London, Jan. 26.--Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, today authorized the following statement in reply to
an interview obtained with Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German
Imperial Chancellor, by a representative of The Associated Press and
published in London on Jan. 26 and in the United States on Jan. 25:
"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs authorizes the publication
of the following observations upon the report of an interview recently
granted by the German Chancellor to an American correspondent. It is
not surprising that the German Chancellor should show anxiety to
explain away his now historic phrase about a treaty being a mere
'scrap of paper.'
"The phrase has made a deep impression because the progress of the
world largely depends upon the sanctity of agreements between
individuals and between nations, and the policy disclosed in Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg's phrase tends to debase the legal and moral currency
of civilization.
"What the German Chancellor said was that Great Britain in requiring
Germany to respect the neutrality of Belgium 'was going to make war
just for a word, just for a scrap of paper'--that is, that Great
Britain was making a mountain out of a molehill. He now asks the
American public to believe that he meant the exact opposite of what he
said; that it was Great Britain who really regarded the neutrality of
Belgium as a mere trifle, and that it was Germany who 'took her
responsibilities toward the neutral States so seriously.'
"The arguments by which Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg seeks to establish
the two sides of this case are in flat contradiction of the plain
facts.
"First, the German Chancellor alleges that 'England in 1911 was
determined to throw troops into Belgium without the assent of the
Belgian Government.' This allegation is absolutely false. It is based
upon certain documents found in Brussels which record conversations
between British and Belgian officers in 1906, and again in 1911.
"The fact that there is no note of these conversations at the British
War Office or the Foreign Office shows that they were of a purely
informal character and that no military agreement of any sort was at
either time made between the two Governments. Before any conversations
took place between the British and the Belgian officers it was
expressly laid down on the British side that discussion of the
military possibilities was to be addressed to the manner in which, in
case of need, British assistance could be most effectually afforded to
Belgium for the defense of her neutrality, and on the Belgian side a
marginal note upon the record explains that 'the entry of the English
into Belgium would only take place after the violation of our
(Belgium's) neutrality by Germany.'
"As regards the conversation of 1911, the Belgian officer said to the
British officer: 'You could only land in our country with our
consent'; and in 1913 Sir Edward Grey gave the Belgian Government a
categorical assurance that no British Government would violate the
neutrality of Belgium and that 'so long as it was not violated by any
other power we should certainly not send troops ourselves into their
territory.'
"The Chancellor's method of misusing documents may be illustrated in
this connection. He represents Sir Edward Grey as saying, 'he did not
believe England would take such a step because he did not think
English public opinion would justify such action.'
"What Sir Edward Grey actually wrote was: 'I said that I was sure
that this Government would not be the first to violate the neutrality
of Belgium, and I did not believe that any British Government would be
the first to do so, nor would public opinion here ever approve of it.'
"If the German Chancellor wishes to know why there were conversations
on military subjects between British and Belgian officers he may find
one reason in a fact well known to him--namely, that Germany was
establishing an elaborate network of strategical railways leading from
the Rhine to the Belgian frontier through a barren, thinly populated
tract. The railways were deliberately constructed to permit of a
sudden attack upon Belgium, such as was carried out in August last.
"This fact alone was enough to justify any communications between
Belgium and the other powers on the footing that there would be no
violation of Belgian neutrality, unless it was previously violated by
another power. On no other footing did Belgium ever have any such
communications.
"In spite of these facts the German Chancellor speaks of Belgium as
having thereby 'abandoned and forfeited' her neutrality, and he
implies that he would not have spoken of the German invasion as a
'wrong' had he then known of the conversations of 1906 and 1911.
"It would seem to follow that according to Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg's
code wrong becomes right if the party which is to be the subject of
the wrong foresees the possibility and makes preparations to resist
it.
"Those who are content with older and more generally accepted
standards are likely to agree rather with what Cardinal Mercier said
in his pastoral letter: 'Belgium was bound in honor to defend her own
independence. She kept her oath. The other powers were bound to
respect and to protect her neutrality. Germany violated her oath.
England kept hers. These are the facts.'
"In the second part of the German Chancellor's thesis, namely, that
Germany 'took her responsibilities toward the neutral States
seriously,' he alleges nothing except that 'he spoke frankly of the
wrong committed by Germany' in invading Belgium.
