. The only safe wagon roads to the rear were by a long and
circuitous route through the mountains north of the Tennessee River,
which was besides so rough and muddy that the teams could haul hardly
enough for their own subsistence, much less an adequate supply for the
troops.
All the contemporary accounts go to show that Rosecrans, while
personally brave enough, was himself more or less confused and excited
by the great disaster which had overtaken his army at Chickamauga. He
had been cut off and greatly shaken by the overthrow of his right wing,
and consequently retired with it to Chattanooga. Notwithstanding this
unfortunate withdrawal and his failure to rejoin the organized portion
of his army, which under General George H. Thomas, held on firmly to
its position against every attack, those who knew Rosecrans best still
believed him to be a most loyal and gallant gentleman who was anxious
and willing to do all that could be done to save his army and maintain
its advanced position. But there is no satisfactory evidence that up to
the time he turned over his command to his successor, he had formed any
adequate or comprehensive plan for supplying it or getting it ready to
resume the offensive. Every general in it knew that it needed and must
have supplies, and that the only way to get them, without falling back,
was to open and keep open the direct road or "cracker line" to
Bridgeport. But how and when this was to be done was the great
question.
Much has been written upon this subject; a military commission has had
it under consideration; the records have been consulted; a report has
been made, and comments upon it have been issued by General Smith and
his friends. Even the late Secretary of War, Elihu Root, has passed
judgment upon it, and yet it can be safely said that nothing has been
done to disturb the conclusion reached at the time, that General Smith
in consultation with his superiors worked out the plan as to how, when
and by what means the short supply line by the way of Brown's Ferry and
the Lookout Valley should he opened and maintained. He certainly
secured its adoption first by Thomas and afterwards by Grant, and
finally when he had arranged all the details of the complicated and
delicate operations, and had prepared all engineer's materials and
pontoons which were required, he personally commanded the troops and
carried that part of the plan which was based on Chattanooga, to a
successful conclusion.
When it is remembered that Rosecrans had left Chattanooga, that he had
been succeeded by Thomas, and that Grant himself had arrived on the
ground and assumed supreme command, before the first practical step had
been taken to carry the plan into effect, and that the plan itself
involved a descent and passage of the Tennessee River by night, the
defeat and capture of the enemy's outposts, the laying of a pontoon
bridge across a broad and rapid river, the rebuilding of the railroad,
and its maintenance within easy reach of the enemy's front for
twenty-five miles, and that all of this was done without the slightest
mishap and with but little loss, and that it resulted in relieving the
army from want and in putting it in condition to resume the offensive
as soon as its reinforcements had arrived, some fair idea may be had of
the value of General Smith's services and the part he actually
performed in all that took place. If General Rosecrans had actually
conceived and worked out all the details of the plan, which cannot be
successfully claimed, there would still be enough left to the credit of
General Smith to immortalize him, but when Grant, Thomas and all the
other officers who were present and in position to know what was
actually done gave Smith the praise, not only for conceiving it, but
carrying the plan into successful effect, there is but little room left
for further controversy.
If any additional testimony is needed as to the masterful part played
by Smith at Chattanooga, it is found in the fact that Grant made haste
to attach him to his own staff and to recommend him for promotion to
the grade of major-general to take rank from the date of his original
appointment, declaring in support of his recommendation that he felt
"under more than ordinary obligations for the masterly manner in which
he discharged the duties of his position." Later he recommended that
Smith be put first of all the army on the list for promotion, adding:
"He is possessed of one of the clearest military heads in the army, is
very practical and industrious," and emphasized it all with the highly
eulogistic declaration that "no man in the army is better qualified
than he for the largest military commands."
It is noteworthy that about the same time General Butler with whom he
had served for a short season, made an application to have General
Smith re-assigned to his command, but the Secretary of War, having
evidently forgotten his order for Smith's arrest at the close of the
Gettysburg campaign, wrote: "The services of William F. Smith, now
Chief Engineer in the Army of the Cumberland, are indispensable in that
command, and it will be impossible to assign him to your Department."
But this was not all. General George H. Thomas, the soul of honor and
fair dealing on the 20th of November, 1863, although General Smith had
already been transferred from his own to the staff of General Grant,
formally recommended him for promotion in the following striking and
comprehensive words:
"For industry and energy displayed by him from the time of
his reporting for duty at these headquarters, in organizing
the Engineer Department, and for his skillful execution of
the movements at Brown's Ferry, Tennessee, on the night of
October 26th, 1863, in surprising the enemy and throwing a
pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River at that point, a
vitally important service necessary to the opening of
communications between Bridgeport and Chattanooga."
Certainly no language could be more clear and unequivocal than this,
and yet, as though General Thomas wished to remove all chance of doubt
as to whom the highest credit was due, he declared in a later and more
formal official report:
"To Brigadier General William F. Smith, Chief Engineer,
should be accorded great praise for the ingenuity which
conceived and the ability which executed the movements at
Brown's Ferry."
While even the best memory so long after the event is but little to be
depended upon for details, it may serve especially when supplementing
the records, to strengthen the conclusions therefrom. In this instance
it should be stated that it was perfectly well known to the late
Charles A. Dana, then present at Chattanooga as Assistant Secretary of
War, and also to myself, who was serving at the time on General Grant's
staff as Inspector General, and was in daily contact with all the
leading officers, that it was General Smith, and General Smith alone,
who conceived and carried out the plan actually used for the capture of
Brown's Ferry and the re-establishment of the direct line of
communication between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. Indeed, there was no
question in that army, or at that time, in regard to the matter.
Rosecrans was never mentioned in connection with it, while Smith's
praise was in everybody's mouth till the close of the campaign, not
only for the Brown's Ferry movement, but, what was still more
important, for the plan of operations against Bragg's position on
Missionary Ridge. He it was who personally familiarized himself with
the _terrain_ in the entire field of operations, which, with the
mountains, valleys, rivers and creeks, that gave it its unique
character, was the most complicated and difficult one of the entire
war, if not the most complicated and difficult one upon which a great
battle was ever fought. It was he alone who worked out every detail of
the combinations and movements by which the great victory of Missionary
Ridge was won. I state this upon my own knowledge and not upon hearsay.