General Aspect of the Near East on Aug. 1, 1914.
By Adamantios Th. Polyzoides, Editor The Atlantis.
The opening of the great European war found the Balkan Peninsula in
the political shape given to it by the Treaty of Bucharest, Aug. 10,
(old style, July 28,) 1913.
This treaty was signed in the Rumanian capital immediately after the
second Balkan war by Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, Servia, and
Montenegro, and, considered in its essential points, was the handiwork
of European diplomacy, at whose instance Rumania had entered the war,
with the avowed purpose to re-establish the destroyed Balkan
equilibrium. Europe had two reasons for interfering in what was then
considered as the final settlement of the Balkan question. In the
first place, she wanted to reaffirm her authority and predominance
over the Balkan States, and, in the second, she considered it as an
indispensable part of her Near Eastern policy never to allow much
freedom of movement on the part of these same States, which in two
successive wars had proved their ability to safeguard and promote
their vital interests in spite of all European opposition. To explain
this course of European diplomacy one must bear in mind that the
Balkan States, since their constitution as such, have always been
considered as protégés of Europe, or, to put it more plainly, as not
being of age, and therefore deprived of the right and privilege to
deal directly with their ancient master, Turkey, in all serious
matters in which their most vital interests were involved.
In the Treaty of Berlin after the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 a
congress, in which all of the Great European powers participated, most
emphatically affirmed that Turkey was responsible to Europe for any
complaints that the Balkan States might have against the Ottoman
Government regarding the treatment of their connationals, still left
under the Sultan. At the same time the Balkan States received due
warning regarding their dealings with Turkey, and were made to take a
pledge that whenever they had troubles with the Porte the powers and
not themselves were to be the arbiters. All the world knows how
Turkey, by constant wire-pulling, secured immunity from Europe for not
fulfilling the obligations incumbent on her by the Treaty of Berlin,
and how one of the Balkan States, namely, Greece, was left alone and
unprotected, to be chastised by Turkey in 1897 for not leaving to the
powers the settlement of the Cretan question which had brought about
the war.
The European powers, having done practically nothing during
thirty-five years for the betterment of the conditions under which the
non-Moslem populations had to live in Turkey, were overwhelmed to hear
in the Autumn of 1912 the news of a series of alliances concluded at
Sofia on June 12 between Bulgaria and Servia, and between Bulgaria and
Greece, for the purpose of settling once for all the perennial Balkan
question. European diplomacy was slow, as usual, in grasping the
meaning of the new alliance, and when, on Oct. 5, 1912, Montenegro
suddenly declared war on Turkey, with Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece
following suit on the 18th, there was consternation in London, Paris,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and, to a certain degree, in Petrograd.
An idea of the unpreparedness of European diplomacy in the face of the
sudden Balkan war can be had by simply glancing at the records of the
British House of Commons of the first weeks after the war was
declared.
Sir Edward Grey, then and now Foreign Secretary of State for Great
Britain, making the first announcement of the rupture between Turkey
and the Balkan States, said--exposing the views not only of his
Government but of the European concert as well--that Europe, being
taken unawares, would not permit any alteration of the Balkan
frontiers as the result of the war. After the first victories of the
Balkan allies we see Great Britain changing her policy. "The Balkan
victors shall not be deprived of the fruits of their victories,"
Premier Asquith was declaring in Parliament less than a fortnight
after Sir Edward spoke. In both these instances the British statesmen
were voicing the policy of the European concert taken as a whole. In
the first place, the Foreign Secretary was led into believing that
Turkey might prove victorious against the Balkan coalition, and the
warning about the immutability of the Balkan frontiers was only for
Turkey, in case her victorious armies were to cross the boundaries
into Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece.
When events marked the utter collapse of the Turkish campaign, Premier
Asquith came out with the declaration that Europe had agreed on a
policy safeguarding the interests of the victorious Balkan allies.
This policy was maintained as long as the Balkan victories were
confined in their first progress toward Ottoman territory, at the same
time leaving the great European interests unharmed. But when Servian
troops arrived at Durazzo, and Montenegro entered Scutari while Greece
kept pushing on to Avlona and Bulgaria stood before Tchataldja, the
European concert was no longer unanimous in safeguarding the interests
of the victors.
