Report of Gen. Ducarme, Chief of the Belgian General Staff, to the
Belgian Minister of War
"_Confidential_
Letter to the Minister
Concerning the Confidential Conversations.
"BRUSSELS, April 10, 1906.
"Mr. Minister:
"I have the honor to report to you briefly about the conversations
which I had with Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and which have already been
the subject of my oral communications.
"The first visit took place in the middle of January. Mr. Barnardiston
referred to the anxieties of the General Staff of his country with
regard to the general political situation, and because of the
possibility that war may soon break out. In case Belgium should be
attacked, the sending of about 100,000 troops was provided for.
"The Lieutenant Colonel asked me how such a measure would be regarded
by us. I answered him, that from a military point of view it could not
be but favorable, but that this question of intervention was just as
much a matter for the political authorities, and that, therefore, it
was my duty to inform the Minister of War about it.
"Mr. Barnardiston answered that his Minister in Brussels would speak
about it with our Minister of Foreign Affairs.
"He proceeded in the following sense: The landing of the English
troops would take place at the French coast in the vicinity of Dunkirk
and Calais, so as to hasten their movements as much as possible. The
entry of the English into Belgium would take place only after the
violation of our neutrality by Germany. A landing in Antwerp would
take much more time, because larger transports would be needed, and
because, on the other hand, the safety would be less complete.
"This admitted, there would be several other points to consider, such
as railway transportation, the question of requisitions which the
English army could make, the question concerning the chief command of
the allied forces.
"He inquired whether our preparations were sufficient to secure the
defense of the country during the crossing and the transportation of
the English troops--which he estimated to last about ten days.
"I answered him that the places Namur and Liége were protected from a
coup de main and that our field army of 100,000 men would be capable
of intervention within four days.
"After having expressed his full satisfaction with my explanations, my
visitor laid emphasis on the following facts: (1) That our
conversation was entirely confidential; (2) that it was not binding on
his Government; (3) that his Minister, the English General Staff, he
and I were, up to the present, the only ones[1] informed about the
matter; (4) that he did not know whether the opinion of his sovereign
had been consulted....
[Footnote 1: This is similar to the manner in which the English
entente with France was arranged. The British Parliament and the
British Cabinet were kept in ignorance of the fact that English and
French naval experts were consulting together. The British Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, repeatedly assured the country
that Great Britain's hands were free. Yet, when the crisis came, this
quite unofficial exchange of military views and plans, this mere
gentleman's agreement, revealed itself, of course, as a binding
obligation. Nations do not reveal their military secrets to each other
except on the clear understanding that an alliance is in force.]
"In a following discussion Lieut. Col. Barnardiston assured me that he
had never received confidential reports of the other Military Attachés
about our army. He then gave the exact numerical data of the English
forces; we could depend on it, that in twelve or thirteen days two
army corps, four cavalry brigades, and two brigades of horse infantry
would be landed.
"He asked me to study the question of the transport of these forces to
that part of the country where they would be useful, and he promised
to give me for this purpose details about the composition of the
landing army.
"He reverted to the question concerning the effective strength of our
field army, and he emphasized that no detachments should be sent from
this army to Namur and Liége, because these places were provided with
garrisons of sufficient strength.
"He asked me to direct my attention to the necessity of granting the
English Army the advantages which the regulations concerning the
military requisitions provided for. Finally he insisted upon the
question of the chief command.
"I answered him that I could say nothing with reference to this last
point and promised him that I would study the other questions
carefully....
"Later on the English Military Attaché confirmed his former
calculations: twelve days would at least be necessary to carry out the
landing at the French coast. It would take a considerably longer time
(1 to 2-1/2 months) to land 100,000 men in Antwerp.
"Upon my objection that it would be unnecessary to await the end of
the landing in order to begin with the railway transportations, and
that it would be better to proceed with these when the troops arrived
at the coast, Lieut. Col. Barnardiston promised to give me exact data
as to the number of troops that could be landed daily.
