[From THE NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 17, 1915.]
William Roscoe Thayer, author of the article printed below,
is one of the leading authorities on Italy in this country.
His works on Italian history include "The Dawn of Italian
Independence," "Italica," "A Short History of Venice," and
"The Life and Times of Cavour." The last named, published
three years ago, made a marked impression and won for its
author an enviable place as a historian. Mr. Thayer is a
graduate of Harvard and has edited the Harvard Graduates'
Magazine since 1892. Since 1913 he has been a member of the
Board of Overseers of Harvard College.
Too little has been said about Italy's refusal to join Germany and
Austria in their war for world power. During the past five months we
have heard German apologists offer the most contradictory arguments to
prove, first, that Russia, next, that France and Belgium, and,
finally, that England began the struggle. The Kaiser himself, with
that disdain of fact which is the privilege of autocrats, declared
that the sword was forced into his hands. And all the while the mere
abstention of Italy from supporting Germany and Austria gave the lie
to the Germanic protestations and excuses.
By the terms of the Triple Alliance every member of it is bound to
communicate at once to the other members all international diplomatic
transactions which concern the alliance. Germany and Austria failed to
do this during the earlier stages in July, when they were preparing
for the war. Only after they had laid their train so surely that an
explosion was almost inevitable did they communicate the documents to
Italy and call upon her to take her place in the field with them. But
Italy refused; because, after examining the evidence, she concluded
that Germany and Austria were the aggressors. Now, the terms of the
Triple Alliance bind its members to stand by each other only in case
of attack.
Italy's verdict, therefore, threw the guilt of the war on Germany and
Austria. She had testimony before her which does not appear even in
the "White Papers" and other official diplomatic correspondence; and
all the efforts of German zealots and casuists have not subtracted one
iota from the meaning of her abstention. Germany and Austria were the
aggressors--that is the Italian verdict which history will confirm.
On this side of the water the German apologists made as little as
possible of Italy's withdrawal--they were too busy trying to persuade
the American public that trivialities like the passage of a French
aeroplane or of a French automobile with two French officers in it,
across a corner of Belgium, thirty minutes before the German Army
invaded Belgium, proved that the French and Belgians began the war.
They sneered a little at Italian honor; they implied that scuttling
off was all that could be expected of a decadent Latin people; and
they hinted that, after the Kaiser had disposed of France, Belgium,
England, and Russia, he would punish Italy for her "flight."
At Berlin, however, the importance--military, political, and naval--of
Italy's withdrawal from the Triple Alliance was appraised at its true
value. The German Foreign Office employed alternately threats and
blandishments upon her. They warned her that, if she refused to back
up her allies, she would be treated without mercy at the end of
hostilities. When the policy of terrorizing failed, seductive promises
were held out--suggestions of an addition to Italian territory and of
a subsidy for military expenses. These also failed. Italy could not be
induced to send her million soldiers against the Allies. Then Germany
labored to prevent her from actively joining the Allies--and this
effort Germany is keeping up at the present moment, under the
direction of the sleek Prince von Bülow.
The Italians, who have in large measure a sense of humor, that
clarifying quality which Prussianization has destroyed in the Germans,
must have smiled when they heard the German envoys expatiate on the
beauties of neutrality, and, although they are a polite people, they
must have found it hard to keep from laughing when the agents of Dr.
Bethmann-Hollweg, who had just declared that a treaty is only a scrap
of paper, to be torn up at pleasure, tried to impress upon Italy the
sacredness of the treaty which bound her to the Triple Alliance.
Not content with these official, or officious, manoeuvres, the German
Government sent Socialist leaders into Italy to urge the Italian
Socialists not to consent to a war in behalf of the Allies; but they,
too, seem to have met with a chilly reception. The Italian Socialists,
like the rest of the world, wondered why it was that 5,000,000
Socialists in Germany should allow themselves to be commandeered,
apparently without a murmur, to uphold a war waged to preserve and
extend military despotism.
In addition to these direct efforts to win Italy to their side, or at
least to keep her from going over to the enemy, the Germans have been
busy since early in August with their Press Bureau, which has pursued
methods there similar to those they have made us familiar with here.
But in Italy they have been more guarded and less truculent, and they
have not, like the preposterous Bernstorff and his associates, assumed
that the public they were addressing was not only ignorant of the
simplest facts of recent European history, but were also morally
imbecile.
