Herewith are published facsimiles of papers found among the documents
of the Belgian General Staff at Brussels, referring to arrangements
between the English Military Attaché and the Belgian Minister of War
regarding British intervention in Belgium.
It will be remembered from the British "White Book" that in November,
1912, a correspondence passed between Sir Edward Grey and the French
Minister in London, in which it was stated that British and French
military and naval experts had consulted together from time to time as
to plans to be followed in case of war, and it was stated in this
correspondence that in accordance with such prearranged plans the
French fleet would stay in the Mediterranean to safeguard the joint
interests there, whereas the British fleet would safeguard their
interests in the north. Of this correspondence the members of the
British Cabinet remained ignorant until the Cabinet meeting
immediately preceding the written statement by Great Britain on Aug. 2
that in case a German fleet attacked the French coast or passed into
the Channel, England would give all the assistance in her power,
(British "White Papers," No. 148,) and it was also, of course,
concealed from the British public until the speech of Sir Edward Grey
on Aug. 3. It will be remembered that in consequence of this
revelation the British Minister of Commerce, Mr. John Burns, and two
other members, Lord Morley and Mr. Trevelyan, left the British Cabinet
under protest; that the leader of the British Labor Party, Mr. Ramsey
Macdonald, resigned from the leadership and that Mr. Arthur Ponsonby
in his famous letter denounced Sir Edward Grey's practices.
Mr. Ponsonby said that time and again they had been assured that there
were no obligations whatsoever on the part of Great Britain to come to
France's assistance and yet they found themselves now so hopelessly
entangled that as a matter of fact the British Government could not
back out.
The fact of these consultations, by which, of course, all the plans of
mobilization of both the British and French armies were disclosed to
the two allies and which include the landing of English troops in
France, is now fully established by the annexed documents. They show
that these conversations were also held with Belgium, that plans had
been concerted to invade Belgium with an army of 100,000 men by way of
three French ports--viz., Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne--and that the
British plans even considered a landing by way of the Scheldt, thus
violating also Dutch neutrality.
The documents, giving all the details as translated and showing that
Belgian railway cars were to be sent to the named French ports in
order to transport the British troops into Belgium, are dated from
1906.
The Belgian Minister at Berlin, Baron Greindl, a well-known Belgian
patriot, protested to his Government. The heading of his protest is
also given in facsimile. In it he said that it was not quite safe to
trust to the British and French to keep the Belgian neutrality, that
it was not wise to take all measures only against a German infraction
of Belgian neutrality and that the British spirit was clearly shown by
the words of Col. Barnardiston that the Scheldt might be used for
transporting troops into Belgium.
Furthermore, it will be remembered that the British and French
Governments violently protested when the plans were made public that
the Dutch Government intended to fortify the mouth of the Scheldt in
1906. But in 1912, when the Balkan crisis became acute, the British
went one step further. When Col. Bridges, in a conversation with Gen.
Jungbluth, the Chief of the Belgian General Staff, said that England
was ready to strike, that 160,000 men were ready to be landed and that
they would land them as soon as any European conflict should break
out, Gen. Jungbluth protested that for such a step the permission of
Belgium was necessary. The cool reply was that the English knew it,
but thought that, as Belgium was not strong enough alone to protect
herself, England would land troops anyway. Gen. Jungbluth answered
that Belgium felt strong enough to protect herself, which is in
keeping with her declaration to France, when she offered to protect
Belgium by five army corps, as reported in the British "White Book."
The position of England was therefore that, while in 1906 they had
already concerted plans for a joint action, in 1912 England intended
action in any case, should a European conflagration break out.
Now, it must be recollected that as early as July 28, 1914, Sir Edward
Grey said to Prince Lichnowsky, as mentioned in his communication to
Sir E. Goschen: "The situation was very grave. While it was restricted
to the issues at present actually involved, we had not thought of
interfering in it. But if Germany became involved in it and then
France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European
interests, and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of
our conversation--which I hoped would continue--into thinking that we
should stand aside." (British "White Papers," No. 89.)
