[From the Paris Temps of Aug. 23, 1914.]
From an occasional correspondent we receive the following letter:
The departure of the mobilized French soldiers who were in Bucharest
has been the occasion for sympathetic manifestations toward France.
Among the population and in the streets there was not a single voice
which was not heartily and enthusiastically for the Triple Entente in
general and France in particular.
Certain personages, such as the General Pilot who in 1870 fought on
the side of France, and certain newspaper editors who, yielding to
national aspirations, have carried on since the first day of the war a
violent campaign against Austria, are enthusiastically cheered by the
public in the cafés and by the majority of the army officers who
assisted in uniform at these scenes.
More than that, there were imposing manifestations in the streets;
other meetings, still more effective, were held in secret, at which
Generals and superior officers assisted. But notwithstanding this
public sentiment the police are on the lookout; the orders they have
received are particularly severe, as entire regiments are kept in
readiness in the public parks and Government buildings. All those
functionaries who are suspected of being openly hostile to Austria are
closely followed and watched.
What is the reason of this? One may put the question to himself, as
really this sentiment of the nations corresponds too well with a
secular and inevitable policy. Despite all contrary reasoning, one
fact remains, and this is summed up in Transylvania and Bukowina and
the five million Rumanians who are under Austro-Hungarian rule. There
is for the Rumanians of the kingdom the unforgettable series of
persecutions of every kind to which their brethren on the other side
of the mountains are subjected--persecutions dating from yesterday and
which are continued today. Only the day before the Austrian
mobilization fifty students from the Rumanian Kingdom who happened to
be in Brassow (Hungary) on an excursion were arrested and brought
before the police authorities, and actually thrown into prison,
because they dared display badges with Rumanian colors in their
buttonholes.
"If I were to march into Moldavia," a Rumanian was telling me,
"against the enemies of Austria, I would have to begin by sabring all
the Moldavian peasants, who are crying, 'Down with Austria!' Of
course, I never could do this!"
Under such conditions, if the waverings of the Government were to be
explained, the task would be a hard one. In our opinion, they may be
ascribed to different causes, the more important factor being the
opinion of the King himself; but this alone would not suffice.
The King (Carol) is first of all bound to Emperor Francis Joseph by an
old friendship. King Carol has never admitted that the diminution of
his kingdom after Plevna was a right thing, and the toasts in
Constanza (during the Czar's visit to Rumania early in the Summer of
1914) have demonstrated, for those who could read between the lines,
in both the politeness of the Czar and the reserved tone of King
Carol, that this sentiment had not yet disappeared.
In the face of this disposition, so firmly expressed, the Ministers
and the party leaders of Rumania felt rather uncomfortable. It must be
borne in mind that a parliamentary régime, properly speaking, does not
exist; the Ministries do not fall by vote of the chambers of
Parliament. When the King estimates that a Ministry has been too long
in power, when he hears distinctly the murmur of the Opposition, then
he calls a new President of the Council, who has Parliament prorogued
and a new one formed--this is the exact procedure--according to his
liking. By reason of this process, and also by reason of a special
attraction which the Court exercises over a small, refined, and
elegant society, the counsels of the King are inspired by the advices
of his counselors.
But there are also other reasons that plead for this uncertain
attitude, and by which it is attempted to justify a policy of
indifference.
The successes of last year--of which the Rumanians have not understood
the causes, because they never tried to understand them--have troubled
them in a certain way.
Their statesmen persist perhaps a little too much in playing
Machiavelli, and in exalting abstention to a system. Their fondest
desire at the present moment is not, we are persuaded, to march on
Austria, but, on the contrary, not to march at all, and not to
intervene in the war up to the day of the final liquidation.
What is this policy worth? The chances are that it may not always be
good, particularly in the present state of things. Rumania is still a
small country by reason of its area. In addition to this, her
neighbors, on which she was wont to exercise a moderating influence,
are bound to change in density of population. And it is very likely
that Rumania, on the next day after the war, might find herself
suddenly surrounded by homogeneous peoples, who in the meantime would
become distinctly more important than she is, and that these people
might have against her certain slight grievances which they would make
her feel. Moreover, even if Austria by chance is victorious, and even
if the Government at Bucharest helped her, is it not clear that her
(Rumania's) Hungarian neighbor, becoming stronger, would make her
(Rumania) suffer the same as she made the Servians suffer when they
were feeble?
Rumania may well protest her friendship, but this will not prevent
her, if only by her presence, from being a danger to the tranquillity
of the Hungarian subjects in Transylvania. And then who is going to
defend her?
Here is what the good sense of the people says, and it is this common
sense which will triumph in the end over all vacillation, and will, in
spite of everything, assert its way of seeing things.