Report of Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister in Berlin, to the Belgian
Minister of Foreign Affairs
[On the 23d of December, 1911, Baron Greindl, then and for many years
Belgian Minister in Berlin, made a report to the Belgian Minister of
Foreign Affairs. There was found in Brussels a copy of this report.
Although a copy, the official character of this third document found
in Brussels is evident from the official imprint on the paper on which
the copy stands. The first page reads:]
....... SECTION
No. ...........
..... ENCLOSURE COPY
Reply to No.
General department
Office of ........
BERLIN, Dec. 23, 1911.
Belgian Legation,
No. 3,022--1,626.
Strictly Confidential.
What is Belgium to do in case of war?
Mr. Minister:
I have had the honor to receive the dispatch of the 27th November
last, P without docket number, registration number 1,108....
[Baron Greindl's report is an extremely long one. Extracts from it
were published in The North German Gazette of Oct. 13. A facsimile has
been made of the first page only of the document, because of its great
length.
The writer reveals with great astuteness the ulterior motives
underlying the English proposal and draws attention to the danger of
the situation in which Belgium had become involved by a one-sided
partisanship in favor of the powers of the Entente. In this very
detailed report, dated Dec. 23, 1911, Baron Greindl explains that the
plan of the General Army Staff for the defense of Belgian neutrality
in a Franco-German war as communicated to him only concerned the
question as to what military measures should be adopted in case
Germany violated Belgian neutrality. The hypothesis of a French attack
on Germany through Belgium had, however, just as much probability in
itself. The diplomat then goes on in the following manner:]
"From the French side danger threatens not only in the south of
Luxemburg, it threatens us on our entire joint frontier. We are not
reduced to conjectures for this assertion. We have positive evidence
of it.
"Evidently the project of an outflanking movement from the north forms
part of the scheme of the entente cordiale. If that were not the case,
then the plan of fortifying Flushing would not have called forth such
an outburst in Paris and London. The reason why they wished that the
Scheldt should remain unfortified was hardly concealed by them. Their
aim was to be able to transport an English garrison, unhindered, to
Antwerp, which means to establish in our country a basis of operation
for an offensive in the direction of the Lower Rhine and Westphalia,
and then to make us throw our lot in with them, which would not be
difficult, for, after the surrender of our national centre of refuge,
we would, through our own fault, renounce every possibility of
opposing the demands of our doubtful protectors after having been so
unwise as to permit their entrance into our country. Col.
Barnardiston's announcements at the time of the conclusion of the
entente cordiale, which were just as perfidious as they were naïve,
have shown us plainly the true meaning of things. When it became
evident that we would not allow ourselves to be frightened by the
pretended danger of the closing of the Scheldt, the plan was not
entirely abandoned, but modified in so far as the British Army was not
to land on the Belgian coast, but at the nearest French harbors.
"The revelations of Capt. Faber, which were denied as little as the
newspaper reports by which they were confirmed or completed in several
respects, also testify to this. This British Army, at Calais and
Dunkirk, would by no means march along our frontier to Longwy in order
to reach Germany. It would directly invade Belgium from the northwest.
That would give it the advantage of being able to begin operations
immediately, to encounter the Belgian Army in a region where we could
not depend on any fortress, in case we wanted to risk a battle.
Moreover, that would make it possible for it to occupy provinces rich
in all kinds of resources and, at any rate, to prevent our
mobilization or only to permit it after we had formally pledged
ourselves to carry on our mobilization to the exclusive advantage of
England and her allies.
"It is therefore of necessity to prepare a plan of battle for the
Belgian Army also for that possibility. This is necessary in the
interest of our military defense as well as for the sake of the
direction of our foreign policy, in case of war between Germany and
France."
[The text of the documents presented above is not disputed
by the Belgian Government. Instead it is made the basis of
the Belgian reply, beginning on the next page.]
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