This was at a time when the Belgian issue had not been raised at all.
It only came about by Sir Edward Grey's notes written on July 31. Thus
the British entanglement with France, as evidenced by the British
"White Book," prevented England taking the same attitude in 1914 which
she had taken in 1870, when she made a treaty with France as against
the German invasion of Belgium and with Germany as against the French
invasion of Belgium. A similar agreement was suggested by Prince
Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey on Aug. 1, 1914, as reported in the
English "White Book," No. 123, when the former asked Sir Edward Grey
whether if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality
England would engage to remain neutral, upon which Grey replied that
he could not say that.
It is therefore perfectly evident, in the first place, that in case of
a German war, that was sure to be brought about by Russia's
mobilization against Germany, England would go to war against Germany,
and it has been proved that the English assurance to that effect has
strengthened the hands of the Russian war party, which thereupon got
the upper hand and forced the Russian Czar into the war, (see report
of Belgian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs at Brussels, July 30.)
In the second place, it is shown that England meant, with or without
Belgium's will, to land her troops, in violation of Belgium's
neutrality, in Belgium, irrespective of whether German troops were
marching through Belgium or not, because no such declaration had been
made in 1912 or any time thereafter until Aug. 4 in the German
Reichstag. It is further evident that as soon as Russia mobilized,
Germany would have to fight Russia as well as France and England, and
that in such a fight she was forced to draw quickly when she saw her
enemies reaching for their hip pockets. And only the prompt action at
Liége that put this important railway centre commanding the railway
connections to France and Germany into German hands prevented the
English landing and invading Belgium.
The guilt of the Belgian Government in this matter consists, in the
first place, in making and concerting plans with the English and
French Governments as to what steps to take in case of war. A plan of
the French mobilization was found in the same docket, and it cannot be
presumed that the conference between British and French experts was
unknown to the British Military Attaché in Brussels. It is furthermore
impossible to believe that the French railway for the shipping of
British troops from Calais, Dunkirk, and Boulogne into Belgium in
Belgian cars could have been used without the knowledge of the French
authorities. Secondly, that Belgium did not heed the advice of Baron
Greindl and did not try to insure her independence in the same way by
approaching Germany and making a similar contract with her. This
disposes of the contention that the Belgian conversation had a purely
defensive character as against all comers. It shows the one-sidedness
of the inclination, which is evidenced also by the placing of all
Belgium's fortresses on the eastern frontier.
The Belgian people had been told at the beginning of the war that
Germany demanded that the Belgian forces should fight with the Germans
against the French and the English, and the truth had become known
only three full months later, when the Belgian "Gray Book" was
published. Then Belgium was practically occupied territory. While
Belgium pretended neutrality and friendship toward Germany, it was
secretly planning for her defeat in a war which was considered
unavoidable. The poor Belgian people, however, must suffer because of
the large ambitions of King Leopold of Congo fame and of a broken-down
diplomacy.
The Imperial Chancellor has declared that there was irrefutable proof
that if Germany did not march through Belgium, her enemies would. This
proof, as now being produced, is of the strongest character. So the
Chancellor was right in appealing to the law of necessity, although he
had no regret that it violated international law. This law of
necessity has been recognized as paramount by nearly every prominent
statesman, including Gladstone, and by all teachers of international
law, even by the United States Supreme Court's decision, Vol. 130,
Page 601, stating in regard to the treaty with China concerning
Chinese immigration into the United States: "It will not be presumed
that the legislative department of the Government will lightly pass
laws which are in conflict with the treaties of the country, but that
circumstances may arise which would not only justify the Government in
disregarding their stipulations, but demand in the interests of the
country that it should do so, there can be no question. Unexpected
events may call for a change in the policy of the country." And to
strengthen this opinion another decision by Justice Curtis, rendered
in 1908, may be cited, stating that, "while it would be a matter of
the utmost gravity and delicacy to refuse to execute a treaty, the
power to do so was a prerogative of which no country could be deprived
without deeply affecting its independence."
We now let these Belgian documents speak for themselves.