Austria, seeing her secular dream of a descent on Saloniki definitely
destroyed, and feeling at the same time the imperative need of making
impossible a Servian occupation of the Adriatic littoral, raised her
voice in favor of the creation of an autonomous Albania at the expense
of Servia, Montenegro, and Greece.
Italy, and then Germany, joined their ally in support of Albania.
Russia, at the same time not wishing to give any greater impetus to
the Bulgarian campaign, dexterously manipulated Rumania, which raised
at that time her first claims on Dobrudja. France, who for the last
twenty-five years has subjected her Near Eastern policy to the
exigencies of the Petrograd statesmen, agreed to the Albanian
proposals of the four powers, and finally Great Britain, fearing
complications, declared abruptly through Sir Edward Grey that the
Balkan war was one of conquest, and for that reason subject to
European intervention. In this way European diplomacy stepped into the
Balkan conflict and took charge of the final settlement of the first
war.
The resolution to interfere in the war once taken, the European powers
lost no time in finding a way to end the conflict, and with this
object in mind they forced on the belligerents two successive
armistices, culminating in the two peace conferences of London. These
armistices served two purposes from the diplomatic point of view;
first, they exhausted financially the little Balkan countries; and,
secondly, they prepared public opinion for the acceptance of any peace
terms. The second conference in London succeeded in forcing a peace
treaty on the Balkan States. With the exception of Bulgaria, who hoped
to retain most of the Turkish territory won by the Balkan coalition,
every one was dissatisfied with the way the London conference ended.
Turkey, on one hand, was losing more territory than at first imagined,
as the result of her defeat, and the loss of Adrianople was especially
hard for every Turk.
Greece was obliged to sign a peace treaty giving her vague and
indefinite boundaries and leaving out the question of the Aegean
Islands and Epirus, to be settled at a later date by another
conference of the Ambassadors of the six great powers in London.
Servia also had to wait for the realization of her fondest hope, which
was to obtain a free commercial access to the Adriatic by way of
Durazzo or San Giovanni di Medua. That question also was to be decided
by the Ambassadorial conference. Montenegro was to lose Scutari, for
which she had shed her heart's blood, without getting at the same time
any adequate compensation. Such was the Peace of London, from the
strictly Balkan point of view, and its conclusion in May, 1913, was
the signal for the disruption of the Balkan League and the forerunner
of the second war. One month later Bulgaria, having fallen under
Austrian influences, quarreled with Servia and Greece over the
division of certain Macedonian territories, and on June 16 (29, new
style) all of a sudden attacked her erstwhile allies, thereby bringing
about the second Balkan conflict, with Greece, Servia, and Montenegro
united against her. The outcome of this war, the entry of Rumania and
Turkey into the field against Bulgaria, the tearing up of the London
Treaty, and the settlement of Bucharest are too well known to need an
extensive mention here.
The Treaty of London once torn to pieces by the second Balkan war, it
remained for the great powers to find a new way of forcing their terms
on the recalcitrant Balkan States, and this they succeeded in doing by
adroitly using Rumania as the representative of European diplomacy.
Thus the Rumanian Army, without any provocation from Bulgaria, took
the field against her neighbor, and acted as a mediator and arbiter of
the second Balkan conflict.
The Greek, Servian, Montenegrin, and Bulgarian delegates who went to
Bucharest at the close of the war knew beforehand that behind the
actions of the Rumanian Government stood united the whole of European
diplomacy, again striving to put down once for all these insolent
little States who thought themselves emancipated from European
guardianship. These delegates knew quite well that there was no
escape, but they went, trying and hoping for the best. The Rumanian
"Green Papers," published a short time after the Treaty of Bucharest
and covering a period between Sept. 20, 1912, and Aug. 1, 1913, give a
vivid and true story of the whole proceedings, showing once more what
a powerful instrument diplomacy is in the hands of the strong for
cheating the weak.
