By H.G. Wells.
(_Copyright by The New York Times Company._)
The article which follows was written by H.G. Wells for
publication in England. The British censor, however, refused
to permit its appearance there, and thus it was printed in
the United States for the first time by THE NEW YORK TIMES
on Feb. 7, 1915. In the development of his argument Mr.
Wells points out that "the Dutch hold a sword at the back of
Germany." That Holland has no intention of sheathing this
sword, so removing a menace from Germany, is indicated by
the recent cable from The Hague telling of the message sent
by the Government to the Second Chamber of the Legislature
dealing with pending legislation to prolong the term of
enlistment in the regular army, in which this language is
used: "The position of our country demands today, as it did
in August, that our entire military force should be at all
times available."
What changes for Holland are likely to result from the present war?
Let me, as an irresponsible journalist, try to estimate them, and try
to forecast what Holland is likely to do in the next few months. I do
not want for a moment to suggest what Dutchmen ought to do; this
preaching to highly intelligent neutrals is not a writer's business,
but I want to imagine how things must look in the private mind of a
wary patriotic Hollander, and to guess what may be the outcome.
Because in many ways Holland does seem to hold the key to the present
situation.
It is clear that whatever fears may have been felt for the integrity
of Holland at the beginning of the war must now be very much abated.
The risk of Germany attacking Holland diminishes with each day of
German failure, and the whole case and righteousness of the Allies
rests upon their respect for Holland. Holland's position as regards
Germany now is extraordinarily strong materially, and as regards the
Allies it is overwhelmingly strong morally. She has behaved patiently
and sanely through a trying crisis. She has endured much almost
inevitable provocation and temptation with dignity and honesty. Were
she now subjected to any German outrage she could strike with her
excellent army of 400,000 men at Aix-la-Chapelle, and turn repulse
into rapid disaster.
That is the interesting thing about the Dutch position now. The Dutch
hold a sword at the back of Germany. Were they to come into the war on
the German side, they would, no doubt, provide a most effective but
certainly not a decisive reinforcement to the German western front,
but they would also lay open a convenient way for the Allies to the
vital part of Germany, Westphalia. But were they to come in on the
side of the Allies they would at once deliver a conclusive blow. They
could cut the main communications of the German army in Flanders, they
could round up and assist to capture a very large portion of the
German western forces, and they could open the road not only to attack
but to turn the Rhine defenses. In fact, they could finish Germany.
This situation is already fairly obvious; I betray no strategic
secret; it must become manifest to every Dutchman before many more
weeks. One has but to look at the map. Every day now diminishes the
possibility of Germany being able to make any effective
counterattack, any Belgian destruction, in Holland, and every day
increases the weight of the blow that Holland may deliver. What are
the chances that Holland may not ultimately realize to the full the
possibilities of that blow and join the Allies?
Against her doing so is the consideration that she is doing very well
as she is. She keeps her freedom. Practically the Allies fight to
secure it for her. The dread of Germanization which has hung over
Holland for forty years seems to recede.
And, of course, as a secondary restraining force there is the
reasonable fear of devastation. The "good German" vindictiveness might
make one last supreme effort.
But, on the other hand, is she really doing as well as it seems?
Unless she intervenes this war will probably last for another full
year. She wants it to end. It is a terrible oppression. Her army must
remain mobilized, even if it does not fight. Her trade stagnates. She
is incumbered by refugees. What if she struck to end the war and get
the tension over? Not now, perhaps, but presently. Simultaneously with
the Franco-British counter-stroke that now draws near.
And what if she struck also for a hatred of what has happened to
Belgium? Suppose the Dutch are not so much frightened by the horrible
example of Belgium as indignant. My impression of the Dutch--and we
English know something of the Dutch spirit--is that they are a people
not easily cowed. Suppose that they have not only a reasonable fear
but a reasonable hatred of "frightfulness." Suppose that an
intelligent fellow-feeling for a small nation has filled them with a
desire to give Germany a lesson. There, it may be, is a second reason
why Holland should come in.
And by coming in, there is something more than the mere termination of
a strain and the vindication of international righteousness to
consider. There is the possibility, and not only the possibility but
the possible need, that Holland should come out of this world war
aggrandized. I want to lay stress upon that, because it may prove a
decisive factor in this matter.
The Dutch desire aggrandizement for the sake of aggrandizement as
little as any nation in Europe. But what if the path of aggrandizement
be also the path of safety?
It is clear that both France and Belgium will demand and receive
territorial compensation for these last months of horror. It is
ridiculous to suppose that the Germans may fling war in its most
atrocious and filthy form over Belgium and some of the sweetest parts
of France without paying bitterly and abundantly for the freak.
Quite apart from indemnities, France and Belgium must push forward
their boundaries so far that if ever Germany tries another rush she
will have to rush for some days through her own lost lands. The only
tolerable frontier against Germans is a day's march deep in Germany.
