OPPOSITION PARTY'S STATEMENT.

_Following is an editorial article published Oct. 15, (28,) 1914, in

the Mir, the organ of the Nationalists, and signed by A. Bouroff,

ex-Minister and ex-Vice President of the Bulgarian Parliament, or

Sobranje._

The Government knows that the Bulgarian people will never forgive it,

should the Ministry let pass the present historical opportunity

without securing important advantages for Bulgaria.

These advantages the Government is endeavoring to obtain by keeping a

pro-Austro-German neutrality. In order not to disclose this policy,

the Government avoids a discussion with Austria and Germany. In order

to render service to Austria the Government is courting Turkey,

provoking Russia through its action and its press, avoids the

constitution of a council of State demanded by the opposition, and

objects to the formation of a Ministry in which all the political

parties were to be represented. Perhaps the Government would go even

further, but it is prevented from doing so, on one hand by Rumania,

who maintained a puzzling position, and the probable surprises that

her "friendly" Turkey has in store, and on the other by the explicit

and general unwillingness of the Bulgarian people to jeopardize its

existence through adventurous actions that are so contrary to its

national character and sentiments. The result of these contradictory

inclinations and influences is shown in our present political

weakness, which I am afraid will be fruitless in the end.

What is to be expected from this policy? In case of victory of the

Triple Entente, Bulgaria can hope for nothing good. If the Dual

Alliance is victorious we shall have certain compensations that to my

deep conviction will be far from satisfying our national aspirations.

The Austro-German alliance, first of all, will think of itself; that

is to say, to realize the greatest ideals of pan-Germanism, the

debouching of Austria in the Aegean Sea through Saloniki, which

necessarily comprises the occupation by Austria of all Macedonia west

of the Vardar. In the second place, Turkey will have to be compensated

and strengthened, as in the future her army will be a more obedient

organ in the hands of German diplomacy and more amenable than Slav

Bulgaria, whose troops, in the opinion of the most prominent German

papers, cannot fight the Russians, while Turkey at any time is ready

to serve Germany. But Turkey can be compensated in Europe only at the

expense of Bulgarian Thrace. To Bulgaria will be given, at most,

Istip, Kotchana, Radovich, Serrés Drama, and Cavalla to make good the

losses in Thrace.

To obtain such a meagre result, the Government of Bulgaria maintains a

policy contrary to popular sentiment and to the racial bonds of the

people, and a policy contrary to the further interests of Bulgaria,

which are incompatible with the building up of a strong Turkey in the

Balkans, a Turkey that would be the bulwark of Germany. The most

essential part of it is that this policy is based on a most

improbable hypothesis, that is to say, the final triumph of the

Austro-German arms. If the Bulgarian Government had left prejudices to

one side and looked clearly at the events, they would not have been

slow to understand that from the moment England stepped into the war

and Italy abandoned her allies, the Austro-German alliance politically

lost the game. Each passing day diminishes more and more the hopes of

success of the Dual Alliance, and permits England and Russia to expand

their inexhaustible forces. It is not difficult to foresee from now

the terms of peace that England and Russia will impose. Any policy

which expects to profit from the defeat of these two powers is doomed

to failure, and because such is the policy of the Bulgarian

Government, we think that it is against the interests of the country.

This policy, among its other disadvantages, opens forever a gap

between little Bulgaria and great Russia, which power, even if

defeated, will never cease to play an active part in the Balkans.

Against this policy, which is risking much to obtain little, we

propose the policy of coming to an agreement with the Triple Entente,

on the basis of a Bulgarian neutrality favorable to it, which surely

and without sacrifices is expected to bring to us greatest results.

The only thing that the powers of the Triple Entente are demanding

from us is to open negotiations with them. This does not abolish our

neutrality, because other States, too, such as Italy, Rumania, Greece,

and Turkey, are negotiating at the present time.

The New York Times Current History, A Monthly Magazine The European War, March 1915 · 第 40 / 308 题