PROFESSOR FLINT ON ATHEISM.

(January, 1877.)

Professor Flint delivered last week the first of the present year's

course of Baird lectures to a numerous audience in Blythswood Church,

Glasgow, taking for his subject "The Theories opposed to Theism."

Anti-Theism, he said, is more general now than Atheism, and includes

all systems opposed to Theism. Atheism he defined as "the system which

teaches that there is no God, and that it is impossible for man to know

that there is a God." At least this is how Professor Flint is reported

in the newspapers, although we hope he was not guilty of so idiotic a

jumble.

Where are the Atheists who say there is no God? What are their names?

Having mingled much with thoroughgoing sceptics, and read many volumes

of heretical literature, we can confidently defy Professor Flint to

produce the names of half a dozen dogmatic Atheists, and we will give

him the whole world's literature to select from. Does he think that the

brains of an Atheist are addled? If not, why does he make the Atheist

first affirm that there is _no_ God, and then affirm the impossibility

of man's ever knowing whether there is a God or not? How could a man

who holds his judgment in suspense, or who thinks the universal mystery

insoluble to us, dogmatise upon the question of God's existence? If

Professor Flint will carefully and candidly study sceptical literature,

he will find that the dogmatic Atheist is as rare a the phoenix, and

that those who consider the extant evidences of Theism inadequate, do

not go on to affirm an universal negative, but content themselves with

expressing their ignorance of Nature's _why_. For the most part they

endorse Thomas Cooper's words, "I do not say there _is_ no God, but

this I say, _I know not_" Of course this modesty of affirmation may seem

impiously immodest to one who has been trained and steeped in Theism so

long that the infinite universe has become quite explicable to him; but

to the sceptic it seems more wise and modest to confess one's ignorance,

than to make false pretensions of knowledge.

Professor Flint "characterised the objections which Atheism urges

against the existence of God as extremely feeble." Against the existence

of _what_ God? There be Gods many and Lords many; which of the long

theological list is to be selected as _the_ God? A God, like everything

else from the heights to the depths, can be known only by his

attributes; and what the Atheist does is not to argue against the

existence of _any_ God, which would be sheer lunacy, but to take the

attributes affirmed by Theism as composing its Deity and inquire whether

they are compatible with each other and with the facts of life. Finding

that they are not, the Atheist simply sets Theism aside as not proven,

and goes on his way without further afflicting himself with such

abstruse questions.

The Atheist must be a very dreary creature, thinks Professor Flint. But

why? Does he know any Atheists, and has he found them one half as dreary

as Scotch Calvinists? It may seem hard to the immoderately selfish that

some Infinite Spirit is not looking after their little interests, but

it is assuredly a thousandfold harder to think that this Infinite Spirit

has a yawning hell ready to engulph the vast majority of the world's

miserable sinners. If the Atheist has no heaven, he has also no hell,

which is a most merciful relief. Far better were universal annihilation

than that even the meanest life should writhe for ever in hell, gnawed

by the worm which never dieth, and burnt in the fire which is never

quenched.

Even Nature, thinks Professor Flint, cannot be contemplated by the

Atheist as the Theist contemplates it; for while the latter views it

as God's vesture wherewith he hides from us his intolerable glory, the

latter views it as the mere embodiment of force, senseless, aimless,

pitiless, an enormous mechanism grinding on of itself from age to

age, but towards no God and for no good. Here we must observe that the

lecturer trespasses beyond the truth. The Atheist does not affirm that

Nature drives on to no God and no good; he simply says he knows not

whither she is driving. And how many Theists are there who think of God

in the presence of Nature, who see God's smile in the sunshine, or hear

his wrath in the storm? Very few, we opine, in this practical sceptical

age. To the Atheist as to the Theist, indeed to all blessed with vision,

Nature is an ever new wonder of majesty and beauty! Sun, moon, and

stars, earth, air, and sky, endure while the generations of men pass

and perish; but every new generation is warmed, lighted, nurtured and

gladdened by them with most sovereign and perfect impartiality. The

loveliness and infinite majesty of Nature speak to all men, of all

ages, climes and creeds. Not in her inanimate beauty do we find fatal

objections to the doctrine of a wise and bountiful power which overrules

her, but rather in the multiplied horrors, woes, and pangs of

sentient life. When all actual and recorded misery is effaced, when no

intolerable grief corrodes and no immedicable despair poisons life, when

the tears of anguish are assuaged, when crime and vice are unknown and

unremembered, and evil lusts are consumed in the fire of holiness; then,

and then only, could we admit that a wise and righteous omnipotence

rules the universal destinies. Until then we cannot recognise the

fatherhood of God, but must find shelter and comfort in the more

efficacious doctrine of the brotherhood of Man.

Professor Flint concluded his lecture, according to the newspaper

report, thus:--"History bears witness that the declension of religion

has ever been the decline of nations, because it has ever brought the

decay of their moral life; and people have achieved noble things only

when strongly animated by religious faith." All this is very poor

stuff indeed to come from a learned professor. What nation has declined

because of a relapse from religious belief? Surely not Assyria, Egypt,

Greece, or Carthage? In the case of Rome, the decline of the empire was

coincident with the rise of Christianity and the decline of Paganism;

but the Roman Empire fell abroad mainly from political, and not from

religious causes, as every student of history well knows. Christianity,

that is the religion of the Bible, has been dying for nearly three

centuries; and during that period, instead of witnessing a general

degradation of mankind we have witnessed a marvellous elevation. The

civilisation of to-day, compared with that which existed before Secular

Science began her great battle with a tyrannous and obscurantist Church,

is as a summer morn to a star-lit winter night.

Again, it is not true that men have achieved noble things only when

strongly animated by religious faith; unless by "religious faith" be

meant some vital idea or fervent enthusiasm. The three hundred Spartans

who met certain death at Thermopylae died for a religious idea, but not

for a theological idea, which is a very different thing. They perished

to preserve the integrity of the state to which they belonged. The

greatest Athenians were certainly not religious in Professor Flint's

sense of the word, and the grand old Roman patriots had scarcely a

scintillation of such a religious faith as he speaks of. Their religion

was simply patriotism, but it was quite as operant and effective as

Christian piety has ever been. Was it religious faith or patriotism

which banded Frenchmen together in defiance of all Europe, and made

them march to death as a bridegroom hastens to his bride? And in our

own history have not our greatest achievers of noble things been very

indifferent to theological dogmas? Nay, in all ages, have not the

noblest laborers for human welfare been impelled by an urgent enthusiasm

of humanity rather than by any supernatural faith? Professor Flint may

rest assured that even though all "the old faiths ruin and rend," the

human heart will still burn, and virtue and beauty still gladden the

earth, although divorced from the creeds which held them in the thraldom

of an enforced marriage.

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