Of course, Liége will have to be covered in the future by Belgian
annexations in the Aix region and stretching toward Cologne, and
France will go to the Rhine. I think Belgium as well as France will be
forced to go to the Rhine.
It is no good talking now of buffer States, because the German
conscience cannot respect them. Buffer States are just anvil States.
At any rate, very considerable annexations of German territory by
Belgium and France are now inevitable, and Holland must expect a much
larger and stronger Belgium to the south of her, allied firmly to
France and England.
And to the north is it very likely that the British will be able to
tolerate the continued German possession of the Frisian Islands? These
islands, and the coast of East Friesland, have had but one use in
German hands, and that use has been the preparation of attacks on
England. Clearly the British may decide to have no more of such
attacks. Every advance in scientific warfare may make them more
dangerous and exasperating. The British intend soberly and sanely to
do their utmost to make a repetition of the present war impossible. To
secure this they may find it necessary to have Germany out of the
North Sea. But they have no desire whatever to take either the Frisian
Islands or East Friesland, if Holland will save them that trouble.
Now, suppose the Dutch will not think of this now. Suppose, for the
want of their aid, the Allies are unable to press the war to the
complete regimentation of Germany, what will be the position of
Holland in twenty years' time?
[Illustration: [map]]
She will stand between England and Germany. A Germany incompletely
beaten means an Anglophobe Germany. Belgium and France expanded,
recuperated, allied, linked by a common literature and language, may
be too formidable for another German attack. So that there is the
possibility that in twenty years' time or so Germany, recovering and
vindictive, may in some way contrive to hold off France and Belgium,
and try her luck against England alone. By that time submarine and
aeroplane may be so developed as to render a German attack on England
much more hopeful than it is at present, especially by way of the
Rhine mouth. What, in the light of the Belgian experience and the new
doctrine of a "right of way," will be the outlook for a little
isolated Holland, as small as she is now, as a buffer State in such a
case.
She has always been claimed as a part of the great Pan-German scheme,
and at any time she may find the German heel upon her face,
vindictively punishing her for her lack of enthusiasm for Teutonic
brotherhood. Hadn't she better get herself a little larger and
stronger now; hadn't she better help to make the ending of the German
threat more conclusive, and link herself definitely with the grand
alliance of the Western Powers? Now she could make a very good bargain
indeed. If she inquired she would find Britain ready enough to
guarantee the integrity and protection of Holland's colonial empire
forever by the British fleet. All the four Western Powers, France,
Belgium, Holland, Britain, would be willing to make the most binding
pledges for such mutual protection. It is the manifest common-sense of
the settlement that they should set up such a collective guarantee.
And, in addition, there are those Frisian Islands, and East Friesland,
and that dangerous wedge that Germany drives into Holland along the
Rhine. It is not difficult to map a very much improved Dutch frontier
along the Ems, and thence striking down to the Rhine and meeting the
iron country on the left bank of the Rhine, whose annexation and
exploitation is Belgium's legitimate compensation for her devastation
and sufferings. Here are the makings of a safer Greater Holland!
Thousands of Dutchmen must be looking on the map at the present time
and thinking such things as this. There, clearly and attractively, is
the price of alliance.
The price of neutrality is an intact Holland--and a certain isolation
in the years ahead. But still, I admit, a not unhappy Holland, Dutch
and free. Until a fresh Anglo-German struggle begins. Yet, be it
noted, a Holland a little helpless and friendless if some renascent
Asiatic Power should presently covet her Eastern possessions.
The price of participation with Germany, on the other hand, is
complete envelopment in the warm embrace of the "good German
brotherhood"--the gradual substitution of the German language for the
Dutch, and a Germanization of such colonies as the Allies may still
leave for Holland, frequent State visits from Kaisers, and the
subordination of Dutch mercantile interests to those of Hamburg and
Altona and (Germanized) Antwerp. And--the everlasting howling
everywhere of "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles."
(No! No! They will never fight for the Germans. No sane people will
ever fight for the Germans if they can possibly avoid it. Not even our
press censorship, not even the Maximilian Krafts in our silliest
weekly papers will provoke Holland to that.)
But I have a sort of feeling, for the reasons I have stated, that even
without any serious breach of Dutch neutrality by the Germans, Holland
may decide presently to put her troops beside the Belgians. And if, as
is always possible, the Germans do make some lumpish onslaught upon
Dutch neutrality, then I am convinced that at once that sturdy little
country will up and fight like the very devil. And do remarkably well
by it.
And I have a much stronger feeling that presently the Dutch Government
will ask the Germans to reconsider their proposed annexation of
Belgium. Upon that point Holland has absolutely dictatorial power at
the present moment. She could secure the independence of Belgium at
the cost of a little paper and ink, she could force Germany to
evacuate her sister country by the mere movement of her army.
_Copyright in U.S.A._