On Aug. 1, 1914, we see the Balkan Peninsula presenting the following
aspect:
From the erstwhile European Turkey, of six vilayets, or departments,
namely, those of Adrianople, Saloniki, Monastir, Uskub, Jannina, and
Scutari, only one, and that mutilated, remains, the Vilayet of
Adrianople. Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Albania
appropriated the rest. Gone is Crete, and gone are the twenty-six
Aegean Islands, twelve of them permanently united to their Hellenic
motherland, while Italy temporarily occupies fourteen as a result of
the Tripolitan war of 1911. Thus Turkey, from an area of 168,500
square kilometers, and 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 inhabitants, forming her
European dominions, was reduced to about 30,000 square kilometers and
nearly 3,000,000 inhabitants, including the population of
Constantinople, amounting, according to the only available foreign
statistics, to 1,203,000 inhabitants. Of course Turkey has in Asia an
area of more than 2,000,000 square kilometers, with a population
approximating 20,000,000, but that, properly speaking, does not enter
into Balkan considerations.
Greece, after her two victorious wars, approximates 120,000 square
kilometers in territory, with more than 5,000,000 population.
Rumania has 139,690 square kilometers of area and 7,601,660 of
population.
Servia has an area of 87,300 square kilometers and a population of
4,256,000.
Bulgaria's area is 114,000 square kilometers, with 4,766,900 of
population.
Montenegro has an area of 14,180 square kilometers and half a million
in population, and, lastly, Albania, the newborn State, with its
scant hope of future political life, has an area of about 17,600
square kilometers, with an approximate population of 800,000
inhabitants.
Were the Balkan States satisfied with the above arrangement when the
great European war broke? To this question we have the following
answer from those concerned:
Turkey never forgave the European powers the treatment accorded to her
in the London peace conference, and proved her dissatisfaction by
entering Thrace and occupying Adrianople immediately she saw Bulgaria
engaged in the second war. But Turkey desired also the Aegean islands
occupied by Greece, and these, all but two at the entrance to the
Dardanelles, the powers allotted to Greece, not securing thereby an
increase of Turkish sympathies.
Greece was disappointed in two instances by the European powers;
first, because they did not make their decision regarding the islands
binding upon Turkey, thus creating a series of unending controversies
between the Porte and the Government of Athens, one result of which
was the wholesale expulsions and persecutions of the Greek element in
Turkey, and especially in the Vilayets of Adrianople and Smyrna. The
question of settling in a friendly way the Greco-Turkish differences
was to be discussed between the Grand Vizier, Prince Said Halim, and
the Premier of Greece, E.K. Venizelos, in a meeting of the two
statesmen in Brussels, when the great European war broke.
Bulgaria, who for a moment saw her most cherished dream of Balkan
hegemony realized and had all her fondest hopes shattered by the
second war and the Treaty of Bucharest, cannot help regarding her
neighbors as the robbers of what she considers her national patrimony,
and at the same time she does not forget that in all their proceedings
against her, Greek, Servian, Rumanian, and Montenegrin acted with the
tacit approval of the great powers.
Servia for years had struggled to get an outlet on the Adriatic, and
when, after a glorious war, she attained her goal, she found Austria
opposing her, and behind Austria the whole of the European concert.
Montenegro in the same way cannot forget the disappointment of being
cast out of Scutari after one of the most strenuous and glorious
campaigns of her history, and lastly Albania, poor and helpless,
without any support from her creators, feels all that a weak and
wretched foundling has to feel toward those responsible for its
misfortunes and miseries. In contrast with these feelings, Rumania was
the only Balkan State perfectly satisfied with the new arrangement. In
fact, Rumania, having played in the war the part of a great power,
came out of it not only with increased prestige but also with the
richest of all the Bulgarian provinces, Dobrudja, as a sort of
deserved payment for serving the ends of European diplomacy.
From this general dissatisfaction of the Balkan States with European
diplomacy and European intrigue sprang Gavrilo Prinzip and the murder
at Serajevo that plunged Europe and the world into the greatest and
most disastrous war of all time.
In fairness, however, to the Balkan States it must be said at this
juncture that war, in whatever form and character, was far from the
Balkan mind on June 28, 1914, when the Austrian Archduke and heir to
the throne, Franz Ferdinand, and his consort were assassinated by the
Servian youth Prinzip in the capital of Bosnia.