Although the Italians are not less susceptible than are other peoples
to be swayed by sudden political gusts, they were not at the end of
July, 1914, taken by surprise. For a long time past their King and
statesmen had deliberated as to what ought to be Italy's course in
case Germany should carry out her well-understood purpose of humbling
England. The Italians were not deceived by the increase from year to
year of the German Army. They knew perfectly well what the tremendous
efforts of the Germans to create a great navy meant. They had no
illusions as to the purpose of the strategic railways to the Belgian
frontier on the west or to the Russian border on the east. They knew
how narrowly a European war was averted during the Balkan cataclysm
two years ago. They did not wrong the Kaiser by supposing that the
immense fund which he had recently raised from "voluntary" 5 per cent.
contributions on incomes was to be given to The Hague Tribunal to
promote the cause of universal peace. They logically and honorably
decided that, if Germany provoked war, Italy would not support her.
The bond of the Triple Alliance called for no other action on her
part. Germany and Austria provoked the war; Italy stood by her
agreement.
But a still further consideration influenced her. It was understood
that, _if the war in which Germany and Austria engaged should involve
England as an enemy, Italy's obligation to support the Triple Alliance
would cease_. Since it would be suicidal for Italy to accept the
liability of a _casus foederis_ which should expose her to attack by
the English and French Navies, her participation in the Triple
Alliance always carried the proviso that it did not bind her to fight
England.
Such is the substance of the statement made by the dean of Italian
statesmen, in a letter I received from him two months ago. No Italian
could speak from a more thorough knowledge of the facts than he
possessed, and that it has long been surmised that the Triplice could
not drive Italy against England appears in various publications. Gen.
Bernhardi, for instance, who knew so accurately the intentions of the
German General Staff and the secrets of the German Foreign Office,
intimates more than once that Germany and Austria, in their war for
world power, need not hope for Italy's support. Referring to Col.
Boucher's book, "L'Offensive contre L'Allemagne," he says: "Modern
French writers are already reckoning so confidently on the withdrawal
of Italy from the Triple Alliance that they no longer think it
necessary to put an army in the field against Italy, but consider that
the entire forces of France are available against Germany."[4]
[Footnote 4: Bernhardi: "Germany and the Next War." English popular
edition, Page 138.]
[Illustration: [map]]
Why Italy made the reservation in the case of England will appear when
we glance at the origin of the Triple Alliance.
In 1871 Bismarck thought that the Franco-Prussian war, by the military
losses and by the immense indemnity which it inflicted on the French
people, had rendered France powerless for a generation. But within
four years she paid the indemnity and had so far recovered in her
armament, commerce, and prosperity, that the Iron Chancellor prepared
to attack her again, and this time, to quote his butcher's phrase, "to
bleed her white." Only the certainty that the other powers would
interfere stayed his hand then.
So he set about circumventing France by other means. A league of the
three Emperors of Germany, Austria, and Russia was the combination he
preferred; but Russia proved an uncertain partner, as she feared
Germanization, on the one hand, and, on the other, she was the
encourager of pro-Slavic aspirations which ran counter to the Germans'
ambition. Bismarck, therefore, looked about him for an alternative
plan.
He would keep the friendship of Russia--even though Russia declined a
formal league--and he would lure Italy into the Germanic alliance.
England, he knew, could not be persuaded to enter a Continental
combination. Her commercial interests pointed elsewhere, and she still
clung to her policy of splendid isolation. But Italy was unattached;
and while she was the least formidable of the six great powers,
Bismarck saw that he could make good use of her for his own purposes.
The adroitness by which he drew her into his net is in direct contrast
to the bovine diplomacy by which Kaiser William II. and his
subservient Chancellors have succeeded, during the past twenty years,
in smashing all their alliances and in alienating the sympathy of the
civilized world.
After the completion of Italian unity in 1870, the new Italian Kingdom
found itself harassed not only by the many details of solidifying the
civil Government, but also by the perplexities of international
relations. The abolition of the Pope's temporal power made her, in
theory at least, an object of odium to zealous Roman Catholics
throughout the world. Her nearest neighbors--France and
Austria--having long been the most loyal supporters of the head of the
Roman Church, Italy could not be sure that either or both of them
might not intrigue against her in behalf of the restoration of the
Papacy. There was also in Italy a group of patriotic Jingoes--the
Irredentists--bent on "redeeming" from Austria territory whose
inhabitants they claimed were Italian in language, ideals, and
situation. The Irredentist propaganda naturally increased the rancor
which Austria felt toward the Italians over whom she had recently
despotized.