"As regards the military requisitions, I told my visitor that this
question could be easily regulated....
"The further the plans of the English General Staff progressed, the
clearer became the details of the problem. The Colonel assured me that
one-half of the English Army could be landed within eight days; the
rest at the conclusion of the twelfth or thirteenth day, with the
exception of the horse infantry, which could not be counted upon until
later.
"In spite of this I thought I had to insist again upon the necessity
of knowing the exact number of the daily shipments, in order to
regulate the railway transportation for every day.
"The English Military Attaché conversed with me about several other
questions, namely:
"(1) The necessity of keeping the operations secret and of demanding
strict secrecy from the press;
"(2) The advantages which would accrue from giving one Belgian officer
to each English General Staff, one interpreter to each commanding
officer, and gendarmes to each unit of troops, in order to assist the
British police troops....
"In the course of another interview Lieut. Col. Barnardiston and I
studied the combined operations to take place in the event of a German
offensive with Antwerp as its object and under the hypothesis of the
German troops marching through our country in order to reach the
French Ardennes.
"In this question, the Colonel said he quite agreed with the plan
which I had submitted to him, and he assured me also of the approval
of Gen. Grierson, Chief of the English General Staff.
"Other secondary questions which were likewise settled had particular
reference to intermediary officers, interpreters, gendarmes, maps,
photographs of the uniforms, special copies, translated into English,
of some Belgian regulations, the regulations concerning the import
duties on English provisions, to the accommodation of the wounded of
the allied armies, &c. Nothing was resolved on as regards the activity
which the Government or the military authorities might exert on the
press....
"During the final meetings which I had with the British Attaché, he
informed me about the numbers of troops which would be daily
disembarked at Boulogne, Calais, and Cherbourg. The distance of the
last place, which is necessary for technical considerations, will
involve a certain delay. The first corps would be disembarked on the
tenth day, and the second on the fifteenth day. Our railways would
carry out the transportation so that the arrival of the first corps,
either in the direction of Brussels-Louvain or of Namur-Dinant, would
be assured on the eleventh day, and that of the second on the
sixteenth day.
"I again, for a last time, and as emphatically as I could, insisted on
the necessity of hastening the sea transports so that the English
troops could be with us between the eleventh and twelfth day. The
happiest and most favorable results can be reached by a convergent and
simultaneous action of the allied forces. But if that co-operation
should not take place, the failure would be most serious. Col.
Barnardiston assured me that everything serving to this end would be
done....
"In the course of our conversations, I had occasion to convince the
British Military Attaché that we were willing, so far as possible, to
thwart the movements of the enemy and not to take refuge in Antwerp
from the beginning.
"Lieut. Col. Barnardiston on his part told me that, at the time, he
had little hope for any support or intervention on the part of
Holland. At the same time he informed me that his Government intended
to transfer the basis of the British commissariat from the French
coast to Antwerp as soon as all German ships were swept off the North
Sea....
"In all our conversations the Colonel regularly informed me about the
secret news which he had concerning the military circumstances and the
situation of our eastern neighbors, &c. At the same time he emphasized
that Belgium was under the imperative necessity to keep herself
constantly informed of the happenings in the adjoining Rhinelands. I
had to admit that with us the surveillance service abroad was, in
times of peace, not directly in the hands of the General Staff, as our
legations had no Military Attachés. But I was careful not to admit
that I did not know whether the espionage service which is prescribed
in our regulations was in working order or not. But I consider it my
duty to point out this position which places us in a state of evident
inferiority to our neighbors, our presumable enemies.
"Major General, Chief of the General Staff. (Initials of Gen.
Ducarme.)
"Note.--When I met Gen. Grierson at Compiègne, during the manoeuvres
of 1906, he assured me the result of the reorganization of the English
Army would be that the landing of 150,000 would be assured and, that,
moreover, they would stand ready for action in a shorter time than has
been assumed above.
"Concluded September, 1906."
(Initials of Gen. Ducarme.)