The years 1912 and 1913 had been too costly for the whole of the
Balkan Peninsula, and the necessity of a continued peace for a good
number of years was universally recognized, with the exception of
Constantinople, in Athens, Bucharest, Sofia, Belgrade, Cettinge, and
even Durazzo. To prove this we have the opinions of all the Balkan
leaders and the views expressed in the Balkan press up to Aug. 1,
1914.
A single point yet calls for a few remarks, and this covers the mutual
relations of the Balkan States just before the European war.
We have seen in what a degree the question of the ownership of the
Aegean Islands had divided the Governments of Athens and
Constantinople. In fact, if any war in the Near East were to be
feared, this was one between the two secular enemies, Greek and Turk,
and when in May, 1913, the anti-Greek agitation in the Ottoman Empire
reached its climax it was only through the tremendous influence of the
Greek Premier on Hellenic public opinion and his extreme moderation
that a new diplomatic rupture between the two countries was averted.
In anticipation of this eventuality Turkey secured two battleships of
the dreadnought type, the Brazilian Rio de Janeiro (then Sultan Osman
I. and afterward H.M.S. Erin, England having taken over the ship on
Aug. 5, 1914) and the Reshadieh, (likewise taken over by England and
renamed H.M.S. Agincourt,) and was preparing for war in such haste
that Greece did not hesitate to buy at the original cost price the two
old American battleships Idaho and Mississippi, (now Limnos and
Kilkis.)
This was in July, 1914, just a few weeks before the European war.
Since that time Greco-Turkish relations have been neither better nor
worse. It must be said here that these relations had their origin, not
in the obsolete London Treaty of May, 1913, but in the Treaty of
Athens, signed in December, 1913, between the two countries, and
covering in a general way the more essential points of the outstanding
questions between the two parties, excluding, however, the Aegean
Islands controversy.
After signing the Treaty of Bucharest Bulgaria turned her attention
exclusively to Turkey, and, letting bygones be bygones, concluded the
Peace Treaty of Constantinople in October, 1913, and inaugurated the
most friendly relations with her erstwhile opponent. Since that time
the report has spread that an alliance, both offensive and defensive,
had been signed by the two countries, but this has been repeatedly
denied both from Constantinople and Sofia.
The diplomatic relations between Servia and Turkey and Montenegro and
Turkey were re-established a short time before the European war, but
these countries, being now in no direct contact with Turkish
territory, their relations with the Porte are of little importance.
Between Bulgaria on one hand and Rumania, Greece, Servia, and
Montenegro on the other, the diplomatic relations have been
re-established, but gone is the old friendship, for reasons already
explained. Greece, Servia, and Montenegro are the best of friends,
and, according to unofficial and confidential reports, a defensive and
offensive alliance for the maintenance of the Balkan status quo,
exists between the three countries. Between Rumania and Greece
friendly relations exist, and for some time it was said that a
marriage was to be arranged between the Greek Crown Prince, George,
and the Princess Elizabeth, daughter of the Rumanian King, Ferdinand
I., who succeeded to the throne after the death of his uncle, King
Charles. This match, however, seems to have been abandoned, perhaps
for political reasons, and more so because Greco-Rumanian relations
have not as yet reached that firmness which only might justify such a
rapprochement of the two royal families.
Between Servia and Rumania there is some courtesy but scarcely any
friendship, and this is not surprising, especially now, when each side
is aiming to an aggrandizement (at the expense of Austria) in a way
injurious to the other. Montenegro naturally follows Servia's course,
and as for Albania, what we said previously of her applies now, with
this particular observation, that the only neighborly interest shown
her is from Italy, trying to play the game of Tripoli at the expense
of the Skipetars, while all the other European powers are busily
engaged in the great war.
In conclusion we may note that of all the Balkan States only Rumania
and, to a certain degree, Greece have any money to run their affairs.
This, however, has nothing to do with the matter of their entrance in
the war, as in that case there will be one or the other European
combination to pay the freight.
Such was the aspect of the Balkan Peninsula at the beginning of the
great European war.
[Illustration: (_From The Bystander, London._)