When Crispi, who was passing from his earlier character of conspirator
and Radical to that of constitutional statesman, made the tour of the
European Chancelleries, in 1877, he found Bismarck profuse in his
expression of good-will toward Italy. If we are to believe Crispi, the
Chancellor was ready then to draw up a treaty with her, and went so
far as to hint that he approved of Italy's aspirations. Among these
were the possession of Tunis and a foothold on the east coast of the
Adriatic. The next year, at the Berlin Congress, however, Italy's
interests were ignored, and, instead, Austria was encouraged to extend
her dominion south of the Balkans, and the French were at least not
discouraged from coveting a stronger position in the Mediterranean.
Finally, in 1882, France seized Tunis, to the immense indignation of
the Italians, who had come to regard that as their predestined
province. For it lay only a few hours by steamer from the southern
coast of Sicily; it commanded the passage between the western and
eastern Mediterranean; and, above all, it was the symbol of Italy's
colonial ambition. To have a colony, if not several, was then regarded
as the sign of being a first-class power; and that Italy should be
tricked out of Tunis seemed to advertise to the world that she was not
a first-class power. For her protests availed nothing.
The Italians did not know then, nor for a long time afterward, that
_the French seizure of Tunis was directly due to Bismarck's
instigation_. Lord Salisbury, also, who seems to have been in the
plot, approved it for his own reasons. Bismarck's motives were
plain--he wished to entangle France further in African colonial
ventures. It had taken forty years, many thousand soldiers' lives, and
great expenditures for France to make Algiers reasonably safe. As
Tunis would increase the French burdens, it followed that every
regiment needed there would diminish the strength of the armies with
which France guarded herself from a German attack on her eastern
frontier.
Having roused the Italians to wrath by this ruse, Bismarck had no
difficulty in persuading them to join the Triple Alliance. He hardly
needed to suggest that, if they had felt anxious at the possibility of
French hostile pressure before, they had an even greater reason for
such anxiety now that the French controlled the Mediterranean south of
them. We may suspect also that Bismarck pointed out, as a special
inducement, that, if Italy joined the alliance, she would be free from
the likelihood of an attack by Austria.
Accordingly, in 1882, Italy entered into partnership with Germany and
Austria for mutual defense. The only powers likely to assail them at
that time were France and Russia; for England was still isolated, and
Bismarck, although he felt a strong antipathy toward the English, was
too shrewd a statesman either to scorn or to provoke them. As late as
1889, he approved of Italy's seeking an _entente_ with England.
At the time Italy joined the Triplice she felt, no doubt, an unwonted
sense of security. Were not two powerful empires standing by, ready
to defend her? Her wounded pride, also, was solaced by her admission
on equal terms into such a league. Neither France nor any other could
henceforth taunt her with being a second-rate power.
The immediate result of the alliance was the spread of German
commercial and financial enterprises throughout the peninsula, and the
steady growth of Italian bad feeling toward France. A large group of
Italians made Gallophobia their guiding principle. They remembered
that, in the sixties, Napoleon III. had maintained at Rome that French
garrison which prevented them from emancipating the States of the
Church from Papal control, and from completing the unification of
Italy. They remembered that Napoleon annexed Nice--Garibaldi's
birthplace--to France, and that the French _chassepots_ at Mentana
dispersed Garibaldi and his red shirts bent on capturing the Eternal
City. In the eighties, the Italians had good reason to suspect that
the French Clericals were busy devising some imbroglio through which
the Pope might be restored to the temporal power.
A convinced Gallophobe and crafty intriguer like Crispi, therefore,
easily inflamed Italian indignation, so recently excited by the
seizure of Tunis and by Clerical intrigues, and he counted it a gay
feather in his cap when, in 1889, he declared a tariff war on France.
Hard times for Italy followed; the commerce of the country was
dislocated, and although Crispi tried to get compensation by
negotiating special terms for trade with Germany and Austria, the new
customers did not make up for the old. Germany could not furnish
capital as France had done. Paris was, and is, the financial capital
of the European Continent.
On this side Italy lost and Bismarck gained by the Triple
Alliance--for he had attained his purpose of splitting France and
Italy apart. What advantage did the Italians derive from the
agreement? The reply commonly given is, protection. But, we ask,
protection from whom? Not from France, because it is clear enough
that, whether the Triplice existed or not, Germany would have attacked
the French, if they had attacked the Italians; so that Italy had in
Germany a logical protector, to whom she need not have sacrificed her
initiative.
Her only other possible assailant was Austria, and it may fairly be
argued that the alliance restrained Austria from attack; but Austria
permitted herself every other unfriendly act toward Italy except open
war; and Germany looked placidly on.