"That a man knows the right while doing the wrong is not usually
accepted as proof of his serious conscientiousness. The real nature of
Germany's view of her 'responsibilities toward the neutral States'
may, however, be learned on authority which cannot be disputed by
reference to the English 'White Paper.'
"If those responsibilities were in truth taken seriously why, when
Germany was asked to respect the neutrality of Belgium if it were
respected by France, did Germany refuse? France, when asked the
corresponding question at the same time, agreed. This would have
guaranteed Germany from all danger of attack through Belgium.
"The reason of Germany's refusal was given by Herr von
Bethmann-Hollweg's colleague, (the German Foreign Secretary, Herr von
Jagow.) It may be paraphrased in the well-known gloss upon
Shakespeare: 'Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just, but four
times he that gets his blow in fust.'
"'They had to advance into France,' said Herr von Jagow, 'by the
quickest and easiest way so as to be able to get well ahead with their
operations and endeavor to strike some decisive blow as early as
possible.'
"Germany's real attitude toward Belgium was thus frankly given by the
German Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador, and the German
Chancellor in his speech to the Reichstag claimed the right to commit
a wrong in virtue of the military necessity of hacking his way
through. The treaty which forbade the wrong was by comparison a mere
scrap of paper.
"The truth was spoken in these first statements by the two German
Ministers. All the apologies and arguments which have since been
forthcoming are afterthoughts to excuse and explain away a flagrant
wrong. Moreover, all the attacks upon Great Britain in regard to this
matter and all talk about 'responsibilities toward neutral States'
come badly from the man who, on July 29, asked Great Britain to enter
into a bargain to condone the violation of the neutrality of Belgium.
"The German Chancellor spoke to the American correspondent of his
'efforts for years to bring about an understanding between England and
Germany.' An understanding, he added, which would have 'absolutely
guaranteed the peace of Europe.'
"He omitted to mention what Mr. Asquith made public in his speech at
Cardiff,[3] that Germany required as the price of an understanding an
unconditional pledge of England's neutrality. The British Government
were ready to bind themselves not to be parties to any aggression
against Germany. They were not prepared to pledge their neutrality in
case of aggression by Germany.
[Footnote 3: In his address at Cardiff, appearing in Vol. 1, No. 2, of
THE NEW YORK TIMES CURRENT HISTORY, Premier Asquith said:
In a communication to the German Government in 1912
regarding her future policy Great Britain declared that she
would neither make nor join in any unprovoked attack upon
Germany. But that was not enough for German statesmanship.
Germany wanted us to go further and pledge ourselves to
absolute neutrality in the event of Germany being engaged in
war. To that demand there was but one answer, and that was
the answer which the Government gave.]
"An Anglo-German understanding on the latter terms would not have
meant an absolute guarantee for the peace of Europe, but it would have
meant an absolutely free hand for Germany, so far as England was
concerned, for Germany to break the peace of Europe.
"The Chancellor says that in his conversation with the British
Ambassador in August last he 'may have been a bit excited at seeing
the hopes and work of the whole period of his Chancellorship going for
nought.'
"Considering that at the date of the conversation, Aug. 4, Germany had
already made war on France, the natural conclusion is that the
shipwreck of the Chancellor's hopes consisted not in a European war,
but in the fact that England had not agreed to stand out of it.
"The sincerity of the German Chancellor's professions to the American
correspondent may be brought to a very simple test, the application of
which is more apposite because it serves to recall one of the leading
facts which produced the present war.
"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg refused the proposal which England put
forward and in which France, Italy, and Russia concurred, for a
conference at which the dispute would have been settled on fair and
honorable terms without war. If he really wished to work with England
for peace why did he not accept that proposal? He must have known
after the Balkan conference in London that England could be trusted to
play fair. Herr von Jagow had given testimony in the Reichstag to
England's good faith in those negotiations.
"The proposal for the second conference between the powers was made by
Sir Edward Grey with the same straightforward desire for peace as in
1912 and 1913. The German Chancellor rejected this means of averting
the war. He who does not will the means must not complain if the
conclusion is drawn that he did not will the end.
"The second part of the interview with an American newspaper
correspondent consists of a discourse upon the ethics of the war. The
things which Germany has done in Belgium and France have been placed
on record by those who have suffered from them and who know them at
first hand. After this it does not lie with the German Chancellor to
read to the other belligerents a lecture upon the conduct of the
war."