The fact that Germany, the chief Protestant nation in Europe, was the
ally of Italy, might also be regarded as a support to the Italians in
their long conflict with Papal pretensions; but how little Germany
cared for Italy's welfare in this struggle appeared in 1903, when
Kaiser Wilhelm prevented the election of Cardinal Rampolla as Pope.
Rampolla, if not a Liberal, was a devoted Italian; Sarti, who defeated
him, was a Reactionary, controlled by the Jesuits, hostile to Italy.
When we look at Germany's action in other affairs we find pleasant
words but no tangible profit. From her geographical position Italy
claimed an interest in the status of the Balkan Peninsula, and
particularly in the eastern shore of the Adriatic. Germany pretended
to favor her interests--according to Crispi, Bismarck even went so far
as to ask, "Why don't you take Albania?"--but it was Austria that
Germany steadily pushed on into the Balkans; and in 1908, when
Austria, with Germany's connivance, appropriated Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the Italians realized that they had been tricked again,
as they were in the case of Tunis.
Since 1908 the Teutonic partners, growing more and more arrogant, have
shown indifference to the concerns of their Italian ally, who, seeing
no future for her in Europe, swooped down on Tripoli, the only stretch
of North African littoral not already possessed by the French and by
the English. Persons on the inside at Rome whispered that, if Italy
had not occupied Tripoli when she did, Germany would have forestalled
her; for the Kaiser, furious at being thwarted in Morocco and at
having failed to bully France into submission, as he had done in 1905,
had determined to seize Tripoli, come what might. More than one
Foreign Office has ample proof to settle this assertion. Its
plausibility is patent--Germany was already in close league with
Turkey, and, looking forward to a war on England, she saw the
advantage of owning territory and a naval base within easy reach of
the Suez Canal.
Certain it is that both Germany and Austria frowned on Italy's Libyan
enterprise, and that, in their intrigues in the Balkan Peninsula, in
1912 and 1913, they ignored their Italian partner.
And yet as long ago as 1895 Germany admitted that Italy was hardly
getting a fair return from her bargain with her Teutonic allies. On
March 5, 1895, Senator Lanza reported an interview he had just had
with Emperor William, who said; "He had found Count Kálnoky (the
Austrian Premier) ... still uneasy lest we (Italy) may come to
consider the Triple Alliance insufficiently advantageous, merely
because it cannot supply us, at once and in times of peace, with the
necessary means of satisfying our desires with regard to the
territories of Northern Africa and others as well. His Majesty ...
added: 'Wait patiently. Let the occasion but present itself and you
shall have whatever you wish.'"[5]
[Footnote 5: Crispi's "Memoirs," iii., 326-7.]
In spite of the Kaiser's assurance, Italy has got less and less return
from the Triple Alliance every year since 1895.
It appears, therefore, that Italy long ago opened her eyes as to the
real profit the alliance brought her. When England loomed up as the
objective which Germany resolved to destroy, Italy quite logically let
it be understood that she would not engage in a fight against England.
Over thirty years of political alliance had created no sympathy among
the Italians for the Germans. Like all other Europeans, they resented
the arrogance of the Teutons who strode over their country.
But deeper, far deeper than personal dislike of bad manners was the
fundamental antagonism between the Italian and the Prussian ideal. The
Italians were pledged to Liberty, the Germans to Autocracy, bulwarked
by militarism. In their long struggle for independence the Italians
had had the sympathy of the best Englishmen, and in Palmerston, and
especially in Lord John Russell, they found very powerful political
helpers. But never since Bismarck took the helm of Prussia had one
word in behalf of Democracy and Freedom been lisped by Monarch or
Minister. For Italy to abandon her democratic ideal and to revert to
the feudal-despotic ideal of the Pan-Germanists is unthinkable.
If she goes into the war, as now seems probable, it will be to uphold
the Allies, who are fighting against Teutonic ambition inspired by
despotic aims. Self-preservation demands that choice--because, should
Germany win, she will not spare Italy. A stronger reason than
self-interest, or than fear, however, will guide the Italians. In
their past civilization and in their modern ideals they belong with
the Western powers. They know the origin of their national
independence. And if any Ministry should attempt to send them to
replenish the wasting armies of Germany and of Austria, they would
invoke the memory of Victor Emmanuel and of Garibaldi, of Mazzini and
of Cavour, and refuse to be partners in schemes to aggrandize the
Hapsburgs and the Hohenzollerns.
"I am the son of Liberty," said Cavour; "to her I owe all that I am."
That, too, is Italy's motto, which she will not deny.